Black Basta Ransomware Operators Expand Their Attack Arsenal With
QakBot Trojan and PrintNightmare Exploit
By Kenneth Adrian Apostol, Paolo Ronniel Labrador, Mirah Manlapig, James Panlilio, Emmanuel Panopio, John Kenneth Reyes,
Melvin Singwa ( words)
Published: 2022-06-30 · Archived: 2026-04-06 00:33:44 UTC
Ransomware
We look into a recent attack orchestrated by the Black Basta ransomware group that used the banking trojan QakBot as a
means of entry and movement and took advantage of the PrintNightmare vulnerability to perform privileged file operations.
By: Kenneth Adrian Apostol, Paolo Ronniel Labrador, Mirah Manlapig, James Panlilio, Emmanuel Panopio, John Kenneth
Reyes, Melvin Singwa Jun 30, 2022 Read time: 4 min (955 words)
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Since it became operational in April, Black Bastaopen on a new tab has garnered notoriety for its recent attacks on 50
organizations around the worldopen on a new tab and its use of double extortionopen on a new tab, a modern ransomware
tactic in which attackers encrypt confidential data and threaten to leak it if their demands are not met. The emerging
ransomwareopen on a new tab group has continued to improve its attacks: We recently caught it using the banking trojan
QakBotopen on a new tab as a means of entry and movement, and taking advantage of the PrintNightmare vulnerability
(CVE-2021-34527)open on a new tab to perform privileged file operations.
In the case of a Trend Micro customer, its system was infected with Black Basta ransomware that was deployed by QakBot
(Figure 1). This behavior is typical of the QakBot malware family, which has served as a key enabler of ransomware
families like MegaCortex, PwndLockerm, Egregor, ProLock, and REvil (aka Sodinokibi)open on a new tab. QakBot, which
was discovered in 2007, is known for its infiltration capabilities and has been used as a “malware-installation-as-a-service”
for various campaigns. Over the years, this banking trojan has become increasingly sophisticated, as evidenced by its
exploitation of a newly disclosed Microsoft zero-day vulnerability known as Follina (CVE-2022-30190)open on a new tab.
Figure 1. A timeline of the files detected on the infected machine
QakBot’s infection chain
QakBot is distributed using spear-phishing emails (Figure 2) that contain Excel files with Excel 4.0 macros. The emails
entice the recipient to enable macros, which download and execute the QakBot DLL files (Figures 3 and 4). The
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downloaded QakBot DLL is dropped onto a specific file path and file name, and is executed via regsvr32.exe (Figure 5).
The QakBot DLL performs process injection using explorer.exe (Figure 6), after which the injected Explorer process creates
a scheduled task to maintain the malware’s initial foothold in the infected system (Figure 7).
Figure 2. The infection chain from the point of entry to the Black Basta ransomware payload
Figure 3. Instructions in the Excel file used by QakBot to lure a potential victim into enabling Excel 4.0
macros
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Figure 4. The malicious URL used to download the QakBot malware
Figure 5. The downloaded QakBot malware dropped onto a specific file path and file name
Figure 6. The explorer.exe process used in process injection
Figure 7. The scheduled task created by QakBot
Once QakBot is installed in a system, it proceeds to download and drop the other components in the infection chain,
beginning with the Cobeacon backdoor. We have observed the execution of Cobeacon using a fileless PowerShell script with
multiple layers of obfuscation (Figures 8 to 11). The Base64-encoded shellcode of the installed Cobeacon establishes and
names a pipe for communication (Figure 12) that is possibly used for exfiltration purposes once information has been
collected from a targeted system. The Black Basta ransomware group posts this information on its leak sites if the victim
does not pay the ransom.
Figure 8. Cobeacon’s first layer of obfuscation, a Base64-encoded PowerShell command
Figure 9. Cobeacon’s second layer of obfuscation, the loading and reading of an archive file in memory
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Figure 10. Cobeacon’s third layer of obfuscation, the decoded script for running the Base64-encoded
shellcode
Figure 11. Disassembly of the decoded shellcode
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Figure 12. Shellcode containing the named pipe for communication
PrintNightmare and Coroxy
Upon further analysis of the system that was affected by Black Basta, we found evidence that points to the ransomware
group’s exploitation of the PrintNightmare vulnerabilityopen on a new tab. Exploiting this vulnerability, Black Basta abused
the Windows Print Spooler Service or spoolsv.exe to drop its payload, spider.dll, and perform privileged file operations. It
also exploited the vulnerability to execute another file in the affected system, but samples of this file were no longer
available in the system.
Additionally, our investigation found that the ransomware actors used the Coroxy backdoor. They used Coroxy in
conjunction with the abuse of the computer networking utility tool Netcat to move laterally across the network. Once the
attackers gained a wide foothold in the network, they executed the Black Basta ransomware, whose infection process we
explained in more detail in a previous blog postopen on a new tab.
Thwarting phishing attempts
Spear phishing is a common precursor to ransomware infection. Organizations can protect their data from threats that spread
through emails by adhering to best practices such as:
Ensuring that macros are disabled in Microsoft Office applications.
Verifying an email’s sender and content before opening or downloading any attachments.
Hovering the pointer over embedded links to show the links’ full addresses.
Being wary of telltale signs of malicious intent, including unfamiliar email addresses, mismatched email and sender
names, and spoofed company emails.
Businesses and their employees can safeguard sensitive company data from email-borne ransomware threats like Black
Basta by turning to endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro’s Smart Protection Suitesproducts and Worry-Free Business
Securityworry free services suites solutions, which are equipped with behavior-monitoring capabilities that are able to detect
malicious files, scripts, and messages, and block all related malicious URLs. Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™products also
has a layer for email inspectionproducts that protects businesses by detecting any malicious attachments and URLs.
Multilayered detection and response solutions like the Trend Micro Vision One™products platform provides companies
with greater visibility across multiple layers — like email, endpoints, servers, cloud workloads, and networks — to look out
for suspicious behavior in their systems and block malicious components early, mitigating the risk of ransomware infection. 
Indicators of compromise
Hashes
SHA-256 Trend Micro detection
01fafd51bb42f032b08b1c30130b963843fea0493500e871d6a6a87e555c7bac Ransom.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEP
72a48f8592d89eb53a18821a54fd791298fcc0b3fc6bf9397fd71498527e7c0e Trojan.X97M.QAKBOT.YXCFH
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580ce8b7f5a373d5d7fbfbfef5204d18b8f9407b0c2cbf3bcae808f4d642076a Backdoor.Win32.COROXY.YACEKT
130af6a91aa9ecbf70456a0bee87f947bf4ddc2d2775459e3feac563007e1aed Trojan.Win64.QUAKNIGHTMARE.YACEJT
c7eb0facf612dbf76f5e3fe665fe0c4bfed48d94edc872952a065139720e3166 TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YXCEEZ
ffa7f0e7a2bb0edf4b7785b99aa39c96d1fe891eb6f89a65d76a57ff04ef17ab TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
2083e4c80ade0ac39365365d55b243dbac2a1b5c3a700aad383c110db073f2d9 TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
1e7174f3d815c12562c5c1978af6abbf2d81df16a8724d2a1cf596065f3f15a2 TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
2d906ed670b24ebc3f6c54e7be5a32096058388886737b1541d793ff5d134ccb TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
72fde47d3895b134784b19d664897b36ea6b9b8e19a602a0aaff5183c4ec7d24 TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
2e890fd02c3e0d85d69c698853494c1bab381c38d5272baa2a3c2bc0387684c1 TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
c9df12fbfcae3ac0894c1234e376945bc8268acdc20de72c8dd16bf1fab6bb70 Ransom.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YACEJ
8882186bace198be59147bcabae6643d2a7a490ad08298a4428a8e64e24907ad Trojan.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEJ
0e2b951ae07183c44416ff6fa8d7b8924348701efa75dd3cb14c708537471d27 Trojan.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEJ
0d3af630c03350935a902d0cce4dc64c5cfff8012b2ffc2f4ce5040fdec524ed Trojan.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEJ
df35b45ed34eaca32cda6089acbfe638d2d1a3593d74019b6717afed90dbd5f8 Trojan.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEJ
3fe73707c2042fefe56d0f277a3c91b5c943393cf42c2a4c683867d6866116fc Trojan.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEJ
433e572e880c40c7b73f9b4befbe81a5dca1185ba2b2c58b59a5a10a501d4236 Ransom.Win32.BLACKBASTA.A.note
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c4683097a2615252eeddab06c54872efb14c2ee2da8997b1c73844e582081a79 PUA.Win32.Netcat.B
URLs
24[.]178[.]196[.]44:2222
37[.]186[.]54[.]185:995
39[.]44[.]144[.]182:995
45[.]63[.]1[.]88:443
46[.]176[.]222[.]241:995
47[.]23[.]89[.]126:995
72[.]12[.]115[.]15:22
72[.]76[.]94[.]52:443
72[.]252[.]157[.]37:995
72[.]252[.]157[.]212:990
73[.]67[.]152[.]122:2222
75[.]99[.]168[.]46:61201
103[.]246[.]242[.]230:443
113[.]89[.]5[.]177:995
148[.]0[.]57[.]82:443
167[.]86[.]165[.]191:443
173[.]174[.]216[.]185:443
180[.]129[.]20[.]53:995
190[.]252[.]242[.]214:443
217[.]128[.]122[.]16:2222
elblogdeloscachanillas[.]com[.]mx/S3sY8RQ10/Ophn[.]png
lalualex[.]com/ApUUBp1ccd/Ophn[.]png
lizety[.]com/mJYvpo2xhx/Ophn[.]png
Tags
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