A Full Analysis of the Pure Malware Family: Unique and Growing
Threat
By khr0x and Jane
Published: 2024-01-16 · Archived: 2026-04-05 22:30:36 UTC
In this article, we’re analyzing one of the most unusual crypters— PureCrypter, and a multifunctional stealer — PureLogs.
We’ll look at several examples and identify patterns among Pure-malware families, and also explain how to detect
PureCrypter and PureLogs. 
Why did we decide to undertake this analysis? 
While analyzing Public Submissions, we came across several interesting samples. We were intrigued by unusual traffic that
showed signs of encryption operations on executable files with short keys, as well as TCP connections with high entropy in
the connections. 
Inside, all samples looked different from other malware and were very similar to each other. Through network analysis, we
found a couple of articles dedicated to PureCrypter and the family, which shed light on this group, but we wanted to add our
insights and combine all the information in one place. 
Our objectives were: 
Study the distribution system 
Investigate the distinctive features of PureCrypter and PureLogs 
Develop detection methods for PureCrypter and PureLogs 
Examine the traffic 
The distribution of PureCoder products began in March 2021, according to information provided by the developer on the the
malware’s old website.
Information about the service on the old website
On the main page of Pure’s current website, there is a message stating that the software is used for educational and
penetration testing purposes. 
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The website lies about educational and pentesting nature of the software
However, it’s worth noting that we observe a trend where the code sold is actually being used for malicious purposes. Here
are examples on services that tell us about the distribution of these products along with other malware: 
ANY.RUN Submissions (PureCrypter, PureLogs) 
Abuse.ch Bazaar 
Telegram update
Pure’s update notes tell us that since March 2023, it is also sold through a Telegram bot. Telegram bots make purchasing
malware more automated and anonymous. Bot usage shows that the author is developing the service, exploring new
channels, and scaling up. 
Here are all the products that this group distributes under the guise of “educational purposes”: 
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Pure products
Despite the claim that these products are distributed for educational purposes, the presence of silent miners, botnets, and
hidden HVNC seems odd. 
Comments and ratings on Pure’s website reveal high demand — every month there are at least couple of purchases. 
Comments and reviews on Pure’s website
We attempted to follow the purchase flow and found that users are to make a cryptocurrency payment In Bitcoin. The
payment page offers several Bitcoin wallets. These wallets are likely part of a Bitcoin mixer. The activity in these wallets
started between May 19-26, 2023, and as of the writing of this article, one of them already had 250 transactions
amounting to $32,000 (see it on Blockhain.com).
Details about the Cryptocurrency wallet
So far, we’ve established that there is a wide range of Pure malware, it is popular, and it has existed for several years. Now,
let’s move on to the technical analysis of the Pure family.
Staged and Stage-less loader 
The deployment of products from the Pure family usually begins with a loader that includes both Staged and Stage-less
payloads. Let’s analyze the behavior using PureCrypter as an example.
What is PureCrypter? 
PureCrypter is a crypter (or obfuscator), as its name suggests, that has a set of algorithms for data obfuscation and
encryption. In combination, they hide malware from antivirus programs and also make it difficult to analyze for analysts.
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Behaviour flow of PureCrypter
As seen in the diagram above, the loader has two stages: Staged and Stage-less payload. The decrypted resources contain
libraries such as Protobuf-net and Costura. Using Protobuf-net, data are deserialized, forming a configuration with the
compressed malware. Ultimately, after decompression, the malware is launched with parameters from the configuration in a
new process. 
Let’s examine each variant separately. 
Staged Loader
SHA256
3ACD90196DCF53DD6E265DC9C89B3CB0C47648A3B7AC8F226C6B4B98F39F2FC8 
View the task
The static analysis of the sample under examination reveals that it’s written in .NET:
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Information from DIE 
After analyzing the sample in the ANY.RUN sandbox, we determined that a file with an .mp4 extension is downloaded: 
Payload download
Additionally, we found examples downloading payloads with extensions like .vdf, .mp3, etc. This is another characteristic
of the loader — to download files with legitimate extensions. 
In the image above, the downloaded file is not an actual .mp4 file, but an encrypted payload. It’s challenging to determine
the encryption method right away, so we will analyze its internals. 
Code analysis in DnSpy allowed us to establish that the downloaded payload is encrypted with an XOR operation, with a
key length of 3 bytes. You can see the overall scheme of payload downloading and decryption below: 
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Source code
To decrypt the file, we will use our CyberChef recipe.
XOR with the key ”335” in Cyberchef
As evident from the screenshot above, the downloaded and decrypted file is an executable or a library. 
Additionally, this type of encryption is not the only possible method and can be substituted with reverse encryption and
others. 
Now, let’s move on to the analysis of the stage-less loader. 
Stage-less Loader 
SHA256
5030BC30C14139D9C48DC4CD175DE6C966E83A9059035D18AF33DDA06F2541AB
View the task
Unlike the Staged payload, the examined Stage-less payload is protected by SmartAssembly, which you can see in DIE:
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Information from DIE
In the stage-less loader, the payload is stored in a resource in an encrypted form:
Resource on board
First, the resource is decrypted using AES with embedded keys (KEY: dd2e7fe3fd9cb1b2f91a16460c8acb5b and IV:
80f3f9712e01f98fab92ab84ec40a8e5) and then decompressed:
Rijndael Algorithm
We will use a CyberChef recipe for decryption. 
Cyberchef – AES+decompress
As a result, we get a .NET Assembly without executable code but with an encrypted resource, which is also decrypted and
loaded into modules: 
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Nchya resource
The decryption of the second resource is done using 3DES with the key KEY “68433890991609093ead30a9d75c39db” and
IV “4A64DD85048433D7” (CBC model). 
Let’s use a CyberChef recipe to decrypt this resource:
Cyberchef – TripleDES
After decryption, we obtain an executable file or library, similar to the case with the Staged Loader. 
Now, let’s move on to the analysis of the obtained files. 
PureCrypter 
Comparing the entry points of Staged and stage-less PureCrypter, we see that they are identical. From this, we can
conclude that they are essentially the same. 
Here’s EntryPoint of PureCrypter:
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EntryPoint of PureCrypter
PureCrypter can carry two types of payloads – 3rd party malware or its own proprietary product, PureLogs. Let’s examine
each option separately. 
3rd party malware (AgentTesla) 
The program begins decrypting and loading the .NET Assembly resource, similar to the stage-less process. This happens in
an identical manner – using AES (Rijndael) encryption. 
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Resource decryption with AES (Rijndael)
We can use this CyberChef recipe for decryption. 
CyberChef AES+inflate
After decrypting with the AES algorithm, the program takes this resource and proceeds to the second stage of its decryption. 
The first action the program performs is parsing the data of the header. The first 30 bytes are the length of the data, and the
next 10 bytes are the XOR key: 
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The header
From the header, a license and key are obtained. The data can be decrypted using this CyberChef recipe. A similar string was
already seen in ZGRat.
XOR
After calculating the data, the program selects a method of decryption. In our case, it is AES. 
Encryption selection
In AES, IV is used, which is the XOR key 7C685406ED380C74532A9488BA58083D, and the KEY is the last 32 bytes in
the decrypted header b2912dfe705af74a11e7d2bf3786103116adee71727185419bf7c4d7f986bd4c. 
We can decrypt the data using a CyberChef recipe. 
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As a result of the decryption, we obtain a .NET Assembly with a set of resources and encrypted strings before the MZ
header. 
Resources after decryption
The header looks as follows:  
4 bytes at the beginning and end (for calculation purposes) 
1 byte for the message size highlighted in red 
And the message itself afterwards.
The header
The messages can be decrypted using the following CyberChef recipe: 
Encoding and XOR
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The resource zJSLu is decrypted in the same way — using AES and decompression. It contains strings that will be used later
(if the flag is set in the configuration).
The zJSLu resource, once decrypted (subject to serialization)
The malware uses protobuf for deserializing data, which is taken from the Issal resource after prior decompression.
Deserialization
At this point, having decrypted all the resources, we arrive at the program’s main function. But before starting the analysis
of the main function, let’s take a look at what the PureCrypter builder interface looks like:
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PureCrypter builder
From the screenshot, we can see a large set of functions, including anti-debugging, anti-deletion, and others. Let’s go
through the main code and see what techniques are used in this version of the crypter. 
Code with configuration analysis and checks.
In the version under study, the check for the presence of a virtual machine is disabled, but the functionality is present in the
code of the program. It includes: 
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent to find a debugger; 
Checks for the presence of the Sandboxie virtual environment by searching for the loaded library sbiedll.dll; 
Executes a WMI query “select * from Win32_BIOS” to check the BIOS version; 
Executes a WMI query “select * from Win32_ComputerSystem” and looks for one of the substrings
“Microsoft|VMWare|Virtual” in the results; 
Checks the width and height of the monitor screen, which should be more than 1024 and 768 pixels, respectively; 
Checks whether the program is running on a 64-bit OS, as most modern operating systems are 64-bit; 
Compares the current username with one from a list. 
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Other capabilities include: 
1. A feature to reset the network interface by executing the command “cmd /c ipconfig /release,” presumably to prevent
security tools or antivirus software from communicating with their servers. In the sample analyzed, this feature is disabled. 
2. Ability to use a mutex to prevent the launch of a duplicate copy. In this instance, the mutex is named “Gjrstoo,” but this
option is not active. 
3. A function to check if it is running with administrator privileges and to restart with the necessary permissions if needed.
Moreover, the malware uses the command “set-mppreference -exclusionpath ” to add the entire “C:” drive to the antivirus
exclusions. This function is also disabled. 
4. A delay execution feature, where the delay occurs N times for 1 second each. 
5. Capability to execute an arbitrary PowerShell command passed in Base64 via the “-enc” parameter. This function is also
disabled. 
6. Displaying a fake error message, but this feature is also turned off. 
7. Ability to establish persistence in the system through Run registry keys or the Startup directory. 
The purpose of using “ipconfig /renew” is unclear, but the functionality exists (it allows the release of all dynamic IP
addresses assigned to the computer using a DHCP server). 
Subsequently, the payload is loaded, which can be downloaded from the internet (as indicated by the HTTP Client), or from
a resource (as in our example).
Injection options
1. Ordinary library loading  
2. Decryption of the resource followed by loading 
3. Unclear — possibly, decryption is executed here. 
Subsequently, the malware reverses bytes and is decompressed using the same GZIP, the recipe for which can be found here.
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Cyberchef – Gunzip
After decompression, PureCrypter creates a new process: 
And injects code into this process. 
This is how malware is commonly distributed, often including stealers and RATs. Now let’s move on to analyzing PureLogs,
which can distribute PureCrypter. 
PureLogs Loader 
PureLogs  malware is typically distributed by a loader covered by the NET Reactor protector. PureLogs is a small library
that is involved in data theft. Usually, the library is loaded by the loader from a C2 server. 
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Analysis of the loading traffic revealed that in the first connection an encrypted message is sent, and an encrypted response
is received. All of this occurs within the loader. 
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First connection in the loader
Both messages within the first connection are encrypted in the same way, but the response has an additional layer of
serialization and undergoes re-encryption with byte reversal. 
First, the data is compressed and then encrypted using 3DES with a key (which is stored in the loader’s resources, along
with the IP data and client ID). However, the key itself is encrypted using md5Crypto, resulting in the hash
‘9F4D71CF2393253FB5324C6731B962F8’. 
After encryption, the program sends this message to the server. The process begins with sending 4 bytes indicating the size
of the message, followed by the message itself. 
A complete decryption is presented here:
Decryption key
Now let’s consider the received message. After decryption, the data undergoes deserialization and is then re-encrypted again
(3DES+GZIP), similar to the initial process. However, at the end, a Reverse bytes operation is applied. 
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TripleDES+GZIP (you can immediately remove the first 4 bytes of length or use DROP)
After deserialization: TripleDES+GZIP+Reverse
As a result, we obtain our library, which is responsible for stealing data and then sending it onward. Let’s take a closer look
at it. 
PureLogs
PureLogs is a multi-functional stealer. Like PureCrypter, PureLogs has obfuscation and obfuscation methods that
complicate its analysis. But what’s really interesting is its network traffic, which we will discuss in this section. 
Like other samples of the Pure family, PureLogs is sometimes confused with ZGRat — we are going to clear up this
misunderstanding in this article. 
Let’s get to the analysis. 
Looking at the class library, we immediately see a class called PlgCore (We assume this stands for PureLogsCore).
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ClassLibrary1
Serialized data enters the library as an argument from a resource, which the loader has loaded from the C2 server. 
Configuration data
Inside, they are deserialized and stored as configuration.
Configuration
Next, the library iterates through a vast number of functions and collects data from the system: 
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Browser data, including extensions 
Data about Crypto Wallets 
Complete information about the user 
Full information about the PC configuration 
Below is an example of some of the system data. 
System data 
Next, all the collected data is serialized. Following the same principle, the data is encrypted before transmission:
compression and 3DES encryption using a pre-existing key. Now, all the data ready for transmission is transformed, and the
final connection is made to send the gathered data.
Data transmission (first 4 bytes indicate size, followed by the message)
Then, there are three transmissions: the first and last are hashes of the data, and the second one contains the actual data. 
To decrypt the traffic, we can use this CyberChef recipe. 
Decryption of the first message (the last one is identical)
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Decryption of the data
And with this, we have dissected the traffic and the operation of PureLogs. Now, let’s consider another malware variant
from the Pure family — a miner. 
PureMiner 
While examining samples on other services with detections for PureLogs and PureCrypter, we came across several
samples that didn’t appear to be like either but exhibited a strikingly similar signature. 
Firstly, the traffic they generated followed an identical pattern (first 4 bytes for length, followed by the remaining bytes
for data). What’s even more intriguing is that they were encrypted in the same fashion (using 3DES encryption with a key
that was similarly encrypted through MD5Crypto). 
Secondly, there were similarities in code behavior and module loading, such as the use of the proto-buf module for
processing configuration data. 
Thirdly, the code structure and its resemblance to PureCrypter and PureLogs code were notable. 
Lastly, the configurations showed similarities in their structure. 
The diagram below shows this resemblance to PureLogs. It involves the transmission and reception of data from the C2
server (with the data being encrypted using 3DES).
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Based on all of this information, we have decided to conduct an investigation into the discovered sample:
SHA256
A20F2623022BC0D5BDC49B235736CC791A3392198D7A601B2478C1974D5D9F17
View the task
The first thing we noticed during our analysis was the sample’s behavior when executed with administrative privileges (we
will see why we executed the sample with admin privileges later on). 
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The process of restarting using cmd
After the restart, the program creates a scheduled task in Task Scheduler to launch its copy at
%APPDATA%/HResult/TypeId.exe. Following this, there is an injection into a new legitimate process.
The process is launched under Task Scheduler
After analyzing the behavior, we proceeded with an in-depth analysis of the sample. We discovered its configuration, which
utilizes proto-buf. 
Configuration
Additionally, there is an executable file that appears to be responsible for executing commands from the C2 server. In the
strings, there is a mention of the XMRIG miner. We suspect that this is a distributor of the miner, which runs it quietly.
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Strings from the miner
We decided to decrypt the traffic to understand what information is being transmitted and what we receive in response. We
managed to obtain the decryption key. It was no surprise that the traffic was encrypted using the same 3DES encryption, and
the first 4 bytes represent the length, which we remove: 
Decrypted traffic
The decryption recipe is available here. And here’s the link to a server response.  
Response from the server
And with this, we have found another malware from the Pure family — a miner. PureMiner collects information about the
system and sends it to C2. After this, it receives a response with mining instructions.
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Let’s wrap up the analysis 
To summarize — this was one of the most comprehensive investigations we’ve done so far in ANY.RUN. We analyzed a
widely popular and rapidly spreading malware family — Pure — and even uncovered a new variant — a miner. 
Pure tools masquerade as legitimate software created for “educational purposes”. But analysis of the code clearly shows that
it is a powerful malicious tool. Recently, the creators began distributing it through a telegram bot, which indicates that they
are scaling an operation. Currently, Pure receives at least a couple of orders every month, but it’s highly likely that its
popularity will start skyrocketing in the near future. 
We hope that this analysis helped you better understand how to reverse and detect malware from the Pure family, so if that
happens, you’ll be well prepared. 
If you have any information to add about Pure — we’d love to hear it. Let’s discuss in the comments below. And as always,
make sure to share your thoughts about the article.
About ANY.RUN
ANY.RUN is an interactive malware analysis sandbox that streamlines the work of SOC and DFIR teams. Our service is
trusted by 300,000 professionals worldwide who use it to investigate both emerging and persistent threats.      
Request a free trial of ANY.RUN for 14 days to explore all the features we offer.     
Request demo → 
MITRE ATT&CK Matrix
Tactics  Techniques  Description 
Defense Evasion 
T1140 - Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
Information 
Deobfuscate/Decode resourses and files 
Discovery 
T1082 - System Information Discovery 
Pure-malware discovery system
information 
T1083 - File and Directory Discovery  PureLogs discoveries files for stealing 
Collection 
T1119 - Automated Collection  Collect information 
T1005 - Data from Local System  Search local system sources for stealing 
Command and
Control 
T1071.001 - Application Layer Protocol:Web
Protocols 
Connection and delivery 
IOCs
PureCrypter
FIle
0f60f086665fd4d442821851c878c21b 
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MD5  0f60f086665fd4d442821851c878c21b 
SHA256  3acd90196dcf53dd6e265dc9c89b3cb0c47648a3b7ac8f226c6b4b98f39f2fc8 
SHA1  a4d4f31fb794bbf59be542f493aea9f9e3857d4 
Dropped file 
Path  C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\ydVSL\ydVSL.exe  
SHA256  3acd90196dcf53dd6e265dc9c89b3cb0c47648a3b7ac8f226c6b4b98f39f2fc8 
Connections 
5[.]181.80.126 
URLs
Http[x]://5.181.80.126/Hjysa.mp4 
FIle
QUOTATION_NOVQTRFA00541·PDF.scr 
FIle
0f60f086665fd4d442821851c878c21b
MD5  83999a2ce0109ea4adbecb3a96744e8c 
SHA256  5030bc30c14139d9c48dc4cd175de6c966e83a9059035d18af33dda06f2541ab 
SHA1  4b94f4b23b157c7ae2df54e251cd4d22c683134d 
Domain 
gator3220.hostgator[.]com 
PureLogs 
FIle
RH2023-17.exe 
MD5  a7c14a39a5ee93ca25ab793be06c1478 
SHA256  e5b27dc1672088a5a584467511a02844d45f4eb6af92a96373c803fd3dc5e6b7 
SHA1  c9eb61977fa0fd1bf1c9e7175a0088289e6b9bbd 
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Dropped file
Path  C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\Xokmrjn.exe  
SHA256  e5b27dc1672088a5a584467511a02844d45f4eb6af92a96373c803fd3dc5e6b7 
Path  C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Costura\1485B29524EF63EB83DF771D39CCA767\64\sqlite.interop.dll  
SHA256  5f0e72e1839db4aa41f560e0a68c7a95c9e1656bc2f4f4ff64803655d02e5272 
Connections 
91[.]92.120.119 
Domain 
Teleturismo[.]it 
PureMiner 
FIle
491310d10c0ea2d217c90a2403c20bea 
MD5  491310d10c0ea2d217c90a2403c20bea 
SHA256  a20f2623022bc0d5bdc49b235736cc791a3392198d7a601b2478c1974d5d9f17 
SHA1  5bd371ae2edc0c2cf926e1543e4cdd7d92c83577 
Dropped file
Path  C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\HResult\TypeId.exe  
SHA256  a20f2623022bc0d5bdc49b235736cc791a3392198d7a601b2478c1974d5d9f17 
Connections 
91[.]92.240.95 
Domain 
Farmjo[.]mine.nu 
More Submissions 
https://app.any.run/tasks/f972efd3-c053-42c2-a2d4-eade0f40acfb/
https://app.any.run/tasks/c4344ee1-bcd6-438f-9aba-f13c1c3dcca9/
https://app.any.run/tasks/629232cd-67e4-4f3b-880d-34c3675931a0/
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https://app.any.run/tasks/50294ac2-f3c1-43bd-9bec-0527fb1b8443/
ANY.RUN malware analyst
khr0x
I'm 21 years old and I work as a malware analyst for more than a year. I like finding out what kind of malware got on my
computer. In my spare time I do sports and play video games.
ANY.RUN writer and network traffic analyst
Jane
I'm ANY.RUN ambassador and a real network traffic numismatist. I also love penguins and tortoises. My motto is to do
good and throw it into the sea.
khr0x
khr0x
Malware analyst at ANY.RUN
I'm 21 years old and I work as a malware analyst for more than a year. I like finding out what kind of malware got on my
computer. In my spare time I do sports and play video games.
jane
Jane
Leading network traffic analysis expert at ANY.RUN
I'm ANY.RUN ambassador and a real network traffic numismatist. I also love penguins and tortoises. My motto is to do
good and throw it into the sea.
Source: https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/pure-malware-family-analysis/
https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/pure-malware-family-analysis/
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