MAR-10337802-1.v1: DarkSide Ransomware | CISA Published: 2021-07-08 · Archived: 2026-04-05 15:13:17 UTC Notification This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise. This document is marked TLP:WHITE--Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.cisa.gov/tlp. Summary Description This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). CISA processed three (3) files associated with a variant of DarkSide ransomware. NOTE: CISA has no evidence that this variant is related to the pipeline incident, referred to in Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware Attacks. Ransomware is designed to encrypt the victim's files to extort and ransom for their recovery. DarkSide is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS)--the developers of the ransomware received a share of the proceeds from the cybercriminal actors who deploy it, known as "affiliates." This DarkSide ransomware variant executes a dynamic-link library (DLL) program used to delete Volume Shadow copies available on the system. The malware collects, encrypts, and send system information to the threat actor's command and control (C2) domains and generates a ransom note to the victim. CISA is distributing this MAR, which includes suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques, to help network defenders identify and mitigate risks. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10337802-1.v1.WHITE.stix. Click here for a PDF version of this report. Submitted Files (3) 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 (156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d...) 3ba456cafcb31e0710626170c3565aae305bc7c32a948a54f0331d0939e0fe8a (045621d9.BMP) f6fba207c71d1f53f82d96a87c25c4fa3c020dca58d9b8a266137f33597a0b0e (README.045621d9.TXT) Domains (2) baroquetees.com rumahsia.com IPs (2) 176.103.62.217 99.83.154.118 Findings 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 Tags downloaderloaderransomwaretrojan Details Name 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673.dll https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a Page 1 of 12 Size 55810 bytes Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows MD5 f587adbd83ff3f4d2985453cd45c7ab1 SHA1 2715340f82426f840cf7e460f53a36fc3aad52aa SHA256 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 SHA512 37acf3c7a0b52421b4b33b14e5707497cfc52e57322ad9ffac87d0551220afc202d4c0987460d295077b9ee681fac2021bbfdebdc52c829b5f998 ssdeep 768:u2v9Ij6f3J8OT1PMK30DbQDH2doyomHRL83M4/NShWxEs0l29SFd2Xyj09rLd:fmET1PMK3qbpHY3M4wWmXgSFTSrLd Entropy 6.789366 Antivirus Ahnlab Ransomware/Win.DarkSide Antiy Trojan[Ransom]/Win32.DarkSide.gen Avira TR/AD.DarkSideRansom.muasl BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.46189032 ClamAV Win.Packed.DarkSide-9262656-0 Comodo Malware Cyren W32/Trojan.HLZV-8042 ESET a variant of Win32/Filecoder.DarkSide.B trojan Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.46189032 (B) Ikarus Trojan-Ransom.DarkSide K7 Trojan ( 005795061 ) Lavasoft Trojan.GenericKD.46189032 McAfee GenericRXOX-NH!F587ADBD83FF NANOAV Trojan.Win32.Encoder.iuukal Quick Heal Trojanransom.Encoder Symantec Downloader Systweak trojan-ransom.darkside TACHYON Ransom/W32.DarkSide.55810 TrendMicro Ransom.17F5A898 TrendMicro House Call Ransom.17F5A898 VirusBlokAda BScope.TrojanRansom.Convagent Zillya! Trojan.Encoder.Win32.2315 YARA Rules No matches found. ssdeep Matches No matches found. PE Metadata Compile Date 2021-04-05 18:09:20-04:00 Import Hash 6c8408bb5d7d5a5b75b9314f94e68763 https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a Page 2 of 12 PE Sections MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy db99af79840cc24e4a2bc8920af97c4d header 1024 1.699168 6738c20d4ea897835026864651841fca .text 37376 6.090461 4e6ca671cfd10e3aa0e2dcd99bc287b6 .text1 1024 5.130274 c0265513cd36f1d659cc71bd70bfef58 .rdata 512 3.215043 3853bbcd5344aff518bb2f1ccbd05bdd .data 12288 7.713634 4d2b117a0087a34a0cb8575f34413c47 .ndata 3584 7.935769 Packers/Compilers/Cryptors Relationships 156335b95b... Connected_To baroquetees.com 156335b95b... Connected_To rumahsia.com 156335b95b... Dropped 3ba456cafcb31e0710626170c3565aae305bc7c32a948a54f0331d0939e0fe8a 156335b95b... Dropped f6fba207c71d1f53f82d96a87c25c4fa3c020dca58d9b8a266137f33597a0b0e Description This artifact is a 32-bit DLL that is a Darkside ransomware variant. The program is called ‘encryptor2.dll’. When it is executed, it will invoke the Volume Shadow service (vssvc.exe) to delete any Volume Shadow copies available on the system. The malware collects information on the system to include the operating system, default language, username, hostname, domain, and operating system (OS) architecture. This information is encrypted and sent to one of the following command-and-control (C2) domains: ---Begin C2 Domains--- baroquetees[.]com rumahsia[.]com ---End C2 Domains--- The malware reads the system GUID and uses the value to generate a unique eight character hexadecimal extension that it appends to the encrypted files. This extension is also used as the name of the running service the program uses to encrypt the user’s data. ---Begin Service Example--- HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\.045621d9 HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\.045621d9\DisplayName Data: “.045621d9” HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\.045621d9\ObjectName Data: “LocalSystem” HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\.045621d9\ImagePath Data: ---End Service Example--- This variant of the malware contains a hard-coded key ‘_M8607761bf3212d6’ that it uses to decrypt an embedded base64 encoded configuration that runs the ransomware program. The program is configured to avoid encrypting any files located in directories that contain the following strings: ---Begin Avoided Directories--- $recycle.bin config.msi $windows.~bt $windows.~ws windows appdata application data boot google mozilla program files https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a Page 3 of 12 program files (x86) programdata system volume information tor browser windows.old intel msocache perflogs x64dbg public all users default ---End Avoided Directories--- Any files with the following extensions will not be encrypted: ---Begin File Extensions--- .386 .adv .ani .bat .bin .cab .cmd .com .cpl .cur .deskthemepack .diagcab .diagcfg .diagpkg .dll .drv .exe .hlp .icl .icns .ico .ics .idx .ldf .lnk .mod .mpa .msc .msp .msstyles .msu .nls .nomedia .ocx .prf .ps1 .rom .rtp .scr .shs .spl .sys .theme .themepack .wpx .lock .key https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a Page 4 of 12 .hta .msi .pdb .sql ---End File Extensions--- Before the encryption routine starts, the program will check to determine if any of the following processes are running, and shut them down: ---Begin Running Processes--- oracle ocssd dbsnmp synctime agntsvc isqlplussvc xfssvccon mydesktopservice ocautoupds encsvc firefox tbirdconfig mydesktopqos ocomm dbeng50 sqbcoreservice excel infopath msaccess mspub onenote outlook powerpnt steam thebat thunderbird visio winword wordpad notepad ---End Running Processes--- The following services will also be terminated: ---Begin Terminated Services--- .vss .sql svc$ memtas mepocs sophos veeam backup GxVss GxBlr GxFWD GxCVD GxCIMgr ---End Terminated Services--- After the encryption routine runs, a bitmap image file is created in the path C:\ProgramData with the same name as the encryption extension, e.g. ‘045621d9.BMP’. The following registry keys are created that generate a ransom note wallpaper on the user’s desktop: ---Begin Wallpaper Registry Keys--- HKU\DEFAULT\ControlPanel\Desktop\Wallpaper Data: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a Page 5 of 12 HKCU\ControlPanel\Desktop\Wallpaper    Data: ---End Wallpaper Registry Keys--- The .BMP file contains instructions to the victim for recovering data (Figure 1). In each directory that the program has encrypted files, a ransom note is dropped with the naming format ‘README. .TXT’. The file contains instructions for the victim to follow to recover files. The following is an example of the recovery instructions: ---Begin Recovery Instructions--- ----------- [ Welcome to DarkSide ] -------------> What happend? ---------------------------------------------- Your computers and servers are encrypted, backups are deleted. We use strong encryption algorithms, so you cannot decrypt your data. But you can restore everything by purchasing a special program from us - universal decryptor. This program will restore all your network. Follow our instructions below and you will recover all your data. What guarantees? ---------------------------------------------- We value our reputation. If we do not do our work and liabilities, nobody will pay us. This is not in our interests. All our decryption software is perfectly tested and will decrypt your data. We will also provide support in case of problems. We guarantee to decrypt one file for free. Go to the site and contact us. How to get access on website? ---------------------------------------------- Using a TOR browser: 1) Download and install TOR browser from this site: hxxps[:]//torproject.org/ 2) Open our website: hxxp[:]//dark24zz36xm4y2phwe7yvnkkkkhxionhfrwp67awpb3r3bdcneivoqd.onion/ZWQHXVE7MW9JXE5N1EGIP6IMEFAGC7LNN6WJCBVKJFKB When you open our website, put the following data in the input form: Key: lmrlfxpjZBun4Eqc4Xd4XLJxEOL5JTOTLtwCOqxqxtFfu14zvKMrLMUiGV36bhzV5nfRPSSvroQiL6t36hV87qDIDlub946I5ud5QQIZC3EEzHaIy04dB !!! DANGER !!! DO NOT MODIFY or try to RECOVER any files yourself. We WILL NOT be able to RESTORE them. !!! DANGER !!! ---End Recovery Instructions--- Screenshots Figure 1. - baroquetees.com Tags command-and-control Ports 443 TCP Whois Domain Name: BAROQUETEES.COM Registry Domain ID: 2536327775_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.namecheap.com Registrar URL: http://www.namecheap.com Updated Date: 2021-02-27T09:49:39Z Creation Date: 2020-06-11T14:12:08Z Registry Expiry Date: 2021-06-11T14:12:08Z Registrar: NameCheap, Inc. https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a Page 6 of 12 Registrar IANA ID: 1068 Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@namecheap.com Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.6613102107 Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited Name Server: DNS1.REGISTRAR-SERVERS.COM Name Server: DNS2.REGISTRAR-SERVERS.COM DNSSEC: unsigned Domain name: baroquetees.com Registry Domain ID: 2536327775_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.namecheap.com Registrar URL: http://www.namecheap.com Updated Date: 0001-01-01T00:00:00.00Z Creation Date: 2020-06-11T14:12:08.00Z Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2021-06-11T14:12:08.00Z Registrar: NAMECHEAP INC Registrar IANA ID: 1068 Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@namecheap.com Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.6613102107 Reseller: NAMECHEAP INC Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited Registrant Name: Withheld for Privacy Purposes Registrant Organization: Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf Registrant Street: Kalkofnsvegur 2 Registrant City: Reykjavik Registrant State/Province: Capital Region Registrant Postal Code: 101 Registrant Country: IS Registrant Phone: +354.4212434 Registrant Email: b261116753cd4019a6d879fad2cd43ca.protect@withheldforprivacy.com Admin Name: Withheld for Privacy Purposes Admin Organization: Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf Admin Street: Kalkofnsvegur 2 Admin City: Reykjavik Admin State/Province: Capital Region Admin Postal Code: 101 Admin Country: IS Admin Phone: +354.4212434 Admin Email: b261116753cd4019a6d879fad2cd43ca.protect@withheldforprivacy.com Tech Name: Withheld for Privacy Purposes Tech Organization: Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf Tech Street: Kalkofnsvegur 2 Tech City: Reykjavik Tech State/Province: Capital Region Tech Postal Code: 101 Tech Country: IS Tech Phone: +354.4212434 Tech Email: b261116753cd4019a6d879fad2cd43ca.protect@withheldforprivacy.com Name Server: dns1.registrar-servers.com Name Server: dns2.registrar-servers.com DNSSEC: unsigned Relationships baroquetees.com Resolved_To 176.103.62.217 baroquetees.com Connected_From 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 Description The ransomware collects system information and sends it to this domain. 176.103.62.217 Tags https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a Page 7 of 12 command-and-control Relationships 176.103.62.217 Resolved_To baroquetees.com Description At the time of analysis the domain baroquetees[.]com resolved to this Internet protocol (IP) address. rumahsia.com Tags command-and-control Whois Domain Name: RUMAHSIA.COM Registry Domain ID: 2519337945_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.namecheap.com Registrar URL: http://www.namecheap.com Updated Date: 2021-04-28T07:21:46Z Creation Date: 2020-04-27T16:07:26Z Registry Expiry Date: 2022-04-27T16:07:26Z Registrar: NameCheap, Inc. Registrar IANA ID: 1068 Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@namecheap.com Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.6613102107 Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited Name Server: DNS101.REGISTRAR-SERVERS.COM Name Server: DNS102.REGISTRAR-SERVERS.COM DNSSEC: unsigned Domain name: rumahsia.com Registry Domain ID: 2519337945_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.namecheap.com Registrar URL: http://www.namecheap.com Updated Date: 0001-01-01T00:00:00.00Z Creation Date: 2020-04-27T16:07:26.00Z Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2021-04-27T16:07:26.00Z Registrar: NAMECHEAP INC Registrar IANA ID: 1068 Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@namecheap.com Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.6613102107 Reseller: NAMECHEAP INC Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited Registrant Name: REACTIVATION PERIOD Registrant Organization: Withheld for Privacy Purposes Registrant Street: Kalkofnsvegur 2 Registrant City: Reykjavik Registrant State/Province: Capital Region Registrant Postal Code: 101 Registrant Country: IS Registrant Phone: +354.4212434 Registrant Email: reactivation-pending@mail.withheldforprivacy.com Admin Name: REACTIVATION PERIOD Admin Organization: Withheld for Privacy Purposes Admin Street: Kalkofnsvegur 2 Admin City: Reykjavik Admin State/Province: Capital Region Admin Postal Code: 101 Admin Country: IS Admin Phone: +354.4212434 Admin Email: reactivation-pending@mail.withheldforprivacy.com https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a Page 8 of 12 Tech Name: REACTIVATION PERIOD Tech Organization: Withheld for Privacy Purposes Tech Street: Kalkofnsvegur 2 Tech City: Reykjavik Tech State/Province: Capital Region Tech Postal Code: 101 Tech Country: IS Tech Phone: +354.4212434 Tech Email: reactivation-pending@mail.withheldforprivacy.com Name Server: dns101.registrar-servers.com Name Server: dns102.registrar-servers.com DNSSEC: unsigned Relationships rumahsia.com Resolved_To 99.83.154.118 rumahsia.com Connected_From 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 Description The ransomware collects system information and sends it to this domain. 99.83.154.118 Tags command-and-control Relationships 99.83.154.118 Resolved_To rumahsia.com Description At the time of analysis the domain rumahsia[.]com resolved to this IP address. 3ba456cafcb31e0710626170c3565aae305bc7c32a948a54f0331d0939e0fe8a Tags ransomware Details Name 045621d9.BMP Size 4339094 bytes Type PC bitmap, Windows 3.x format, 2308 x 940 x 16, image size 4339040, cbSize 4339094, bits offset 54 MD5 2e5dee7e7d8aa32b5a638cd619eb67b3 SHA1 1cbb4aa1dd284d62f4eb1833b6fe1290c122ccf7 SHA256 3ba456cafcb31e0710626170c3565aae305bc7c32a948a54f0331d0939e0fe8a SHA512 7f731e2fa892082a5f2c3e4865eaeab9b3f03ae26ce4fe545a46de5002130b1374b941fc3cb3bf0204d036b2233023658869bf22b626bf947627e ssdeep 12:RLp5BJxhfVfPNpNhdhhxvn9RBxJRRPHJvPZBJxhf55vPpZ5B1ZJZxNBJv5B15Bpx:R Entropy 0.155294 Path C:\ProgramData Antivirus No matches found. YARA Rules https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a Page 9 of 12 No matches found. ssdeep Matches No matches found. Relationships 3ba456cafc... Dropped_By 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 Description This bitmap image is the wallpaper used by the ransomware. f6fba207c71d1f53f82d96a87c25c4fa3c020dca58d9b8a266137f33597a0b0e Tags ransomwaretrojan Details Name README.045621d9.TXT Size 2009 bytes Type ASCII text, with very long lines, with CRLF line terminators MD5 135d0337c142e73417030daf30d835ac SHA1 4d03e3db39adaf57df53181429706aa854878026 SHA256 f6fba207c71d1f53f82d96a87c25c4fa3c020dca58d9b8a266137f33597a0b0e SHA512 b07fefbceeba5eddac04ecf011f347fd3879b77330d4db6178dd1daa54dbed956f90e28ecf93404e8c98f9683aac0fd238133d6188f29264752045 ssdeep 48:L7EZWCOqZGgQx8N3NbS/3TXWAxdHyJWtbXi5RLNRVtRGHE:LAMCMxq3NbS/rrn9d2RL/VH7 Entropy 5.517181 Antivirus ESET Win32/Filecoder.DarkSide trojan TrendMicro Ransom.B01C9038 TrendMicro House Call Ransom.B01C9038 YARA Rules No matches found. ssdeep Matches No matches found. Relationships f6fba207c7... Dropped_By 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 Description This is the ransom note created by the Darkside ransomware variant. The note contains the .onion address and the preshared key to be sent to decrypt one file for free. Screenshots Figure 2. - Relationship Summary https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a Page 10 of 12 156335b95b... Connected_To baroquetees.com 156335b95b... Connected_To rumahsia.com 156335b95b... Dropped 3ba456cafcb31e0710626170c3565aae305bc7c32a948a54f0331d0939e0fe8a 156335b95b... Dropped f6fba207c71d1f53f82d96a87c25c4fa3c020dca58d9b8a266137f33597a0b0e baroquetees.com Resolved_To 176.103.62.217 baroquetees.com Connected_From 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 176.103.62.217 Resolved_To baroquetees.com rumahsia.com Resolved_To 99.83.154.118 rumahsia.com Connected_From 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 99.83.154.118 Resolved_To rumahsia.com 3ba456cafc... Dropped_By 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 f6fba207c7... Dropped_By 156335b95ba216456f1ac0894b7b9d6ad95404ac7df447940f21646ca0090673 Recommendations CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts. Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines. Keep operating system patches up-to-date. Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication. Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required. Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes. Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known. Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests. Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers. Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header). Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content. Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.). Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing. Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs). Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, "Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops". Contact Information Document FAQ What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis. What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis. Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-844-Say-CISA or CISA Service Desk . Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods: Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov E-Mail: submit@malware.us-cert.gov https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a Page 11 of 12 FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous) CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at www.cisa.gov. Source: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-189a Page 12 of 12