{
	"id": "9ed0b621-b326-4145-a1d9-00ff1a957e83",
	"created_at": "2026-04-06T01:30:31.485442Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T13:12:25.34463Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "e5e215ecbcffd287baded80ec819798584a46544",
	"title": "Discovery of Simps Botnet Leads to Ties to Keksec Group",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
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	"plain_text": "Discovery of Simps Botnet Leads to Ties to Keksec Group\r\nBy Uptycs Threat Research\r\nPublished: 2021-05-17 · Archived: 2026-04-06 00:42:45 UTC\r\nResearch by Siddartha Sharma and Ashwin Vamshi\r\nUptycs' threat research team has discovered a new Botnet named ‘Simps’ attributed to Keksec group primarily\r\nfocussed on DDOS activities. We discovered the Simps Botnet binaries downloaded via shell script sample and\r\nRemote Code Execution vulnerability exploits by Gafgyt - detailed in our earlier post.\r\nBased on our analysis and threat intelligence, we have the following observations:\r\nSimps Botnet binary uses Mirai \u0026 Gafgyt modules for DDOS functionality\r\nThe Botnet might be in the early stages of development because of the presence of the infected.log file\r\nafter execution\r\nThe author behind this Botnet has a Youtube channel and Discord Server for the usage and demonstration\r\nof the Botnet\r\nThe Youtube channel and the historical data provided evidence that Simps Botnet is active since April 2021\r\nThe Discord server discussions and threat intel data provided us evidence of the possible association of\r\nSimps Botnet to Keksec group\r\nThis post will cover details on our discovery, threat intelligence data attributing relations to Keksec group,\r\nworking of the binaries and the code similarity, and reuse modules of Simps Botnet.\r\nDuring the first week of May 2021, the Uptycs’ threat research team detected a shell script and Gafgyt malware\r\ndownloading Simps binaries from the same C2- 23.95.80[.]200.\r\nShell Script Downloading Simps Binary\r\nThe shell script (hash: c2d5e54544742b7a1b04cf45047859a10bb90c6945d340120872f575aa866e6d), ‘ur0a.sh’\r\nwas downloaded from the C2 URL 23.95.80[.]200. \r\nThe script downloaded several next stage payloads for several *nix architectures from the open directory named\r\n“Simps” in the same C2 URL from where the shell script was downloaded (see Figure 1)\r\nhttps://www.uptycs.com/blog/discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group\r\nPage 1 of 9\n\nFigure 1: Malicious Shell script dropping payloads\r\nThe script performs the following:\r\n1. Uses Wget to fetch the payloads from 23.95.80[.]200 in simps directory to tmp.\r\n2. Changes permission using chmod.\r\n3. Deletion of the payloads using the command rm. \r\nOn execution of the Simps binary, it drops a log file containing that the device has been infected with malware by\r\nSimps Botnet (see Figure 2) \r\nFigure 2: Dropped log file\r\nThe binary also connects to the C2 23.95.80[.]200 (see figure 3)\r\nFigure 3: C2 communication\r\nGafgyt Downloading Simps Binary\r\nDuring this same time, Gafgyt binary (hash:\r\ne847dfbd831df6015519d03d42ada8241ce1174e9bd96f405452627617229c63) was also downloading Simps\r\nbinary from the same C2 URL. The Simps payload was delivered by exploiting multiple Remote Code Execution\r\nvulnerabilities in vulnerable IOT devices. An excerpt of Realtek and Linksys router exploits downloading the next\r\nstage payloads. (see Figure 4 and 5)\r\nhttps://www.uptycs.com/blog/discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group\r\nPage 2 of 9\n\nFigure 4: Linksys router exploit\r\nFigure 5: Realtek router exploit\r\nBoth these exploits downloaded a Simps MIPS UPX packed binary (hash -\r\n6d18b433183fc68cd7b731fed198732d3460a21afba53163f059152bd410b55f), for MIPS architecture which also\r\ndisplays a message that the device has been infected by Simps Botnet (see Figure 6)\r\nhttps://www.uptycs.com/blog/discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group\r\nPage 3 of 9\n\nFigure 6: Simps ELF execution\r\nSimps Botnet - Youtube Channel \u0026 Discord Server\r\nWhile looking into the historical data of our threat intelligence systems and passive DNS records, we identified\r\nseveral malicious URLs (hash in IOCs section below) downloading a shell script named ur0a.sh and containing\r\nSimps next stage payloads. Another commonality was the Simps Botnet infection log message. Searching for\r\nthese common entries led us to a YouTube video titled “Simps Botnet😈, Slamming!!!”, created by a user named\r\n“itz UR0A'' created on 24 April 2021. (see Figure 7)\r\nFigure 7: Youtube video demo of Simps Botnet\r\nhttps://www.uptycs.com/blog/discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group\r\nPage 4 of 9\n\nThe Youtube link also contained a Discord server link of “UR0A”, which was also present in the infection log.\r\n(see Figure 8)\r\nFigure 8: Simps Botnet Discord server\r\nKeksec Attribution With Simps Botnet\r\nThe Discord server contained several discussions around DDOS activities and Botnets carrying different names.\r\nOne binary we identified in a chat conversation named gay.x86 (hash:\r\ne258a284d5cad584a14df27f022c99515de1cec69ab3157640d1ce7584c50ecd). Upon execution, it displayed a\r\nmessage that the system is pawned by md5hashguy (see Figure 9)\r\nFigure 9: Discord message\r\nWe also came across another Gafgyt malware from a Joesandbox report, that contained the Infected By Simps\r\nBotnet ;) message. This malware dropped a file name “keksec.infected.you.log” that contained a message “youve\r\nbeen infected by urmommy, thanks for joining keksec..” (see Figure 10)\r\nhttps://www.uptycs.com/blog/discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group\r\nPage 5 of 9\n\nFigure 10: keksec.infected.you.log file\r\nInterestingly, the same Discord server also contained an users named “urmommy” and\r\n“698a20e0da24bcebca57f09b7d695f8d#2881” who actively involved in DDOS activities and Botnet discussions.\r\nAll this data gathered tied reactions Simps Botnet and the Discord server users related to Keksec group. This\r\ngroup is also referred as Kek Security, which according to NSFOCUS is a group which operates HybridMQ-keksec, a Botnet created with Trojan programs. HybridMQ-keksec is a DDoS Trojan program obtained by\r\ncombining and modifying the source code of Mirai and Gafgyt.”\r\nFigure 11: TCP flood module of Simps and Mirai\r\nFigure 12: UDP flood module of Simps and Mirai\r\nSimilarly, Simps binaries also have the Valve source Engine and OVH modules which were also seen in a variant\r\nof Gafgyt that targeted Huawei and Asus Routers and killed its rival IoT Botnets. The code similarity of the Valve\r\nsource Engine module used by Simps was similar to Gafgyt. (see Figure 13)\r\nhttps://www.uptycs.com/blog/discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group\r\nPage 6 of 9\n\nFigure 13: VSE attack module of Simps and Gafgyt\r\nUptycs EDR Detections\r\nUptycs’ EDR capabilities, armed with YARA process scanning, detected Simps downloader shell-script activity\r\n(See Figure 13) and the Simps ELF binary with a threat score of 10/10 (See Figure 14).\r\nFigure 14: Shell script detection\r\nhttps://www.uptycs.com/blog/discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group\r\nPage 7 of 9\n\nFigure 15: Simps binary detection\r\nAdditionally, Uptycs’ EDR also detects the outbound connection of the malware C2 URLs via our threat\r\nintelligence.\r\nConclusion\r\nOur research initially started with the discovery and analysis of Simps Botnet binaries used for DDOS activities.\r\nUsing Uptycs’ EDR, threat intelligence data and Open-source intelligence (OSINT) we were able to tie relations\r\nand attribute Simps Botnet to the Keksec group. The Uptycs threat research team has reported the associated\r\nDiscord server, Youtube and Github links to the concerned entities. We will continue to monitor the developments\r\nof this group and share updates. \r\nWe recommend the following measures for enterprise users and administrators to identify and protect against such\r\nattacks\r\nRegularly monitor the suspicious processes, events, and network traffic spawned on the execution of any\r\nuntrusted binary / scripts.\r\nAlways be cautious in executing shell-scripts from unknown or untrusted sources.\r\nKeep systems and firmware updated with the latest releases and patches.\r\nFor more on IOC's, URL's and YARA, see below after the break\r\nWant to learn more about how Uptycs EDR can improve security transparency in\r\nyour hybrid cloud environment? Click below to see a live demo.\r\nSee a live demo!\r\nIOCs\r\nhttps://www.uptycs.com/blog/discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group\r\nPage 8 of 9\n\nHashes\r\n1. c2d5e54544742b7a1b04cf45047859a10bb90c6945d340120872f575aa866e6d\r\n2. 45dda743b2c85f0bda113a271dad2e27c059bbacbbd083e420bf6777610c1f12\r\n3. c1f4402201114a74cc213ac8c0f2ccac9a9ec6edfc3d672b6055763a960001c1\r\n4. e847dfbd831df6015519d03d42ada8241ce1174e9bd96f405452627617229c63\r\n5. 6d18b433183fc68cd7b731fed198732d3460a21afba53163f059152bd410b55f\r\nURLs\r\n1. 159.65.46.32\r\n2. 45.14.224.127\r\n3. 185.224.129.235\r\n4. b0tz.xyz\r\n5. 23.95.80.200\r\nYARA\r\nrule Uptycs_Simps\r\n{\r\nmeta:\r\nmalware_name = \"Simps\"\r\ndescription = \"Simps is a Botnet that uses several DDOS modules from Mirai and Gafgyt\"\r\nauthor = \"Uptycs Inc.\"\r\nversion = \"1\"\r\nstrings:\r\n$simps_0 = \"Infected By Simps Botnet\"  ascii wide nocase\r\n$simps_1 = \"This Device Has successfully Been Infected\"  ascii wide nocase\r\ncondition:\r\nall of ($simps*)\r\n}\r\nSource: https://www.uptycs.com/blog/discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group\r\nhttps://www.uptycs.com/blog/discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group\r\nPage 9 of 9",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"Malpedia"
	],
	"origins": [
		"web"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://www.uptycs.com/blog/discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"discovery-of-simps-botnet-leads-ties-to-keksec-group"
	],
	"threat_actors": [
		{
			"id": "5a270f6c-2c13-4abf-861e-7d44dcfa5ceb",
			"created_at": "2023-11-03T02:00:07.794425Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:03.383096Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "Keksec",
			"aliases": [],
			"source_name": "MISPGALAXY:Keksec",
			"tools": [],
			"source_id": "MISPGALAXY",
			"reports": null
		}
	],
	"ts_created_at": 1775439031,
	"ts_updated_at": 1775826745,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
	"files": {
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}