

Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net - 2017-12-22 - Remcos RAT infection from RTF using CVE-2017-0199 exploit

Archived: 2026-04-05 22:36:03 UTC

NOTICE:


- The zip archives on this page have been updated, and they now use the new password scheme. For the new password, see the "about" page of this website.

ASSOCIATED FILES:

- [2017-12-22-Remcos-RAT-malspam-example.eml.zip](#) 39.9 kB (39,866 bytes)
- [2017-12-22-Remcos-RAT-infection-traffic.pcap.zip](#) 1.0 MB (1,044,961 bytes)
- [2017-12-22-malware-from-Remcos-RAT-infection.zip](#) 1.9 MB (1,880,322 bytes)

NOTES:

- On 2017-12-21, I saw malspam dated 2017-12-21 with an RTF attachment using [CVE-2017-0199](#) to push [Remcos RAT](#).
- Today's post-infection traffic is similar to Remcos RAT post-infection traffic I reported almost 2 months ago on [2017-10-27](#).




Shown above: *Flowchart for today's infection.*

WEB TRAFFIC BLOCK LIST


Indicators are not a block list. If you feel the need to block web traffic, I suggest the following domains and URLs:

- `hxxps[:]//streetsave[.]club/styles/break/beta.hta`
- `hxxps[:]//regwide[.]club/images/scale/nile.php`
- `hxxps[:]//regwide[.]club/images/scale/nite.exe`
- `darlz.freedomdns[.]org`


IMAGES



Shown above: Screenshot of the email.



Shown above: The attached .doc file is actually an RTF that uses CVE-2017-0199. I clicked my way "yes" to an infection!



Shown above: The executable for Remcos RAT needed my permission to run.

Filter: `ssl.handshake.type == 1 or (!(tcp.port eq 443) and tcp.` Expression... Clear Apply Save

Date/Time	Dst	port	Server Name	Info
2017-12-22 00:27:04	148.163.124.20	443	streetsave.club	Client Hello
2017-12-22 00:27:04	148.163.124.20	443	streetsave.club	Client Hello
2017-12-22 00:28:33	148.163.124.20	443	regwide.club	Client Hello
2017-12-22 00:29:33	185.62.190.214	1695		49511-rriIwm [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS
2017-12-22 00:29:41	10.12.22.1	53		Standard query 0xe215 A darlz.freeddns.org
2017-12-22 00:29:41	10.12.22.101	57601		Standard query response 0xe215 A 185.62.190.214

Shown above: Traffic from the infection filtered in [Wireshark](#).

#	Result	Protocol	Host	URL	Body	Content-Type	Process
2	200	HTTPS	streetsave.club	/styles/break/beta.hta	1,243	application/octet-stream	winword:1072
4	304	HTTPS	streetsave.club	/styles/break/beta.hta	0		mshta:1612
8	302	HTTPS	regwide.club	/images/scale/nile.php	5	text/html; charset=UTF-8	iexplore:2476
9	200	HTTPS	regwide.club	/images/scale/nite.exe	999,301	application/x-msdownload	iexplore:2476

Shown above: HTTPS traffic as seen in [Fiddler](#).

Date/Time	Src	port	Dst	port	Info
2017-12-22 00:29:33	10.12.22.101	49511	185.62.190.214	1695	49511->185.62.190.214 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460
2017-12-22 00:29:34	185.62.190.214	1695	10.12.22.101	49511	185.62.190.214->10.12.22.101 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460
2017-12-22 00:29:34	10.12.22.101	49511	185.62.190.214	1695	10.12.22.101->185.62.190.214 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=0 MSS=1460

Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 3)

Stream Content

```
.j..'.*.B..N..?.W.!D.....n.Jo  
[...u3G.xC.of.....@.Q%)6e4 .!W5...s.....b5....*.q.CH.I...?m.....=. ".W.V...  
[7...G.-).....P.....2...c.....>.._Jy..w.!>..t...*......7!(...|fx....Q=x.{/.b..C...U  
[2..w...'.6.....{.R.CO...../.j...w.G.....^h... ..T.....@.....H..c.m..B.....g.D.Y.q.  
{...a.m!.fk...1..~X[q,;...|.lm...>.....5t(.6...Tg...K..20.#\..S..  
...n...CS.d..5b.7.@g.V.4 ..Y.....U.wR{=.E..J.L...].UP..yeq<...w)31\  
\e..uX...u..a.U.....za|;|;...TOS..Z...f.a  
V.....C..|  
S.....'.O.m@.....?.....lb..s)....A.....B.a....Y...:g.#.p.....W.....v.....hz 4.t  
\C;.....4.....q..7A.....i...+...JV...&k+...o..b.>...>.*b...f{g[|  
C...R...T].JL....."e5.2.JB=9...k.X...h.9}M.l...j...v..h...w>...%B.....~.[U.b.l<..~Z.%K.Y.<..Su.70C..  
.X..D...d.v.(g.-.j..'.*.B..L....].8P.....l.ZzI..j..'.*.B..qL....].8P.....l.Zz8>..Dwn...|  
=.k..R..).0mGy.f..AzT..0...>\.....Zm5.."...(.nm.jb...2n..(.c.\.k.  
$L..Q.....j..'.*.B..L....].8P.....l.ZzI..j..'.*.B..sL....].8P.....l.Zz+>..wW\  
.|=..k..R..%.=mLy.f.I.Lz...0.....\.....XmQ.....+n{.b...<n.*...[.%.%...V./  
d.....j..'.*.B..L....].8P.....l.ZzI..j..'.*.B..nL....].8P.....l.Zz8>..Dwn...|  
=.k..R..).0mGy.f..AzT..0...>\.....Zm5.."...(.ns.jb...7n>.....8.%KzT....r/.....@  
..j..'.*.B..L....].8P.....l.ZzI..j..'.*.B./  
L....].8P.....l.Zz4>..lWR...w=.d..6..x.a.J.....B...j..'.*.B..L....].8P.....l.ZzI..j..'.*.B./  
L....].8P.....l.Zz4>..lWR...w=.d..6..q.b.J.....B...j..'.*.B..L....].8P.....l.ZzI..j..'.*.B..oL....].  
8P.....l.Zz8>..Dwn...|.k..R..).0mGy.f..AzT..0...>\.....Zm5.."...(.ns.jb...7n>.....8.%  
KzT....sd.....K  
..j..'.*.B..L....].8P.....l.ZzI..j..'.*.B..4L....].8P.....l.Zz>..DWG..be.S.d..6..u.i^..O.j..'.*.B..  
L....].8P.....l.ZzI..j..'.*.B..UL....].8P.....l.ZzN>..-W..L..=R.!..R..2.>mYy.fR.Sz  
\..0...8...I...w...}!.j..'.*.B..L....].8P.....l.ZzI..j..'.*.B..L....].8P.....l.Zz)>..wR...m=...a..
```

Shown above: Post-infection traffic from the Remcos RAT-infected host.

The screenshot shows the Windows Registry Editor window. The left pane shows the tree structure expanded to 'Computer\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\dizy-937GNR'. The right pane shows a list of registry values:


Name	Type	Data
(Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)
EXEpath	REG_BINARY	a5 60 7c 77 81 d6 3f 89 8c 1b 1a 3f d2 97 d8 f6 d6 4e 19 c2 2c 28 9b 08 4f 9c 14 72 41 7f d2 5f 47 bb e7 24 8c 64 f5 0f 44 9...

Shown above: Randomly-named key with binary data in the Windows registry.


The screenshot shows the Windows Registry Editor window. The left pane shows the tree structure expanded to 'Computer\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'. The right pane shows a list of registry values:

Name	Type	Data
(Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)
WindowsUpdate	REG_SZ	C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\Temp\58594949\mrk.exe C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\Temp\58594949\VJE_WT-1

Shown above: Updated key in the Windows registry to keep the infection persistent.



Shown above: Folder in the user's **AppData/Local/Temp** directory.



Shown above: File run by the AutoIt script engine, **vje=wtl**, as seen in a text editor.

INDICATORS

EMAIL DATA:

- Date: Thursday, 2017-12-21 at 13:56 UTC
- Subject: Invoice
- From: "Helen Rowe" <admin@besita[.]Jtk>
- Reply-To: "Helen Rowe" <order.sbsbio@outlook[.]com>
- Message-ID: <b98edd6e87c6201c7056c859bb73b48a.squirrel@212.237.6[.]114>
- User-Agent: SquirrelMail/1.4.22
- Attachment: Proforma invoice.doc

TRAFFIC:

- 148.164.124[.]20 port 443 - **streetsave[.]club** - GET /styles/break/beta.hta (HTTPS)
- 148.164.124[.]20 port 443 - **regwide[.]club** - GET /images/scale/nile.php (HTTPS)
- 148.164.124[.]20 port 443 - **regwide[.]club** - GET /images/scale/nite.exe (HTTPS)
- 185.62.190[.]214 por 1695 - **darlz.freedom[.]org** - encrypted post-infection traffic caused by Remcos RAT

MALWARE AND ARTIFACTS FROM THE INFECTED WINDOWS HOST:

- SHA256 hash: [1b78b77b4f571548df7d7a7e324bfe38425b901663906d91d7c5ec110a333a07](#)
File size: 332,066 bytes

File name: Proforma invoice.doc

File description: RTF document using CVE-2017-0199

- SHA256 hash: [402517926305219d9d482063334b9955866fbeb7fadd5fe9e0f72cc04a112173](#)

File size: 1,243 bytes

File name: beta.hta

File description: HTML application (HTA) file to download the next-stage malware

- SHA256 hash: [9717a2ec51316ca3b97d5c379e4b331e03e274dfd6de5433f3382b760f09b51b](#)

File size: 999,301 bytes

File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\foxread.exe

File description: RemcosRAT Installer for next stage of the infection

- SHA256 hash: [fb73a819b37523126c7708a1d06f3b8825fa60c926154ab2d511ba668f49dc4b](#)

File size: 750,320 bytes

File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\Temp\58594949\mrk.exe

File description: AutoIt v3 script engine (version 3.3.8.1) NOTE: This is a legitimate file. It is not inherently malicious.

- SHA256 hash: [fd00256c375f5d744d73a7ddba571f1887779af042bd6cf7100533c68c461a33](#)

File size: 3,092,687 bytes

File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\Temp\58594949\vje=wtl

File description: AutoIt script file executed by mrk.exe

WINDOWS REGISTRY UPDATES:

- [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]
"WindowsUpdate"="C:\\Users\\[username]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\58594949\\mrk.exe C:\\Users\\[username]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\58594949\\VJE_WT~1"
- [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\dizy-937GNR]
"EXEpath"=hex:a5,60,7c,77,81,d6,3f,89,8c,1b,1a,3f,d2,97,d8,f6,d6,4e,19,c2,2c,\\28,9b,08,4f,9c,14,72,41,7f,d2,5f,47,bb,e7,24,8c,64,f5,0f,44,91,cb,54,5f,1a,\\ba,bc,67,e6,94,1a,c0,54,66,67,c0,79,55,c1,8f,7c,29,3e,8a,08,bc,ed,f9,3f,5f,\\6d,17,22,66,b1,c8,c8,a3,e0,27,f2,ac,f3,82,3b,ed,3e,2a,69,56,21,8b,85,f4,c0,\\35,47,be,02,9f,d0,a0,c7,2a,f0,87,28,83,42,7c,97,2d,90,3b,c3

[Click here](#) to return to the main page.