

# Daggerfly, Evasive Panda, BRONZE HIGHLAND, Group G1034

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Enterprise [T1071 .001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols](#)

[Daggerfly](#) uses HTTP for command and control communication.<sup>[4]</sup>

Enterprise [T1059 .001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell](#)

[Daggerfly](#) used PowerShell to download and execute remote-hosted files on victim systems.<sup>[1]</sup>

Enterprise [T1584 .004 Compromise Infrastructure: Server](#)

[Daggerfly](#) compromised web servers hosting updates for software as part of a supply chain intrusion.<sup>[4]</sup>

Enterprise [T1136 .001 Create Account: Local Account](#)

[Daggerfly](#) created a local account on victim machines to maintain access.<sup>[1]</sup>

Enterprise [T1587 .002 Develop Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates](#)

[Daggerfly](#) created code signing certificates to sign malicious macOS files.<sup>[4]</sup>

Enterprise [T1189 Drive-by Compromise](#)

[Daggerfly](#) has used strategic website compromise for initial access against victims.<sup>[4]</sup>

Enterprise [T1574 .001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL](#)

[Daggerfly](#) has used legitimate software to side-load [PlugX](#) loaders onto victim systems.<sup>[1]</sup> [Daggerfly](#) is also linked to multiple other instances of side-loading for initial loading activity.<sup>[4]</sup>

Enterprise [T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer](#)

[Daggerfly](#) has used PowerShell and [BITSAdmin](#) to retrieve follow-on payloads from external locations for execution on victim machines.<sup>[1]</sup>

Enterprise [T1036 .003 Masquerading: Rename Legitimate Utilities](#)

[Daggerfly](#) used a renamed version of rundll32.exe, such as "dbengin.exe" located in the `ProgramData\Microsoft\PlayReady` directory, to proxy malicious DLL execution.<sup>[1]</sup>

Enterprise [T1003 .002 OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager](#)

[Daggerfly](#) used [Reg](#) to dump the Security Account Manager (SAM) hive from victim machines for follow-on credential extraction.<sup>[1]</sup>

Enterprise [T1012 Query Registry](#)

[Daggerfly](#) used [Reg](#) to dump the Security Account Manager (SAM), System, and Security Windows registry hives from victim machines. <sup>[1]</sup>

Enterprise [T1053 .005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task](#)

[Daggerfly](#) has attempted to use scheduled tasks for persistence in victim environments. <sup>[4]</sup>

Enterprise [T1553 .002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing](#)

[Daggerfly](#) has used signed, but not notarized, malicious files for execution in macOS environments. <sup>[4]</sup>

Enterprise [T1195 .002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain](#)

[Daggerfly](#) is associated with several supply chain compromises using malicious updates to compromise victims. <sup>[2]</sup>  
<sup>[4]</sup>

Enterprise [T1218 .011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32](#)

[Daggerfly](#) proxied execution of malicious DLLs through a renamed rundll32.exe binary. <sup>[1]</sup>

Enterprise [T1082 System Information Discovery](#)

[Daggerfly](#) utilizes victim machine operating system information to create custom User Agent strings for subsequent command and control communication. <sup>[4]</sup>

Enterprise [T1204 .001 User Execution: Malicious Link](#)

[Daggerfly](#) has used strategic website compromise to deliver a malicious link requiring user interaction. <sup>[4]</sup>

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Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034>