{
	"id": "2cf6e413-d109-408e-af6a-a2527af60753",
	"created_at": "2026-04-06T01:32:10.311073Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T03:38:19.349277Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "de35b42fa74beecbf12b4a0e39f56ee87f9aba71",
	"title": "MAR-10322463-4.v1 - AppleJeus: Kupay Wallet | CISA",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 91447,
	"plain_text": "MAR-10322463-4.v1 - AppleJeus: Kupay Wallet | CISA\r\nPublished: 2021-04-15 · Archived: 2026-04-06 00:48:44 UTC\r\nbody#cma-body { font-family: Franklin Gothic Medium, Franklin Gothic, ITC Franklin Gothic, Arial, sans-serif; font-size:\r\n15px; } table#cma-table { width: 900px; margin: 2px; table-layout: fixed; border-collapse: collapse; } div#cma-exercise {\r\nwidth: 900px; height: 30px; text-align: center; line-height: 30px; font-weight: bold; font-size: 18px; } div.cma-header { text-align: center; margin-bottom: 40px; } div.cma-footer { text-align: center; margin-top: 20px; } h2.cma-tlp { background-color: #000; color: #ffffff; width: 180px; height: 30px; text-align: center; line-height: 30px; font-weight: bold; font-size:\r\n18px; float: right; } span.cma-fouo { line-height: 30px; font-weight: bold; font-size: 16px; } h3.cma-section-title { font-size:\r\n18px; font-weight: bold; padding: 0 10px; margin-top: 10px; } h4.cma-object-title { font-size: 16px; font-weight: bold;\r\nmargin-left: 20px; } h5.cma-data-title { padding: 3px 0 3px 10px; margin: 10px 0 0 20px; background-color: #e7eef4; font-size: 15px; } p.cma-text { margin: 5px 0 0 25px !important; word-wrap: break-word !important; } div.cma-section { border-bottom: 5px solid #aaa; margin: 5px 0; padding-bottom: 10px; } div.cma-avoid-page-break { page-break-inside: avoid; }\r\ndiv#cma-summary { page-break-after: always; } div#cma-faq { page-break-after: always; } table.cma-content { border-collapse: collapse; margin-left: 20px; } table.cma-hashes { table-layout: fixed; width: 880px; } table.cma-hashes td{ width:\r\n780px; word-wrap: break-word; } .cma-left th { text-align: right; vertical-align: top; padding: 3px 8px 3px 20px;\r\nbackground-color: #f0f0f0; border-right: 1px solid #aaa; } .cma-left td { padding-left: 8px; } .cma-color-title th, .cma-color-list th, .cma-color-title-only th { text-align: left; padding: 3px 0 3px 20px; background-color: #f0f0f0; } .cma-color-title td,\r\n.cma-color-list td, .cma-color-title-only td { padding: 3px 20px; } .cma-color-title tr:nth-child(odd) { background-color:\r\n#f0f0f0; } .cma-color-list tr:nth-child(even) { background-color: #f0f0f0; } td.cma-relationship { max-width: 310px; word-wrap: break-word; } ul.cma-ul { margin: 5px 0 10px 0; } ul.cma-ul li { line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 5px; word-wrap:\r\nbreak-word; } #cma-survey { font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; } div.cma-banner-container { position: relative; text-align:\r\ncenter; color: white; } img.cma-banner { max-width: 900px; height: auto; } img.cma-nccic-logo { max-height: 60px; width:\r\nauto; float: left; margin-top: -15px; } div.cma-report-name { position: absolute; bottom: 32px; left: 12px; font-size: 20px; }\r\ndiv.cma-report-number { position: absolute; bottom: 70px; right: 100px; font-size: 18px; } div.cma-report-date { position:\r\nabsolute; bottom: 32px; right: 100px; font-size: 18px; } img.cma-thumbnail { max-height: 100px; width: auto; vertical-align: top; } img.cma-screenshot { margin: 10px 0 0 25px; max-width: 800px; height: auto; vertical-align: top; border: 1px\r\nsolid #000; } div.cma-screenshot-text { margin: 10px 0 0 25px; } .cma-break-word { word-wrap: break-word; } .cma-tag {\r\nborder-radius: 5px; padding: 1px 10px; margin-right: 10px; } .cma-tag-info { background: #f0f0f0; } .cma-tag-warning {\r\nbackground: #ffdead; }\r\nNotification\r\nThis report is provided \"as is\" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not\r\nprovide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial\r\nproduct or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.\r\nThis document is marked TLP:WHITE--Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries\r\nminimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to\r\nstandard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the\r\nTraffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.\r\nSummary\r\nDescription\r\nThis Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the\r\nCybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Treasury (Treasury) to highlight the cyber\r\nthreat to cryptocurrency posed by North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and\r\nprovide mitigation recommendations. Working with U.S. government partners, FBI, CISA, and Treasury assess that Lazarus\r\nGroup—which these agencies attribute to North Korean state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors—is\r\ntargeting individuals and companies, including cryptocurrency exchanges and financial service companies, through the\r\ndissemination of cryptocurrency trading applications that have been modified to include malware that facilitates theft of\r\ncryptocurrency.\r\nThis MAR highlights this cyber threat posed by North Korea and provides detailed indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by\r\nthe North Korean government. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as\r\nHIDDEN COBRA. For more information on other versions of AppleJeus and recommended steps to mitigate this threat, see\r\nJoint Cybersecurity Advisory AA21-048A: AppleJeus: Analysis of Lazarus Group Cryptocurrency Malware at\r\nhttps://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/AA21-048A.\r\nhttps://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nPage 1 of 12\n\nThere have been multiple versions of AppleJeus malware discovered since its initial discovery in August 2018. In most\r\nversions, the malware appears to be from a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading company and website, whereby an\r\nunsuspecting individual downloads a third-party application from a website that appears legitimate.\r\nThe U.S. Government has identified AppleJeus malware version—Kupay Wallet—and associated IOCs used by the North\r\nKorean government in AppleJeus operations.\r\nKupay Wallet, discovered in March 2020, is a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading software that is marketed and\r\ndistributed by a company and website—Kupay Service and kupaywallet[.]com, respectively—that appear legitimate. Some\r\ninformation has been redacted from this report to preserve victim anonymity.\r\nFor a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10322463-4.v1.stix.\r\nSubmitted Files (7)\r\n0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba (kupay_upgrade)\r\n1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6 (Kupay.exe)\r\n55eacc25e9eaba5d3f04b6cbcac2e16879b83d967596d645e5ec4b8f42656ef9 (Kupay.dmg)\r\n6b945159b4c816ec5e212ba125eb01938234205d8d3e57fca46de7c064c628f8 (Kupay.msi)\r\n91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd (kupayupdate_stage2)\r\na0c461c94ba9f1573c7253666d218b3343d24bfa5d8ef270ee9bc74b7856e492 (kupay)\r\nfc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d (KupayUpgrade.exe)\r\nDomains (2)\r\nkupaywallet.com\r\nlevelframeblog.com\r\nFindings\r\n6b945159b4c816ec5e212ba125eb01938234205d8d3e57fca46de7c064c628f8\r\nTags\r\ndropper\r\nDetails\r\nName Kupay.msi\r\nSize 143568384 bytes\r\nType\r\nComposite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 10.0, MSI Installer, Last Printed: Fri Dec 11 11:47:44 20\r\nTime/Date: Fri Dec 11 11:47:44 2009, Last Saved Time/Date: Fri Dec 11 11:47:44 2009, Security: 0, Code page: 1252, Revision Numbe\r\nC353-460A-B325-AF38D7F3E338}, Number of Words: 2, Subject: Kupay, Author: Kupay Service, Name of Creating Application: Adv\r\n14.5.2 build 83143, Template: ;1033, Comments: This installer database contains the logic and data required to install Kupay., Title: Inst\r\nKeywords: Installer, MSI, Database, Number of Pages: 200\r\nMD5 afdf3dd62dafd401be4bbeca65b42635\r\nSHA1 8b45d12ed8c058ea0ce3122da9a82b9fb045d6a3\r\nSHA256 6b945159b4c816ec5e212ba125eb01938234205d8d3e57fca46de7c064c628f8\r\nSHA512 bdc7a8904ad154046ade472442810c0007e5494665b429d847eef74b05567422600dd543bd8ae632128cd8def853926f2a86eab0e7d91a1d\r\nssdeep 3145728:M8yVXZLQX6rw3cJRGmMEuwRNiPTdy68L04oIRHndNQGOx:9yVXZfrw3CGtw3iPTdytmIRHdlw\r\nEntropy 7.997013\r\nAntivirus\r\nNo matches found.\r\nhttps://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nPage 2 of 12\n\nYARA Rules\r\nNo matches found.\r\nssdeep Matches\r\nNo matches found.\r\nRelationships\r\n6b945159b4... Contains 1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6\r\n6b945159b4... Contains fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d\r\n6b945159b4... Downloaded_By kupaywallet.com\r\nDescription\r\nThis Windows program from the Kupay Service site is a Windows MSI Installer with the file name Kupay[GUID].msi. The\r\ninstaller was hosted at hxxps[:]kupaywallet.com/product/[GUID]. The [GUID] is a unique file that is crated for a specific\r\nvictim and is being withheld to preserve the identity of the intended recipient.\r\nThe installer looks legitimate and will install the \"Kupay.exe\"\r\n(1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6) file in the “C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Kupay”\r\nfolder. It also installs \"KupayUpgrade.exe\" (fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d) in\r\nthe “C:\\Users\\\u003cusername\u003e\\AppData\\Roaming\\KupaySupport” folder. Immediately after installation, the installer launches\r\nthe \"KupayUpgrade.exe\" binary.\r\nScreenshots\r\nFigure 1 - Screenshot of \"Kupay.msi\" installation.\r\nkupaywallet.com\r\nTags\r\ncommand-and-control\r\nURLs\r\nkupaywallet.com/kupay_update.php\r\nkupaywallet.com/product/\r\nWhois\r\nWhois for kupaywallet.com had the following information:\r\nRegistrar: NAMECHEAP INC\r\nCreation Date: 2020-02-21\r\nRegistrar Registration Expiration Date: 2021-02-21\r\nRelationships\r\nkupaywallet.com Downloaded 6b945159b4c816ec5e212ba125eb01938234205d8d3e57fca46de7c064c628f8\r\nkupaywallet.com Downloaded 55eacc25e9eaba5d3f04b6cbcac2e16879b83d967596d645e5ec4b8f42656ef9\r\nkupaywallet.com Connected_From 0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba\r\nDescription\r\nThe domain kupaywallet.com had a legitimately signed Sectigo Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificate, which was “Domain\r\nControl Validated” just as all previous AppleJeus domain certificates. Investigation revealed the point of contact listed for\r\nverification was admin[@]kupaywallet.com. No other contact information was available as the administrative or technical\r\ncontact for the kupaywallet.com domain.\r\nThe domain is registered with NameCheap at the IP address 104.200.67.96 with ASN 8100.\r\nhttps://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nPage 3 of 12\n\nIn addition to the site kupaywallet.com, a Twitter account @kupayservice is associated with the company. This account\r\ntweets out general cryptocurrency articles and information and replies to various related tweets. The first tweet was on May\r\n23, 2019, while the last was on July 11, 2019. Twitter lists the joined date for @kupayservice to be October 2018.\r\nScreenshots\r\nFigure 2 - Screenshot of KupayService Twitter account.\r\n1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6\r\nTags\r\ntrojan\r\nDetails\r\nName Kupay.exe\r\nSize 97686016 bytes\r\nType PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows\r\nMD5 668d696582f9c00029e2e8253470e9db\r\nSHA1 e83ebe43da7bbfb9c95d34163383d1b3926e663f\r\nSHA256 1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6\r\nSHA512 0b370636ea2b7211d691a3bfcfc9017cb12df6874becb9b6334ca735bc325f59c50e99fc3b57c8db2d265e0c631651c7280109ffdbb3b48b7d\r\nssdeep 1572864:MdJvugr82jf19dUM/1T8+1VJRukUhkmG:Mdhg6Pm\r\nEntropy 6.674838\r\nAntivirus\r\nNo matches found.\r\nYARA Rules\r\nNo matches found.\r\nssdeep Matches\r\n97 78b56a1385f2a92f3c9404f71731088646aac6c2c84cc19a449976272dab418f\r\nPE Metadata\r\nCompile Date 2019-12-16 00:00:00-05:00\r\nImport Hash bb1d46df79ee2045d0bc2529cf6c7458\r\nCompany Name BitPay\r\nFile Description Kupay\r\nInternal Name Kupay\r\nLegal Copyright Copyright © 2020 BitPay\r\nProduct Name Kupay\r\nProduct Version 9.1.0.0\r\nPE Sections\r\nMD5 Name Raw Size Entropy\r\n32b731864b0ff3d1c427c97d582e7897 header 1024 2.990247\r\nhttps://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nPage 4 of 12\n\nMD5 Name Raw Size Entropy\r\n36430f041d87935dcb34adde2e7d625d .text 78234112 6.471421\r\nee7e02e8e2958ff79f25c8fd8b7d33e5 .rdata 15596032 6.376243\r\n65c59271f5c2bab26a7d0838e9f04bcf .data 262144 3.484705\r\n00406f1d9355757d80cbf48242fdf344 .pdata 2768896 6.805097\r\n6a6a225bfe091e65d3f82654179fbc50 .00cfg 512 0.195869\r\n786f587a97128c401be15c90fe059b72 .rodata 6144 4.219562\r\n9efa43af7b1faae15ffbd428d0485819 .tls 512 0.136464\r\n60d3ea61d541c9be2e845d2787fb9574 CPADinfo 512 0.122276\r\nbf619eac0cdf3f68d496ea9344137e8b prot 512 0.000000\r\n85237257867935c227d2f2f39316b12a .rsrc 106496 4.912524\r\nfb3216031225fdb1902888e247009d0c .reloc 709120 5.476445\r\nPackers/Compilers/Cryptors\r\nMicrosoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL)\r\nRelationships\r\n1b60a6d35c... Contained_Within 6b945159b4c816ec5e212ba125eb01938234205d8d3e57fca46de7c064c628f8\r\nDescription\r\nThis file is a 64-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer \"Kupay.msi.\" When executed,\r\n\"Kupay.exe\" loads a legitimate looking cryptocurrency wallet application with no signs of malicious activity. This\r\napplication appears to be a modification of the open source cryptocurrency wallet Copay, which is distributed by Atlanta\r\nbased company BitPay. According to their website bitpay.com, “BitPay builds powerful, enterprise-grade tools for crypto\r\nacceptance and spending.\"\r\nIn addition to application appearance being similar, a DNS request for \"bitpay.com\" is always sent out immediately after a\r\nDNS request for \"kupaywallet.com\" and the company listed in the version information for Kupay is Bitpay.\r\nLastly, the GitHub “Commit Hash” listed in the Dorusio application “638b2b1” is to a branch of Copay found at\r\nhxxps[:]//github.com/flean/copay-1 (Figure 5).\r\nScreenshots\r\nFigure 3 - Screenshot of the Kupay Wallet application.\r\nFigure 4 - Screenshot of the Bitpay site displaying the application.\r\nFigure 5 - Copay GitHub branch matching Dorusio.\r\nfc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d\r\nTags\r\ntrojan\r\nDetails\r\nName KupayUpgrade.exe\r\nSize 115712 bytes\r\nType PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows\r\nMD5 60c2efdafbffc5bd6709c8e461f7b77d\r\nhttps://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nPage 5 of 12\n\nSHA1 dbddccba18422eea5d7bb1bdfe66ceee90446a45\r\nSHA256 fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d\r\nSHA512 5543d4e5872ef5b0f12ba180425d2ab94131c03f4fec7195f3a74d051d5a867ad580ea794a1af6c6bd16e4bc27337cc138fe71aab9600792bf\r\nssdeep 3072:oHAqeXaeHx9pdpqw6IQIsMF6s3yvPxdOBU:kWXaeHxrvB6X9M33\r\nEntropy 6.128091\r\nAntivirus\r\nAhnlab Trojan/Win64.FakeCoinTrader\r\nESET a variant of Win64/NukeSped.DE trojan\r\nK7 Trojan ( 00569b451 )\r\nZillya! Trojan.Generic.Win32.1058845\r\nYARA Rules\r\nNo matches found.\r\nssdeep Matches\r\n94 572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09\r\nPE Metadata\r\nCompile Date 2020-02-25 03:46:13-05:00\r\nImport Hash 565005404f00b7def4499142ade5e3dd\r\nPE Sections\r\nMD5 Name Raw Size Entropy\r\n695567cdbccfbe54b19634abe3bb1e5b header 1024 2.723717\r\ne35b1061d665602ed7e1c2d9de87f059 .text 65536 6.456115\r\n1578510ae509e46d8f3201edb3349d54 .rdata 39936 5.084900\r\ndbf3b39f579f6cafbdf3960f0a87f5f9 .data 2560 1.851526\r\ncb3735cf6fde4690ee7a6cd2026eb4de .pdata 4096 4.957030\r\n90e2eb1b90616d039eca5e2627ea1134 .gfids 512 1.320519\r\n3f1861d2a0b1dc2d1329c9d2b3353924 .reloc 2048 4.762609\r\nPackers/Compilers/Cryptors\r\nMicrosoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL)\r\nRelationships\r\nfc1aafd2ed... Contained_Within 6b945159b4c816ec5e212ba125eb01938234205d8d3e57fca46de7c064c628f8\r\nDescription\r\nThis file is a 64-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer \"Kupay.msi.\" When executed,\r\n\"KupayUpgrade.exe\" first installs itself as a service, which will automatically start when any user logs on. The service is\r\ninstalled with a description stating “Automatic Kupay Upgrade.\"\r\nOn startup, \"KupayUpgrade.exe\" allocates memory in order to later write a file. After allocating the memory and storing the\r\nhard-coded string “Latest” in a variable, the program attempts to open a network connection. The connection is named\r\nhttps://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nPage 6 of 12\n\n“Kupay Wallet 9.0.1 (Check Update Windows)”, likely to avoid suspicion from a user.\r\nSimilarly to previous AppleJeus variants, \"KupayUpgrade.exe \"collects some basic information from the system as well as a\r\ntimestamp, and places them in hard coded format strings. Specifically, the timestamp is placed into a format string\r\n“ver=%d\u0026timestamp=%lu” where ver is set as the 90001, possibly referring to the Kupay Wallet version previously\r\nmentioned (Figure 7).\r\nThis basic information and hard-coded strings are sent via a POST to the C2 kupaywallet.com/kupay_update.php. If the\r\nPOST is successful (i.e. returns an HTTP response status code of 200) but fails any of multiple different checks,\r\n\"KupayUpgrade.exe\" will sleep for two minutes and then regenerate the timestamp and contact the C2 again.\r\nAfter receiving the payload from the C2, the program writes the payload to memory and executes the payload.\r\nThe payload for the Windows malware could not be downloaded, as the C2 server \"kupaywallet.com/kupay_update.php\"\r\nwas no longer accessible. In addition, the sample was not identified in open source reporting for this sample.\r\nScreenshots\r\nFigure 6 - Screenshot of Kupay service.\r\nFigure 7 - Screenshot of the format string.\r\n55eacc25e9eaba5d3f04b6cbcac2e16879b83d967596d645e5ec4b8f42656ef9\r\nTags\r\ndropper\r\nDetails\r\nName Kupay.dmg\r\nSize 132870749 bytes\r\nType zlib compressed data\r\nMD5 2f6573b3ae4262f04227468aab353387\r\nSHA1 dd9058e3a6c791b18bf561a3177788cf60cd6e91\r\nSHA256 55eacc25e9eaba5d3f04b6cbcac2e16879b83d967596d645e5ec4b8f42656ef9\r\nSHA512 a26f1e0673563fea0d134f3238fe36b12dcd4567c6ae7e962113e9531e1847e9195b010a2b10ee087382163a973164c795052788ab450785f\r\nssdeep 3145728:ttCQsiN4OYPdJvjr78vjHPZBs3CI0s9KVzcGesHiYhR7SsH:ttCQsiNmPjLXqvsgS/AusH\r\nEntropy 7.993885\r\nAntivirus\r\nNo matches found.\r\nYARA Rules\r\nNo matches found.\r\nssdeep Matches\r\nNo matches found.\r\nRelationships\r\n55eacc25e9... Contains a0c461c94ba9f1573c7253666d218b3343d24bfa5d8ef270ee9bc74b7856e492\r\n55eacc25e9... Downloaded_By kupaywallet.com\r\n55eacc25e9... Contains 0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba\r\nDescription\r\nhttps://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nPage 7 of 12\n\nIn March 2020, a download link for the OSX version of Kupay Wallet was found to be hosted at\r\nhxxps[:]//kupaywallet.com/[GUID]. The OSX program from the Kupay Wallet download link is an Apple DMG installer.\r\nThe [GUID] is a unique file that is crafted for a specific victim and is being withheld to preserve the identity of the intended\r\nrecipient. The OSX program uses a DMG installer with the file name Kupay[GUID].dmg.\r\nThe OSX program does not have digital signature, and will warn of that before installation. Just as JMTTrader,\r\nCelasTradePro, and UnionCrypto, the Kupay installer appears to be legitimate, and installs both “Kupay” in the\r\n“/Applications/Kupay.app/Contents/MacOS/” folder and a program named kupay_upgrade also in the\r\n“/Applications/Kupay.app/Contents/MacOS/” folder. The installer contains a postinstall script (Figure 8).\r\nThe postinstall script is identical in functionality to the postinstall scripts from previous AppleJeus variants, though\r\naccomplishes the same functions in a different way than previously done. The postinstall script creates a “KupayDaemon”\r\nfolder in the OSX “/Library/Application Support” folder, and moves kupay_upgrade to it. The “Application Support” folder\r\ncontains both system and third-party support files which are necessary for program operation. Typically, the subfolders have\r\nnames matching those of the actual applications. At installation, Kupay placed the plist file (com.kupay.pkg.wallet.plist) in\r\n“/Library/LaunchDaemons/”.\r\nWhile previous versions of AppleJeus simply moved the plist file to the LaunchDaemons folder and waited for a restart for it\r\nto be loaded, the Kupay postinstall runs the command “launchctl load” to load the plist without a restart. The postinstall then\r\nlaunches the kupay_upgrade program in the background.\r\nScreenshots\r\nFigure 8 - Screenshot of the postinstall script.\r\nFigure 9 - Screenshot of \"com.kupay.pkg.wallet.plist.\"\r\na0c461c94ba9f1573c7253666d218b3343d24bfa5d8ef270ee9bc74b7856e492\r\nDetails\r\nName kupay\r\nSize 186044 bytes\r\nType Mach-O 64-bit x86_64 executable, flags:\u003cNOUNDEFS|DYLDLINK|TWOLEVEL|PIE\u003e\r\nMD5 4a43bafb4af0a038a7f430417bcc1b6e\r\nSHA1 438243575764a5e856951126674f72f20b2a0d6f\r\nSHA256 a0c461c94ba9f1573c7253666d218b3343d24bfa5d8ef270ee9bc74b7856e492\r\nSHA512 51d37b27f390bc7f124f2cb8efb2b9c940d7a0c21b0912d06634f7f6af46a35e3221d25945bcad4b39748699ba8a33b17c350a480560e5c5c\r\nssdeep 3072:RiD/8kxClwjnLFycZ+xzknUapR+Nghc1VeY1HhNGKBqzoJGUNKFsJuMuixQdf:RiDUSyQnLFycZ+a8yhUVeY1LngzofKFF\r\nEntropy 6.083001\r\nAntivirus\r\nNo matches found.\r\nYARA Rules\r\nNo matches found.\r\nssdeep Matches\r\nNo matches found.\r\nRelationships\r\na0c461c94b... Contained_Within 55eacc25e9eaba5d3f04b6cbcac2e16879b83d967596d645e5ec4b8f42656ef9\r\nDescription\r\nhttps://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nPage 8 of 12\n\nThis OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG \"Kupay.dmg.\" Kupay is likely a copy of an open source cryptocurrency\r\nwallet application. When ran it loads a legitimate looking wallet program, which is fully functional, and is identical to the\r\nWindows Kupay.exe program. Although this executable is not inherently malicious, organizations who identify the hash and\r\na \"kupay[GUID].dmg\" present on a system should assume they are compromised if it is present with other files or activity\r\ndescribed in this report.\r\n0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba\r\nTags\r\ntrojan\r\nDetails\r\nName kupay_upgrade\r\nSize 33248 bytes\r\nType Mach-O 64-bit x86_64 executable, flags:\u003cNOUNDEFS|DYLDLINK|TWOLEVEL|PIE\u003e\r\nMD5 f00bde07d9f8b7af1da425c23cc47e47\r\nSHA1 c0670e18e1e3fbde58a25cbb94ba11558c02e7d3\r\nSHA256 0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba\r\nSHA512 266746da74bda3aed3af13d0b51adaee0e2e56d13ff8b1f68e1766b96b12dd2d5dadca143b7f5fc8693bd24aaa008c3a24161e69625c6b053c\r\nssdeep 192:AShk5sZUIyfKaTuy+YZ+qyepkfLYrs4eL:AShmxfKaTuQr\r\nEntropy 1.652634\r\nAntivirus\r\nNo matches found.\r\nYARA Rules\r\nNo matches found.\r\nssdeep Matches\r\nNo matches found.\r\nRelationships\r\n0bc7517aa2... Contained_Within 55eacc25e9eaba5d3f04b6cbcac2e16879b83d967596d645e5ec4b8f42656ef9\r\n0bc7517aa2... Connected_To kupaywallet.com\r\n0bc7517aa2... Downloaded 91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd\r\nDescription\r\nThis OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG \"Kupay.dmg.\" When executed, \"kupay_upgrade\" immediately sleeps\r\nfor five seconds and then tests to see if the hard-coded value stored in “isReady” is a 0 or a 1. If it is a 0, the program sleeps\r\nagain, and if it is a 1, the function “CheckUpdate” is called. This function contains most of the logic functionality of the\r\nmalware. \"CheckUpdate\" sends a POST to the C2 hxxps[:]//kupaywallet.com/kupay_update.php with a connection named\r\n“Kupay Wallet 9.0.1 (Check Update Osx).\"\r\nJust as the Windows malware, the timestamp is placed into a format string “ver=%d\u0026timestamp=%ld” where ver is set as\r\nthe 90001, possibly referring to the AppleJeus version 4 Kupay Wallet (Figure 11).\r\nIf the C2 server returns a file, it is decoded and written to “/private/tmp/kupay_update”, with permissions by the command\r\nchmod 700 (only the user can read, write, and execute). The stage2 (/private/tmp/kupay_update) is then launched, and the\r\nmalware kupay_upgrade returns to sleeping and checking in with the C2 server.\r\nScreenshots\r\nhttps://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nPage 9 of 12\n\nFigure 10 - Screenshot of the C2 loaded into variable.\r\nFigure 11 - Screenshot of the format string.\r\n91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd\r\nTags\r\ntrojan\r\nDetails\r\nName kupayupdate_stage2\r\nSize 40176 bytes\r\nType Mach-O 64-bit x86_64 executable, flags:\u003cNOUNDEFS|DYLDLINK|TWOLEVEL|PIE\u003e\r\nMD5 17ab2927a235a0b98480945285767bcf\r\nSHA1 d4b96e9d966b0f1e9ff1ef61a8d09c9020254652\r\nSHA256 91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd\r\nSHA512 51a5279db7b0074c83aac19f7f426b8a1dadd939e3ee660f71be3e5da110f0af8ae5bb781ad0b57c6ded19ae74aa95dbc2a8887443f63837f6\r\nssdeep 192:HZpt4Xnd+9EQbpvhyN1pQhO9de0II+pldd6gH1h8h/XbARs8xpDOL3ySoAk8+4uT:5pMUq6DaxaI+rddNH16VXbXDP4\r\nEntropy 3.266343\r\nAntivirus\r\nNo matches found.\r\nYARA Rules\r\nNo matches found.\r\nssdeep Matches\r\nNo matches found.\r\nRelationships\r\n91eaf215be... Connected_To levelframeblog.com\r\n91eaf215be... Downloaded_By 0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba\r\nDescription\r\nThis file is the stage 2 payload for the OSX KupayWallet. The stage 2 payload for the OSX KupayWallet was decoded and\r\nanalyzed, and file properties are related to the decoded file. The stage 2 kupay_update has a variety of functionalities. Most\r\nimportantly, kupay_update checks in with the C2 levelframeblog.com/felix.php. After connecting to the C2, kupay_update\r\ncan send or receive a payload, read and write files, execute commands via the terminal, etc.\r\nIf a payload is received or is going to be sent, kupay_update will base64 encode/decode and XOR encode/decode the data\r\nbefore sending or after receiving. The functions which base64 encode and decode are named b64_encode and b64_decode.\r\nThe functions which XOR encodes and decodes is XEncoding, and it uses a 32-byte XOR key which is hardcoded into\r\nkupay_update. The key is “wLqfM]%wTx`~tUTbw\u003eR^0x18#yG5R(30x7FC:;” where all values are in ASCII except for\r\n0x18 and 0x7F as those are non-readable characters in ASCII. This key is also used in the DecryptPayload and CryptPayload\r\nfunctions. These two functions implement the XOR encode or decode without calling XEncoding, and also call the\r\nb64_decode and b64_encode functions.\r\nKupay_update checks in with the C2 frequently, in order to execute or preform whatever commands and requests the server\r\nsends. There are multiple “sleep” calls throughout the function to dictate when the contact with the C2 is made.\r\nScreenshots\r\nhttps://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nPage 10 of 12\n\nFigure 12 - Screenshot of the portion of b64_encode.\r\nFigure 13 - Screenshot of XOR Loop in function XEncoding\r\nlevelframeblog.com\r\nTags\r\ncommand-and-control\r\nURLs\r\nlevelframeblog.com/felix.php\r\nWhois\r\nWhois for levelframeblog.com had the following information:\r\nRegistrar: NAMECHEAP INC\r\nCreated: 2019-11-14\r\nExpires: 2020-11-14\r\nRelationships\r\nlevelframeblog.com Connected_From 91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd\r\nDescription\r\nThis domain is the C2 for 2nd stage malware. The domain is registered with NameCheap at the IP address 23.152.0.101 with\r\nASN 8100.\r\nRelationship Summary\r\n6b945159b4... Contains 1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6\r\n6b945159b4... Contains fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d\r\n6b945159b4... Downloaded_By kupaywallet.com\r\nkupaywallet.com Downloaded 6b945159b4c816ec5e212ba125eb01938234205d8d3e57fca46de7c064c628f8\r\nkupaywallet.com Downloaded 55eacc25e9eaba5d3f04b6cbcac2e16879b83d967596d645e5ec4b8f42656ef9\r\nkupaywallet.com Connected_From 0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba\r\n1b60a6d35c... Contained_Within 6b945159b4c816ec5e212ba125eb01938234205d8d3e57fca46de7c064c628f8\r\nfc1aafd2ed... Contained_Within 6b945159b4c816ec5e212ba125eb01938234205d8d3e57fca46de7c064c628f8\r\n55eacc25e9... Contains a0c461c94ba9f1573c7253666d218b3343d24bfa5d8ef270ee9bc74b7856e492\r\n55eacc25e9... Downloaded_By kupaywallet.com\r\n55eacc25e9... Contains 0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba\r\na0c461c94b... Contained_Within 55eacc25e9eaba5d3f04b6cbcac2e16879b83d967596d645e5ec4b8f42656ef9\r\n0bc7517aa2... Contained_Within 55eacc25e9eaba5d3f04b6cbcac2e16879b83d967596d645e5ec4b8f42656ef9\r\n0bc7517aa2... Connected_To kupaywallet.com\r\n0bc7517aa2... Downloaded 91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd\r\n91eaf215be... Connected_To levelframeblog.com\r\n91eaf215be... Downloaded_By 0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba\r\nlevelframeblog.com Connected_From 91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd\r\nRecommendations\r\nhttps://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nPage 11 of 12\n\nCISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security\r\nposture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators\r\nprior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.\r\nMaintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.\r\nKeep operating system patches up-to-date.\r\nDisable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory\r\nauthentication.\r\nRestrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local\r\nadministrators group unless required.\r\nEnforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.\r\nExercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be\r\nknown.\r\nEnable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.\r\nDisable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.\r\nScan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its \"true file type\" (i.e., the\r\nextension matches the file header).\r\nMonitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.\r\nExercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).\r\nScan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.\r\nMaintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).\r\nAdditional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and\r\nTechnology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, \"Guide to Malware Incident Prevention \u0026 Handling for Desktops and\r\nLaptops\".\r\nContact Information\r\nDocument FAQ\r\nWhat is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in\r\na timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request\r\nadditional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.\r\nWhat is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware\r\nanalysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide\r\ninformation regarding the level of desired analysis.\r\nCan I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to\r\nthis document should be directed to the CISA at 1-844-Say-CISA or CISA Central .\r\nCan I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:\r\nWeb: https://malware.us-cert.gov\r\nE-Mail: submit@malware.us-cert.gov\r\nFTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)\r\nCISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software\r\nvulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at www.cisa.gov.\r\nFebruary 17, 2021: Initial Version|April 15, 2021: AppleJeus: Kupay Wallet, clarified that a malware sample contained\r\nwithin Apple DMG \"Kupay.dmg\" is not inherently malicious and provided guidance on what organizations should look for\r\nto determine compromise\r\nSource: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nhttps://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d\r\nPage 12 of 12",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"Malpedia"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-048d"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"ar21-048d"
	],
	"threat_actors": [
		{
			"id": "34eea331-d052-4096-ae03-a22f1d090bd4",
			"created_at": "2025-08-07T02:03:25.073494Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:03.709243Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "NICKEL ACADEMY",
			"aliases": [
				"ATK3 ",
				"Black Artemis ",
				"COVELLITE ",
				"CTG-2460 ",
				"Citrine Sleet ",
				"Diamond Sleet ",
				"Guardians of Peace",
				"HIDDEN COBRA ",
				"High Anonymous",
				"Labyrinth Chollima ",
				"Lazarus Group ",
				"NNPT Group",
				"New Romanic Cyber Army Team",
				"Temp.Hermit ",
				"UNC577 ",
				"Who Am I?",
				"Whois Team",
				"ZINC "
			],
			"source_name": "Secureworks:NICKEL ACADEMY",
			"tools": [
				"Destover",
				"KorHigh",
				"Volgmer"
			],
			"source_id": "Secureworks",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "544ecd2c-82c9-417c-9d98-d1ae395df964",
			"created_at": "2025-10-29T02:00:52.035025Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:05.408558Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "AppleJeus",
			"aliases": [
				"AppleJeus",
				"Gleaming Pisces",
				"Citrine Sleet",
				"UNC1720",
				"UNC4736"
			],
			"source_name": "MITRE:AppleJeus",
			"tools": null,
			"source_id": "MITRE",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "732597b1-40a8-474c-88cc-eb8a421c29f1",
			"created_at": "2025-08-07T02:03:25.087732Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:03.776007Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "NICKEL GLADSTONE",
			"aliases": [
				"APT38 ",
				"ATK 117 ",
				"Alluring Pisces ",
				"Black Alicanto ",
				"Bluenoroff ",
				"CTG-6459 ",
				"Citrine Sleet ",
				"HIDDEN COBRA ",
				"Lazarus Group",
				"Sapphire Sleet ",
				"Selective Pisces ",
				"Stardust Chollima ",
				"T-APT-15 ",
				"TA444 ",
				"TAG-71 "
			],
			"source_name": "Secureworks:NICKEL GLADSTONE",
			"tools": [
				"AlphaNC",
				"Bankshot",
				"CCGC_Proxy",
				"Ratankba",
				"RustBucket",
				"SUGARLOADER",
				"SwiftLoader",
				"Wcry"
			],
			"source_id": "Secureworks",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "a2b92056-9378-4749-926b-7e10c4500dac",
			"created_at": "2023-01-06T13:46:38.430595Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:02.971571Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "Lazarus Group",
			"aliases": [
				"Operation DarkSeoul",
				"Bureau 121",
				"Group 77",
				"APT38",
				"NICKEL GLADSTONE",
				"G0082",
				"COPERNICIUM",
				"Moonstone Sleet",
				"Operation GhostSecret",
				"APT 38",
				"Appleworm",
				"Unit 121",
				"ATK3",
				"G0032",
				"ATK117",
				"NewRomanic Cyber Army Team",
				"Nickel Academy",
				"Sapphire Sleet",
				"Lazarus group",
				"Hastati Group",
				"Subgroup: Bluenoroff",
				"Operation Troy",
				"Black Artemis",
				"Dark Seoul",
				"Andariel",
				"Labyrinth Chollima",
				"Operation AppleJeus",
				"COVELLITE",
				"Citrine Sleet",
				"DEV-0139",
				"DEV-1222",
				"Hidden Cobra",
				"Bluenoroff",
				"Stardust Chollima",
				"Whois Hacking Team",
				"Diamond Sleet",
				"TA404",
				"BeagleBoyz",
				"APT-C-26"
			],
			"source_name": "MISPGALAXY:Lazarus Group",
			"tools": [],
			"source_id": "MISPGALAXY",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "32a223a8-3c79-4146-87c5-8557d38662ae",
			"created_at": "2022-10-25T15:50:23.703698Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:05.261989Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "Lazarus Group",
			"aliases": [
				"Lazarus Group",
				"Labyrinth Chollima",
				"HIDDEN COBRA",
				"Guardians of Peace",
				"NICKEL ACADEMY",
				"Diamond Sleet"
			],
			"source_name": "MITRE:Lazarus Group",
			"tools": [
				"RawDisk",
				"Proxysvc",
				"BADCALL",
				"FALLCHILL",
				"WannaCry",
				"MagicRAT",
				"HOPLIGHT",
				"TYPEFRAME",
				"Dtrack",
				"HotCroissant",
				"HARDRAIN",
				"Dacls",
				"KEYMARBLE",
				"TAINTEDSCRIBE",
				"AuditCred",
				"netsh",
				"ECCENTRICBANDWAGON",
				"AppleJeus",
				"BLINDINGCAN",
				"ThreatNeedle",
				"Volgmer",
				"Cryptoistic",
				"RATANKBA",
				"Bankshot"
			],
			"source_id": "MITRE",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "f32df445-9fb4-4234-99e0-3561f6498e4e",
			"created_at": "2022-10-25T16:07:23.756373Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:04.739611Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "Lazarus Group",
			"aliases": [
				"APT-C-26",
				"ATK 3",
				"Appleworm",
				"Citrine Sleet",
				"DEV-0139",
				"Diamond Sleet",
				"G0032",
				"Gleaming Pisces",
				"Gods Apostles",
				"Gods Disciples",
				"Group 77",
				"Guardians of Peace",
				"Hastati Group",
				"Hidden Cobra",
				"ITG03",
				"Jade Sleet",
				"Labyrinth Chollima",
				"Lazarus Group",
				"NewRomanic Cyber Army Team",
				"Operation 99",
				"Operation AppleJeus",
				"Operation AppleJeus sequel",
				"Operation Blockbuster: Breach of Sony Pictures Entertainment",
				"Operation CryptoCore",
				"Operation Dream Job",
				"Operation Dream Magic",
				"Operation Flame",
				"Operation GhostSecret",
				"Operation In(ter)caption",
				"Operation LolZarus",
				"Operation Marstech Mayhem",
				"Operation No Pineapple!",
				"Operation North Star",
				"Operation Phantom Circuit",
				"Operation Sharpshooter",
				"Operation SyncHole",
				"Operation Ten Days of Rain / DarkSeoul",
				"Operation Troy",
				"SectorA01",
				"Slow Pisces",
				"TA404",
				"TraderTraitor",
				"UNC2970",
				"UNC4034",
				"UNC4736",
				"UNC4899",
				"UNC577",
				"Whois Hacking Team"
			],
			"source_name": "ETDA:Lazarus Group",
			"tools": [
				"3CX Backdoor",
				"3Rat Client",
				"3proxy",
				"AIRDRY",
				"ARTFULPIE",
				"ATMDtrack",
				"AlphaNC",
				"Alreay",
				"Andaratm",
				"AngryRebel",
				"AppleJeus",
				"Aryan",
				"AuditCred",
				"BADCALL",
				"BISTROMATH",
				"BLINDINGCAN",
				"BTC Changer",
				"BUFFETLINE",
				"BanSwift",
				"Bankshot",
				"Bitrep",
				"Bitsran",
				"BlindToad",
				"Bookcode",
				"BootWreck",
				"BottomLoader",
				"Brambul",
				"BravoNC",
				"Breut",
				"COLDCAT",
				"COPPERHEDGE",
				"CROWDEDFLOUNDER",
				"Castov",
				"CheeseTray",
				"CleanToad",
				"ClientTraficForwarder",
				"CollectionRAT",
				"Concealment Troy",
				"Contopee",
				"CookieTime",
				"Cyruslish",
				"DAVESHELL",
				"DBLL Dropper",
				"DLRAT",
				"DRATzarus",
				"DRATzarus RAT",
				"Dacls",
				"Dacls RAT",
				"DarkComet",
				"DarkKomet",
				"DeltaCharlie",
				"DeltaNC",
				"Dembr",
				"Destover",
				"DoublePulsar",
				"Dozer",
				"Dtrack",
				"Duuzer",
				"DyePack",
				"ECCENTRICBANDWAGON",
				"ELECTRICFISH",
				"Escad",
				"EternalBlue",
				"FALLCHILL",
				"FYNLOS",
				"FallChill RAT",
				"Farfli",
				"Fimlis",
				"FoggyBrass",
				"FudModule",
				"Fynloski",
				"Gh0st RAT",
				"Ghost RAT",
				"Gopuram",
				"HARDRAIN",
				"HIDDEN COBRA RAT/Worm",
				"HLOADER",
				"HOOKSHOT",
				"HOPLIGHT",
				"HOTCROISSANT",
				"HOTWAX",
				"HTTP Troy",
				"Hawup",
				"Hawup RAT",
				"Hermes",
				"HotCroissant",
				"HotelAlfa",
				"Hotwax",
				"HtDnDownLoader",
				"Http Dr0pper",
				"ICONICSTEALER",
				"Joanap",
				"Jokra",
				"KANDYKORN",
				"KEYMARBLE",
				"Kaos",
				"KillDisk",
				"KillMBR",
				"Koredos",
				"Krademok",
				"LIGHTSHIFT",
				"LIGHTSHOW",
				"LOLBAS",
				"LOLBins",
				"Lazarus",
				"LightlessCan",
				"Living off the Land",
				"MATA",
				"MBRkiller",
				"MagicRAT",
				"Manuscrypt",
				"Mimail",
				"Mimikatz",
				"Moudour",
				"Mydoom",
				"Mydoor",
				"Mytob",
				"NACHOCHEESE",
				"NachoCheese",
				"NestEgg",
				"NickelLoader",
				"NineRAT",
				"Novarg",
				"NukeSped",
				"OpBlockBuster",
				"PCRat",
				"PEBBLEDASH",
				"PLANKWALK",
				"POOLRAT",
				"PSLogger",
				"PhanDoor",
				"Plink",
				"PondRAT",
				"PowerBrace",
				"PowerRatankba",
				"PowerShell RAT",
				"PowerSpritz",
				"PowerTask",
				"Preft",
				"ProcDump",
				"Proxysvc",
				"PuTTY Link",
				"QUICKRIDE",
				"QUICKRIDE.POWER",
				"Quickcafe",
				"QuiteRAT",
				"R-C1",
				"ROptimizer",
				"Ratabanka",
				"RatabankaPOS",
				"Ratankba",
				"RatankbaPOS",
				"RawDisk",
				"RedShawl",
				"Rifdoor",
				"Rising Sun",
				"Romeo-CoreOne",
				"RomeoAlfa",
				"RomeoBravo",
				"RomeoCharlie",
				"RomeoCore",
				"RomeoDelta",
				"RomeoEcho",
				"RomeoFoxtrot",
				"RomeoGolf",
				"RomeoHotel",
				"RomeoMike",
				"RomeoNovember",
				"RomeoWhiskey",
				"Romeos",
				"RustBucket",
				"SHADYCAT",
				"SHARPKNOT",
				"SIGFLIP",
				"SIMPLESEA",
				"SLICKSHOES",
				"SORRYBRUTE",
				"SUDDENICON",
				"SUGARLOADER",
				"SheepRAT",
				"SierraAlfa",
				"SierraBravo",
				"SierraCharlie",
				"SierraJuliett-MikeOne",
				"SierraJuliett-MikeTwo",
				"SimpleTea",
				"SimplexTea",
				"SmallTiger",
				"Stunnel",
				"TAINTEDSCRIBE",
				"TAXHAUL",
				"TFlower",
				"TOUCHKEY",
				"TOUCHMOVE",
				"TOUCHSHIFT",
				"TOUCHSHOT",
				"TWOPENCE",
				"TYPEFRAME",
				"Tdrop",
				"Tdrop2",
				"ThreatNeedle",
				"Tiger RAT",
				"TigerRAT",
				"Trojan Manuscript",
				"Troy",
				"TroyRAT",
				"VEILEDSIGNAL",
				"VHD",
				"VHD Ransomware",
				"VIVACIOUSGIFT",
				"VSingle",
				"ValeforBeta",
				"Volgmer",
				"Vyveva",
				"W1_RAT",
				"Wana Decrypt0r",
				"WanaCry",
				"WanaCrypt",
				"WanaCrypt0r",
				"WannaCry",
				"WannaCrypt",
				"WannaCryptor",
				"WbBot",
				"Wcry",
				"Win32/KillDisk.NBB",
				"Win32/KillDisk.NBC",
				"Win32/KillDisk.NBD",
				"Win32/KillDisk.NBH",
				"Win32/KillDisk.NBI",
				"WinorDLL64",
				"Winsec",
				"WolfRAT",
				"Wormhole",
				"YamaBot",
				"Yort",
				"ZetaNile",
				"concealment_troy",
				"http_troy",
				"httpdr0pper",
				"httpdropper",
				"klovbot",
				"sRDI"
			],
			"source_id": "ETDA",
			"reports": null
		}
	],
	"ts_created_at": 1775439130,
	"ts_updated_at": 1775792299,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
	"files": {
		"pdf": "https://archive.orkl.eu/de35b42fa74beecbf12b4a0e39f56ee87f9aba71.pdf",
		"text": "https://archive.orkl.eu/de35b42fa74beecbf12b4a0e39f56ee87f9aba71.txt",
		"img": "https://archive.orkl.eu/de35b42fa74beecbf12b4a0e39f56ee87f9aba71.jpg"
	}
}