

# Detection Strategy for SSH Key Injection in Authorized Keys, Detection Strategy DET0126

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## AN0350

Adversary attempts to gain persistence by modifying ~/.ssh/authorized\_keys via shell, text editor, echo or redirected output.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
TimeWindow	Temporal window to correlate file writes and suspicious process launches (e.g., <60s)
UserContext	Expected user-to-process correlation (e.g., root writing to non-root authorized_keys)
TargetPath	Custom SSH path or user home variation (e.g., /etc/skel/.ssh/)

## AN0351

Insertion of public keys into authorized\_keys using bash/zsh or editor tools, correlated with suspicious process ancestry.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
ParentProcess	Track unusual parent process writing to SSH config (e.g., curl -> bash)
InteractiveSessionFlag	Flag whether shell session was interactive (normal) or spawned remotely (potential abuse)

## AN0352

Abuse of cloud metadata APIs or CLI to push SSH public keys to authorized\_keys of virtual machines.

### Log Sources

**Mutable Elements**

Field	Description
MetadataFieldName	Custom metadata field (e.g., ssh-keys or custom-key)
AccountType	Was it an admin, service principal, or automation user initiating?
TargetRoleEscalation	Privilege level of the VM account receiving the key

**AN0353**

Direct modification of `/etc/ssh/keys-/authorized_keys` or enabling SSH in `sshd_config` to support public key auth.

**Log Sources**

**Mutable Elements**

Field	Description
SSHConfigPath	Could be modified SSH path in hypervisor
ESXiShellActivity	Whether shell was enabled beforehand via DCUI or API

**AN0354**

Use of command-line like `ip ssh pubkey-chain` to bind SSH keys to privileged accounts on routers or switches.

**Log Sources**

**Mutable Elements**

Field	Description
CLIUserRole	Was the role allowed to push persistent config changes?
DeviceModel	Variations in syntax or log behavior across device OS

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Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0126#AN0353>