

Detect Suspicious Access to Private Key Files and Export Attempts Across Platforms, Detection Strategy DET0549

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AN1516

A process (non-system or user-initiated) accesses private key files in user profile paths or system certificate stores followed by potential network connections or compression activity.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
FilePathRegex	Regex for matching key file extensions (.pem, .pfx, .ppk, etc.) or known certificate directories like C:\Users*\ssh\
ParentProcessName	Set of known benign certificate management tools to exclude (e.g., certutil.exe, ssh.exe)

AN1517

User or script-based access to ~/.ssh or other directories containing private keys followed by unusual shell activity or network connections.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
FilePathRegex	Directory/file path regex for ~/.ssh, *.pem, *.key, *.p12
CommandLineMatch	Script or user agent seen accessing keys (e.g., cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa, tar ~/.gnupg)

AN1518

Access to user private key directories (e.g., /Users/*/.ssh) via Terminal, scripting engines, or non-default processes.

Log Sources

Data Component	Name	Channel
File Access (DC0055)	macos:unifiedlog	open/read access to private key files (id_rsa, *.pem, *.p12)
Process Creation (DC0032)	macos:unifiedlog	launch of bash/zsh/python/osascript targeting key file locations

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
ProcessName	Processes reading key files (osascript, python, bash, etc.)
FileAccessPath	Private key and certificate paths like /Users/*/ssh, /Library/Keychains/

AN1519

CLI-based export of private key material (e.g., 'crypto pki export') with anomalous user session or AAA role escalation.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
CLICommandMatch	Regex for export commands (e.g., crypto pki export, export ssh-key)
AAAUserContext	Source username or role performing export — may tune for known admins

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0549#AN1517>