

Masquerading, Technique T1036 - Enterprise

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[G1030 Agrius](#)

[Agrius](#) used the Plink tool for tunneling and connections to remote machines, renaming it `systems.exe` in some instances.^[2]

[G1007 Aojin Dragon](#)

[Aojin Dragon](#) has used fake icons including antivirus and external drives to disguise malicious payloads.^[3]

[S0622 AppleSeed](#)

[AppleSeed](#) can disguise JavaScript files as PDFs.^[4]

[G0007 APT28](#)

[APT28](#) has renamed the WinRAR utility to avoid detection.^[5]

[G0050 APT32](#)

[APT32](#) has disguised a Cobalt Strike beacon as a Flash Installer.^[6]

[C0046 ArcaneDoor](#)

[ArcaneDoor](#) involved the use of digital certificates on adversary-controlled network infrastructure that mimicked the formatting used by legitimate Cisco ASA appliances.^[7]

[S1246 BeaverTail](#)

[BeaverTail](#) has masqueraded as MiroTalk installation packages: "MiroTalk.dmg" for macOS and "MiroTalk.msi" for Windows, and has included login GUIs with MiroTalk themes.^[8]

[S0268 Bisonal](#)

[Bisonal](#) dropped a decoy payload with a .jpg extension that contained a malicious Visual Basic script.^[9]

[S0635 BoomBox](#)

[BoomBox](#) has the ability to mask malicious data strings as PDF files.^[10]

[G0060 BRONZE BUTLER](#)

[BRONZE BUTLER](#) has masked executables with document file icons including Word and Adobe PDF.^[11]

[C0015 C0015](#)

During [C0015](#), the threat actors named a binary file `compareForfor.jpg` to disguise it as a JPG file. [\[12\]](#)

[C0018 C0018](#)

During [C0018](#), [AvosLocker](#) was disguised using the victim company name as the filename. [\[13\]](#)

[G1052 Contagious Interview](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has delivered [BeaverTail](#) malware masquerading as legitimate software or applications. [\[14\]](#)
[\[15\]\[16\]\[17\]\[8\]](#) [Contagious Interview](#) has also delivered malicious payloads masquerading as legitimate software drivers. [\[18\]](#)

[S0497 Dacls](#)

The [Dacls](#) Mach-O binary has been disguised as a .nib file. [\[19\]](#)

[S1111 DarkGate](#)

[DarkGate](#) can masquerade as pirated media content for initial delivery to victims. [\[20\]](#)

[S1066 DarkTortilla](#)

[DarkTortilla](#)'s payload has been renamed `PowerShellInfo.exe`. [\[21\]](#)

[S0673 DarkWatchman](#)

[DarkWatchman](#) has used an icon mimicking a text file to mask a malicious executable. [\[22\]](#)

[G1003 Ember Bear](#)

[Ember Bear](#) has renamed the legitimate Sysinternals tool procdump to alternative names such as `dump64.exe` to evade detection. [\[23\]](#)

[S0634 EnvyScout](#)

[EnvyScout](#) has used folder icons for malicious files to lure victims into opening them. [\[10\]](#)

[G1016 FIN13](#)

[FIN13](#) has masqueraded staged data by using the Windows [certutil](#) utility to generate fake Base64 encoded certificates with the input file. [\[24\]\[25\]](#)

[S0696 Flagpro](#)

[Flagpro](#) can download malicious files with a .tmp extension and append them with .exe prior to execution. [\[26\]](#)

[S0661 FoggyWeb](#)

[FoggyWeb](#) can masquerade the output of C2 commands as a fake, but legitimately formatted WebP file.^[27]

[C0035 KV Botnet Activity](#)

[KV Botnet Activity](#) involves changing process filename to `pr_set_mm_exe_file` and process name to `pr_set_name` during later infection stages.^[28]

[G0140 LazyScripter](#)

[LazyScripter](#) has used several different security software icons to disguise executables.^[29]

[G0045 menuPass](#)

[menuPass](#) has used [esentutil](#) to change file extensions to their true type that were masquerading as .txt files.^[30]

[S1015 Milan](#)

[Milan](#) has used an executable named `companycatalogue` to appear benign.^[31]

[S0637 NativeZone](#)

[NativeZone](#) has, upon execution, displayed a message box that appears to be related to a Ukrainian electronic document management system.^[32]

[G0133 Nomadic Octopus](#)

[Nomadic Octopus](#) attempted to make [Octopus](#) appear as a Telegram Messenger with a Russian interface.^[33]

[S0368 NotPetya](#)

[NotPetya](#) drops [PsExec](#) with the filename `dllhost.dat`.^[34]

[G0049 OilRig](#)

[OilRig](#) has used .doc file extensions to mask malicious executables.^[35]

[C0016 Operation Dust Storm](#)

For [Operation Dust Storm](#), the threat actors disguised some executables as JPG files.^[36]

[C0006 Operation Honeybee](#)

During [Operation Honeybee](#), the threat actors modified the MaoCheng dropper so its icon appeared as a Word document.^[37]

[G0068 PLATINUM](#)

[PLATINUM](#) has renamed `rar.exe` to avoid detection.^[38]

[S0453 Pony](#)

[Pony](#) has used the Adobe Reader icon for the downloaded file to look more trustworthy. [\[39\]](#)

[S1046 PowGoop](#)

[PowGoop](#) has disguised a PowerShell script as a .dat file (goopdate.dat). [\[40\]](#)

[S0565 Raindrop](#)

[Raindrop](#) was built to include a modified version of 7-Zip source code (including associated export names) and Far Manager source code. [\[41\]\[42\]](#)

[S0458 Ramsay](#)

[Ramsay](#) has masqueraded as a JPG image file. [\[43\]](#)

[S0662 RCSession](#)

[RCSession](#) has used a file named English.rtf to appear benign on victim hosts. [\[44\]\[45\]](#)

[S1240 RedLine Stealer](#)

[RedLine Stealer](#) malware has masqueraded as legitimate software such as "PDF Converter Software" which has been distributed through poisoned search engine results often resembling legitimate software lures with the combination of typo squatted domains. [\[46\]](#)

[S0148 RTM](#)

[RTM](#) has been delivered as archived Windows executable files masquerading as PDF documents. [\[47\]](#)

[S0446 Ryuk](#)

[Ryuk](#) can create .dll files that actually contain a Rich Text File format document. [\[48\]](#)

[S1018 Saint Bot](#)

[Saint Bot](#) has renamed malicious binaries as `wallpaper.mp4` and `slideshow.mp4` to avoid detection. [\[49\]\[50\]](#)

[C0059 Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#)

During [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](#), threat actors used voice calls to socially engineer victims into authorizing a modified version of the Salesforce Data Loader app. [\[51\]](#)

[G0034 Sandworm Team](#)

[Sandworm Team](#) masqueraded malicious installers as Windows update packages to evade defense and entice users to execute binaries. [\[52\]](#)

[S0615 SombRAT](#)

[SombRAT](#) can use a legitimate process name to hide itself. [\[53\]](#)

[G1046 Storm-1811](#)

[Storm-1811](#) has prompted users to download and execute batch scripts that masquerade as legitimate update files during initial access and social engineering operations. [\[54\]](#)

[S1183 StrelaStealer](#)

[StrelaStealer](#) PE executable payloads have used uncommon but legitimate extensions such as `.com` instead of `.exe`. [\[55\]](#)

[G0127 TA551](#)

[TA551](#) has masked malware DLLs as dat and jpg files. [\[56\]](#)

[G0139 TeamTNT](#)

[TeamTNT](#) has disguised their scripts with docker-related file names. [\[57\]](#)

[S0682 TrailBlazer](#)

[TrailBlazer](#) has used filenames that match the name of the compromised system in attempt to avoid detection. [\[58\]](#)

[S0266 TrickBot](#)

The [TrickBot](#) downloader has used an icon to appear as a Microsoft Word document. [\[59\]](#)

[S1164 UPSTYLE](#)

[UPSTYLE](#) has masqueraded filenames using examples such as `update.py`. [\[60\]](#)

[S0689 WhisperGate](#)

[WhisperGate](#) has been disguised as a JPG extension to avoid detection as a malicious PE file. [\[61\]](#)

[G0112 Windshift](#)

[Windshift](#) has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask malicious executables. [\[62\]](#) [Windshift](#) has also attempted to hide executables by changing the file extension to ".scr" to mimic Windows screensavers. [\[63\]](#)

[S0466 WindTail](#)

[WindTail](#) has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask payloads. [\[62\]](#)

[G1035 Winter Vivern](#)

[Winter Vivern](#) created specially-crafted documents mimicking legitimate government or similar documents during phishing campaigns. [\[64\]](#)

[S0658 XCSSET](#)

[XCSSET](#) installs malicious application bundles that mimic native macOS apps, such as Safari, by using the legitimate app's icon and customizing the `Info.plist` to match expected metadata. [\[65\]](#)[\[66\]](#)

[G0128 ZIRCONIUM](#)

[ZIRCONIUM](#) has spoofed legitimate applications in phishing lures and changed file extensions to conceal installation of malware. [\[67\]](#)[\[68\]](#)

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036>