

Detecting DDE in MS Office documents

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[Dynamic Data Exchange](#) is an old Microsoft technology that can be (ab)used [to execute code from within MS Office documents](#). Etienne Stalmans and Saif El-Sherei from Sensepost published a blog post in which they describe how to weaponize MS Office documents.

We wrote 2 YARA rules to detect this in Office Open XML files (like .docx):


Update 1: our YARA rules [detected several malicious documents in-the-wild](#).

Update 2: we added rules for OLE files (like .doc) and updated our OOXML rules based on your feedback.

```
1 // YARA rules Office DDE
2 // NVISIO 2017/10/10 - 2017/10/12
3 rule Office_DDEAUTO_field {
4     strings:
5         $a = /&lt;w:fldChar\s+?w:fldCharType=&quot;begin&quot;\&gt;.+?\b[Dd][Dd][Ee][Aa][Uu]
6         [Tt][Oo]\b.+?&lt;w:fldChar\s+?w:fldCharType=&quot;end&quot;\&gt;/
7     condition:
8         $a
9 }
10 rule Office_DDE_field {
11     strings:
12         $a = /&lt;w:fldChar\s+?w:fldCharType=&quot;begin&quot;\&gt;.+?\b[Dd][Dd][Ee]\b.+?
13         &lt;w:fldChar\s+?w:fldCharType=&quot;end&quot;\&gt;/
14     condition:
15         $a
16 }
17 rule Office_OLE_DDEAUTO {
```

```
17 strings:
18 $a = /\x13\s*DDEAUTO\b[^\x14]+/ nocase
19 condition:
20 uint32be(0) == 0xD0CF11E0 and $a
21 }
22 rule Office_OLE_DDE {
23 strings:
24 $a = /\x13\s*DDE\b[^\x14]+/ nocase
25 condition:
26 uint32be(0) == 0xD0CF11E0 and $a
27 }
28
29
30
31
```

These rules can be used in combination with a tool like [zipdump.py](#) to scan XML files inside the ZIP container with the YARA engine:



The detection is based on regular expressions designed to detect fields containing the word DDEAUTO or DDE. By dumping the detected YARA strings with option `-yarastringsraw`, one can view the actual command:

