DanaBot's Latest Move: Deploying Latrodectus
By eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU)
Archived: 2026-04-05 22:20:04 UTC
Adversaries don’t work 9-5 and neither do we. At eSentire, our 24/7 SOCs are staffed with Elite Threat Hunters
and Cyber Analysts who hunt, investigate, contain and respond to threats within minutes.
We have discovered some of the most dangerous threats and nation state attacks in our space – including the
Kaseya MSP breach and the more_eggs malware.
Our Security Operations Centers are supported with Threat Intelligence, Tactical Threat Response and Advanced
Threat Analytics driven by our Threat Response Unit – the TRU team.
In TRU Positives, eSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) provides a summary of a recent threat investigation. We
outline how we responded to the confirmed threat and what recommendations we have going forward.
Here’s the latest from our TRU Team…
What did we find?
In December 2023, this blog post was revised based on insights from Proofpoint's researcher, known as
@Myrtus0x0. The malware under investigation has been identified as 'Latrodectus', which is believed to have
been developed by the creators of IcedID.
In early November 2023, the eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU) detected the presence of DanaBot, a
sophisticated banking Trojan renowned for its ability to pilfer banking credentials, personal information, and
hVNC (hidden Virtual Network Computing) feature (Figure 1).
This malware was being employed to deliver IcedID, a banking Trojan that has been active since 2017 and is
widely recognized for its various capabilities. Notably, since 2020, IcedID has been linked to ransomware attacks,
including those involving Egregor, Maze, and Conti.
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Figure 1: DanaBot advertisement on a Russian hacking forum
In a recent case, we assess with high confidence that the initial infection for DanaBot occurred via a drive-by
download. The user was likely searching for a Webex installer and visited an imposter website serving the
payload. The archive payload is named Webex.zip (MD5: 4be85751a07081de31f52329c2e2ddc8).
The archive contains the following files:
rash.docx (IDAT Loader encrypted file), MD5: 34b87976172e911e3e2ed6007252e7dc
sqlite3.dll – malicious side-loaded DLL, MD5: 4ca6db064effc1730299a0f20531e49c
webex.exe – legitimate binary, MD5: 1f166f5c76eb155d44dd1bf160f37a6a
Upon execution of webex.exe, it will side-load the malicious DLL (sqlite3.dll), decrypt and decompress the
contents of rash.docx file, perform injection into explorer.exe via Process Doppelgänging, and decrypt and run the
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final payload. In our case, it’s DanaBot (MD5: 6ad1d4e1ca3f1784840364700f5a8a14).
We have observed DanaBot dropping the following files on the infected system under %TEMP% folder:
10608194856200.exe (MD5: 0d0c437a39787127fc0fbf19efc747ab), the file is, what we assess, an IcedID
VNC module
c5cfe172.dll, IcedID loader (MD5: 350915536540a76d44ce12dc03450424)
Upon execution of the IDAT loader, two folders are created under %AppData%:
DownloadWordpadISR (folder that contains rash.docx and sqlite3.dll)
Custom_update (folder that contains IcedID payloads Update_* (for example, Update_88d58563) and
update_data.dat)
The persistence for DanaBot is created via Startup folder (T1547.001) for webex.exe binary.
IcedID Technical Analysis
After the IcedID payload decryption, it creates a copy of itself under “%AppData%\ Custom_update\ Update_{8-
hexidecimal-characters}”. The 8 hexadecimal characters are determined by the function in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Hexadecimal value generation
The payload retrieves the volume serial number of the infected machine via GetVolumeInformationW API and
multiplies the result with the seed value 0x19660D. The returned result is then used as a part of the DLL filename
appended after “Update_” as 8 hexadecimal characters.
The function then proceeds and enters the loop where it performs the multiplication with the seed value with the
result of each seeded value returned from the mw_seed function; it then grabs the first byte from each calculated
result and builds a 14-byte unique HWID string that is sent to C2.
IcedID uses a CRC-32 hashing algorithm to calculate the hashes for the APIs used in the binary (Figures 3-4).
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Figure 3: CRC-32 API hashing function
Figure 4: CRC-32 calculated API hashes
The string decryption (Figure 5) is performed based on the following algorithm:
The function initializes using the first 4 bytes derived from the encrypted string.
Within prng_gen function, it generates a series of pseudo-random values based on the first 4-bytes derived
from the encrypted string.
For each byte in a certain range, it performs a bitwise XOR with the pseudo-random value and a byte from
the offset location in the encrypted string.
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Figure 5: String decryption function
We wrote the script to decrypt the strings with IDAPython.
The decrypted strings can be accessed here.
IcedID creates the hardcoded mutex “runnung". If the payload fails to create a mutex or if the mutex already exists
(indicated by the error code 183, which typically means ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS), then the payload enters
an infinite loop delay using NtDelayExecution (1000 milliseconds of delay) (Figure 6).
This prevents multiple instances of infections on the same infected machine.
Figure 6: IcedID enters an infinite loop of delays if the mutex already exists
The campaign ID is generated using the hardcoded string in the binary; in our binary, it’s “Novik”, and FNV
hashing algorithm.
Figure 7: FNV hashing algorithm
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Here is the implementation of the algorithm in Python:
def mw_fnv(input_str):
 v3 = 0x811C9DC5
 for char in input_str:
 v3 = (v3 ^ ord(char)) * 0x1000193
 v3 &= 0xFFFFFFFF
 return v3
fnv_hash = mw_fnv("Novik") # input your hardcoded string here
print(fnv_hash)
Upon successful infection, IcedID runs the following reconnaissance commands on the infected host:
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c systeminfo
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c nltest /domain_trusts
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c net view /all /domain
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c net view /all
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c net group "Domain Admin”
C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmic.exe /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path
AntiVirusProduct Get * /Format:List
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c net config workstation
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c wmic.exe /node:localhost /namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 path
AntiVirusProduct Get DisplayName | findstr /V /B /C:dis
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c whoami /groups
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
The results then are converted into base64-encoded strings and appended to the following tags accordingly:
&ipconfig=
&systeminfo=
&domain_trusts=
&domain_trusts_all=
&net_view_all_domain=
&net_view_all=
&net_group=
&net_config_ws=
&net_wmic_av=
&whoami_group=
Figure 8 shows the function responsible for the following:
Decrypts and sets HTTP headers (Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded).
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Determines the request method (POST or GET) based on the input parameter a2, decrypts the relevant
method string, and prepares it for use.
Calls HttpOpenRequestA with parameters including the request method, URL, and other settings. The
request is opened using a handle provided by InternetOpenW.
Checks if HttpOpenRequestA successfully created a request handle.
If it's a POST request, it calculates the length of the request data and headers, then sends the HTTP
request with HttpSendRequestA using these lengths and the base64-encoded data.
If it's a GET request, it sends the request without additional data.
Figure 8: HTTP Request Handler Function
The payload enumerates through the list of running processes using APIs such as CreateToolhelp32Snapshot,
Process32First, and Process32Next and appends the results to the following tags:
&proclist=
“pid":
"proc":
"subproc":
The persistence is achieved via the scheduled task named “Updater”. The task runs at every log on with the
following command:
rundll32.exe "C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Custom_update\Update_88d58563.dll", scab
Previously, we mentioned IcedID deploying the VNC module. There are a few interesting strings in the payload
that we observed:
{%0.8X-%0.4X-%0.4X-%0.4X-%0.4X%0.8X}
%ProgramFiles%\
gw@SET TO TOP
%ProgramData%\
%LOCALAPPDATA%\
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{"dev":[
%sProfile %u\
FOREGRAUND
%APPDATA%\
%ProgramFiles(x86)%\
/NOUACCHECK
xpChrome_WidgetWin_
NEW FOREGRAUND
aaa_11.02_mmm
hdesk
What did we do?
Our team of 24/7 SOC Cyber Analysts detected malicious network connections originating from the rundll32.exe
process, isolated the affected machine, and informed the impacted customer.
What can you learn from this TRU Positive?
The use of drive-by downloads for initial infection shows the effectiveness of this method for deploying
malware, emphasizing the risk associated with unverified downloads.
The execution of a legitimate binary to side-load a malicious DLL highlights advanced techniques used by
attackers to evade detection.
IcedID's approach to preventing multiple infections on the same machine using a hardcoded mutex and
entering an infinite loop if the mutex exists showcases a method to avoid detection and potential
interference with other malware.
The use of the FNV hashing algorithm to generate campaign IDs based on hardcoded strings.
The execution of various system commands post-infection for reconnaissance purposes underlines the
importance of monitoring command line activity on endpoints.Top of Form
Recommendations from our Threat Response Unit (TRU) Team:
Prioritize application installations from your organization’s library of approved applications (if
implemented).
Treat files downloaded from the Internet with the same vigilance as those delivered through email. Assume
files are potentially hostile regardless of the path that got you there. Remember, a website hosting software
advertised on a trusted search engine does not inherit that trust.
Encouraging good cybersecurity hygiene among your users by using Phishing and Security Awareness
Training (PSAT) when downloading software from the Internet.
Protect endpoints against malware by:
Ensuring antivirus signatures are up-to-date.
Using a Next-Gen AV (NGAV) or Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tool to detect and
contain threats.
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Indicators of Compromise
Name Indicator
Webex.zip 4be85751a07081de31f52329c2e2ddc8).
rash.docx 34b87976172e911e3e2ed6007252e7dc
sqlite3.dll 4ca6db064effc1730299a0f20531e49c
10608194856200.exe 0d0c437a39787127fc0fbf19efc747ab),
c5cfe172.dll 350915536540a76d44ce12dc03450424)
DanaBot 6ad1d4e1ca3f1784840364700f5a8a14).
IcedID C2 arsimonopa[.]com/live
IcedID C2 lemonimonakio[.]com/live
IcedID VNC C2 178.208.87[.]21
DanaBot C2 77.91.73[.][187
DanaBot C2 74.119.193[.]200
Reference
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/
https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/08/31/fake-update-utilizes-new-idat-loader-to-execute-stealc-and-lumma-infostealers/
https://github.com/esThreatIntelligence/iocs/blob/main/IcedID/icedid_decrypted_strings.txt
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To learn how your organization can build cyber resilience and prevent business disruption with eSentire’s Next
Level MDR, connect with an eSentire Security Specialist now.
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ABOUT ESENTIRE’S THREAT RESPONSE UNIT (TRU)
The eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU) is an industry-leading threat research team committed to helping your
organization become more resilient. TRU is an elite team of threat hunters and researchers that supports our 24/7
Security Operations Centers (SOCs), builds threat detection models across the eSentire XDR Cloud Platform, and
works as an extension of your security team to continuously improve our Managed Detection and Response
service. By providing complete visibility across your attack surface and performing global threat sweeps and
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proactive hypothesis-driven threat hunts augmented by original threat research, we are laser-focused on defending
your organization against known and unknown threats.
Source: https://www.esentire.com/blog/danabots-latest-move-deploying-icedid
https://www.esentire.com/blog/danabots-latest-move-deploying-icedid
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