Investigating 3CX Desktop Application Attacks: What You Need to Know By Threat Analysis Unit Published: 2023-03-31 · Archived: 2026-04-05 17:55:15 UTC This is a developing situation and this blog post will be updated as needed.  Reports of malicious code associated with the 3CX desktop application – part of the 3CX VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) platform – began on March 22, 2023. On March 30, 2023, 3CX confirmed the compromise, noting the affected 3CX desktop app versions were 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 for Windows and 18. 11.1213, 18.12.402, 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 versions for Mac. NIST National Vulnerability Database has assigned CVE-2023-29059 to track this issue.  Reports indicate that one of the bundled libraries included with the 3CX Windows and Mac desktop clients had been altered to contact command and control infrastructure, including a GitHub repository, to deliver second-stage malware. According to 3CX, the malicious domains and the GitHub repository have since been taken down.   What is the potential impact?   Software supply chain attacks, as seen with the SolarWinds attack in December 2020, can lead to security teams discovering that their environment has been breached months prior in what is disguised as a standard software update. This highlights the challenges associated with software validation as part of supply chains. The impact of such an attack can be devastating, causing long-term damage to the business, its reputation, and its customers  In the case of this 3CXDesktopApp attack, there is not yet enough information on how the compromised code ended up being included with 3CX digitally signed installers. 3CX has hired Mandiant to assist with forensic activities.   Observations by VMware Threat Analysis Unit  Note: This is a developing situation and threat analysis will be updated as needed.  VMware Contexa detected the first connections to the C2 domains included in the ICO files as early as 2023-03- 06 (akamaitechcloudservices[.]com) and 2023-03-07 (pbxphonenetwork[.]com, sbmsa[.]wiki, azureonlinestorage[.]com, officeaddons[.]com, pbxsources[.]com, officestoragebox[.]com). See Figure 1 for the whole timeline.   https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2023/03/investigating-3cx-desktop-application-attacks-what-you-need-to-know.html Page 1 of 5 Figure 1: Connections to C2 domains as detected by VMware Contexa.  TLS connections to visualstudiofactory[.]com taking place on 2023-03-24 and later were established to a server with a certificate with the following hash ‘cda34a2b46a2269dc5934967175656a81bd3667a21855273dc2c777f8bd2d4c9’, valid from 2022-11-17, expiring on 2023-11-17, and issued by “C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=Sectigo Limited, CN=Sectigo RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA”. The recorded JA3S is 61be9ce3d068c08ff99a857f62352f9d, although note that it is only useful when looking for TLS connections established by the compromised 3CX desktop app.   A search on Censys can also reveal that the host had been online since 2022-11-19; our telemetry, however, does not show any activity related to this C2 domain prior to March 2023.  Current hashes identified to be banned are the following:   Compromised parents/Installers  59e1edf4d82fae4978e97512b0331b7eb21dd4b838b850ba46794d9c7a2c0983  aa124a4b4df12b34e74ee7f6c683b2ebec4ce9a8edcf9be345823b4fdcf5d868  7c55c3dfa373b6b342390938029cb76ef31f609d9a07780772c6010a4297e321  e32cc0103827e8eef5881bd6fcae30ccc6bf6d68e8378c007a8fac2d8edbc071  B5e318240401010e4453e146e3e67464dd625cfef9cd51c5015d68550ee8cc09  Zip file  5c54932fdbb077d73c58ac41a1ad3f6ea5576b3e1f719c8b714b637c9ceb361b  b57d7e6c47516aeb1fd8384a9bc002f8c637b7d42b8f008a0c9e872914344dad  https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2023/03/investigating-3cx-desktop-application-attacks-what-you-need-to-know.html Page 2 of 5 ffmpeg.dll    7986bbaee8940da11ce089383521ab420c443ab7b15ed42aed91fd31ce833896  c485674ee63ec8d4e8fde9800788175a8b02d3f9416d0e763360fff7f8eb4e02  253f3a53796f1b0fbe64f7b05ae1d66bc2b0773588d00c3d2bf08572a497fa59   d3dcompiler_47.dll  11be1803e2e307b647a8a7e02d128335c448ff741bf06bf52b332e0bbf423b03  Secondary stage Payloads  851c2c99ebafd4e5e9e140cfe3f2d03533846ca16f8151ae8ee0e83c692884b7   6a0f637546684c90809cf264c22a861c9a07b1ca3b2ef6a359a14d612e392c1a   aa4e398b3bd8645016d8090ffc77d15f926a8e69258642191deb4e68688ff973  F5fdefaa5321e2cea02ef8b479de8ec3c5505e956ea1484c84a7abb17231fe24  8ab3a5eaaf8c296080fadf56b265194681d7da5da7c02562953a4cb60e147423  MacOS Samples  5407cda7d3a75e7b1e030b1f33337a56f293578ffa8b3ae19c671051ed314290  fee4f9dabc094df24d83ec1a8c4e4ff573e5d9973caa676f58086c99561382d7  e6bbc33815b9f20b0cf832d7401dd893fbc467c800728b5891336706da0dbcec  a64fa9f1c76457ecc58402142a8728ce34ccba378c17318b3340083eeb7acc67  b86c695822013483fa4e2dfdf712c5ee777d7b99cbad8c2fa2274b133481eadb  fd15a9619987925827ede24efa8990c3680c9c0b4a76eb1c43031de39c1b7ae1  9a47c9a3f7cf26ddc1fdb90dc48d30d69448e6d8ab64cc57dcb285c6b9d846c3  92005051ae314d61074ed94a52e76b1c3e21e7f0e8c1d1fdd497a006ce45fa61  c649e7c1897bfd30aad85c6b6736fcb2d002a7eaf64186eea00c1a44d6220803  fdad2f34e466782e4b272d3f8505c49c3bb6269c8d5fd8846f0cc399f9744cba  87c5d0c93b80acf61d24e7aaf0faae231ab507ca45483ad3d441b5d1acebc43c  How can you protect your organization?   3CX has provided mitigation guidance, which includes a recommendation to uninstall the 3CX desktop app. As of this writing, an updated desktop app was being prepared by 3CX.   One of the biggest challenges with supply chain attacks is that they are challenging to detect. Because the attack occurs through a third-party vendor, the business may not even be aware that an attack has taken place until it is too late. Organizations can minimize overall risk of a supply chain attack by following security best practices. These include:  Developing a robust security strategy that encompasses the entire supply chain. This means conducting thorough security checks on all vendors, ensuring that they have appropriate security measures in place, and regularly monitoring their systems for any potential threats.  https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2023/03/investigating-3cx-desktop-application-attacks-what-you-need-to-know.html Page 3 of 5 Implementing endpoint and network security solutions that can detect and respond to threats in real-time, as well as advanced threat detection solutions that can identify potential anomalous threats as they occur.  Ensuring a solid incident response plan is in place in case of a supply chain attack. This includes identifying the key stakeholders who need to be notified, as well as having a clear process in place for containing and mitigating the attack. By taking these steps, businesses can reduce the risk of a supply chain attack and ensure the safety and security of their operations and customers.   How can VMware security products help?   The hashes listed in this blog post have a known malware reputation and should be blocked automatically by Carbon Black Cloud.  Carbon Black EDR customers can search for netconn traffic to the domains listed in this blog post.  Carbon Black App Control customers can ban the hashes listed in this blog post.  Carbon Black customers can also find additional product related details and instructions by logging on to the user community and accessing this link: HERE For NSX Advanced Threat Prevention (ATP), all published indicators are currently detected as malicious. Where guest virtual machines are protected by the Distributed Malware Prevention Service leveraging Guest Introspection, all malicious DLL files associated with this threat can be mitigated with a ‘detect and prevent’ malware prevention profile (Figure 2 shows how NSX ATP detect the malicious DLLs through Guest Introspection). NSX ATP has also anomaly-based detectors specifically tailored to identify anomalous beaconing; the malicious domains associated with 3CXDesktopApp are now part of the network reputation feed provided by NSX ATP.  Figure 2: User interface of NSX Guest Introspection Malware Prevention Service.  NSX ATP Standalone customers can also increase upload limits to support analyzing large files (up to 100MB on on-premise, see the following article for instructions on how to change this: INSTRUCTIONS), and threat hunt for the associated malicious network activity via the Network Explore console using the https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2023/03/investigating-3cx-desktop-application-attacks-what-you-need-to-know.html Page 4 of 5 following search query: “akamaicontainer.com OR akamaitechcloudservices.com OR azuredeploystore.com OR azureonlinecloud.com OR azureonlinestorage.com OR dunamistrd.com OR glcloudservice.com OR journalide.org OR msedgepackageinfo.com OR msstorageazure.com OR msstorageboxes.com OR officeaddons.com OR officestoragebox.com OR pbxcloudeservices.com OR pbxphonenetwork.com OR pbxsources.com OR sbmsa.wiki OR sourceslabs.com OR visualstudiofactory.com OR zacharryblogs.com OR  qwepoi123098.com”.  Source: https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2023/03/investigating-3cx-desktop-application-attacks-what-you-need-to-know.html https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2023/03/investigating-3cx-desktop-application-attacks-what-you-need-to-know.html Page 5 of 5