{
	"id": "0ff0e981-cde1-4248-8fd3-2b73aebccc4d",
	"created_at": "2026-04-06T00:14:04.61661Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T03:20:35.429657Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "e70355e2276694df0099a02799d66f79eb24f811",
	"title": "Case Study: The DangerDev@protonmail.me Investigation",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 2328321,
	"plain_text": "Case Study: The DangerDev@protonmail.me Investigation\r\nArchived: 2026-04-05 23:06:21 UTC\r\nAn AWS incident response story\r\nRecently we worked on a very interesting incident response case in a customer's AWS environment. We would\r\nlike to share the story of this case in more detail in this blog including the techniques used by the threat actor\r\n(TA). In this blog, we want to share a detailed story of this case, including the techniques used by the TA. We hope\r\nthat this is helpful for people protecting AWS accounts around the world.\r\nBackground\r\nIt all started on a Friday afternoon when we got a call asking for support with an ongoing AWS incident. The\r\ntrigger for the incident was a suspicious support case that was created within one of the AWS accounts of our\r\nclient. The support case wasn’t raised by the client themselves and the reason it triggered an alert from AWS to the\r\nclient is because it was a request to increase Simple Email Service (SES) sending limits. However our client\r\nwasn’t using SES….\r\nDue to client confidentiality we have censored certain information.\r\nSES is a popular target for attackers as it can be abused to send out phishing and spam campaigns at massive rates\r\nand from a trusted sender (Amazon). We talked about it before in an incident write-up there’s also an excellent\r\nblog on SES abuse by Permiso Security.\r\nReading Guide\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 1 of 29\n\nPlease consider that cloud attack techniques are challenging to categorize into specific MITRE phases due to their\r\nmultipurpose nature and the ambiguity of threat actor intent.\r\nFor instance, an attacker’s actions related to user activities may fit into the persistence phase, but could also serve\r\nto evade defenses by blending in with specific usernames and roles. Additionally, threat actors often move\r\nbetween phases, such as transitioning from traditional persistence activities to subsequent discovery activities with\r\nnewly created users. The story is written in chronological order.\r\nIncident overview\r\nThe malicious activity took places over the course of a month. Within that month there were 3 distinguished\r\nphases of activity. We have separated this write-up in the three phases of the attack and used the MITRE ATT\u0026CK\r\nframework techniques to categorize our findings.\r\nPhase 1\r\nThe support case that triggered the incident response was opened by an IAM user called DangerDev@protonmail.me.\r\nAccording to our client this was not a legitimate user, time to figure out how this all happened. (Tip: Right-click\r\nopen in new tab for high quality)\r\nInitial access\r\nAccess to the environment was achieved through an accidentally exposed long term access key belonging to an\r\nIAM user. The access key belonged to a user with Administrator Access. We cannot provide additional details as\r\nto where the access key was stored.\r\nDiscovery\r\nWhat do you do if you just received a fresh access key to start your hacking adventure with?\r\nSES discovery\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 2 of 29\n\nIf you think the answer is discovering and enumerating SES you are correct. Repeated calls were made towards\r\nSES with GetSendQuota and ListIdentities.These calls are used to get an idea on how much emails can be sent at once\r\nand which emails and domains are registered to send emails.\r\nThe SES activity occurred on two separate days and was the only observed activity in the first two weeks, which\r\nwas interesting. In other engagements we have seen that after discovery of an active access key the TA will launch\r\nwhatever they can immediately before they get kicked out.\r\nUser discovery\r\nAfter approximately two weeks the TA came back and ran ListUsers to list the IAM users in the AWS account.\r\nThe discovery commands were most likely automated based on the user-agent and the frequency of the calls\r\nperformed.\r\nAn observation for this phase is that the TA isn’t running the typical enumeration commands like GetCallerIdentity\r\nand ListAttachedUserPolicies. This could be because calls like that could trigger detection.\r\nPersistence\r\nAfter all of the above it’s time for our main character to make an entrance. A\r\nCreateUser\r\n call was made for a new\r\naccount DangerDev@protonmail.me.\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 3 of 29\n\nAfter this action the TA performed a CreateLoginProfile\r\n call which is used to give a user the ability to login through\r\nthe AWS management console.\r\nPrivilege Escalation\r\nThe AdministratorAccess policy was attached to the newly created account with AttachUserPolicy. This policy is an\r\nAWS managed policy that provides full access to AWS services and resources.\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 4 of 29\n\nThis activity marked the end of the activity with the original IAM user and most of the subsequent activity was\r\nperformed with the DangerDev user and some new identities will enter this story.\r\nPhase 2\r\nIn the second phase of the attack that lasted approximately one week the TA was mostly testing out their access\r\nand what kind of activities they could perform within the environment.\r\nDiscovery\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 5 of 29\n\nWith the newly created account the TA performed additional discovery activities which were probably closer\r\naligned with their malicious intentions. The following calls were made in less than an hour.\r\nThe majority of this activity relates to EC2 instances:\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 6 of 29\n\nUsing the sessionCredentialFromConsole\r\n field we can identify activity performed through the AWS management\r\nconsole. Which is quite interesting as it’s less likely this activity was scripted. This example shows a\r\nDescribeSecurityGroups\r\n event which lists all security groups in the account, which is a nice bridge to the next phase\r\nof the attack.\r\nPersistence\r\nAfter the discovery activity the TA performed the following actions in a timespan of 30 minutes:\r\nCreateKeyPair\r\nCreateSecurityGroup\r\nCreateDefaultVpc\r\nAuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress\r\nRunInstances\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 7 of 29\n\nIn short what happened was that the TA launched a EC2 instance and as part of that process a VPC with a security\r\ngroup was created. The TA modified the security group to allow for external RDP access as shown below:\r\nWe will discuss the EC2 instance creation next, because the TA did something interesting.\r\nImpact\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 8 of 29\n\nWhat we saw was that the TA created a test instance first with instance type t2.micro, which is one of the smallest\r\ninstances and definitely not suitable for crypto mining. It seems the TA wanted to test if they could successfully\r\nlaunch and access their EC2 machine, because shortly after the instance was terminated by the TA.\r\nAfter this test it was time for the heavy hitters. The TA launched three instances with instance type p3.16xlarge.\r\nThis instance type is much better for crypto mining as it has a GPU with 128GB and 64 vCPUs. However, there\r\nwas a problem with launching the instance, due to account limits.\r\nThe other machine launched successfully but was terminated after approximately one hour. After this activity it\r\nstayed mostly quiet for another two weeks.\r\nPhase 3\r\nThe bulk of the activity took place in the last phase of the attack and some of the actions ultimately led to\r\ndiscovery of the attack.\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 9 of 29\n\nPersistence \u0026 Defense Evasion\r\nThe majority of the activities is related to user and role creation or modification. The TA used an interesting\r\ntechnique to achieve persistent access into the AWS account.\r\nUser creation\r\nOver the course of this attack the TA performed a number of activities related to users and roles. The graphic\r\nbelow is intended to show you the activities that were performed.\r\nThe TA manually created a user account called ses.\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 10 of 29\n\nThe username ses\r\n is interesting, because it mimics accounts automatically created when using SES. They can be\r\nidentified because they all follow the official name convention ses-smtp-user.\u003cdate-time\u003e and in the event you can see\r\nit’s invoked by SES console\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 11 of 29\n\nTherefore the creation of an account with the name ses\r\n might also be an attempt to evade detection.\r\nAdditionally the TA created access keys for existing accounts, due to confidentiality we can’t name the accounts in\r\nquestion. We’ve added an example of this activity for the ses account below.\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 12 of 29\n\nRole creation\r\nOne of the more interesting actions observed in this attack is the creation of a role that allows identities from an\r\nexternal AWS account to assume a privileged role in the victim tenant. Which sounds quite complicated, but this is\r\nhow it works:\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 13 of 29\n\nAnd what it looks like in CloudTrail:\r\nNotice the external AWS account ID and also the roleName. The roleName is AWSLanding-Zones-ConfigRecorderRoles\r\nwhich was very similar to an existing role name.\r\nThe second role has the same purpose, but for a different external AWS account it also has a name very similar to\r\nan existing role.\r\nAWSeservedSSO_*\r\n vs. AWSReservedSSO_*\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 14 of 29\n\nAfter the creation of both roles, an AssumeRole\r\n event was observed as shown below. The TA assumed the role from\r\ntheir own account (671050157472).\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 15 of 29\n\nIf you see any of these accounts in your environment please reach out to us or start your incident response process\r\nas they’re confirmed malicious by AWS:\r\n265857590823\r\n671050157472\r\nWe haven’t seen this type of attack technique before, it’s a pretty clever way of establishing backdoor access that\r\ndoesn’t require an IAM user inside the victim account.\r\nPrivilege escalation\r\nIn addition to the aforementioned activities such as the creation of users and roles with privileged access the TA\r\nperformed activities that could be classified as attempts to escalate privileges.\r\nUsing AttachRolePolicy the TA added the AWS managed AdministratorAccess policy to the AssumeRole that allows\r\nfor external access:\r\nAnother interesting event is UpdateLoginProfile where the TA uses the initially compromised account to update the\r\nconsole password of another account.\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 16 of 29\n\nDiscovery\r\nIn this phase the TA also performed discovery activities such as:\r\nListBuckets\r\nListGroupsForUser\r\nListInstanceProfiles\r\nListSSHPublicKeys\r\nSimulatePrincipalPolicy\r\nMost of the above actions are pretty self-explanatory, however we want to highlight SimulatePrincipalPolicy. As this\r\nis a technique not reported on before by anyone (or at least we couldn’t find it).\r\nSo how does this work, let’s start with the event that is generated first..\r\nThe AWS Policy Simulator allows users to test an existing policy recorded in the policySourceArn field against a set\r\nof actions recorded in the actionNames field. This helps answer the question can I perform action X with policy Y.\r\nThe fact that the TA used this service to test certain actions tells us that they were interested in actions related to\r\nthe SSM service and AWS Secrets Manager.\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 17 of 29\n\nDefense evasion\r\nInterestingly enough the TA actor put quite some effort into hiding their traces:\r\nRemoving IAM users with DeleteUser\r\nCleaning up policies with DetachUserPolicy and DeleteUserPolicy\r\nDeactivating long term access keys with UpdateAccessKey\r\nCleaning up long term access keys with DeleteAccessKey\r\nInspecting GuardDuty findings with ListFindingsand GetFindings\r\nCreating a LightSail instance upon discovery with CreateInstances\r\nIt was interesting to see that the TA modified users and access keys during the attack before they were discovered.\r\nIt shows that they wanted to stay under the radar for a little longer. We would like to focus on the GuardDuty and\r\nLightSail actions as these are less commonly observed and offer some great insights.\r\nGuardDuty\r\nLooking at the GuardDuty related activities, we believe it was one action performed by the TA that resulted in the\r\nevents below:\r\nWhat was interesting is the user-agent being Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) console, it seems that\r\nthe TA accessed GuardDuty from the RDS console. This is also visible in the ListFindings event which is filtered for\r\nfindings related to the RDS resources.\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 18 of 29\n\nLightSail\r\nFor those who primarily use EC2 or ECS for compute there’s another compute resource in AWS that threat actors\r\ntarget. It’s often overlooked as it isn’t part of the regular AWS compute offering nor does it integrate with IAM.\r\nIt’s called LightSail and it’s basically a virtual private server offering.\r\nWhat happened is that our client started removing access for the TA actor. However, at this point they didn’t yet\r\nknow that the TA created an access key for another user. So when the TA noticed access was lost to their account\r\nthey quickly used another account to create a LightSail instance, this resulted in an error because the account\r\nwasn’t verified.\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 19 of 29\n\nApproximately an hour later the request went through successfully and the TA was able to launch a LightSail\r\ninstance.\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 20 of 29\n\nThe TA accessed the associated RDP settings. Access was soon revoked as the instance was deleted within an\r\nhour. We were not able to investigate the LightSail to determine what happened within that hour.\r\nImpact\r\nNo story is complete without some impact, in this case there was quite a few things the TA did which gave us\r\nsome insights into their objectives. Roughly speaking we can categorize these into three actions:\r\n1. Cryptomining\r\n2. Phishing and spam through SES\r\n3. Setting up fake domains for spear phishing and scams\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 21 of 29\n\nCryptomining\r\nLuckily it didn’t last long, because this activity closely preceded the initial discovery of the incident. But the TA\r\nactor did create several powerful and expensive instances in the AWS account. All of the below instanceTypes have\r\nGPU’s enabled and significant CPU power.\r\nThe instances weren’t available for investigation and no VPC flow logs were available to perform further analysis.\r\nTo access the machines the TA created new inbound rules to allow traffic on port 22:\r\nPhishing and spam through SES\r\nThe TA was mostly interested in SES for further malicious activity. We can’t share too many details on the emails\r\nthat were sent out. However they were mostly aimed at individuals to phish for cryptocurrency exchange\r\ncredentials and general spam.\r\nWhat is interesting and what ultimately led to discovery of the incident is that the AWS Trust \u0026 Safety team\r\ncommunicated with the TA through a support case. Here’s what happened:\r\n1. TA requests increase in SES sending quoata (to send more spam)\r\n2. AWS requests more details\r\n3. TA responds in the support case\r\n4. Quota increased by AWS\r\nAs part of the SES abuse the TA created the following identities with CreateEmailIdentity.\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 22 of 29\n\nMost of the domains are targeting Japanese websites, which is pretty interesting in itself in regards to attribution.\r\nFake domains mimicking PayPal\r\nThe TA also knew his way inside Amazon Route 53, four domains were created with RegisterDomain.\r\nThere’s no need to guess what these domains were intended to be used for. The domains were short lived and\r\nquickly taken offline, which brings us to the end of the malicious activity observed.\r\nThe threat actor\r\nWe noticed that there’s not a lot of threat intelligence on cloud threat actors. While we were completing this write-up Datadog published an excellent incident write-up which has some overlapping indicators for the ASN and IP\r\naddresses used by the TA. We’ve added all the IOCs below, if you’re working for an organization in the TI field\r\nand have more information please do reach out.\r\nWith that in mind, some observations from our side on the TA:\r\nThey know their way around AWS they go beyond the basic EC2 abuse and have skills to setup (more\r\nadvanced) persistence methods;\r\nUses a combination of automation scripts and hands-on keyboard activity. For example the testing and\r\nenumeration of AWS access keys was definitely automated as we kept seeing the original access keys\r\nbeing used to make calls on set times. However they also performed lots of activity through the\r\nmanagement console;\r\nSome OPSEC was observed, as an example the TA didn’t use the GetCallerIdentity command. Which is\r\ncommonly observed in attacks as it’s basically a whoami for AWS environments. Additionally we didn’t see\r\nmany failed API calls, which is often an indicator for a less skilled TA trying every possible action;\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 23 of 29\n\nFinancially motivated, ultimately their goal seemed to be to perform (spear)phishing for financial gain\r\nthrough PayPal lures and cryptocurrency phishing;\r\nThe TA was mostly using Indonesian based IP addresses outside of commercial VPN solutions.\r\nConclusion\r\nWe hope you made it this far, we know it’s quite the read, but we believe this is a story worth sharing with all the\r\ntechnical details. There are lessons to be learned from this incident, which we will save for another blog post.\r\nLast but definitely not least, we want to thank our client for allowing us to write this story. Your willingness  to\r\nshare this information will help others.\r\nIndicators of Compromise\r\nType Indicator\r\nIAM user DangerDev@protonmail.me\r\nIAM user rajajh\r\nIAM user cevlupdia\r\nIAM user ses\r\nIP Address 45.141.215.56\r\nIP Address 37.19.205.154\r\nIP Address 212.102.51.243\r\nIP Address 212.102.51.242\r\nIP Address 172.86.96.166\r\nIP Address 140.213.52.30\r\nIP Address 140.213.51.83\r\nIP Address 140.213.49.11\r\nIP Address 140.213.47.147\r\nIP Address 140.213.45.145\r\nIP Address 140.213.22.46\r\nIP Address 140.213.22.245\r\nIP Address 140.213.105.43\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 24 of 29\n\nType Indicator\r\nIP Address 140.213.104.41\r\nIP Address 140.213.104.172\r\nIP Address 140.213.104.12\r\nIP Address 140.213.103.218\r\nIP Address 140.213.103.218\r\nIP Address 140.213.103.106\r\nIP Address 140.213.103.106\r\nIP Address 140.213.102.80\r\nIP Address 140.213.102.107\r\nIP Address 140.213.101.161\r\nIP Address 140.213.100.197\r\nIP Address 140.213.100.13\r\nIP Address 138.199.53.239\r\nIP Address 138.199.22.105\r\nIP Address 114.122.132.171\r\nIP Address 112.215.253.179\r\nIP Address 112.215.208.219\r\nIP Address 108.181.27.205\r\nIP Address 107.151.188.91\r\nIP Address 104.28.250.136\r\nIP Address 104.28.250.135\r\nIP Address 104.28.218.136\r\nIP Address 140.213.99.249\r\nIP Address 140.213.98.193\r\nIP Address 140.213.98.125\r\nIP Address 140.213.51.240\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 25 of 29\n\nType Indicator\r\nIP Address 140.213.49.33\r\nIP Address 140.213.49.247\r\nIP Address 140.213.47.253\r\nIP Address 140.213.47.116\r\nIP Address 140.213.45.86\r\nIP Address 140.213.45.43\r\nIP Address 140.213.45.223\r\nIP Address 140.213.45.192\r\nIP Address 140.213.45.148\r\nIP Address 140.213.43.96\r\nIP Address 140.213.43.91\r\nIP Address 140.213.43.75\r\nIP Address 140.213.43.62\r\nIP Address 140.213.43.30\r\nIP Address 140.213.43.213\r\nIP Address 140.213.41.83\r\nIP Address 140.213.39.93\r\nIP Address 140.213.39.220\r\nIP Address 140.213.37.94\r\nIP Address 140.213.37.56\r\nIP Address 140.213.37.52\r\nIP Address 140.213.37.206\r\nIP Address 140.213.37.190\r\nIP Address 140.213.24.82\r\nIP Address 140.213.24.101\r\nIP Address 140.213.22.36\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 26 of 29\n\nType Indicator\r\nIP Address 140.213.22.201\r\nIP Address 140.213.22.16\r\nIP Address 140.213.22.143\r\nIP Address 140.213.18.44\r\nIP Address 140.213.18.249\r\nIP Address 140.213.18.201\r\nIP Address 140.213.18.169\r\nIP Address 140.213.18.150\r\nIP Address 140.213.18.137\r\nIP Address 140.213.18.112\r\nIP Address 140.213.16.70\r\nIP Address 140.213.16.17\r\nIP Address 140.213.16.130\r\nIP Address 140.213.105.30\r\nIP Address 140.213.105.3\r\nIP Address 140.213.105.223\r\nIP Address 140.213.105.188\r\nIP Address 140.213.105.137\r\nIP Address 140.213.105.118\r\nIP Address 140.213.104.222\r\nIP Address 140.213.104.217\r\nIP Address 140.213.104.203\r\nIP Address 140.213.104.162\r\nIP Address 140.213.103.222\r\nIP Address 140.213.103.210\r\nIP Address 140.213.103.17\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 27 of 29\n\nType Indicator\r\nIP Address 140.213.102.5\r\nIP Address 140.213.102.224\r\nIP Address 140.213.102.193\r\nIP Address 140.213.102.172\r\nIP Address 140.213.101.86\r\nIP Address 140.213.101.227\r\nIP Address 140.213.101.20\r\nIP Address 140.213.101.179\r\nIP Address 140.213.101.17\r\nIP Address 140.213.101.128\r\nIP Address 140.213.100.76\r\nIP Address 140.213.100.44\r\nIP Address 140.213.100.152\r\nIP Address 140.213.100.136\r\nIP Address 140.213.100.131\r\nIP Address 140.213.100.127\r\nIP Address 112.215.210.73\r\nIP Address 112.215.210.187\r\nIP Address 112.215.210.145\r\nIP Address 112.215.209.144\r\nIP Address 112.215.209.131\r\nIP Address 112.215.208.204\r\nIP Address 112.215.208.135\r\nIP Address 104.28.218.135\r\nDomain congtyxaydungvuhiep.com\r\nDomain login.3dlntl-paypal.com\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 28 of 29\n\nType Indicator\r\nDomain paypal-lntl.com\r\nDomain 3dlntl-paypal.com\r\nDomain 3dlntlverify.com\r\nDomain 3dlntlpaypalcard.com\r\nDomain lntl-paypal.com\r\nDomain login.paypal-lntl.com\r\nSource: https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nhttps://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\r\nPage 29 of 29",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"MITRE"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me"
	],
	"threat_actors": [],
	"ts_created_at": 1775434444,
	"ts_updated_at": 1775791235,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
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