

# Detection Strategy for Lua Scripting Abuse, Detection Strategy DET0101

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## AN0278

Detects execution of Lua interpreters or scripts (.lua), especially when correlated with suspicious parent processes or file drop events, indicating malicious use of embedded scripting.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
ParentProcessName	May vary depending on delivery vector (e.g., explorer.exe, cmd.exe, rundll32.exe)
TimeWindow	Used to correlate file drop and execution of Lua scripts in close succession.

## AN0279

Detects invocation of lua or luajit interpreters by users or services outside of expected packages, chained with script drop or memory artifacts.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
ExecutablePath	Lua interpreter path may vary based on distro or adversary staging.
UserContext	May need to exclude service or admin accounts that use Lua legitimately.

## AN0280

Detects Lua script execution via native or 3rd party interpreters, chained with unsigned binaries or unexpected parent lineage.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
ParentProcessName	Adjustable based on system activity patterns (e.g., Terminal vs GUI)
SignatureStatus	Helps filter unsigned or self-signed Lua payloads.

### AN0281

Detects embedded Lua interpreter execution or script injection on devices supporting Lua scripting (e.g., routers, firewalls), often seen in modified firmware or abused APIs.

#### Log Sources

#### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
FirmwareBuildHash	Used to baseline known good versions versus injected scripts.
ScriptInjectionPath	Path to where scripts are allowed or denied based on config.

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Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0101#AN0281>