# Backdoored 3CXDesktopApp Installer Used in Active Threat Campaign **[rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/03/30/backdoored-3cxdesktopapp-installer-used-in-active-threat-campaign/](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/03/30/backdoored-3cxdesktopapp-installer-used-in-active-threat-campaign/)** Rapid7 March 30, 2023 _Last updated at Mon, 03 Apr 2023 21:12:33 GMT_ _Emergent threats evolve quickly. We will update this blog with new information as it comes to_ _light and we are able to verify it. Erick Galinkin, Ted Samuels, Zach Dayton, Eoin Miller,_ _Caitlin Condon, Stephen Fewer, Spencer McIntyre, and Christiaan Beek all contributed to_ _this blog._ [On Wednesday, March 29, 2023, multiple security firms issued](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/crowdstrike-detects-and-prevents-active-intrusion-campaign-targeting-3cxdesktopapp-customers/) [warnings about malicious](https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/smoothoperator-ongoing-campaign-trojanizes-3cx-software-in-software-supply-chain-attack/) activity coming from a legitimate, signed binary from communications technology company 3CX. The binary, 3CXDesktopApp, is popular video-conferencing software available for download on all major platforms. Several analyses have attributed the threat campaign to [state-sponsored threat actors, and security firms have observed malicious activity in both](https://www.reddit.com/r/crowdstrike/comments/125r3uu/20230329_situational_awareness_crowdstrike/) Windows and Mac environments. Rapid7’s threat research teams analyzed the 3CXDesktopApp Windows binary and confirmed that the 3CX MSI installer drops the following files: 3CXDesktopApp.exe, a benign file that loads the backdoored ffmpeg.dll, which reads an RC4-encrypted blob after the hexadecimal demarcation of fe ed fa ce in d3dcompiler.dll. The RC4-encrypted blob in ``` d3dcompiler.dll is executable code that is reflectively loaded and retrieves .ico files with ``` appended Base64-encoded strings from GitHub. The encoded strings appear to be command-and-control (C2) communications. There is a non-exhaustive list of indicators of compromise (IOCs) at the end of this blog. Rapid7 reached out to GitHub’s security team the evening of March 29 about the GitHub repository being used as adversary infrastructure in this campaign. As of 9:40 PM ET, the malicious user has been suspended and the repository is no longer available. Rapid7 Managed Detection and Response (MDR) has observed the backdoored 3CX installer and components in several customer environments as of March 29, 2023. Rapid7 MDR is in contact with customers that we believe may be impacted. ## Mitigation Guidance Official [guidance from 3CX confirms that the following clients and versions are affected:](https://www.3cx.com/blog/news/desktopapp-security-alert/) Electron Windows App (shipped in Update 7) versions 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 Electron Mac App versions 18 11 1213 18 12 402 18 12 407 and 18 12 416 ----- As of March 30 at 11 AM ET, 3CX has not confirmed which versions of the 3CXDesktopApp are definitively unaffected. **Update March 31: 3CX has** [released new versions of their Windows and Mac Electron app](https://www.3cx.com/blog/news/desktopapp-security-alert-updates/) as of March 31. Their [update included the following statement:](https://www.3cx.com/blog/news/desktopapp-security-alert-updates/) "The Electron App update that we are releasing today is considered to be secure but there is no guarantee given that we only had 24 hours to make the necessary adjustments." Rapid7 is continuing to advise customers to pursue a conservative mitigation strategy of **uninstalling 3CXDesktopApp on all platforms and removing any artifacts left behind.** Users should retroactively hunt for indicators of compromise and block known-bad domains. There is a non-exhaustive list of known-bad domains and malicious file hashes at the end of this blog. 3CX has a browser-based Progressive Web App (PWA) that does not require the user to download an executable file. Users should leverage this PWA for the time being instead of [downloadable clients. 3CX is intermittently issuing updated guidance here.](https://www.3cx.com/blog/news/desktopapp-security-alert-updates/) ## Rapid7 customers The following new rules have been added for Rapid7 InsightIDR and Managed Detection & Response (MDR) customers and will alert on known-bad hashes and file versions of the backdoored executable, as well as known-bad domains in WEB_PROXY and DNS logs: Suspicious Web Request - 3CX Desktop Supply Chain Compromise Suspicious DNS Request - 3CX Desktop Supply Chain Compromise Suspicious Process - 3CX Desktop Supply Chain Compromise [InsightVM and Nexpose customers can use Query Builder (asset.software.product](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/query-builder/) `CONTAINS` `'3CX Desktop App') or a` [Filtered Asset Search (Software Name](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/performing-filtered-asset-searches/) `contains` `3CX` ``` Desktop App) to find assets in their environment with 3CX installed. The March 30 content ``` release also contains a check that will report any installed version of 3CX Desktop App as vulnerable. This check may be refined as new information regarding vulnerable versions comes to light. [A Velociraptor artifact is available here.](https://docs.velociraptor.app/exchange/artifacts/pages/smoothoperator/) ## Indicators of compromise A non-exhaustive list of known-bad domains is below. We advise blocking these immediately: ----- ``` akamaicontainer[.]com akamaitechcloudservices[.]com azuredeploystore[.]com azureonlinecloud[.]com azureonlinestorage[.]com convieneonline[.]com dunamistrd[.]com glcloudservice[.]com journalide[.]org msedgepackageinfo[.]com msstorageazure[.]com msstorageboxes[.]com officeaddons[.]com officestoragebox[.]com pbxcloudeservices[.]com pbxphonenetwork[.]com pbxsources[.]com qwepoi123098[.]com sbmsa[.]wiki sourceslabs[.]com Soyoungjun[.]com visualstudiofactory[.]com zacharryblogs[.]com ``` More granular URLs our team has decrypted from C2 communications include: ``` hxxps[://]akamaitechcloudservices[.]com/v2/storage hxxps[://]azuredeploystore[.]com/cloud/services hxxps[://]azureonlinestorage[.]com/azure/storage hxxps[://]glcloudservice[.]com/v1/console hxxps[://]msedgepackageinfo[.]com/microsoft-edge hxxps[://]msedgeupdate[.]net/Windows hxxps[://]msstorageazure[.]com/window hxxps[://]msstorageboxes[.]com/office hxxps[://]officeaddons[.]com/technologies hxxps[://]officestoragebox[.]com/api/session hxxps[://]pbxcloudeservices[.]com/phonesystem hxxps[://]pbxphonenetwork[.]com/voip hxxps[://]pbxsources[.]com/exchange hxxps[://]sourceslabs[.]com/downloads hxxps[://]visualstudiofactory[.]com/workload hxxps[://]www[.]3cx[.]com/blog/event-trainings/ hxxps[://]zacharryblogs[.]com/feed ``` **File hashes:** ``` Compromised MSI: aa124a4b4df12b34e74ee7f6c683b2ebec4ce9a8edcf9be345823b4fdcf5d868 3CXDesktopApp.exe: fad482ded2e25ce9e1dd3d3ecc3227af714bdfbbde04347dbc1b21d6a3670405 ffmpeg.dll: 7986bbaee8940da11ce089383521ab420c443ab7b15ed42aed91fd31ce833896 d3dcompiler_47.dll: 11be1803e2e307b647a8a7e02d128335c448ff741bf06bf52b332e0bbf423b03 ``` ----- The following file hashes have been reported as related and malicious by the community but not independently verified by Rapid7 analysts: ``` dde03348075512796241389dfea5560c20a3d2a2eac95c894e7bbed5e85a0acc 92005051ae314d61074ed94a52e76b1c3e21e7f0e8c1d1fdd497a006ce45fa61 b86c695822013483fa4e2dfdf712c5ee777d7b99cbad8c2fa2274b133481eadb ## Updates ``` **April 3, 2023:** [CVE-2023-29059 has been assigned to this issue.](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29059) ## Never miss a blog Get the latest stories, expertise, and news about security today. -----