{ "id": "8be25614-6de9-4d7e-8ca2-accf4d38acf8", "created_at": "2026-04-06T00:10:51.686546Z", "updated_at": "2026-04-10T13:13:04.283833Z", "deleted_at": null, "sha1_hash": "fd3a16ebe67e6dee94887a99a29121a68d5960da", "title": "New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink replaces VPNFilter", "llm_title": "", "authors": "", "file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z", "file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z", "file_size": 348002, "plain_text": "New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink replaces VPNFilter\r\nPublished: 2022-02-23 · Archived: 2026-04-05 19:26:52 UTC\r\nArt Alex via Getty Images\r\nBackground\r\nThe UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),\r\nthe National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the US have identified that\r\nthe actor known as Sandworm or Voodoo Bear is using a new malware, referred to here as Cyclops Blink. The\r\nNCSC, CISA, FBI and NSA have previously attributed the Sandworm actor to the Russian GRU’s Main Centre\r\nfor Special Technologies GTsST.\r\nThe malicious cyber activity below has previously been attributed to Sandworm:\r\nThe BlackEnergy disruption of Ukrainian electricity in 2015\r\nIndustroyer in 2016\r\nNotPetya in 2017\r\nAttacks against the Winter Olympics and Paralympics in 2018\r\nA series of disruptive attacks against Georgia in 2019\r\nCyclops Blink appears to be a replacement framework for the VPNFilter malware exposed in 2018, which\r\nexploited network devices, primarily small office/home office (SOHO) routers, and network attached storage\r\n(NAS) devices.\r\nThis advisory summarises the VPNFilter malware it replaces, and provides more detail on Cyclops Blink, as well\r\nas the associated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by Sandworm. An NCSC malware analysis report\r\non Cyclops Blink is also available and can be read in parallel.\r\nIt also points to mitigation measures to help organisations that may be affected by this malware.\r\nVPNFilter\r\nFirst exposed in 2018\r\nhttps://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter\r\nPage 1 of 6\n\nA series of articles published by Cisco Talos in 2018 describes VPNFilter and its modules in detail. VPNFilter was\r\ndeployed in stages, with most functionality in the third-stage modules. These modules enabled traffic\r\nmanipulation, destruction of the infected host device, and likely enabled downstream devices to be exploited.\r\nThey also allowed monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols, which appears to be an ongoing requirement for\r\nSandworm, as also seen in their previous attacks against ICS networks.\r\nVPNFilter targeting was widespread and appeared indiscriminate, with some exceptions: Cisco Talos reported an\r\nincrease of victims in Ukraine in May 2018. Sandworm also deployed VPNFilter against targets in the Republic of\r\nKorea before the 2018 Winter Olympics.\r\nIn May 2018 Cisco Talos published the blog that exposed VPNFilter, and the US Department of Justice linked the\r\nactivity to Sandworm, and announced its disruption of the botnet.\r\nActivity since its exposure \r\nA Trendmicro blog in January 2021 detailed residual VPNFilter infections and provided data showing a reduction\r\nin requests to a known C2 domain. Since the disruption in May 2018, Sandworm has shown limited interest in\r\nexisting VPNFilter footholds, instead preferring to retool.\r\nCyclops Blink\r\nActive since 2019\r\nThe NCSC, CISA, FBI and NSA, along with industry partners, have now identified a large-scale modular malware\r\nframework which is affecting network devices. The new malware is referred to here as Cyclops Blink and has\r\nbeen deployed since at least June 2019, fourteen months after VPNFilter was disrupted. In common with\r\nVPNFilter, Cyclops Blink deployment also appears indiscriminate and widespread.\r\nThe actor has so far primarily deployed Cyclops Blink to WatchGuard devices, but it is likely that Sandworm\r\nwould be capable of compiling the malware for other architectures and firmware.\r\nNote:\r\nNote that only WatchGuard devices that were reconfigured from the manufacturer default settings to open remote\r\nmanagement interfaces to external access could be infected\r\nMalware overview\r\nThe malware itself is sophisticated and modular with basic core functionality to beacon (T1132.002) device\r\ninformation back to a server and enable files to be downloaded and executed. There is also functionality to add\r\nnew modules while the malware is running, which allows Sandworm to implement additional capability as\r\nrequired.\r\nThe NCSC has published a malware analysis report on Cyclops Blink which provides more detail about the\r\nmalware.\r\nhttps://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter\r\nPage 2 of 6\n\nPost exploitation\r\nPost exploitation, Cyclops Blink is generally deployed as part of a firmware ‘update’ (T1542.001). This achieves\r\npersistence when the device is rebooted and makes remediation harder. \r\nVictim devices are organised into clusters and each deployment of Cyclops Blink has a list of command and\r\ncontrol (C2) IP addresses and ports that it uses (T1008). All the known C2 IP addresses to date have been used by\r\ncompromised WatchGuard firewall devices. Communications between Cyclops Blink clients and servers are\r\nprotected under Transport Layer Security (TLS) (T1071.001), using individually generated keys and certificates.\r\nSandworm manages Cyclops Blink by connecting to the C2 layer through the Tor network:\r\nMitigation\r\nCyclops Blink persists on reboot and throughout the legitimate firmware update process. Affected organisations\r\nshould therefore take steps to remove the malware. \r\nWatchGuard has worked closely with the FBI, CISA and the NCSC, and has provided tooling and guidance to\r\nenable detection and removal of Cyclops Blink on WatchGuard devices through a non-standard upgrade process. \r\nDevice owners should follow each step in these instructions to ensure that devices are patched to the latest version\r\nand that any infection is removed.\r\nThe WatchGuard tooling and guidance is available at: https://detection.watchguard.com/\r\nIn addition:\r\nIf your device is identified as infected with Cyclops Blink, you should assume that any passwords present\r\non the device have been compromised and replace them (see NCSC password guidance for organisations).\r\nhttps://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter\r\nPage 3 of 6\n\nYou should ensure that the management interface of network devices is not exposed to the internet.\r\nIn addition:\r\nIf your device is identified as infected with Cyclops Blink, you should assume that any passwords present\r\non the device have been compromised and replace them (see the NCSC's password guidance for\r\norganisations)\r\nYou should ensure that the management interface of network devices is not exposed to the internet\r\nIndicators of compromise\r\nMITRE ATT\u0026CK®\r\nThis advisory has been compiled with respect to the MITRE ATT\u0026CK® framework, a globally accessible\r\nknowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations.  \r\nTactic Technique Procedure\r\nInitial Access T1133\r\nExternal Remote Services\r\nThe actors most likely deploy modified device firmware images by\r\nexploiting an externally available service\r\nExecution T1059.004\r\nCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell\r\nCyclops Blink executes downloaded files using the Linux API\r\nPersistence T1542.001\r\nPre-OS Boot: System Firmware\r\nCyclops Blink is deployed within a modified device firmware image\r\n  T1037.004\r\nBoot or Logon Initialisation Scripts: RC Scripts\r\n Cyclops Blink is executed on device startup, using a modified RC script\r\nDefence Evasion T1562.004\r\nImpair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall\r\nCyclops Blink modifies the Linux system firewall to enable C2\r\ncommunication\r\nhttps://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter\r\nPage 4 of 6\n\nTactic Technique Procedure\r\n  T1036.005\r\nMasquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location\r\nCyclops Blink masquerades as a Linux kernel thread process \r\nDiscovery T1082\r\nSystem Information Discovery\r\nCyclops Blink regularly queries device information \r\nCommand and\r\nControl\r\nT1090 Proxy\r\n  T1132.002\r\nData Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding\r\nCyclops Blink command messages use a custom binary scheme to encode\r\ndata\r\n  T1008\r\nFallback Channels\r\nCyclops Blink randomly selects a C2 server from contained lists of IPv4\r\naddresses and port numbers\r\n  T1071.001\r\nApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols\r\nCyclops Blink can download files via HTTP or HTTPS\r\n  T1573.002\r\nEncrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography\r\nCyclops Blink C2 messages are individually encrypted using AES-256-\r\nCBC and sent underneath TLS\r\n  T1571\r\nNon-Standard Port\r\nThe list of port numbers used by Cyclops Blink includes non-standard\r\nports not typically associated with HTTP or HTTPS traffic\r\nExfiltration T1041\r\nExfiltration Over C2 Channel\r\nCyclops Blink can upload files to a C2 server\r\nConclusion\r\nhttps://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter\r\nPage 5 of 6\n\nA Cyclops Blink infection does not mean that an organisation is the primary target, but it may be selected to be, or\r\nits machines could be used to conduct attacks.\r\nOrganisations are advised to follow the mitigation advice in this advisory and to refer to indicators of compromise\r\n(not exhaustive) in the Cyclops Blink malware analysis report to detect possible activity on networks.\r\nUK organisations affected by the activity outlined in this advisory should report any compromises to the NCSC\r\nvia our website.\r\nFurther guidance\r\nA variety of mitigations will be of use in defending against the malware featured in this advisory:\r\nDo not expose management interfaces of network devices to the internet\r\nProtect your devices and networks by keeping them up to date\r\nuse the latest supported versions, apply security patches promptly, use anti-virus and scan regularly to\r\nguard against known malware threats. See NCSC guidance: Mitigating malware\r\nUse multi-factor authentication to reduce the impact of password compromises\r\nTreat people as your first line of defence\r\ntell staff how to report suspected phishing emails, and ensure they feel confident to do so. Investigate their\r\nreports promptly and thoroughly. Never punish users for clicking phishing links or opening attachments.\r\nSee NCSC guidance: Phishing attacks: defending your organisation\r\nSet up a security monitoring capability\r\nPrevent and detect lateral movement in your organisation’s networks\r\nDownloads\r\nSource: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter\r\nhttps://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter\r\nPage 6 of 6", "extraction_quality": 1, "language": "EN", "sources": [ "Malpedia", "MITRE" ], "origins": [ "web" ], "references": [ "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter" ], "report_names": [ "joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter" ], "threat_actors": [ { "id": "8941e146-3e7f-4b4e-9b66-c2da052ee6df", "created_at": "2023-01-06T13:46:38.402513Z", "updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:02.959797Z", "deleted_at": null, "main_name": "Sandworm", "aliases": [ "IRIDIUM", "Blue Echidna", "VOODOO BEAR", "FROZENBARENTS", "UAC-0113", "Seashell Blizzard", "UAC-0082", "APT44", "Quedagh", "TEMP.Noble", "IRON VIKING", "G0034", "ELECTRUM", "TeleBots" ], "source_name": "MISPGALAXY:Sandworm", "tools": [], "source_id": "MISPGALAXY", "reports": null }, { "id": "7bd810cb-d674-4763-86eb-2cc182d24ea0", "created_at": "2022-10-25T16:07:24.1537Z", "updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:04.883793Z", "deleted_at": null, "main_name": "Sandworm Team", "aliases": [ "APT 44", "ATK 14", "BE2", "Blue Echidna", "CTG-7263", "FROZENBARENTS", "G0034", "Grey Tornado", "IRIDIUM", "Iron Viking", "Quedagh", "Razing Ursa", "Sandworm", "Sandworm Team", "Seashell Blizzard", "TEMP.Noble", "UAC-0082", "UAC-0113", "UAC-0125", "UAC-0133", "Voodoo Bear" ], "source_name": "ETDA:Sandworm Team", "tools": [ "AWFULSHRED", "ArguePatch", "BIASBOAT", "Black Energy", "BlackEnergy", "CaddyWiper", "Colibri Loader", "Cyclops Blink", "CyclopsBlink", "DCRat", "DarkCrystal RAT", "Fobushell", "GOSSIPFLOW", "Gcat", "IcyWell", "Industroyer2", "JaguarBlade", "JuicyPotato", "Kapeka", "KillDisk.NCX", "LOADGRIP", "LOLBAS", "LOLBins", "Living off the Land", "ORCSHRED", "P.A.S.", "PassKillDisk", "Pitvotnacci", "PsList", "QUEUESEED", "RansomBoggs", "RottenPotato", "SOLOSHRED", "SwiftSlicer", "VPNFilter", "Warzone", "Warzone RAT", "Weevly" ], "source_id": "ETDA", "reports": null }, { "id": "a66438a8-ebf6-4397-9ad5-ed07f93330aa", "created_at": "2022-10-25T16:47:55.919702Z", "updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:03.618194Z", "deleted_at": null, "main_name": "IRON VIKING", "aliases": [ "APT44 ", "ATK14 ", "BlackEnergy Group", "Blue Echidna ", "CTG-7263 ", "ELECTRUM ", "FROZENBARENTS ", "Hades/OlympicDestroyer ", "IRIDIUM ", "Qudedagh ", "Sandworm Team ", "Seashell Blizzard ", "TEMP.Noble ", "Telebots ", "Voodoo Bear " ], "source_name": "Secureworks:IRON VIKING", "tools": [ "BadRabbit", "BlackEnergy", "GCat", "NotPetya", "PSCrypt", "TeleBot", "TeleDoor", "xData" ], "source_id": "Secureworks", "reports": null }, { "id": "b3e954e8-8bbb-46f3-84de-d6f12dc7e1a6", "created_at": "2022-10-25T15:50:23.339976Z", "updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:05.27483Z", "deleted_at": null, "main_name": "Sandworm Team", "aliases": [ "Sandworm Team", "ELECTRUM", "Telebots", "IRON VIKING", "BlackEnergy (Group)", "Quedagh", "Voodoo Bear", "IRIDIUM", "Seashell Blizzard", "FROZENBARENTS", "APT44" ], "source_name": "MITRE:Sandworm Team", "tools": [ "Bad Rabbit", "Mimikatz", "Exaramel for Linux", "Exaramel for Windows", "GreyEnergy", "PsExec", "Prestige", "P.A.S. Webshell", "AcidPour", "VPNFilter", "Neo-reGeorg", "Cyclops Blink", "SDelete", "Kapeka", "AcidRain", "Industroyer", "Industroyer2", "BlackEnergy", "Cobalt Strike", "NotPetya", "KillDisk", "PoshC2", "Impacket", "Invoke-PSImage", "Olympic Destroyer" ], "source_id": "MITRE", "reports": null } ], "ts_created_at": 1775434251, "ts_updated_at": 1775826784, "ts_creation_date": 0, "ts_modification_date": 0, "files": { "pdf": "https://archive.orkl.eu/fd3a16ebe67e6dee94887a99a29121a68d5960da.pdf", "text": "https://archive.orkl.eu/fd3a16ebe67e6dee94887a99a29121a68d5960da.txt", "img": "https://archive.orkl.eu/fd3a16ebe67e6dee94887a99a29121a68d5960da.jpg" } }