

Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net - 2023-01-03 - Google ad --> fake Notepad++ page --

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2023-01-03 (TUESDAY) - GOOGLE AD --> FAKE NOTPAD++ PAGE --> RHADAMANTHYS STEALER

NOTICE:

- The zip archives on this page have been updated, and they now use the new password scheme. For the new password, see the "about" page of this website.

NOTES:

- Special thanks to [@500mk500](#), [@da_667](#), and [@ex_raritas](#) for identifying this malware!

ASSOCIATED FILES:

- [2023-01-03-IOCs-from-Rhadamanthys-Stealer-infection.txt.zip](#) 2.0 kB (1,952 bytes)
- [2023-01-03-Rhadamanthys-Stealer-traffic.pcap.zip](#) 1.0 MB (1,018,898 bytes)
- [2023-01-03-Rhadamanthys-Stealer-malware-and-artifacts.zip](#) 70.9 MB (70,883,162 bytes)

2023-01-03 (TUESDAY) GOOGLE AD --> FAKE NOTEPAD++ PAGE --> RHADAMANTHYS STEALER

NOTES:

- The Google ad for this infection chain did not hide the fake Notepad++ site (malicious site was visible)
- Hasankahrimanoglu[.]com[.]tr was used before in December 2022 for the same type of fake Notepad++ site
- The downloaded zip contains a Rhadamanthys Stealer EXE inflated to approx 802 MB and a folder with artifacts
- This infection process used an image with data hidden through steganography, but I don't know what it was
- After the steganography image, the infection switched to websocket traffic to encrypt the post-infection traffic
- Special thanks to [@500mk500](#), [@da_667](#), and [@ex_raritas](#) for identifying this malware!

GOOGLE AD URL:

- `hxxps[:]//www.googleadservices[.]com/pagead/aclk?sa=L&ai=DChcSEwiDiu-13Kv8AhWkE9QBHa7UADwYABACGgJv'com&cid=CAASJ0RopA-3gIku5H1e8Y7FuoHCKJjSFjgbPRpqoj2ZKXrbPcnfRQ&sig=AOD64_2JnosseZ0C9qLEsz0g47HtrfU'jup-i13Kv8AhVckmoFHeyWDP8Q0Qx6BAgKEAE`

FAKE NOTEPAD++ SITE:

- `hxxps[:]//notepad.hasankahrimanoglu[.]com[.]tr/`

ZIP DOWNLOAD URL :

- `hxxps[:]//noteepad.hasankahrimanoglu[.]com[.]tr/ing.php`

DOWNLOADED ZIP ARCHIVE:

- SHA256 hash: 56840aba173e384469ea4505158eead4e7612c41caa59738fcf5efe9b2e10864
- File size: 69,728,905 bytes
- File name: Nottepaad_lastNeWx32x64.zip

EXE FOR RHADAMANTHYS STEALER EXTRACTED FROM ABOVE ZIP ARCHIVE:

- SHA256 hash: 8d0e8bafffed28f5c709a99392f7ab42430635839f7aba92a01c956c10702c8f
- File size: 802,160,640 bytes
- File name: Noteppad_SetupX32iX64.exe
- Note: This file has more than 801 MB of extra bytes to make the EXE too big for services like VirusTotal

RHADAMANTHYS STEALER EXE CARVED TO REMOVE PADDING:

- SHA256 hash: af67a6bd0baf78191617c97aad2d21b7d6133e879c92c97b1b1345d629f79661
- File size: 333,344 bytes
- File name: Noteppad_SetupX32iX64-carved.exe
- Analysis: <https://app.any.run/tasks/96a0206a-5683-47c1-9804-04aff3c55228>
- Analysis: <https://tria.ge/230103-tr9agsfb8w>

POST INFECTION TRAFFIC:

- 162.33.178[.]106 port 80 - 162.33.178[.]106 - GET /gjnrtrrm/zzn2o.hgfq
- 162.33.178[.]106 port 80 - 162.33.178[.]106 - GET /gjnrtrrm/zzn2o.hgfq


NOTES ON THE POST-INFECTION TRAFFIC:

- The first HTTP GET request returns a 929,566 byte .jpg image that's 95x120 pixels and has obfuscated text, so it seems there's steganography involved here.
- The second HTTP GET request upgrades the traffic, switching to encrypted websocket activity.


STEGANOGRAPHY IMAGE:

- SHA256 hash: c4b7e2de87630bde08e367c75d9a2b9ae79b1d4f03ee8014531239c9597efc2e
- File size: 929,566 bytes
- Location: `hxxp[:]//162.33.178[.]106/gjnrtrrm/zzn2o.hgfq`
- File description: JPEG image 95x120 bytes
- Note: Same size, but different file hash seen from infections on at least 2 different Win10 hosts.


IMAGES




Shown above: Google ad leading to fake Notepad++ site.




Shown above: Downloading zip archive from fake Notepad++ page.



Shown above: Downloaded zip contains padded EXE for Rhadamanthys Stealer and folder full of unrelated files.



Shown above: Microsoft Defender did not like the Rhadamanthys Stealer EXE.



Shown above: Rhadamanthys Stealer post-infection traffic filtered in Wireshark.

Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 0) · 2022-01-03-unknown-malware-post-infection-traffic.pcap

```
GET /gjntrrm/zznb2o.hgfq HTTP/1.1
Host: 162.33.178.106
User-Agent: curl/5.9
Connection: close
X-CSRF-TOKEN: 9AVz9vWrH8A/OQam/
pRWLRXTUik1d0kT6q+zGWx6eioVBZpYowe4IPs0a9N955u4HvbLMGmt4GyAFxDi9EutVA==
Cookie: CSRF-TOKEN=9AVz9vWrH8A/OQam/
pRWLRXTUik1d0kT6q+zGWx6eioVBZpYowe4IPs0a9N955u4HvbLMGmt4GyAFxDi9EutVA==;
LANG=en-US

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 929566
Content-Type: image/jpeg
Server: nginx/1.11.13
Date: Tue, 03 Jan 2023 16:18:48 GMT
Connection: close

.....JFIF.....}4 ..
y...8.#.c.5fd..R..r<..*P3..x....n..~N..p.)Aw.9.k...ob.....a`Ff..<..
5.j.....vvx..uS...RMB..}cf.....%.LM.....
.....!....."$".
$.
.....X._.....
.....}.....!1A..Qa."q.2....#B...R..$3br.
.....
%&'()*456789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz.....
.....w.....!1..AQ.aq."2...B.... #3R..br.
.$4.
%.....&'()*56789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz.....
.....?..s5..k.
```




1 client pkt, 693 server pkts, 1 turn.

Entire conversation (930 kB) Show data as ASCII Stream 0


Find: Find Next

Help Filter Out This Stream Print Save as... Back *Close

Shown above: First HTTP GET request returned steganography image.



Shown above: Steganography image exported from the pcap.



Shown above: Rhadamanthys Stealer data exfiltration through websocket traffic.

[Click here](#) to return to the main page.