{
	"id": "f64c7cb6-a900-4b87-9699-fa9d5d304dd9",
	"created_at": "2026-04-06T00:16:42.258433Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T13:13:07.226872Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "dc110d050c15a619b0eac11b6a87c6496fc62d7c",
	"title": "W32.Flamer | Symantec",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 147544,
	"plain_text": "W32.Flamer | Symantec\r\nArchived: 2026-04-05 18:34:07 UTC\r\nThe Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20190930124504/https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2012-052811-0308-99\r\nDiscovered: May 28, 2012\r\nUpdated: June 05, 2012 3:20:22 PM\r\nAlso Known As: WORM_FLAMER.A [Trend]\r\nType: Worm\r\nSystems Affected: Windows\r\nCVE References: CVE-2010-2729 | CVE-2010-2568\r\nW32.Flamer is a worm that may attempt to spread when it receives instructions from a remote attacker. It also\r\nopens a back door and may steal information from the compromised computer.\r\nFor more information relating to this threat, please see the following resource:\r\nBlog entries on W32.Flamer\r\nAntivirus Protection Dates\r\nInitial Rapid Release version May 28, 2012 revision 009\r\nLatest Rapid Release version March 23, 2017 revision 037\r\nInitial Daily Certified version May 28, 2012 revision 017\r\nLatest Daily Certified version March 23, 2017 revision 041\r\nInitial Weekly Certified release date May 30, 2012\r\nClick here for a more detailed description of Rapid Release and Daily Certified virus definitions.\r\nTechnical Description\r\nW32.Flamer is a worm that has the ability to spread from one computer to another. However, the worm does not\r\nautomatically spread, but instead it waits for instructions from the attackers. If required, it can spread using the\r\nfollowing methods:\r\nNetwork shares using captured credentials, including Domain Administrator\r\nMicrosoft Windows Print Spooler Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2010-2729)\r\nRemovable media using a specially crafted autorun.inf file\r\nRemovable drives using a special folder that hides the files and can result in automatic execution on\r\nviewing the removable drive when combined with the Microsoft Windows Shortcut 'LNK/PIF' Files\r\nAutomatic File Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2010-2568)\r\nhttps://web.archive.org/web/20190930124504/https:/www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2012-052811-0308-99\r\nPage 1 of 6\n\nHijacking clients performing a Microsoft Windows update\r\nWhen the worm executes, it may create the following files:\r\n%System%\\boot32drv.sys\r\n%System%\\ccalc32.sys\r\n%System%\\csvde.exe\r\n%System%\\msglu32.ocx\r\n%System%\\mssecmgr.ocx\r\n%System%\\nteps32.ocx\r\n%SystemDrive%\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\MSAudio\\audcache\r\n%SystemDrive%\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\MSAudio\\audfilter.dat\r\n%SystemDrive%\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\MSAudio\\dstrlog.dat\r\n%SystemDrive%\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\MSAudio\\lmcache.dat\r\n%SystemDrive%\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\MSAudio\\ntcache.dat\r\n%SystemDrive%\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\MSAudio\\wavesup3.drv\r\n%SystemDrive%\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\MSAudio\\wpgfilter.dat\r\n%Temp%\\~a38.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~c34.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~DEB93D.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~dra53.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~HLV084.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~HLV084.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~HLV294.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~HLV473.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~HLV473.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~HLV751.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~HLV927.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~HLV927.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~KWI988.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~mso2a0.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~mso2a2.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~rf288.tmp\r\n%Temp%\\~ZFF\r\n%Temp%\\dat3C.tmp\r\nNext, it creates the following registry entry so that it executes whenever Windows starts:\r\nHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Drivers32\\\"wave9\" =\r\n\"%SystemDrive%\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\msaudio\\wavesup3.drv\"\r\nThe mssecmgr.ocx file is the principal file in this threat and it is the first element of the threat that is executed on a\r\ncompromised computer. The file contains a large number of sub-components that implement many of functions\r\nthat this threat can perform.\r\nhttps://web.archive.org/web/20190930124504/https:/www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2012-052811-0308-99\r\nPage 2 of 6\n\nFor example, there are components that provide Web, Proxy and SSH services, manage databases, a component to\r\nhandle Bluetooth, and there is even a component that is a script engine for the Lua scripting language .\r\nLua is a lightweight and fast scripting language that has multiple uses including video games. It is particularly\r\nsuited for embedding within executable files allowing for functionality to be scripted quickly. Much of the\r\nfunctionality contained within W32.Flamer is implemented using the embedded Lua scripts.\r\nMost sub-components, including various scripts, are stored in an encrypted resource embedded in the\r\nmssecmgr.ocx file. Several standalone executable DLL files are also included. The sub-components include some\r\nof the following files:\r\n%CurrentFolder%\\00006411.dll\r\n%CurrentFolder%\\advnetcfg.ocx\r\n%CurrentFolder%\\boot32drv.sys\r\n%CurrentFolder%\\jimmy.dll\r\n%CurrentFolder%\\msglu32.ocx\r\n%CurrentFolder%\\nteps32.ocx\r\n%CurrentFolder%\\soapr32.ocs\r\nW32.Flamer has built-in modules to gather information from compromised computers, including:\r\nSystem information:\r\nComputer name\r\nDrive properties, e.g. size\r\nPrinter information\r\nRegistered devices\r\nRemovable media properties\r\nRunning processes\r\nhttps://web.archive.org/web/20190930124504/https:/www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2012-052811-0308-99\r\nPage 3 of 6\n\nServices\r\nSystem code page\r\nSystem drive letter\r\nTime and time zone information\r\nSystem network information:\r\nDHCP information\r\nDNS information\r\nGateway settings\r\nHost file\r\nInternet connection information\r\nIP addresses\r\nMail server configuration\r\nNetwork adapters and interfaces\r\nOpen ports\r\nProxy settings\r\nRouting table\r\nWi-fi network name and profiles\r\nProfiles and cached credentials:\r\nCoreFTP\r\nCuteFTP\r\nEmFTP\r\nFTP Explorer\r\nLocal computer credentials\r\nMicrosoft Outlook\r\nMssh\r\nNetserveFTP\r\nRAdmin\r\nRemote AccessServices\r\nRoboFTP\r\nSoftx FTP\r\nSouth River WebDrive\r\nTeamViewer\r\nVNC\r\nFiles:\r\nAutoCAD design data\r\nImages, including the following formats: BMP, GIF, JPEG, PNG, and TIFF\r\nMicrosoft Office documents, including: Access, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, and Word\r\nOutlook details, including: appointments, emails, meeting requests, and notes\r\nhttps://web.archive.org/web/20190930124504/https:/www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2012-052811-0308-99\r\nPage 4 of 6\n\nPDF documents\r\nURL shortcuts\r\nVisio diagrams\r\nFiles with the following extensions:\r\n.CSV\r\n.LNK\r\n.ORA\r\n.RDP\r\n.RTF\r\n.SSH\r\n.SSH2\r\n.TXT\r\nOther information:\r\nFile metadata\r\nInstalled applications\r\nNetwork traffic monitoring\r\nUser data and environment\r\nRecommendations\r\nSymantec Security Response encourages all users and administrators to adhere to the following basic security\r\n\"best practices\":\r\nUse a firewall to block all incoming connections from the Internet to services that should not be publicly\r\navailable. By default, you should deny all incoming connections and only allow services you explicitly\r\nwant to offer to the outside world.\r\nEnforce a password policy. Complex passwords make it difficult to crack password files on compromised\r\ncomputers. This helps to prevent or limit damage when a computer is compromised.\r\nEnsure that programs and users of the computer use the lowest level of privileges necessary to complete a\r\ntask. When prompted for a root or UAC password, ensure that the program asking for administration-level\r\naccess is a legitimate application.\r\nDisable AutoPlay to prevent the automatic launching of executable files on network and removable drives,\r\nand disconnect the drives when not required. If write access is not required, enable read-only mode if the\r\noption is available.\r\nTurn off file sharing if not needed. If file sharing is required, use ACLs and password protection to limit\r\naccess. Disable anonymous access to shared folders. Grant access only to user accounts with strong\r\npasswords to folders that must be shared.\r\nTurn off and remove unnecessary services. By default, many operating systems install auxiliary services\r\nthat are not critical. These services are avenues of attack. If they are removed, threats have less avenues of\r\nattack.\r\nhttps://web.archive.org/web/20190930124504/https:/www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2012-052811-0308-99\r\nPage 5 of 6\n\nIf a threat exploits one or more network services, disable, or block access to, those services until a patch is\r\napplied.\r\nAlways keep your patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services and are\r\naccessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.\r\nConfigure your email server to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly\r\nused to spread threats, such as .vbs, .bat, .exe, .pif and .scr files.\r\nIsolate compromised computers quickly to prevent threats from spreading further. Perform a forensic\r\nanalysis and restore the computers using trusted media.\r\nTrain employees not to open attachments unless they are expecting them. Also, do not execute software\r\nthat is downloaded from the Internet unless it has been scanned for viruses. Simply visiting a compromised\r\nWeb site can cause infection if certain browser vulnerabilities are not patched.\r\nIf Bluetooth is not required for mobile devices, it should be turned off. If you require its use, ensure that the\r\ndevice's visibility is set to \"Hidden\" so that it cannot be scanned by other Bluetooth devices. If device\r\npairing must be used, ensure that all devices are set to \"Unauthorized\", requiring authorization for each\r\nconnection request. Do not accept applications that are unsigned or sent from unknown sources.\r\nFor further information on the terms used in this document, please refer to the Security Response glossary.\r\nSource: https://web.archive.org/web/20190930124504/https:/www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2012-052811-0308-99\r\nhttps://web.archive.org/web/20190930124504/https:/www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2012-052811-0308-99\r\nPage 6 of 6",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"MITRE"
	],
	"origins": [
		"web"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://web.archive.org/web/20190930124504/https:/www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2012-052811-0308-99"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"2012-052811-0308-99"
	],
	"threat_actors": [],
	"ts_created_at": 1775434602,
	"ts_updated_at": 1775826787,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
	"files": {
		"pdf": "https://archive.orkl.eu/dc110d050c15a619b0eac11b6a87c6496fc62d7c.pdf",
		"text": "https://archive.orkl.eu/dc110d050c15a619b0eac11b6a87c6496fc62d7c.txt",
		"img": "https://archive.orkl.eu/dc110d050c15a619b0eac11b6a87c6496fc62d7c.jpg"
	}
}