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	"created_at": "2026-11-14T02:15:16.991168Z",
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	"title": "Luna Moth Returns, Re-Targeting Law Firms Through Access Tokens",
	"llm_title": "Luna Moth Returns, Re-Targeting Law Firms Through Access Tokens",
	"authors": "Joseph Keyes, ReliaQuest",
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	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
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	"plain_text": "https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-luna-moth-returns-re-targeting-law-firms-through-access-tokens/\n\nLuna Moth Returns, Re-Targeting Law Firms Through Access\n\nTokens\n\nBy ReliaQuest Threat Research12 November 2026\n\nPublished: 2026-11-12 · Archived: 2026-11-14 02:00:34 UTC\n\nEditor’s note: This report was authored by Joseph Keyes.\n\nThis is external threat intelligence from the ReliaQuest Threat Research team. The findings describe\n\nthreats, vulnerabilities, and attacker activity affecting third parties and the broader threat landscape—not\n\nReliaQuest’s own environment. Nothing in this report should be interpreted as a vulnerability in\n\nReliaQuest’s systems or data.\n\nKey Points\n\nExtortion group “Luna Moth” (aka “Silent Ransom Group”) has targeted law firms since at least mid-2023\n\nand is now returning to those that likely didn’t pay its first extortion demand. This time, it’s dropped its\n\nmultiple remote-management tools and manual downloads. Instead, a caller persuades the target during a\n\nvideo call to hand over an access token, which the group then uses to bulk-download files automatically.\n\nThis token-based exfiltration is almost certainly a new tactic for the group. The stolen token passes\n\nConditional Access (which approves sign-ins) because its device check runs only at sign-in, not when the\n\ntoken is later used.\n\nOrganizations should implement Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) with strict location enforcement so\n\na stolen token stops working outside the victim’s network.\n\nData-extortion group “Luna Moth” (aka “Silent Ransom Group”) is going back for seconds by re-targeting law\n\nfirms that likely didn’t pay its ransoms the first time. The group is using a new method to steal this additional data:\n\nThe group now persuades targets on remote calls to hand over access tokens, then uses them to bulk-download\n\nfiles automatically—a technique we haven’t seen it use before.\n\nLuna Moth, which steals data without encrypting systems, has targeted law firms since at least mid-2023,\n\npreviously relying on multiple remote-management tools and manual exfiltration. Now, the attacker still calls a\n\ntarget posing as IT support but persuades them to extract a Microsoft Graph access token (the credential that\n\napplications use to read Microsoft 365 data, such as SharePoint files) from Microsoft 365 Copilot. The group then\n\nuses that token from its own infrastructure to download files in bulk.\n\nBecause the stolen token passes MFA and Conditional Access checks, and the video-call platform used for the call\n\nis permitted in almost every organization, this technique is easy for other extortion groups to copy.\n\nIn this spotlight, we:\n\nPage 1 of 7\n\nhttps://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-luna-moth-returns-re-targeting-law-firms-through-access-tokens/\n\nTrace how the token handoff works: Luna Moth gets targets to hand over a token, then replays it from\n\nattacker infrastructure to bulk-download files.\n\nExamine how Luna Moth is re-targeting law firms that likely didn’t pay their original extortion demand,\n\nincluding the social engineering that gets victims on a call.\n\nCompare Luna Moth’s earlier tactics with its new ones and show how they fit a broader shift toward\n\nattacks that skip malware and failed logins.\n\nHow Luna Moth Uses Stolen Tokens to Exfiltrate Data\n\nLuna Moth now steals data by tricking employees into handing over a Microsoft 365 access token, which lets\n\nattackers hide the malicious activity behind what looks like the employee’s own legitimate actions. That makes it\n\nharder for security tools to catch.\n\nPosing as IT support on a call, the attacker either takes control of the employee’s screen or walks them through\n\ncopying the token out of Microsoft 365 Copilot in the application or browser. The attacker then uses it from their\n\nown server to download thousands of files in about an hour. Because the token was issued to the employee’s real,\n\ncompliant device, it passes MFA and Conditional Access, which doesn’t re-check it once it’s issued.\n\nThe attack chain runs in five steps:\n\nStep 1: The attacker, posing as IT support, spoofs a number the victim trusts and persuades the user to join\n\na video call and share their screen.\n\nStep 2: The attacker has the user open Microsoft 365 Copilot in the browser on their managed, compliant\n\nlaptop.\n\nStep 3: The user is told to open the browser’s developer tools, a built-in feature meant for web developers,\n\nto find the request Copilot sends to Microsoft Graph and copy the access token it carries.\n\nStep 4: The user pastes the token into a public text-sharing (“paste”) site, where the attacker retrieves it.\n\nThat gets the token to the attacker without any malware or phishing for a security tool to flag.\n\nStep 5: Within a minute, the attacker replays the token from their own server and downloads files en masse\n\nthrough the Microsoft Graph API.\n\nCopilot is a useful source because it’s already signed in on a managed device and carries delegated access to the\n\nfiles the user can reach. A token is a bearer credential, so whoever holds it can act as the user until it expires. By\n\ndefault, Microsoft access tokens last 60 to 90 minutes. Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE), which lets Microsoft\n\nre-check or revoke a token mid-session, can extend supported tokens to as long as 28 hours. Tokens can also be\n\ncut off early when conditions change, such as a location change or account disablement. Either way, the default\n\nlifetime is about as long as the attackers need to pull thousands of files.\n\nWhy MFA and Conditional Access Don’t Catch the Activity\n\nPage 2 of 7\n\nhttps://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-luna-moth-returns-re-targeting-law-firms-through-access-tokens/\n\nConditional Access doesn’t stop stolen tokens from working because it checks only when a token is issued, not\n\neach time it’s used. In these attacks, users sign in normally on compliant devices, so every check passes. Without\n\nCAE and strict location enforcement, tokens stay valid from any location until they expire. Attackers never have\n\nto authenticate, so no sign-in events are generated for their address.\n\nThis technique shares a core idea with device-code phishing: in both, the attacker persuades a user to take part in a\n\nlegitimate Microsoft process that results in a valid token instead of a password. Because the user completes the\n\nsign-in themselves, MFA is satisfied for both techniques. In device-code phishing, tokens are issued to the\n\nattacker’s device. Here, they’re issued to the victim’s compliant device and then handed over.\n\nThat makes detection and threat hunting much harder, because the bulk theft passes compliant-device and MFA\n\ncontrols and looks like the real user’s own activity. In observed cases, attackers pulled thousands of files in about\n\nan hour, which is more than enough to support extortion, before a security team could respond.\n\nLuna Moth Likely Re-Targeting Law Firms It Already Extorted\n\nSpeed makes the token handoff cheap to repeat, and Luna Moth appears to be using it on its own past victims. In\n\nOctober and early November, the group went back to law firms it had previously extorted in May and August.\n\nThose firms appear on the group’s data-leak site, which suggests they likely didn’t pay the first extortion demand.\n\nThis re-targeting came anywhere from several weeks to months after the first extortion, and the group exfiltrated a\n\nsecond round of data. Luna Moth likely keeps track of which victims didn’t pay and revisits them, rather than\n\nmoving on after a single extortion cycle. Refusing to pay doesn’t end the threat for law firms, and once this tactic\n\ncatches on, the same risk could easily extend to organizations outside the legal sector. What’s more, a second theft\n\nadds to the client-confidentiality, notification, and reputational risks from the first.\n\nSocial Engineering Starts with a Broken PDF and a Call\n\nWhen Luna Moth recently returned to previous victims, it used an attack chain with fewer steps and fewer tools\n\nthan in its first attacks, which makes it harder for defenders to detect. The latest tactics needed only a video call\n\nand a Microsoft Graph token the employee handed to the attacker, who then used it from their own server to\n\ndownload files in bulk.\n\nThe initial attacks began with attackers posing as IT support, who talked employees into joining a video call and\n\nthen had them open a built-in Windows remote-assistance tool to hand over control of their machines. They\n\nmanually exfiltrated sensitive data to personal cloud storage for extortion. This matches Luna Moth’s known\n\napproach: a phone-based lure, remote-access software, and extortion without encryption.\n\nIn the follow-on activity, the group sent a blank-subject email from a free email address with a PDF named like a\n\nbusiness report that was deliberately invalid and crashed the viewer every time it was opened. Soon after, the\n\nattacker called the target, often on a personal number outside corporate call controls, posing as IT support\n\nresponding to a “malicious email.” The broken attachment made the offer to fix it over a video call seem routine.\n\nThis reverses earlier campaigns, where a fake invoice or subscription email prompted the victim to call the\n\nattacker.\n\nPage 3 of 7\n\nhttps://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-luna-moth-returns-re-targeting-law-firms-through-access-tokens/\n\nDoing it over a video call now does both jobs: the call keeps the user engaged while the screen share lets the\n\nattacker direct the session. Nothing is installed, and these video call applications are signed, legitimate software,\n\nso there are no malicious files to block.\n\nWith no malware or endpoint alert, the only evidence is ordinary-looking events: a blank email, an external video\n\ncall session, and Graph access from an unfamiliar address. Correlate these across email, video call, and Microsoft\n\n365 logs, and train users to verify any unsolicited IT call through a known help-desk number.\n\nHow Luna Moth’s Tactics Have Changed\n\nLuna Moth’s shift is part of a broader move toward attacks that don’t require malware or failed logins. In our\n\nrecent threat report on residential proxies, we described social-engineering groups pairing calls to help desks with\n\nlegitimate software-as-a-service (SaaS) interfaces, including Microsoft Graph activity across hundreds of sites,\n\nand reaching their objectives within 6 to 15 minutes of initial access. Luna Moth gets to the same place by a\n\ndifferent route: getting users to hand over tokens instead of enrolling a device or routing activity through a\n\nresidential proxy. Either way, the target is the user’s identity and cloud access, so endpoint controls miss the\n\nactivity.\n\nOver the past year, Luna Moth has simplified how it gets in and changed how it takes data out. Earlier intrusions\n\nused multiple remote-management tools, including commercial remote-support software and a built-in Windows\n\nremote-assistance tool. By late August, the group paired video calls with the built-in remote-assistance tool, and\n\nby October, the video call alone handled both the conversation and the screen control.\n\nBut the biggest change lies in exfiltration. Instead of manual downloads, file-transfer tools, or uploads to personal\n\ncloud storage—all of which ran through the endpoint—the attackers now replay stolen Copilot Graph tokens from\n\ntheir own infrastructure and download files through Microsoft Graph, moving the theft into the cloud.\n\nThe table below breaks down the changes:\n\nArea Earlier Luna Moth Activity New Tactics\n\nTarget\nExtort once, then move on Return to non-paying victims\nselection\n\nRemote A single video call used for both the\nMultiple remote-management tools\naccess conversation and screen sharing\n\nIdentity No token-handoff technique described in A token created on the user’s host and\n\nabuse public reporting used from attacker infrastructure\n\nPage 4 of 7\n\nhttps://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-luna-moth-returns-re-targeting-law-firms-through-access-tokens/\n\nManual downloads, file-transfer tools to\n\nattacker servers, uploads to personal cloud Bulk downloads through Microsoft Graph\nExfiltration\nstorage, or emails to attacker-controlled from attacker infrastructure\n\naccounts\n\nBlank email with a deliberately broken\nLure and Callback phishing and help-desk\nPDF attachment, followed by a call to a\ncalls impersonation\npersonal phone from a spoofed number\n\nThese changes show the group adapting to the controls defenders implemented in response to earlier reporting,\n\nwhile keeping its core loop of phone-based social engineering followed by data theft.\n\nCommon defenses are built around stolen credentials because they assume attackers need to sign in. Token\n\nhandoffs, on the other hand, skip that step, so MFA, compliant-device rules, and geographic alerts all see a normal\n\nsign-in by the real user. Defenders need controls that act after sign-in, such as continuous evaluation of tokens,\n\nfast session revocation, and detection of unusual Graph activity.\n\nStep Up Your Defenses\n\nReliaQuest’s Approach\n\nReliaQuest GreyMatter, an agentic AI security operations platform, equips security teams to spot the activity\n\ndetailed in this report while it’s still visible in identity and SaaS telemetry, rather than after attackers have already\n\nreplayed tokens and downloaded files. A token handoff leaves little for endpoint or sign-in controls to see, so\n\ndefenders need to test their coverage, correlate weak signals, and act within minutes.\n\nDetection at Source: Video-call platform logs, web proxy or DNS logs, and Microsoft 365 audit logs each record\n\npart of the handoff but rarely reach a detection pipeline. Detecting at the source correlates them. A video-call\n\nscreen share, a Copilot session, a visit to a text-sharing site, and Graph file access from an unfamiliar address are\n\neach ordinary on their own. Together, they can indicate a token handoff.\n\nGreyMatter Discover: The token handoff works because nothing checks tokens after they’re issued. GreyMatter\n\nDiscover finds identity and cloud settings that let stolen tokens work from any address, such as Conditional\n\nAccess policies without CAE or strict location enforcement, before attackers do.\n\nGreyMatter Transit: GreyMatter Transit identifies threats in seconds, as telemetry moves from source to storage\n\nrather than after it lands. In the observed intrusions, the first download from attacker infrastructure came about a\n\nminute after the token was copied. With attacks moving this fast, response has to keep pace with the attacker\n\nrather than wait on audit logs that can lag.\n\nReliaQuest detection rules align with techniques used by the groups covered in this report and help prevent similar\n\nthreats in the future. Used alongside the following GreyMatter Automated Response Playbooks, organizations can\n\nPage 5 of 7\n\nhttps://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-luna-moth-returns-re-targeting-law-firms-through-access-tokens/\n\ncontain ransomware threats in as little as five minutes:\n\nDisable User + Terminate Sessions: Cuts off the stolen token’s session and any other authenticated access\n\nonce an identity is confirmed as compromised.\n\nBlock IP + Block Domain: Blocks the replay infrastructure and paste sites used to pass the tokens.\n\nIsolate Host: Contains endpoints if attackers have moved beyond token theft.\n\nYour Action Plan\n\nEnable CAE with strict location enforcement. Conditional Access checks devices only when tokens are\n\nissued, so handed-over tokens keep working from any address. Pilot strict enforcement first, defining every\n\negress IP address, including secure web gateway ranges, as a named location.\n\nBlock browser developer tools and token-inspection pages. Disable developer tools through Group\n\nPolicy on managed browsers and block Graph Explorer and the browser net-export pages (chrome://net-\n\nexport and edge://net-export), because the token handoff depends on users reading tokens out of browsers.\n\nRestrict remote-support and screen-sharing tools. Allow only the tools your help desk uses, and block\n\nunapproved remote-management software where there’s no business need. Tell users that IT will never ask\n\nfor developer tools or tokens and that they should verify IT requests by callback. Limit external video\n\nmeetings to approved platforms and known participants.\n\nKey Takeaways and What’s Next\n\nLuna Moth’s shift to token-based exfiltration is the most important change in this activity, because it moves the\n\ntheft out of the endpoint and into the cloud. These attacks show again that threat actors no longer need remote-\n\nmanagement tools or malware on the victim’s machine to achieve their objectives. In this wave of attacks, the\n\nstolen tokens were issued to users’ compliant devices, so they passed MFA and Conditional Access, and the\n\ndownloads looked like the users’ own activity. Most organizations’ security controls never see an attacker sign in,\n\nso there is nothing for them to flag.\n\nThe token handoff is also cheap to run again, which links it to the group’s re-targeting of law firms that likely\n\ndidn’t pay the first time around. A data-leak site listing already identifies breached firms known to hold sensitive\n\nclient data, and the new attack chain needs only a call and a token. We assess with moderate confidence that Luna\n\nMoth will keep revisiting non-paying victims over the next six months because the required effort is low and the\n\npotential payoff is high. In this campaign, several firms were hit again in October and November with the same\n\ninfrastructure, which points to deliberate tracking of non-payers rather than coincidence. Any organization that has\n\nreceived an extortion email or appeared on a data-leak site should treat a second approach as expected and brief its\n\nusers now.\n\nWe assess with moderate confidence that other extortion groups will copy the token handoff over the next six\n\nmonths, because it needs only a convincing caller and a user at a keyboard. There’s no malware to develop and no\n\nendpoint tooling to evade, and video-call software and Microsoft 365 Copilot are widely available in most\n\norganizations. We also expect the technique to expand beyond Copilot tokens. Other applications signed in to\n\nPage 6 of 7\n\nhttps://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-luna-moth-returns-re-targeting-law-firms-through-access-tokens/\n\nMicrosoft 365, including Microsoft’s own web apps and third-party apps that the organization has granted access\n\nto files and SharePoint sites, hold similar tokens that a user could be talked into copying, as do browser session\n\ncookies. Any of these could give an attacker the same access unless the token is bound to the device or location it\n\nwas issued to. Law firms are the current focus, likely because their client data gives the group strong leverage, but\n\nother sectors holding similarly sensitive data could be targeted next.\n\nIOCs and Observables\n\nThe indicators and observables below come from recent intrusions and are worth blocking and hunting for, but the\n\nattacks don’t depend on them.\n\nIndicator\n\n104.37.184[.]195\n\njustsendtext[.]xyz\n\nSharePointScavenger/1.0\n\n“[Firm] has lost confidential data of their clients.\n\nVery Important!”\n\nDaxton Wirth also contributed to this report.\n\nType\n\nIP address\n\nDomain\n\nUser agent\n\nEmail\n\nsubject\n\nSource: https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-luna-moth-returns-re-targeting-law-firms-through-access-tokens/\n\nPage 7 of 7\n\nContext\n\nToken replay and bulk file download\n\nText-sharing site used to pass the stolen\n\ntoken\n\nOpen-source SharePoint download tool,\n\nseen in one intrusion\n\nExtortion email sent after data theft",
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		"https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-luna-moth-returns-re-targeting-law-firms-through-access-tokens/"
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			"main_name": "Luna Moth",
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