

reversing an Android anti-analysis native library

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VB2018 paper: Unpacking the packed unpacker: reversing an Android anti-analysis native library

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Table of contents

Abstract

Malware authors implement many different techniques to frustrate analysis and make reverse engineering malware more difficult. Many of these anti-analysis and anti-reverse engineering techniques attempt to send a reverse engineer down a different investigation path or require them to invest large amounts of time reversing simple code. This talk analyses one of the most interesting anti-analysis native libraries we've seen in the *Android* ecosystem. No previous references to this library have been found. We've named this anti-analysis library 'WeddingCake' because it has lots of layers.

This paper covers four techniques the malware authors used in the WeddingCake anti-analysis library to prevent reverse engineering. These include: manipulating the Java Native Interface, writing complex algorithms for simple functionality, encryption, and run-time environment checks. This paper discusses the steps and the process required to proceed through the anti-analysis traps and expose what the developers are trying to hide.

Introduction

To protect their code, authors may implement obfuscation, encryption, and anti-analysis techniques. There are both legitimate and malicious reasons why developers may want to prevent analysis and reverse engineering of their code. Legitimate developers may want to protect their intellectual property, while malicious developers may want to prevent detection. This paper details an *Android* anti-analysis native library used by multiple malware families to prevent analysis and detection of their malicious behaviours. Some variants of the Chamois malware family [1] use this anti-analysis library, which has been seen in over 5,000 unique *Android* APKs. The APK with SHA256 hash e8e1bc048ef123a9757a9b27d1bf53c092352a26bdbf9fdbc10109415b5cadac is used as the sample for this paper.

Introduction to the Java Native Interface (JNI)

The sample *Android* application includes a native library to hide the contents and functionality of native code. The Java Native Interface (JNI) allows developers to define Java native methods that run in other languages, such as C or C++, in the application. This allows bytecode and native code to interface with each other. In *Android*, the Native Development Kit (NDK) is a toolset that permits developers to write C and C++ code for their *Android* apps [2]. Using the NDK, *Android* developers can include native shared libraries in their *Android* applications. These native shared libraries are .so files, a shared object library in the ELF format. In this paper, the terms 'native library', 'ELF', and '.so file' are used interchangeably to refer to the anti-analysis library. The anti-analysis library that is detailed in this paper is one of these *Android* native shared libraries.

The bytecode in the .dex file of the *Android* application defines the native methods [3]. These native method definitions pair with a subroutine in the shared library. Before the native method can be run from the Java code, the Java code must call System.loadLibrary or System.load on the shared library (.so file). When the Java code calls one of the two load methods, the JNI_OnLoad() function is called from the shared library. The shared library needs to export the JNI_OnLoad() function.

In order to run a native method from Java, the native method must be 'registered', meaning that the JNI knows how to pair the Java method definition with the correct function in the native library. This can be done either by leveraging the RegisterNatives JNI function or through 'discovery' based on the function names and function signatures matching in both Java and the .so [4]. For either method, a string of the Java method name is required for the JNI to know which native function to call.

Characteristics of the anti-analysis library

WeddingCake, the anti-analysis library discussed in this paper, is an *Android* native library, an ELF file, included in the APK. In the sample, the anti-analysis library is named lib/armeabi/libdxarq.so. The name of the anti-analysis library differs in each APK, as explained in the following section.

Naming

Within the classes.dex of the APK, there is a package of classes whose whole name is random characters. For the sample described in this paper, the class name is ses.fdkxxcr.udayjfrgxp.ojoyqmosj.xien.xmdowmbkdgfgk. This class declares three native methods: quaqrd, ixkjwu, and vxeg.

The native library discussed in this paper is usually named lib[3-8 random lowercase characters].so. However, we've encountered a few samples whose name does not match this convention. All APK samples that include WeddingCake use different random characters for their class and function names. It is likely that WeddingCake provides tooling that generates new random names each time it is compiled.

Variants

The most common version of the library is a 32-bit 'generic' ARM (armeabi) ELF, but I've also identified 32-bit ARMv7 (armeabi-v7a), ARM64 (arm64-v8a), and x86 (x86) versions of the library. All of the variants include the same functionality. If not otherwise specified, this paper focuses on the 32-bit 'generic' ARM implementation of WeddingCake because this is the most common variant.

As an example, the APK with SHA256 hash 92e80872cfd49f33c63993d52290afd2e87cbef5db4adff1bfa97297340f23e0, which is different from the one analysed in this paper, includes three variants of the anti-analysis library: generic ARM, ARMv7, and x86.

| Anti-analysis lib file paths | Anti-analysis library 'type' |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| lib/armeabi/librxovdx.so | 32-bit 'generic' ARM |
| lib/armeabi-v7a/librxovdx.so | 32-bit ARMv7 |
| lib/x86/libaojpp.so | x86 |

Table 1: Anti-analysis lib paths in 92e80872cfd49f33c63993d52290afd2e87cbef5db4adff1bfa97297340f23e0.

Key signatures of the ELF

There are some signatures that help identify ELF files as a WeddingCake anti-analysis library:

- Two strings under the .comment section in the ELF:
 - Android clang version 3.8.275480 (based on LLVM 3.8.275480)
 - GCC: (GNU) 4.9.x 20150123 (prerelease)
- The native function names defined in the APK do not exist in the shared library
- For the 32-bit generic ARM version of the library, when loaded into *IDA Pro*, `JNI_OnLoad` (Figure 1) is an exported function name, but does not exist in 'functions' because there are 12 bytes (three words) that are defined as data, which inhibit *IDA*'s ability to identify the function. The bytes defined as data are always at offsets `+0x24`, `+0x28`, and `+0x44` from the beginning of the `JNI_OnLoad` function.

```

.text:00001B20 ; -----
.text:00001B20
.text:00001B20
.text:00001B20
.text:00001B20      JNI_OnLoad      EXPORT JNI_OnLoad
.text:00001B20      F0 B5      PUSH      {R4-R7,LR}
.text:00001B22      03 AF      ADD       R7, SP, #0xC
.text:00001B24      9D B0      SUB       SP, SP, #0x74
.text:00001B26      07 49      LDR       R1, =(__stack_chk_guard_ptr - 0x1B2C)
.text:00001B28      79 44      ADD       R1, PC ; __stack_chk_guard_ptr
.text:00001B2A      09 68      LDR       R1, [R1] ; __stack_chk_guard
.text:00001B2C      09 68      LDR       R1, [R1]
.text:00001B2E      1C 91      STR       R1, [SP,#0x70]
.text:00001B30      00 25      MOVS     R5, #0
.text:00001B32      1B 95      STR       R5, [SP,#0x6C]
.text:00001B34      EE 43      MVNS     R6, R5
.text:00001B36      04 49      LDR       R1, =(byte_A450 - 0x1B3C)
.text:00001B38      79 44      ADD       R1, PC ; byte_A450
.text:00001B3A      09 78      LDRB     R1, [R1]
.text:00001B3C      00 29      CMP      R1, #0
.text:00001B3E      05 D0      BEQ      loc_1B4C
.text:00001B40      00 F0 93 FF      BL       sub_2A6A
.text:00001B40
.text:00001B44      80 73 00 00 off_1B44      DCD      __stack_chk_guard_ptr - 0x1B2C
.text:00001B44      ; DATA XREF: .text:00001B26↑r
.text:00001B48      14 89 00 00 off_1B48      DCD      byte_A450 - 0x1B3C ; DATA XREF: .text:00001B36↑r
.text:00001B4C
.text:00001B4C
.text:00001B4C      loc_1B4C      ; CODE XREF: .text:00001B3E↑j
.text:00001B4C      05 90      STR       R0, [SP,#0x14]
.text:00001B4E      05 48      LDR       R0, =(byte_A450 - 0x1B54)
.text:00001B50      78 44      ADD       R0, PC ; byte_A450
.text:00001B52      01 21      MOVS     R1, #1
.text:00001B54      01 70      STRB     R1, [R0]
.text:00001B56      13 91      STR       R1, [SP,#0x4C]
.text:00001B58      0C 02      LSLS     R4, R1, #8
.text:00001B5A      10 B4      PUSH     {R4}
.text:00001B5C      01 BC      POP      {R0}
.text:00001B5E      05 F0 33 F8      BL       j_j_malloc
.text:00001B62      01 E0      B        loc_1B68
.text:00001B62
.text:00001B64      FC 88 00 00 off_1B64      DCD      byte_A450 - 0x1B54 ; DATA XREF: .text:00001B4E↑r
.text:00001B68
.text:00001B68
.text:00001B68      loc_1B68      ; CODE XREF: .text:00001B62↑j
.text:00001B68      ; .text:00001B6E↓j
.text:00001B68      45 55      STRB     R5, [R0,R5]
.text:00001B6A      01 35      ADDS     R5, #1
.text:00001B6C      AC 42      CMP      R4, R5
.text:00001B6E      FB D1      BNE     loc_1B68
.text:00001B70      06 4D      LDR       R5, =(off_2C08+1)
.text:00001B72      07 49      LDR       R1, =0x7FFFFFFF
.text:00001B74      1A 91      STR       R1, [SP,#0x68]

```

Figure 1: JNI_OnLoad in IDAPro.

Analysing the library

The JNI_OnLoad function is the starting point for analysis because there are no references to the native methods that were defined in the APK. For this sample, the following three methods were defined as native methods in ses.fdkxxcr.udayjfrgxp.ojoyqmosj.xien.xmdowmbkdjfgk:

```

public static native String quaqr(int p0);
public native Object ixkjuw(Object[] p0);
public native int vxeg(Object[] p0);

```

There are no instances of these strings existing in the native library being analysed. As described in the 'Introduction to JNI' section, in order to call a native function from the Java code in the APK, the ELF must know how to match a Java method (as listed previously) to the native function in the ELF file. This is done by registering the native function using RegisterNatives() and the JNINativeMethod struct [5]. We would normally expect to see the Java native method name and its associated function signature ([Ljava/lang/Object;)I as strings in the ELF file. Since we do not, the ELF file is probably using an anti-analysis technique.

Because `JNI_OnLoad` must be executed prior to the application calling one of its defined native methods, I began analysis in the `JNI_OnLoad` function.

In the sample, the `JNI_OnLoad()` function ends with many calls to the same function. This is shown in Figure 2. Each call takes a different block of memory as its argument, which is often a signal of decryption. In this sample, the subroutine at `0x2F30` (`sub_2F30`) is the in-place decryption function.

```

00001C0A 20 B4      PUSH    {R5}
00001C0C 08 BC      POP     {R3}
00001C0E 01 F0 8F F9 BL      sub_2F30
00001C12 F8 48      LDR     R0, =(unk_907F - 0x1C18)
00001C14 78 44      ADD     R0, PC ; unk_907F
00001C16 18 21      MOVS   R1, #0x18
00001C18 14 91      STR     R1, [SP,#0x80+var_30]
00001C1A 10 B4      PUSH   {R4}
00001C1C 04 BC      POP     {R2}
00001C1E 20 B4      PUSH   {R5}
00001C20 08 BC      POP     {R3}
00001C22 01 F0 85 F9 BL      sub_2F30
00001C26 F4 48      LDR     R0, =(unk_9097 - 0x1C2C)
00001C28 78 44      ADD     R0, PC ; unk_9097
00001C2A 40 B4      PUSH   {R6}
00001C2C 02 BC      POP     {R1}
00001C2E 10 B4      PUSH   {R4}
00001C30 04 BC      POP     {R2}
00001C32 20 B4      PUSH   {R5}
00001C34 08 BC      POP     {R3}
00001C36 01 F0 7B F9 BL      sub_2F30
00001C3A F0 48      LDR     R0, =(unk_90B6 - 0x1C40)
00001C3C 78 44      ADD     R0, PC ; unk_90B6
00001C3E 40 B4      PUSH   {R6}
00001C40 02 BC      POP     {R1}
00001C42 10 B4      PUSH   {R4}
00001C44 04 BC      POP     {R2}
00001C46 20 B4      PUSH   {R5}
00001C48 08 BC      POP     {R3}
00001C4A 01 F0 71 F9 BL      sub_2F30
00001C4E EC 48      LDR     R0, =(unk_90D5 - 0x1C54)
00001C50 78 44      ADD     R0, PC ; unk_90D5
00001C52 17 21      MOVS   R1, #0x17
00001C54 13 91      STR     R1, [SP,#0x80+var_34]
00001C56 10 B4      PUSH   {R4}
00001C58 04 BC      POP     {R2}
00001C5A 20 B4      PUSH   {R5}
00001C5C 08 BC      POP     {R3}
00001C5E 01 F0 67 F9 BL      sub_2F30
00001C62 E8 48      LDR     R0, =(unk_90EC - 0x1C68)
00001C64 78 44      ADD     R0, PC ; unk_90EC
00001C66 37 21      MOVS   R1, #0x37
00001C68 04 91      STR     R1, [SP,#0x80+var_70]
00001C6A 10 B4      PUSH   {R4}
00001C6C 04 BC      POP     {R2}
00001C6E 20 B4      PUSH   {R5}
00001C70 08 BC      POP     {R3}
00001C72 01 F0 5D F9 BL      sub_2F30
00001C76 E4 48      LDR     R0, =(unk_9123 - 0x1C7C)
00001C78 78 44      ADD     R0, PC ; unk_9123
00001C7A 14 21      MOVS   R1, #0x14
00001C7C 0F 91      STR     R1, [SP,#0x80+var_44]
00001C7E 10 B4      PUSH   {R4}
00001C80 04 BC      POP     {R2}
00001C82 20 B4      PUSH   {R5}
00001C84 08 BC      POP     {R3}
00001C86 01 F0 53 F9 BL      sub_2F30
00001C8A E0 48      LDR     R0, =(unk_9137 - 0x1C90)
00001C8C 78 44      ADD     R0, PC ; unk_9137
00001C8E 1A 21      MOVS   R1, #0x1A
00001C90 02 91      STR     R1, [SP,#0x80+var_78]
00001C92 10 B4      PUSH   {R4}
00001C94 04 BC      POP     {R2}
00001C96 20 B4      PUSH   {R5}
00001C98 08 BC      POP     {R3}
00001C9A 01 F0 49 F9 BL      sub_2F30
00001C9E DC 48      LDR     R0, =(unk_9151 - 0x1CA4)
00001CA0 78 44      ADD     R0, PC ; unk_9151

```

Figure 2: Calls to the decryption subroutine in JNI_OnLoad in IDA Pro.

In-place decryption

To obscure its functionality, this library's contents are decrypted dynamically when the library is loaded. The decryption algorithm used in this library was not matched to a known encryption/decryption algorithm. The decryption function, found at sub_2F30 in this sample, takes the following arguments:

- encrypted_array: Pointer to the encrypted byte array (bytes to be decrypted)
- length: Length of the encrypted byte array
- word_seed_array: Word (each value in array is 4 bytes) seed array
- byte_seed_array: Byte (each value in array is 1 byte) seed array

```
sub_2F30(Byte[] encrypted_array, int length, Word[] word_seed_array, Byte[] byte_seed_array)
```

Generating the seed arrays

The decryption function takes two seed arrays as arguments each time it is called: the word seed array and the byte seed array. These two arrays are generated once, beginning at 0x1B58 in this sample, prior to the first call to the decryption function. The byte array is created first; in this sample, it's generated at 0x1B58. The word array is created immediately after the byte array initialization at 0x1BD0. The word seed array and byte seed array are the same for every call to the decryption function within the ELF and are never modified.

The author of this code obfuscated the generation of the seed arrays. The *IDA* decompiled code for the generation of the two arrays, `byte_seed_array` and `word_seed_array`, is shown in Listing 1.

```
byte_seed_array = malloc(0x100u);
index = 0;
do
{
    byte_seed_array[index] = index;
    ++index;
}
while ( 256 != index );
v4 = 0x2C09;
curr_count = 256;
copy_byte_seed_array = byte_seed_array
do
{
    v6 = 0x41C64E6D * v4 + 0x3039;
    v7 = v6;
    v8 = copy_byte_seed_array[v6];
    v9 = 0x41C64E6D * (v6 & 0x7FFFFFFF) + 0x3039;
    copy_byte_seed_array[v7] = copy_byte_seed_array[v9];
    copy_byte_seed_array[v9] = v8;
    --curr_count;
    v4 = v9 & 0x7FFFFFFF;
}
while ( curr_count );
```

```
word_seed_array = malloc(0x400u);
index = 0;
do
{
    word_seed_array[byte_seed_array[index]] = index;
    ++index;
}
while ( 256 != index );
```

Listing 1: The IDA decompiled code for the generation of the two arrays, `byte_seed_array` and `word_seed_array`.

These algorithms output the `byte_seed_array` and `word_seed_array` shown in Listing 2. The author of this code tried to frustrate the reverse engineering process of this library by writing complex algorithms which would require more investment of effort, time and skill to reverse engineer. Using a complex algorithm to accomplish a simple task is a common anti-reverse engineering technique.

```
byte_seed_array =
[0x0, 0x1, 0x2, 0x3, 0x4, 0x5, 0x6, 0x7, 0x8, 0x9, 0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd, 0xe, 0xf, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x3f, 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x5c, 0x5d, 0x5e, 0x5f, 0x60, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, 0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x8f, 0x90, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97, 0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x9e, 0x9f, 0xa0, 0xa1, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6, 0xa7, 0xa8, 0xa9, 0xaa, 0xab, 0xac, 0xad, 0xae, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xb3, 0xb4, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xba, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0xbe, 0xbf, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7, 0xd8, 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xec, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef, 0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff];
word_seed_array =
[0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000003, 0x00000004, 0x00000005, 0x00000006, 0x00000007, 0x00000008, 0x00000009, 0x0000000a, 0x0000000b, 0x0000000c, 0x0000000d, 0x0000000e, 0x0000000f, 0x00000010, 0x00000011, 0x00000012, 0x00000013, 0x00000014, 0x00000015, 0x00000016, 0x00000017, 0x00000018, 0x00000019, 0x0000001a, 0x0000001b, 0x0000001c, 0x0000001d, 0x0000001e, 0x0000001f, 0x00000020, 0x00000021, 0x00000022, 0x00000023, 0x00000024, 0x00000025, 0x00000026, 0x00000027, 0x00000028, 0x00000029, 0x0000002a, 0x0000002b, 0x0000002c, 0x0000002d, 0x0000002e, 0x0000002f, 0x00000030, 0x00000031, 0x00000032, 0x00000033, 0x00000034, 0x00000035, 0x00000036, 0x00000037, 0x00000038, 0x00000039, 0x0000003a, 0x0000003b, 0x0000003c, 0x0000003d, 0x0000003e, 0x0000003f, 0x00000040, 0x00000041, 0x00000042, 0x00000043, 0x00000044, 0x00000045, 0x00000046, 0x00000047, 0x00000048, 0x00000049, 0x0000004a, 0x0000004b, 0x0000004c, 0x0000004d, 0x0000004e, 0x0000004f, 0x00000050, 0x00000051, 0x00000052, 0x00000053, 0x00000054, 0x00000055, 0x00000056, 0x00000057, 0x00000058, 0x00000059, 0x0000005a, 0x0000005b, 0x0000005c, 0x0000005d, 0x0000005e, 0x0000005f, 0x00000060, 0x00000061, 0x00000062, 0x00000063, 0x00000064, 0x00000065, 0x00000066, 0x00000067, 0x00000068, 0x00000069, 0x0000006a, 0x0000006b, 0x0000006c, 0x0000006d, 0x0000006e, 0x0000006f, 0x00000070, 0x00000071, 0x00000072, 0x00000073, 0x00000074, 0x00000075, 0x00000076, 0x00000077, 0x00000078, 0x00000079, 0x0000007a, 0x0000007b, 0x0000007c, 0x0000007d, 0x0000007e, 0x0000007f, 0x00000080, 0x00000081, 0x00000082, 0x00000083, 0x00000084, 0x00000085, 0x00000086, 0x00000087, 0x00000088, 0x00000089, 0x0000008a, 0x0000008b, 0x0000008c, 0x0000008d, 0x0000008e, 0x0000008f, 0x00000090, 0x00000091, 0x00000092, 0x00000093, 0x00000094, 0x00000095, 0x00000096, 0x00000097, 0x00000098, 0x00000099, 0x0000009a, 0x0000009b, 0x0000009c, 0x0000009d, 0x0000009e, 0x0000009f, 0x000000a0, 0x000000a1, 0x000000a2, 0x000000a3, 0x000000a4, 0x000000a5, 0x000000a6, 0x000000a7, 0x000000a8, 0x000000a9, 0x000000aa, 0x000000ab, 0x000000ac, 0x000000ad, 0x000000ae, 0x000000af, 0x000000b0, 0x000000b1, 0x000000b2, 0x000000b3, 0x000000b4, 0x000000b5, 0x000000b6, 0x000000b7, 0x000000b8, 0x000000b9, 0x000000ba, 0x000000bb, 0x000000bc, 0x000000bd, 0x000000be, 0x000000bf, 0x000000c0, 0x000000c1, 0x000000c2, 0x000000c3, 0x000000c4, 0x000000c5, 0x000000c6, 0x000000c7, 0x000000c8, 0x000000c9, 0x000000ca, 0x000000cb, 0x000000cc, 0x000000cd, 0x000000ce, 0x000000cf, 0x000000d0, 0x000000d1, 0x000000d2, 0x000000d3, 0x000000d4, 0x000000d5, 0x000000d6, 0x000000d7, 0x000000d8, 0x000000d9, 0x000000da, 0x000000db, 0x000000dc, 0x000000dd, 0x000000de, 0x000000df, 0x000000e0, 0x000000e1, 0x000000e2, 0x000000e3, 0x000000e4, 0x000000e5, 0x000000e6, 0x000000e7, 0x000000e8, 0x000000e9, 0x000000ea, 0x000000eb, 0x000000ec, 0x000000ed, 0x000000ee, 0x000000ef, 0x000000f0, 0x000000f1, 0x000000f2, 0x000000f3, 0x000000f4, 0x000000f5, 0x000000f6, 0x000000f7, 0x000000f8, 0x000000f9, 0x000000fa, 0x000000fb, 0x000000fc, 0x000000fd, 0x000000fe, 0x000000ff];
```

Listing 2: The `byte_seed_array` and `word_seed_array`.

Knowing that these arrays are static, an analyst could dump the arrays any time post-initialization, thus bypassing this anti-reversing technique.

Decryption algorithm

The overall framework of the in-place decryption process is:

1. Decryption function is called on an array of encrypted bytes.
2. Decryption is performed.
3. Encrypted bytes are overwritten by the decryption bytes.

This process is repeated in `JNI_OnLoad()` for each encrypted array. I did not identify the decryption algorithm used in the library as being a variation of a known encryption algorithm. The Python code I wrote to implement the decryption algorithm is shown in Listing 3.

```
def decrypt(encrypted_bytes, length, byte_seed_array, word_seed_array):
    if (encrypted_bytes is None):
        print ( "encrypted_bytes is null. -- Exiting ")
        return
    if (length < 1):
        print ( "encrypted_bytes len < 1 -- Exiting ")
        return
```

```
reg_4 = ~(0x00000004)
reg_0 = 4
reg_2 = 0
reg_5 = 0
do_loop = True
# Address 0x2F58 in Sample e8e1bc048ef123a9757a9b27d1bf53c092352a26bdbf9fbdc10109415b5cadac
while (do_loop):
    reg_6 = length + reg_0
    reg_6 = encrypted_bytes[reg_6 + reg_4]
    if (reg_6 & 0x80):
        if (reg_5 > 3):
            return
        reg_6 = reg_6 & 0x7F
        reg_2 = reg_2 & 0xFF
        reg_2 = reg_2 << 7
        reg_2 = reg_2 | reg_6
        reg_0 = reg_0 + reg_4 + 4
        reg_3 = length + reg_0 + reg_4 + 2
        reg_5 += 1
        if (reg_3 & 0x80000000 or reg_3 <= 1):
            return
    else:
        do_loop = False
        reg_5 = 0xF0 & reg_6
        reg_3 = length + reg_0 + reg_4
        reg_1 = reg_3 + 1
        if (reg_0 == 0 and reg_5 != 0):
            return
# Address 0x2F9A in Sample e8e1bc048ef123a9757a9b27d1bf53c092352a26bdbf9fbdc10109415b5cadac
reg_5 = reg_1
reg_1 = (reg_2 << 7) + reg_6
byte_FF = 0xFF
reg_1 = reg_1 & byte_FF
last_byte = reg_1
if (reg_5 == 0 or reg_5 & 0x80000000 or last_byte == 0 or signed_ble(reg_3, last_byte)):
    return
reg_1 = (reg_4 + 4)
reg_1 = (reg_1 * last_byte)
reg_1 += length
crazy_num = reg_1 + reg_0 + reg_4
if (crazy_num < 1):
    return
new_index = reg_1 + reg_0
reg_5 = 0
# Address 0x2FD8 in Sample e8e1bc048ef123a9757a9b27d1bf53c092352a26bdbf9fbdc10109415b5cadac
while (1):
    byte = encrypted_bytes[reg_5]
```

```
reg_0 = byte << 2
reg_6 = word_seed_array[byte]
reg_0 = 0xFF - reg_6
if (not reg_6 & 0x80000000):
    reg_6 = reg_0
reg_0 = reg_5
reg_1 = reg_0 % last_byte
reg_0 = new_index + reg_1
reg_0 = encrypted_bytes[(reg_0 + reg_4) & 0xFF]
reg_1 = word_seed_array[reg_0]
reg_2 = reg_1 | reg_6
index_reg_0 = reg_5
if (reg_2 & 0x80000000):
    break
# Address 0x3012 in Sample e8e1bc048ef123a9757a9b27d1bf53c092352a26bdbf9fbdc10109415b5cadac
reg_1 = reg_6 + reg_1 + reg_5
reg_2 = arith_shift_rt(reg_1, 0x1F)
reg_2 = reg_2 >> 0x18
reg_2 = reg_2 & ~0x000000FF
reg_1 -= reg_2
reg_1 = 0x000000FF - reg_1
reg_1 = byte_seed_array[reg_1 & 0xFF]
encrypted_bytes[index_reg_0] = reg_1 & 0xFF
reg_5 += 1
if (reg_5 >= crazy_num):
    break
print "***** FINISHED DECRYPT ***** "
```

Listing 3: Python code to implement the decryption algorithm.

I wrote an IDAPython script to statically decrypt the contents of the ELF so that reverse engineering could continue. This script and description is provided in the Appendix.

Decrypted contents

Each of the encrypted arrays decrypts to a string. Before-and-after samples of the encrypted bytes and the decrypted bytes at 0x9480 are shown in Figures 3 and 4. The bytes were decrypted using the IDAPython decryption script described in the Appendix.

```
00009480 01 F5 F0 81 88 94 F1 C6 29 18 2F DD 0C 34 AE 32 .....)/..4.2
00009490 EA 8E 53 58 0C 52 EE BE 2F 05 F5 0F C2 FC 18 BA ..SX.R../.....
000094A0 B3 6E 36 39 C7 D2 FD D5 FE 73 4B 3A A3 06 FE D3 .n69.....sK:....
000094B0 F5 88 46 0A DC 14 28 D8 CB 5D 59 44 EB 2E FD A2 ..F...(...]YD....
000094C0 F0 8C 56 61 E1 F2 36 E2 1A 91 2C 65 ED 31 3E EE ..Va..6...e.1>..
000094D0 17 A6 34 48 F5 47 42 00 20 75 0D CD C2 56 98 9E ..4H.GB..u...V..
000094E0 54 7E FB 08 59 47 3E E4 CC 0C FB 90 DE 5C FE 9B T~..YG>.....\..
000094F0 5F AA AF 63 67 D7 EF E5 C6 80 99 9B 94 1B 6F 24 ___cg.....o$
00009500 AB 22 DF 38 3A 0F 3D 84 A8 5E 94 7E D2 D0 6B 8F ." :8: .= ..^.~.k.
00009510 4E C8 D5 75 A4 89 D8 DF 3B 78 98 DD E4 76 A8 A2 N..u.....;x...v..
00009520 C6 DA 89 AE 9F EF DF 8D 7F 38 15 5A 5A FA 22 05 .....8.ZZ.".
00009530 8B F9 88 E0 8A 00 4C E9 0B 9B 7D 91 8F BE 05 A2 .....L...}.....
00009540 DE 71 DE 3F 8E 25 67 25 CC DA 81 95 2B 44 33 0F .q.?.%g%.....+D3.
00009550 0D 52 3B 2E AA B6 E8 3C AE 33 FB 4D EF 14 6E 2A .R;.....<.3.M..n*
00009560 11 D1 65 B2 E8 D6 44 B0 5F A2 49 48 EC 0E E3 29 ..e...D...IH...)
00009570 1C 32 1C A2 E3 C7 2F F7 05 2A C3 EF 77 0A A9 37 .2..../...*.w..7
00009580 E9 EC 8A 01 7D 61 F7 03 8B 0E BB 4F B2 E3 92 07 ....}a.....O....
00009590 D0 7B BE 10 93 0F D5 92 FE 17 AD E1 B3 8B 0E 1C .{.....
000095A0 9B 1F D1 70 0A 16 A5 31 E6 6D A7 02 76 83 13 90 ...p...1.m..v...
000095B0 43 06 2A 29 40 DC 08 7F 63 1F B7 D9 B2 C3 C5 D9 C.*)@...c.....
000095C0 7A 8C 42 27 18 8E 28 08 0B C1 7F 0E 86 25 29 3D z.B'...(.....%)=
000095D0 5C 7A 13 16 20 2B 44 FD 8D 57 1D 96 22 F2 BB C8 \z...+D..W..."...
000095E0 26 2C A1 A0 B0 1F CC 56 19 10 2C 79 A2 7C 84 F1 &.....V...y.|..
000095F0 85 4B 14 A2 17 8A 40 7B AF 88 50 E7 92 9C 24 A5 .K...@{...P...$.
00009600 22 87 56 47 A9 87 90 15 AB 99 BC CB 0A 3C 07 11 ".VG.....<..
00009610 83 1B 15 9C 27 9E 09 0C D9 AC 03 9B D4 F6 DF 0E ....'.....
00009620 DC C4 39 EE CF C7 92 15 01 F8 17 D9 C2 1F EE C8 ..9.....
00009630 08 C3 2F 99 6F 4A 8B 37 A1 7E 74 A4 5F 49 C6 0B ../.oJ.7..~t..I..
00009640 31 36 0E BF 16 CD F3 39 6A 43 1F CB 4C 63 34 19 16.....9jC...Lc4.
00009650 DA E1 FA 8E 9C 69 38 23 5F 84 40 1B E6 FD FD A5 .....i8#...@.....
00009660 34 DE F1 C1 9C AA 67 7A 12 14 EB C1 A0 0C DC 3D 4.....gz.....=
00009670 64 5F E2 31 AB EC B0 28 19 C7 18 77 6A CD 34 F4 d_1...(...wj.4.
00009680 7D BA 41 6E 47 AD AA BC 67 B0 0E 26 56 E8 42 67 }.AnG...g...&V.Bg
00009690 09 73 2F EA 3B A5 A9 39 56 0A 4E 77 02 92 47 B3 .s/;...9V.Nw..G.
000096A0 2F 43 FE FA 9A D5 02 8E 0C F9 76 D1 2D 37 0C CE /C.....v.-7..
000096B0 A0 A2 AD 0D 20 E9 C5 18 1D A9 CB 34 5B 2A 3D 47 .....4[*=G
000096C0 A4 A8 70 9E F0 14 36 03 E6 0D 65 AB 73 0B 8F B9 ..p...6...e.s...
000096D0 04 F9 AC 3B EE 63 C3 EC 91 76 C0 B5 1E 9C BA 14 ...;c...v.....
000096E0 07 C3 3B FD 44 F3 3B 43 A0 2A 42 9A 7B 43 C0 7F ...;D.;C.*B.{C..
000096F0 2A 41 76 11 0F 01 8F 3E 04 BE 78 2B C0 D9 41 59 *Av....>..x+..AY
00009700 CA C1 62 70 6F DE 9D 16 DB 8F 49 73 F8 1F EE 7F ..bpo....Is....
00009710 A9 AF 69 4C 49 7D 07 11 A4 BE 9C DB 8D 6D 36 F8 ..iLI}.....m6.
00009720 9B 1E 3B 49 35 6B 89 A5 16 B7 86 67 0A 72 47 4C ...;I5k.....g.rGL
00009730 8F CD 53 C0 78 67 59 88 50 5D 8E 19 4D C1 8E B1 ..S.xgY.P]..M...
00009740 FF 09 D8 E1 18 9B DB 44 0E 31 EC 0A 41 16 8B B4 .....D.1..A...
00009750 D1 94 9F 02 B7 12 15 82 2E 41 6A 3D 1A 21 09 32 .....Aj=.!..2
00009760 2D 50 39 16 64 23 59 32 17 7F 41 18 93 BC C3 BE -P9.d#Y2..A.....
00009770 03 D1 99 13 AE E4 08 55 62 CD 7F 1E 08 30 17 ED .....Ub....0..
00009780 EF E6 F3 87 17 A7 8F B8 A1 6C 09 EA 9C 55 B5 C2 .....1...U..
```

Figure 3: Encrypted bytes in ELF beginning at 0x9480.

```

00009480 01 F5 F0 81 88 94 F1 C6 29 18 2F DD 0C 28 5B 42 .....)./..([B
00009490 29 5B 42 00 0C 52 EE BE 2F 05 28 4C 6A 61 76 61 ) [B..R../.(Ljava
000094A0 2F 6C 61 6E 67 2F 53 74 72 69 6E 67 3B 5B 4C 6A /lang/String; [Lj
000094B0 61 76 61 2F 6C 61 6E 67 2F 43 6C 61 73 73 3B 29 ava/lang/Class;)
000094C0 4C 6A 61 76 61 2F 6C 61 6E 67 2F 72 65 66 6C 65 Ljava/lang/refle
000094D0 63 74 2F 4D 65 74 68 6F 64 3B 00 CD C2 56 98 9E ct/Method;...V..
000094E0 54 7E FB 08 6A 61 76 61 2F 6C 61 6E 67 2F 49 6E T~..java/lang/In
000094F0 74 65 67 65 72 00 EF E5 C6 80 99 9B 94 1B 6F 24 teger.....o$
00009500 AB 22 DF 38 3A 0F 28 29 4C 61 6E 64 72 6F 69 64 ." :8:() Landroid
00009510 2F 63 6F 6E 74 65 6E 74 2F 43 6F 6E 74 65 6E 74 /content/Content
00009520 52 65 73 6F 6C 76 65 72 3B 00 15 5A 5A FA 22 05 Resolver;..ZZ.".
00009530 4C 6A 61 76 61 2F 6C 61 6E 67 2F 53 74 72 69 6E Ljava/lang/Strin
00009540 67 3B 00 3F 8E 25 67 25 CC DA 81 95 2B 44 33 0F g;?.%g%....+D3.
00009550 0D 28 29 5B 42 00 FB 60 63 7B 93 A1 9B C0 75 2A .() [B..`c{...u*
00009560 11 D1 65 B2 E8 D6 44 B0 5F A2 49 48 EC 0E 41 45 ..e...D...IH..AE
00009570 53 00 21 A2 E3 C7 2F F7 05 28 4C 6A 61 76 61 2F S.!.../..(Ljava/
00009580 6C 61 6E 67 2F 53 74 72 69 6E 67 3B 29 4C 6A 61 lang/String;) Lja
00009590 76 61 2F 73 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 2F 4D 65 73 73 va/security/Mess
000095A0 61 67 65 44 69 67 65 73 74 3B 00 02 76 83 13 90 ageDigest;..v...
000095B0 43 06 67 63 65 5F 78 38 36 00 21 A8 A0 C3 C5 D9 C.gce_x86.!.....
000095C0 7A 8C 42 27 18 8E 28 08 0B C1 7F 0E 86 25 29 3D z.B'..(.....%)=
000095D0 5C 7A 13 16 20 2B 44 FD 8D 57 1D 96 22 F2 BB C8 \z...+D..W..."...
000095E0 26 2C A1 A0 B0 1F CC 56 19 10 61 6E 64 72 6F 69 &.....V..androi
000095F0 64 2F 70 72 6F 76 69 64 65 72 2F 53 65 74 74 69 d/provider/Setti
00009600 6E 67 73 24 53 65 63 75 72 65 00 CB 0A 3C 07 11 ngs$Secure...<..
00009610 83 1B 15 9C 27 9E 09 0C 6A 61 76 61 2F 73 65 63 ....!...java/sec
00009620 75 72 69 74 79 2F 4D 65 73 73 61 67 65 44 69 67 urity/MessageDig
00009630 65 73 74 00 6F 4A 8B 37 A1 7E 74 A4 5F 49 C6 0B est.oJ.7.~t..I..
00009640 53 44 4B 20 68 61 73 20 4E 4F 54 20 62 65 65 6E SDK.has.NOT.been
00009650 20 69 6E 69 74 69 61 6C 69 7A 65 64 20 79 65 74 .initialized.yet
00009660 00 DE F1 C1 9C AA 67 7A 12 14 EB C1 A0 0C 72 6F .....gz.....ro
00009670 2E 68 61 72 64 77 61 72 65 00 A5 BA 6A CD 34 F4 .hardware...j.4.
00009680 7D BA 41 6E 47 AD AA BC 67 B0 0E 28 5B 4C 6A 61 }.AnG...g..([Lja
00009690 76 61 2F 6C 61 6E 67 2F 4F 62 6A 65 63 74 3B 29 va/lang/Object;)
000096A0 49 00 FE FA 9A D5 02 8E 0C F9 76 D1 2D 37 0C 73 I.....v.-7.s
000096B0 75 63 63 65 73 73 20 20 00 69 BD 42 5B 2A 3D 47 uccess...i.B[*=G
000096C0 A4 A8 70 9E F0 14 36 03 E6 0D 72 6F 2E 68 61 72 ..p...6...ro.har
000096D0 64 77 61 72 65 2E 76 69 72 74 75 61 6C 5F 64 65 dware.virtual_de
000096E0 76 69 63 65 00 F3 3B 43 A0 2A 42 9A 7B 43 C0 7F vice...;C.*B.{C..
000096F0 2A 41 76 11 0F 64 78 61 72 71 00 2D 9A E3 B9 A6 *Av..dxarq.-....
00009700 10 4C 09 19 E3 C7 9D 16 DB 8F 49 73 F8 1F EE 7F .L.....Is....
00009710 A9 AF 69 4C 49 7D 07 11 69 74 65 6D 00 C3 1A 3A ..iLI)..item...:
00009720 0D AE 3B 49 35 6B 89 A5 16 B7 86 67 0A 69 6E 69 ..;I5k....g.ini
00009730 74 2E 73 76 63 2E 64 75 6D 70 69 70 63 6D 6F 6E t.svc.dumpipcmn
00009740 00 09 D8 E1 18 9B DB 44 0E 31 EC 0A 2F 00 07 83 .....D.1../...
00009750 8C 25 5C E1 8E 12 15 82 2E 41 6A 3D 1A 21 09 6F .%\.....Aj=!.o
00009760 6E 4B 65 79 4C 6F 6E 67 50 72 65 73 73 00 C3 BE nKeyLongPress...
00009770 03 D1 99 13 AE E4 08 6F 6E 44 65 73 74 72 6F 79 .....onDestroy
00009780 00 E6 F3 87 17 A7 8F B8 A1 6C 09 EA 9C 55 B5 C2 .....l...U..
00009790 D6 49 A4 7E 76 2C 00 3E 4C 68 D5 36 08 66 69 6E .I.~v,.,>Lh.6.fin
000097A0 64 43 6C 61 73 73 00 AC D8 08 CE B3 E1 05 E7 C2 dClass.....
000097B0 6D 0A 76 62 6F 78 38 36 70 00 7B 24 75 9B 5F EE m.vbox86p.{su..
000097C0 C0 07 69 6E 69 74 2E 73 76 63 2E 67 63 65 5F 66 ..init.svc.gce_f
000097D0 73 5F 6D 6F 6E 69 74 6F 72 00 39 B8 4A 00 34 AF s monitor.9.J.4.

```

Figure 4: Decrypted bytes in ELF beginning at 0x9480.

Within the decrypted strings of the ELF, we see the names of the native functions defined in the Java code at the following locations in the ELF file:

- quaqrd (0xA107)
- vxeg (0x936E)
- ixkjwu (0x9330)

Now that these strings are decrypted, we can see which subroutines in the ELF are called when the native function is called from the APK. Table 2 shows the native functions defined for this sample in the anti-analysis ELF.

| Native function name | Native subroutine address | Signature | Human-readable signature |
|----------------------|---------------------------|---|---|
| vzeg | 0x30D4 | ([Ljava/lang/Object;)I | public native int vzeg(Object[] p0); |
| quarqd | 0x4814 | (I)Ljava/lang/String; | public static native String quarqd(int p0); |
| ixkjwu | ---- | ([Ljava/lang/Object;)Ljava/lang/Object; | public native Object ixkjwu(Object[] p0); |

Table 2: Native functions in the anti-analysis library.

The Java-declared native method that has the same signature as vzeg has in this sample (([Ljava/lang/Object;)I), is responsible for doing all of the run-time environment checks described in the next section. In each sample, this function is named differently due to the automatic obfuscator run on the Java code, but it always has this signature. For clarity, the rest of this paper will refer to the native subroutine that performs all of the run-time checks as vzeg().

The Java-declared native method that has the same signature as quarqd has in this sample ((I)Ljava/lang/String;) returns a string from an array. The argument to the method is the index into the array and the address of the array is hard coded into the native subroutine. The strings in this array are decrypted by the decryption function described above.

Via static reverse engineering, I did not determine the native subroutine corresponding to the ixkjwu method. In the Java code, the ixkjwu method is only called in one place and is only called based on the value of a variable. It is possible that this method is never called based on the value of that variable and thus the ixkjwu native subroutine does not exist.

vzeg and quarqd are registered with the RegisterNatives JNI method at 0x2B60 in this sample. The array at 0x9048 is used for this call to RegisterNatives. It includes the native method name, signature, and pointer to the native subroutine as shown below. The code at 0x2B42, prior to the call to RegisterNatives, shows that this subroutine can support the following array entries for three native methods instead of the two that exist in this instance.

```
0x9048: Pointer to vzeg string
0x904C: Pointer to vzeg signature string
0x9050: 0x30D5 (Pointer to subroutine)
0x9054: Pointer to quarqd string
```

0x9058: Pointer to quarqrd signature string
 0x905C: 0x4815 (Pointer to subroutine)

The rest of this paper will focus on the functionality found in vxeg() because it contains the anti-analysis run-time environment checks.

Run-time environment checks

The Java classes associated with WeddingCake in the APK define three native functions in the Java code. In this sample vxeg() performs all of the run-time environment checks prior to performing the hidden behaviour. This function performs more than 45 different run-time checks. They can be grouped as follows:

- Checking system properties
- Verifying CPU architecture by reading the /system/lib/libc.so ELF header
- Looking for Monkey [6] by iterating through all PIDs in /proc/
- Ensuring the Xposed Framework [7] is not mapped to the application process memory

If the library detects any of the conditions outlined in this section, the Linux exit(0) function is called, which terminates the *Android* application [8]. The application stops running if any of the 45+ environment checks fail.

System properties checks

The vxeg() subroutine begins by checking the values of the listed system properties. The system_property_get() function is used to get the value of each system property checked. The code checks if the value matches the listed value for each property. If any one of the system properties matches the listed value, the *Android* application exits. Table 3 lists each of the system properties that is checked and the value which will trigger an exit.

| System property checked | Value(s) that trigger exit |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| init.svc.gce_fs_monitor | running |
| init.svc.dumpeventlog | running |
| init.svc.dumpiplog | running |
| init.svc.dumplogcat | running |
| init.svc.dumplogcat-efs | running |
| init.svc.filemon | running |
| ro.hardware.virtual_device | gce_x86 |
| ro.kernel.androidboot.hardware | gce_x86 |
| ro.hardware.virtual_device | gce_x86 |
| ro.boot.hardware | gce_x86 |

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| ro.boot.selinux | disable |
| ro.factorytest | true, 1, y |
| ro.kernel.android.checkjni | true, 1, y |
| ro.hardware.virtual_device | vbox86 |
| ro.kernel.androidboot.hardware | vbox86 |
| ro.hardware | vbox86 |
| ro.boot.hardware | vbox86 |
| ro.build.product | google_sdk |
| ro.build.product | Droid4x |
| ro.build.product | sdk_x86 |
| ro.build.product | sdk_google |
| ro.build.product | vbox86p |
| ro.product.manufacturer | Genymotion |
| ro.product.brand | generic |
| ro.product.brand | generic_x86 |
| ro.product.device | generic |
| ro.product.device | generic_x86 |
| ro.product.device | generic_x86_x64 |
| ro.product.device | Droid4x |
| ro.product.device | vbox86p |
| ro.kernel.androidboot.hardware | goldfish |
| ro.hardware | goldfish |
| ro.boot.hardware | goldfish |
| ro.hardware.audio.primary | goldfish |
| ro.kernel.androidboot.hardware | ranchu |
| ro.hardware | ranchu |
| ro.boot.hardware | ranchu |

Table 3: System properties checked and the values that trigger exit.

The anti-analysis library also checks if any of five system properties exist on the device using the `system_property_find()` function. If any of these five system properties exist, the Android application exits. The properties that the library searches for are listed in Table 4. The presence of any of these properties usually indicates that the application is running on an emulator.

| If any of these system properties exist, the application exits |
|---|
| <code>init.svc.vbox86-setup</code> |
| <code>qemu.sf.fake_camera</code> |
| <code>init.svc.goldfish-logcat</code> |
| <code>init.svc.goldfish-setup</code> |
| <code>init.svc.qemud</code> |

Table 4: System properties checked for using `system_property_find`.

Verifying CPU architecture

If the library has passed all of the system property checks, it (still in `vxeg()`) then verifies the CPU architecture of the phone on which the application is running. In order to verify the CPU architecture, the code reads 0x14 bytes from the beginning of the `/system/lib/libc.so` file on the device. If the read is successful, the code looks at the bytes corresponding to the `e_ident[EI_CLASS]` and `e_machine` fields of the ELF header. `e_ident[EI_CLASS]` is set to 1 to signal a 32-bit architecture and set to 2 to signal a 64-bit architecture. `e_machine` is a 2-byte value identifying the instruction set architecture. The code will only continue if one of the following statements is true. Otherwise, the application exits:

- `e_ident[EI_CLASS] == 0x01 (32-bit) AND e_machine == 0x0028 (ARM)`
- `e_ident[EI_CLASS] == 0x02 (64-bit) AND e_machine == 0x00B7 (AArch64)`
- Unable to read 0x14 bytes from `/system/lib/libc.so`

The anti-analysis library is verifying that it is only running on a 32-bit ARM or 64-bit AArch64 CPU. Even when the library is running its x86 variant, it still checks whether the CPU is ARM and will exit if the detected CPU is not ARM or AArch64.

Identifying if Monkey is running

After the CPU architecture check, the library attempts to iterate through every PID directory under `/proc/` to determine if `com.android.commands.monkey` is running [6]. The code does this by opening the `/proc/` directory and iterating through each entry in the directory, completing the following steps. If any step fails, execution moves to the next entry in the directory.

1. Verifies `d_type` from the `dirent` struct == `DT_DIR`

2. Verifies that `d_name` from the `dirent` struct is an integer
3. Constructs path strings: `/proc/[pid]/comm` and `/proc/[pid]/cmdline` where `[pid]` is the directory entry name that has been verified to be an integer
4. Attempts to read `0x7F` bytes from both `comm` and `cmdline` constructed path strings
5. Stores the data from whichever attempt (`comm` or `cmdline`) reads more data
6. Checks if the read data equals `com.android.commands.monkey`, meaning that package is running.

If the check for Monkey is ever true, `exit()` is called, closing the *Android* application (see Figure 5).




Figure 5: Check for Monkey.

This method of iterating through each directory in `/proc/` doesn't work in *Android* N and above [9]. If the library is not able to iterate through the directories in `/proc/` it will continue executing.

Current process not hooked with Xposed Framework

The Xposed Framework allows hooking and modifying of the system code running on an *Android* device. This library ensures that the Xposed Framework is not currently mapped to the application process. If Xposed is running the process, it could allow for some of the anti-analysis techniques to be bypassed. If the library did not check for Xposed and allowed the application to continue running when Xposed was hooked to the process, an analyst could instrument the application to bypass the anti-analysis hurdles and uncover the functionality that the application author is trying to hide.

In order to determine if Xposed is running, the library, checks if `'LIBXPOSED_ART.SO'` or `'XPOSEDBRIDGE.JAR'` exist in `/proc/self/maps`. If either of them exist, then the application exits. `/proc/self/maps` lists all of the memory pages mapped into the process memory. Therefore, you can see any libraries loaded by the process by reading its contents.

To further verify that the Xposed Framework is not running, the code will check if either of the following two classes can be found using the JNI `FindClass()` function [10]. If either class can be found, the application exits:

- `XC_MethodHook`: `de/robovm/android/xposed/XC_MethodHook`

- XposedBridge: de/robv/android/xposed/XposedBridge

If the Xposed library is not found, the execution continues to the behaviour that the anti-analysis techniques were trying to protect. This behaviour continues in vxeg(). In the case of this sample, it was another unpacker that previously had not been protected by the anti-reversing and analysis techniques described in this paper.

Conclusion

This paper detailed the operation of WeddingCake, an *Android* native library using extensive anti-analysis techniques. Unlike previous packers' anti-emulation techniques, this library is written in C/C++ and runs as a native shared library in the application. Once an analyst understands the anti-reversing and anti-analysis techniques utilized by an application, they can more effectively understand its logic and analyse and detect potentially malicious behaviours.

References

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Appendix: IDAPython decryption script

In order to decrypt the encrypted portions of the ELF library that the decryption function (for this sample, sub_2F30) decrypts during execution, I created an IDAPython script to decrypt the ELF. This script is available at http://www.github.com/maddiestone/IDAPythonEmbeddedToolkit/Android/WeddingCake_decrypt.py. By

decrypting the ELF with the IDAPython script, it's possible to statically reverse engineer the behaviour that is hidden under the anti-analysis techniques. This section describes how the script works.

The IDAPython decryption script runs the following steps:

1. Identifies the `JNI_OnLoad` function
2. Identifies the decryption function
3. Generates the two seed arrays
4. Identifies memory addresses of arrays to be decrypted and their lengths from the ELF loaded into the *IDA Pro* database
5. Decrypts each array and writes the decrypted bytes back to the *IDA* database, defining the decrypted bytes as strings.

The script was written to dynamically identify each of the encrypted arrays and their lengths from an *IDA Pro* database. This allows it to be run on many different samples without an analyst having to define the encrypted byte arrays. Therefore, the IDAPython script is dependent on the library's architecture. This script will run on the 32-bit 'generic' ARM versions of the library. For the other variants of the library mentioned in the 'Variants' section (ARMv7, ARM64, and x86), the same decryption algorithm in the script can be used, but the code to find the encrypted arrays and lengths will not run.

Once the script has finished running, the analyst can reverse engineer the native code as it lives when executing with the decrypted string.

Source: <https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2019/01/vb2018-paper-unpacking-packed-unpacker-reversing-android-anti-analysis-native-library/>