TA551 (Shathak) pushes IcedID (Bokbot) - SANS ISC
By SANS Internet Storm Center
Archived: 2026-04-05 20:31:01 UTC
Introduction
TA551 (also known as Shathak) represents a threat actor behind malspam that has pushed different families of
malware over the past few years.  So far this week, TA551 is pushing IcedID (Bokbot).
Shown above:  Flow chart for this infection.
Images from an infection
https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/TA551+Shathak+pushes+IcedID+Bokbot/28092/
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Shown above:  Screenshot from a TA551 email with sensitive information removed.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
The infection process was similar to my previous diary about TA551 from August 2021, but this time it delivered
IcedID instead of BazarLoader.
Associated malware:
SHA256 hash: d68fb04c96e925efcdb3484669365bed0cda22a272e486e99a43f9626019d31c
File size: 38,958 bytes
File name: request.zip
File description: Password-protected zip archive attached to email
Password: 55egs
SHA256 hash: 0a42f6762ae4f3b1d95aae0f8977cde6361f1d59b5ccc400c41772db0205f7c5
File size: 34,322 bytes
File name: charge_12.01.2021.doc
File description: Word doc with macros for IcedID
SHA256 hash: c7f40608ce8a3dda25c13d117790d08ef757b07b8c2ccb645a27a71adc322fb2
File size: 3,342 bytes
File location: C:\Users\[username]\Documents\youTube.hta
File description: HTA file dropped after enabling Word macros
SHA256 hash: d54a870ba5656c5d3ddfab5f7f325c2fb8ee256b25e2872847c5ff244bc6ee6e
https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/TA551+Shathak+pushes+IcedID+Bokbot/28092/
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File size: 257,672 bytes
File location: hxxp://winrentals2017b[.]com/tegz/[long string of characters]/cab3?ref=[long string of
characters]
File location: C:\Users\Public\dowNext.jpg
File description: Installer DLL for IcedID
Run method: regsvr32.exe [filename]
SHA256 hash: cfc202b44509f2f607d365858a8218dfdc6b26f8087efcc5e46f4fef9ab53705
File size: 341,898 bytes
File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\ReliefEight\license.dat
File description: license.dat data binary used to run persistent IcedID DLL
SHA256 hash: c340ae2dde2bd8fbae46b15abef0c7e706fe8953c837329bde409959836d6510
File size: 116,224 bytes
File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\{24DB904E-86F7-2F2C-B7C1-
85D8BBCE1181}\Miap\Giowcosi64.dll
File description: persistent IcedID DLL
Run method: rundll32.exe [filename],DllMain --giqied="[path to license.dat]"
IcedID traffic:
143.204.155[.]37 port 443 - aws.amazon[.]com - HTTPS traffic
87.120.254[.]190 port 80 - normyils[.]com - GET / HTTP/1.1
87.120.8[.]98 port 443 - baeswea[.]com - HTTPS traffic
91.92.109[.]95 port 443 - bersaww[.]com - HTTPS traffic
Final words
IcedID can be followed by Cobalt Strike when an infected host is part of an Active Directory (AD) environment. 
These types of infections can deliver ransomware as a final payload in real-world environments.
But decent spam filters and best security practices can help you avoid IcedID. Default security settings in
Windows 10 and Microsoft Office 2019 should prevent these types of infections from happening.
---
Brad Duncan
brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net
Source: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/TA551+Shathak+pushes+IcedID+Bokbot/28092/
https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/TA551+Shathak+pushes+IcedID+Bokbot/28092/
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