{ "id": "e74f888c-a441-4b23-9137-579b39dc1d66", "created_at": "2026-04-06T00:16:25.563719Z", "updated_at": "2026-04-10T03:36:33.655433Z", "deleted_at": null, "sha1_hash": "cd5a463dbbb52b17cde83d1ea7ea176a0a3d7bb9", "title": "I Solemnly Swear My Driver Is Up to No Good: Hunting for Attestation Signed Malware | Mandiant", "llm_title": "", "authors": "", "file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z", "file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z", "file_size": 136284, "plain_text": "I Solemnly Swear My Driver Is Up to No Good: Hunting for Attestation\r\nSigned Malware | Mandiant\r\nBy Mandiant\r\nPublished: 2022-12-13 · Archived: 2026-04-05 22:08:23 UTC\r\nThe public key used for the attestation signing (Appendix C: POORTRY Certificate Details) contains two object\r\nidentifiers (OIDs) of interest within the key usage value:\r\nRFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.12 defines Extended Key Usage (EKU). The EKU values in this signature help identify which\r\nmethod was used to sign this file and what purposes this signing certificate may be used for. The values defined show that\r\nthis certificate is used in the Windows Hardware Compatibility driver signing process and is used specifically for\r\nattestation signed drivers. Table 1 shows the OID descriptions.\r\nThe connection between the POORTRY sample, the attestation certificate, and the numerous legitimate samples signed\r\nwith this certificate led Mandiant to assess with high confidence that this malware was verified via the Windows\r\nHardware Compatibility process.\r\nThis field becomes an important artifact for identifying additional associated samples, and by pivoting on the Program\r\nName, Mandiant identified eleven new suspicious files, including an additional POORTRY sample.\r\nThe programName field for attestation signed drivers appears to be populated by the X.509 Subject Organization Name\r\n(O) of the EV Code Signing certificate used to sign the initial CAB submission to the WHCP portal. This is corroborated\r\nby the high amount of malicious detections for samples associated with this Organization Name and other corresponding\r\nProgram Name values on VirusTotal and within other Mandiant data sets. At time of writing, we have not been able to\r\nconfirm with Microsoft that this is the exact mechanism for how the programName field is populated for attestation\r\nsigned drivers.\r\nAll the observed corresponding EV code signing certificates were issued by Digicert. Over time certificate\r\nserial  01:15:3e:7a:3c:8d:c5:0b:3d:23:c8:ba:31:d3:70:52  was revoked, however several others appear to have not\r\nbeen revoked (bolded in Table 4). These corresponding Extended Validation certificates were used to sign launchers for\r\nSOGU malware utilized by Temp.Hex as well as signed distributions of the open source Fast Reverse Proxy tool, which\r\nhas been used by suspected Iranian state-sponsored threat actors in intrusions observed by Mandiant.\r\nUtilizing the OIDs and certificate data, YARA rules were developed to collect additional attestation signed drivers.\r\nExamining these additional attestation signed drivers led to 57 suspicious samples that shared program names that were\r\nobserved in malicious binaries (Appendix B: Indicators of Interest). These samples were spread across nine different\r\nprogram names.\r\nThe suspicious samples identified through this investigation have led to multiple development environment artifacts,\r\nspecifically program database (PDB) paths, implying multiple different development environments and potentially\r\nmultiple different malware authors.\r\nMandiant has previously observed scenarios when it is suspected that groups leverage a common criminal service for\r\ncode signing. This is not a new phenomenon, and has been documented by the Certified Malware project at the University\r\nhttps://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/hunting-attestation-signed-malware\r\nPage 1 of 9\n\nof Maryland in 2017. This is what Mandiant believes is occurring with these suspicious attestation signed drivers and\r\nrelated EV signed samples.\r\nThe use of stolen or fraudulently obtained code signing certificates by threat actors has been a common tactic and\r\nproviding these certificates or signing services has proven a lucrative niche in the underground economy. Mandiant has\r\nidentified numerous threat actors and services advertising in a variety of languages, including English, Russian, and\r\nChinese, that claim to provide code signing certificates or sign malware on behalf of threat actors. For example, while\r\nanalyzing chat messages leaked by the Twitter user “@ContiLeaks,” Mandiant identified several instances where threat\r\nactors involved in Trickbot operations purchased code signing certificates from multiple threat actors, with observed\r\npricing ranging between approximately $1,000-$3,000 USD for a single certificate.\r\nWhile most of these advertisements only mention EV code signing certificates, we have identified a small number of\r\ndiscussions focused on signing drivers through WHQL. While most of these discussions lamented to the challenges\r\npresented by WHQL restrictions, we observed at least one actor who mentioned experience signing drivers with WHQL,\r\nand we have also identified multiple websites on the open Internet advertising WHQL driver signing services to enterprise\r\nbusinesses. While we are unable to link the signed payloads observed in this activity to any of the identified services, it’s\r\nplausible that actors are either enlisting services from underground forums or abusing commercial services to obtain\r\nsigned driver malware.\r\nA pattern emerges of suspected malicious attestation signed drivers that contain the  programName  corresponding to EV\r\ncertificates that have also signed other suspected malicious samples. The Certificates appear to be issued primarily via\r\nDigicert and Globalsign to Chinese customers, indicating possible abuse of a Chinese market certificate reseller or\r\nsigning service.\r\nGiven the different company names identified and the differing development environments Mandiant suspects there is a\r\nservice provider getting these malware samples signed through the attestation process on behalf of the actors.\r\nUnfortunately, at this time, this assessment is stated with low confidence.\r\nAttestation signing is a legitimate Microsoft program, and the resulting drivers are signed with legitimate Microsoft\r\ncertificates. This makes execution-time detection difficult as Microsoft and most EDR tools will allow Microsoft signed\r\nbinaries to load. Organizations must instead depend on behavioral detections to overcome the implicit trust granted to\r\nMicrosoft-signed binaries and alert on suspicious or rootkit-like activities. For proactive hunts, however, there are\r\nnumerous ways to search for these files.\r\nThe OLEs allow detection to be implemented to identify any binary that is signed via the attestation process. This rule\r\nmatches on the presence of the OLEs and the Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher certificate subject.\r\nThe identified company names that were in the certificate program name can be used to home in on potentially suspicious\r\nsamples. However, know that due to the nature of these certificates it is not true that all samples with the certificate are\r\nmalicious, but simply have been abused in the past and warrant further investigation.\r\nThe VirusTotal dataset has additional data available for access via LiveHunt rules. This includes various tags and other\r\nmetadata from the related sandbox execution. This information can be used to identify suspected malicious attestation\r\nsigned binaries by combining the M_Hunting_Signed_Driver_Attestation_1 rule with the malicious count metadata.\r\nAs documented in the Definitive Dossier of Devilish Debug Details, PDB paths can be used to identify strings that are\r\npresent within the malware.However, it’s important to remember that this is a consequence of the malware and malware\r\ndevelopers, and not the certificate or signing process.\r\nhttps://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/hunting-attestation-signed-malware\r\nPage 2 of 9\n\nSee Appendix A: YARA for the full list of detections.\r\nThe attestation signing process offloads the responsibility of verifying the identity of the requesting hardware or software\r\nvendor to the Certificate Authorities.  In theory this is a valid process as the CAs must follow agreed upon procedures to\r\nverify the identity of the requesting entity and the authority of the individual making the request to represent the software\r\nvendor. However, this process is being abused to obtain malware signed by Microsoft.\r\nWhile this blog post has focused on POORTRY and the attestation signing process, Mandiant has observed other malware\r\nbeing signed via attestation. TEMPLESHOT is a malware family consisting of dropper, backdoor, a filter driver, and a\r\nprotection driver. The TEMPLESHOT driver with MD5  48bf11dd6c22e241b745d3bb1d562ca1  has been observed in the\r\nwild and is signed via attestation.\r\nUse of the Signify python library made automated analysis of Authenticode data extremely efficient. This content would\r\nnot have been possible without the assistance of analysts across the Mandiant Intelligence and FLARE organizations.\r\nOne sample ( 688c138fffbb4e7297289433c79d62f5 ) does not have a Signature Date, and this is likely due to binary\r\ntampering including the use of VMProtect after signing and other modifications.\r\nThe following table includes signed POORTRY samples.\r\nThe following table includes samples signed by EV certificates where the Organization Name is 大连纵梦网络科技有限\r\n公司.\r\nThe following list of MD5s are attestation signed binaries that have been identified as suspicious by numerous security\r\nsolutions. While each one may not be directly malicious, they warrant an investigation should they be present in an\r\nenvironment.\r\n0080fde587d6aedccb08db1317360d32 ff985a86bfa60576a8e86b05603ac5fa b00c95692923b8c1e2d45c4a64a5ff05\r\n00a7538086c266e8bcf8a0b1c2b6a2e4 62f289f3b55b0886c419a5077d11eb3c b0fea98c70e510f88b57f45a3f516326\r\n00dd476fa04da76fc2ed37cfdde59875 63960dbc7d63767edb6e1e2dc6f0707b b164daf106566f444dfb280d743bc2f7\r\n024e92733def0b1180f0ee54b81e5836 63d877650a3219f5991fd66bafc46bc5 b34403502499741762912c7bfc9ff21f\r\n03710450e5bebd207bbe471c4685dc49 64a81238d20dcbd4b21abb609040f698 b44dfd8c5e7b0c8652d7a647dfe252e4\r\n07bac50f875f09ad644827c8918e6837 66c145233576766013688088b03103e3 b500ee8d8cb045936d2996a1747bcded\r\n07c4309678ce891fdd868e10c6e7aad4 66d2860a078fb11832ceef28b23481c2 b5c73db8e70d6f46ad9b693f3ce060d2\r\nhttps://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/hunting-attestation-signed-malware\r\nPage 3 of 9\n\n0ae78b90151ec2b0457bb0c2675048f5 67ff9de8e72c4dfdf4b4404abf253e7e b7239e06bcbe6e2c7bb2f7a859cbf4f7\r\n0b4a0fe7db8400ef65ce7618177351cf 688c138fffbb4e7297289433c79d62f5 b83d8761748abb032ab5ae75519eaf71\r\n0d0ffa28823276732a9e4dea5c25cc34 688ca3c12b63fec9f921334d24cf6f78 b849deae20052d72c3c623660fa97e64\r\n14a1d3e07520df607635a3356877f5b9 6916b29893f618ba76b36bd8c297b7ac b8783155d6be5bb3a6d75edaa7ae7f71\r\n14e6507566a404e3158b3e36314bb3a1 6a066d2be83cf83f343d0550b0b8f206 b9d40581ae936662c37f2edc979d7e99\r\n1548b70d8581cbde703b1fb50b48a6a8 6a23d752fbc30e603bbb050a83a580eb ba9907be3a0752369082199ed126f8d8\r\n163118c947aacd0978ad3e019c7d121f 6a893aab7b79b73da7a049c2707aabf1 bb46eb379caae3b05e32d3089c0dd6d0\r\n179ca82f2e523be47df0dcebe808408d 6b0a733568d80be653fc9a568cdd88c5 bd25be845c151370ff177509d95d5add\r\n198877a8ce99289f7281b1475c13ba9f 6c3180163e4a5371647e734c7c817de5 bf13a2f4e2deb62b7dee98a012e94d61\r\n19d14bf80b3dc4e5b774b362f079a102 6c7479b5bb27f250fa32331b6457883a c0471f78648643950217620f6e7e24cc\r\n19d99758b1f33b418cb008530b61a1e7 6d32d2d7a44584c92115ac2a2c3ba3af c0debd2cfb62fc2c56bfd4104b1ff760\r\n1e63ec5b89edb805956f347b5b5cfaae 6e1bb443369973923c8eced16fcbd5cf c12d465743b9c167fc819b7872cd014c\r\n1f2888e57fdd6aee466962c25ba7d62d 6e3516775e7e009777dcdb7a314f1482 c35e6a0e1aef31ed9855499df4317acd\r\n1f46065ac9479253e4babc42b72bc4a8 6e730cf4ebcd166d26414378cab3a6d8 c5120095bf08655407c2f0215d10ac1d\r\n1f929fd617471c4977b522c71b4c91ed 6fcf56f6ca3210ec397e55f727353c4a c77e931a6388b2040cc7c5a1a0f56d93\r\n207cfc647647419adcfcc44c6059a1d1 7182ed3da406ba19bb9ffd8e4948d858 c7850060cfe574a2ef278ba46a136a5e\r\nhttps://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/hunting-attestation-signed-malware\r\nPage 4 of 9\n\n20f94c9cfc3cf012bf90546985f9f3c4 721b40a0c2a0257443f7dcc2c697e28a c812fa7c628c3e19a3da5910acf6206e\r\n22519936cd9e8c7d524b0590826c3e6e 72dbbd1dd61c6b0c2571e83f2c3d1825 c8495649615bf1b9f839d7f357d6d02f\r\n228f9f0a0466fba21ac085626020a8e1 734b3a6e6cbd1f53fbb693140d2c3049 cadc3e4090aed708526f0d6016aba7fd\r\n22949977ce5cd96ba674b403a9c81285 761939b0e442821985ab3281f97e6ceb cb68b7979bbb55bbde0a8c60fe3e5184\r\n232b0156173a9f8f5db6b65aa91e923b 76c6ae0157ea7f41f55ed7e7d241f910 cb6a416204b57470fab0b944d7b59756\r\n23cebc6b0eb76262d796577895f418d2 7737e5e40a439899f326279b7face22c cbc3d1c88a5d0491b7b50bb77ada93fe\r\n24eb9eef69475e4980a555898b25f0c1 77392be5eae901ae371c37861aa88589 cc29cf2294175315acbf33054151f3cd\r\n262c92f2437c80adf232ef147ca2d734 787782e0395b3d5e32cda6fdea2faba0 cd4b6d8bb762c2281c9b1142588ede4c\r\n267c30e484322ad31fa9e1374d6653f0 79ebae9ab3f3b59c754ab1cc82bf7e95 ce455358bf71c88b45fcb5789100969a\r\n26caf3361ec353593f51ebbd3fe5bbde 7a5896673b81beb5589b512c6d781a85 ce4d3a69331ff87920c903a4e4091904\r\n26d6833b1875b138ea34d6ab430cafcd 7a9df5c46c7c65b807f78c6c0bb2c38c ce658935ef6e223893121dce22908655\r\n2739311a6bb1a7b0b88ff24bf603a54d 7b6e3fe75c5ae68d7d5a3ae7b00097e0 ce6ef4dc1dd54baddaa51eaf594a496a\r\n27bb03f2659cd95bf9e7af899ee32728 7ba744b584e28190eb03b9ecd1bb9374 d11b9a4664ea03dfe3e8e1d737cd15f8\r\n286b10451fe364310f4a7baeb0e94a3f 7c6c1b7e6378b4c0bcceee84e0e26fde d22a56e31b4e1fd5b06d46fa56f59151\r\n2a12b959c55f4a2d34f96e45e2417a71 7cb012393114dfb35d60e70166a97986 d27fac80339ad1f2ee86374884996c52\r\n2aa8dc7a5dff7817ce0a9c7cf30847bf 7d78b5773845c5189ca09227d27a9d5a d2ed678542a5d1db494dc47359861467\r\nhttps://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/hunting-attestation-signed-malware\r\nPage 5 of 9\n\n2bec13be352db14fc9665ddf128deb8c 7dd800f100a049a72983dd75f5286d70 d47494b717c82eca8278dea610e1265d\r\n2cc14f20cf6847a2084f2c9cc0622015 7e0a6a234a64350e684544e272c7fc41 d60d8f3f12550dca4ba07ff61263b67f\r\n2d84c734d813af49cec3c3aa4aa4e6e3 7e2e29707e7a601e8ea7f3e2f4d672a2 d60e235b769cadbc7e83090b79b73ed3\r\n2e323c67a8781531a294684f7d2761ec 7e7002dc10c62fb674a3184f4ad6688a d617c9a86328921a8caf924575faf2a2\r\n2f6daca66d2f64c7b1b6f8693ea09cb7 7ee0b286003dc9e8006c22dcd70663f0 d66fc4e2f537566bb4d91cdea0ac64e5\r\n309f16f50e9074ce797eb38eda279298 7f9309f5e4defec132b622fadbcad511 d6b2947d8ff985fa84d697cc6cfdb7ff\r\n331113d1d54a3610f9c9bd72fc783721 811f8d76ff00c9eda27b51a0fb2b0d39 d6e506a1e0417c4507a5314529d84e34\r\n33b5485b35b33fd8ead5a38899522cce 822bbdec4e5630c3170ee05119dcfb5c d77209a21352486435d85e339596eeae\r\n3452586b669e12c1c4ee9db3c1006018 8264b3bdf46c0ece4f66151a613baed5 d87f08d1e50f2a3423813bf161b40859\r\n35c95b6b5f4a6a0bda56276846dae17b 832fe73a91993b387f9a49fafb9d4ea7 dc170d9bba14b0421c2514465055a93f\r\n35deaa9d004714dc6ef9661b91889148 84ce2a917e3d4aefcfc7d17e4a840a99 dc564bac7258e16627b9de0ce39fae25\r\n3608b3a24736dea4bf24a8ac5ae00e30 85063d67203b91bef9772446a1723021 dd1a5bd34f8cfa56e439c6fb275356d6\r\n37d4ba16136986bfded2b6fc698abf02 860f5812d65dc157a59c14e57bc0eaaf ddee86b84dcb72835b57b1d049e9e0cd\r\n395ea8b7d0f257850a3a04a1484bac4d 8986b5b6013cfb2bd3e6c8d22c453390 de4b5043c82ab3b36b4ae73a2e96d969\r\n398384a6cf2b7e26947d2e0acbfeeda5 8ac6ef2475ec89d3709fc124573cb380 e051141b1dcb9e7f889fea7c8b1d6ba5\r\n39ee31f03fe1bb93d47f560f73deffa9 8af6a129902a594ddaceafba38b7c060 e0e0c46ba4f969919e2879717c60ef2a\r\nhttps://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/hunting-attestation-signed-malware\r\nPage 6 of 9\n\n3d4b685dcaebc5bba5f9421572a4ab91 8b423e0395ba6419fcedc0701327c97c e2465ea5c2d5dac4ae1b8d50da1d7cce\r\n3db8146544ee26866a8e99bacb11188c 8d38a092ae5a3511bedadb7243a84409 e2c146a2522e4f40e5036c3fe12c3560\r\n3ecaf3ba4e93916714cc43320f6f2c58 8e4d0f679b092296a2f74cf812907d05 e30830c05ed3d2a3178a3678f3169bec\r\n3fd815ebb7d2ab2b62cff3c777b51e30 8fc8c6e1b2a1047752f60549878fb55f e5f62ef06b0dd656e1e47913f01f9f8a\r\n4070a8b16f318d108be0984e628421ad 909f3fc221acbe999483c87d9ead024a e6960ae657786979493da1786191bcf4\r\n40fda9a3c1be41be414f3795b25647f5 90affc996a2932cb0fec4e31cd673ae9 e777e5a8d2ba97c82128f04272e7841c\r\n415240633837ebcbd80e080ba99c03a9 90b9a4328c4f712815760f9da49bcb6a e7ff38a94ad765eb305fc7f0837f5913\r\n42200c8422347f63b3edb45ea5aa9c45 913d50851abf337abc3c73f2d4e7fb34 ea033ee6df904d863448ffef6386b6ae\r\n42a417e54639c69f033f72bbafe6e09a 929b293090bcc7900c1e8f9ba519e219 ea45419d992c15002c93067840568121\r\n4349378822e2316f18784c10c7ca08a1 934d0cda4cba428e9b75ff16d5f4b0b1 ea5f6ab5666193f805d13a49009f0699\r\n45991757d4ca2dab9e81f2fcbbc1ae23 93c5faf90bc889963f10c608cbde5a14 ee3bad1f5508e2129e0b423b009383e3\r\n45be5c0e7dfe37f88f1fa6c2fbb462c5 947ebc3f481a7b9ee3cf3a34d9830159 ee6b1a79cb6641aa44c762ee90786fe0\r\n467e60b9a0d1153057e0cfd0e721e198 95a04866e6afb8e9b0426f5890681f9a f07506c30237c96e49eecafa0e5a4ed4\r\n48190fd615dcea5c6679b8e30a8bfec0 9885d56d64ac2391a43f02abb2202181 f111bd9b8e55f60f909649820e116430\r\n486b1afce3484a784a1662513ca1272a 9a8323bc7187441a0d85b9a2e8f580e3 f35a8a8f36c13769b9e9fff05fa4f720\r\n48bf11dd6c22e241b745d3bb1d562ca1 9c4034691f6508e2361b6fca890671f9 f4ee6bee04b2ed18024e3a64a0d58385\r\nhttps://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/hunting-attestation-signed-malware\r\nPage 7 of 9\n\n48fc05c42549d0b3ec9e73bbb5be40dc 9d1424c87d89095e3cd6785adb54d2ec f59a1409ce773658e72ad73424841890\r\n4a0f22286134a58d9d20f911a608f636 9dabf30a780794200cd068b145730317 f783277840bbd2023879a87d0788f36e\r\n4b2e59a821589ab091a63770f4a658ed 9e91e55c89f9c17c0a2acaf4376cd72b f78915cbf89d8749a0a4ab18a2b182bd\r\n4d4c17d8b52cd89da0b17cc9653b2010 9f1d60d3cddea7f7558fad0217759094 f8ccabcbe08bbd2c8420f4d1cffcefd8\r\n4d947e4163e8aeafbfc626eb033bc665 a0fdc4543687a1b341b365d6dd16551c f9844524fb0009e5b784c21c7bad4220\r\n4e1f656001af3677856f664e96282a6f a2ee1cc9e80390ca248863004adbde60 f9aad310a5d5c80bbc61d10cc797e4f0\r\n4e8d5c44bfdeffd0168f8a05f6a04e8b a2f3bce86beef23aede69396dcf7e184 fa00cc96c5bea2979a59d0da0d22c83d\r\n4f5c7367f2ebae0097b6f2f1bebd19b6 a55cb8be2887e99b4f662fc1ae08d265 fa914061f5a40b324454d3fb9fc85ca5\r\n508d42f26f8bd562728e6fca866e05eb a7251aad1e81c6194b34dabf6edd6b4a faa5806826ff1ba749b70de0e14835c3\r\n50d13758b811c794bc13769ee3b42e85 a9541530619a3ac2615b92603b705fe6 fbd9ba2b8b2d677d41c30a01c02cfd01\r\n52494f624378ef6ee298f0fc73082d0e aba1be25da0691761f593725e9c067e5 fd3b7234419fafc9bdd533f48896ed73\r\n52fc9ec7a5c177fe27fb00b6c2c5ff09 ac2a1f2ae6b547619bef93dfadb48937 fd4cee1c7b8167f25a8b4b864ede3c5d\r\n548d48b658305ffb77cc814ea080b542 ac7f0fcb6040eb47ea9855d418c32510 fdb6dae1e8c182089fdb86996436330c\r\n561bc6902367d9e43e27c5543e7a5818 acac842a46f3501fe407b1db1b247a0b fe2f8e46ae540d7299c61ba083d52399\r\n5800a88d39fdf63e5a43bfcc6700d907 adab615712eac2719691d01b69254f29 fe7ecd399eec7036a63f0b7eb5ebcfb1\r\n5b281df4aaa915f660e075dc944a02c2 add02792cfff7b19b8e526a247acb0ba ff43f91f2465504e5e67d0b37d92ef18\r\nhttps://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/hunting-attestation-signed-malware\r\nPage 8 of 9\n\n5e5d9971c90287a6aa905e54b2a21b1c ae2f3e2412925a767e372c9c0ccf7ced\r\nThe following certificate details are extracted from the certificate signing to the POORTRY sample. However, note that\r\nthis is a legitimate attestation signing Microsoft certificate. Note that some details were removed for brevity.\r\nSource: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/hunting-attestation-signed-malware\r\nhttps://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/hunting-attestation-signed-malware\r\nPage 9 of 9", "extraction_quality": 1, "language": "EN", "sources": [ "Malpedia" ], "references": [ "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/hunting-attestation-signed-malware" ], "report_names": [ "hunting-attestation-signed-malware" ], "threat_actors": [ { "id": "b69037ec-2605-4de4-bb32-a20d780a8406", "created_at": "2023-01-06T13:46:38.790766Z", "updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:03.101635Z", "deleted_at": null, "main_name": "MUSTANG PANDA", "aliases": [ "Stately Taurus", "LuminousMoth", "TANTALUM", "Twill Typhoon", "TEMP.HEX", "Earth Preta", "Polaris", "BRONZE PRESIDENT", "HoneyMyte", "Red Lich", "TA416" ], "source_name": "MISPGALAXY:MUSTANG PANDA", "tools": [], "source_id": "MISPGALAXY", "reports": null }, { "id": "20b5fa2f-2ef1-4e69-8275-25927a762f72", "created_at": "2025-08-07T02:03:24.573647Z", "updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:03.765721Z", "deleted_at": null, "main_name": "BRONZE DUDLEY", "aliases": [ "TA428 ", "Temp.Hex ", "Vicious Panda " ], "source_name": "Secureworks:BRONZE DUDLEY", "tools": [ "NCCTrojan", "PhantomNet", "PoisonIvy", "Royal Road" ], "source_id": "Secureworks", "reports": null }, { "id": "6daadf00-952c-408a-89be-aa490d891743", "created_at": "2025-08-07T02:03:24.654882Z", "updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:03.645565Z", "deleted_at": null, "main_name": "BRONZE PRESIDENT", "aliases": [ "Earth Preta ", "HoneyMyte ", "Mustang Panda ", "Red Delta ", "Red Lich ", "Stately Taurus ", "TA416 ", "Temp.Hex ", "Twill Typhoon " ], "source_name": "Secureworks:BRONZE PRESIDENT", "tools": [ "BlueShell", "China Chopper", "Claimloader", "Cobalt Strike", "HIUPAN", "ORat", "PTSOCKET", "PUBLOAD", "PlugX", "RCSession", "TONESHELL", "TinyNote" ], "source_id": "Secureworks", "reports": null }, { "id": "9baa7519-772a-4862-b412-6f0463691b89", "created_at": "2022-10-25T15:50:23.354429Z", "updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:05.310361Z", "deleted_at": null, "main_name": "Mustang Panda", "aliases": [ "Mustang Panda", "TA416", "RedDelta", "BRONZE PRESIDENT", "STATELY TAURUS", "FIREANT", "CAMARO DRAGON", "EARTH PRETA", "HIVE0154", "TWILL TYPHOON", "TANTALUM", "LUMINOUS MOTH", "UNC6384", "TEMP.Hex", "Red Lich" ], "source_name": "MITRE:Mustang Panda", "tools": [ "CANONSTAGER", "STATICPLUGIN", "ShadowPad", "TONESHELL", "Cobalt Strike", "HIUPAN", "Impacket", "SplatCloak", "PAKLOG", "Wevtutil", "AdFind", "CLAIMLOADER", "Mimikatz", "PUBLOAD", "StarProxy", "CorKLOG", "RCSession", "NBTscan", "PoisonIvy", "SplatDropper", "China Chopper", "PlugX" ], "source_id": "MITRE", "reports": null }, { "id": "2ee03999-5432-4a65-a850-c543b4fefc3d", "created_at": "2022-10-25T16:07:23.882813Z", "updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:04.776949Z", "deleted_at": null, "main_name": "Mustang Panda", "aliases": [ "Bronze President", "Camaro Dragon", "Earth Preta", "G0129", "Hive0154", "HoneyMyte", "Mustang Panda", "Operation SMUGX", "Operation SmugX", "PKPLUG", "Red Lich", "Stately Taurus", "TEMP.Hex", "Twill Typhoon" ], "source_name": "ETDA:Mustang Panda", "tools": [ "9002 RAT", "AdFind", "Agent.dhwf", "Agentemis", "CHINACHOPPER", "China Chopper", "Chymine", "ClaimLoader", "Cobalt Strike", "CobaltStrike", "DCSync", "DOPLUGS", "Darkmoon", "Destroy RAT", "DestroyRAT", "Farseer", "Gen:Trojan.Heur.PT", "HOMEUNIX", "Hdump", "HenBox", "HidraQ", "Hodur", "Homux", "HopperTick", "Hydraq", "Impacket", "Kaba", "Korplug", "LadonGo", "MQsTTang", "McRAT", "MdmBot", "Mimikatz", "NBTscan", "NetSess", "Netview", "Orat", "POISONPLUG.SHADOW", "PUBLOAD", "PVE Find AD Users", "PlugX", "Poison Ivy", "PowerView", "QMAGENT", "RCSession", "RedDelta", "Roarur", "SPIVY", "ShadowPad Winnti", "SinoChopper", "Sogu", "TIGERPLUG", "TONEINS", "TONESHELL", "TVT", "TeamViewer", "Thoper", "TinyNote", "WispRider", "WmiExec", "XShellGhost", "Xamtrav", "Zupdax", "cobeacon", "nbtscan", "nmap", "pivy", "poisonivy" ], "source_id": "ETDA", "reports": null } ], "ts_created_at": 1775434585, "ts_updated_at": 1775792193, "ts_creation_date": 0, "ts_modification_date": 0, "files": { "pdf": "https://archive.orkl.eu/cd5a463dbbb52b17cde83d1ea7ea176a0a3d7bb9.pdf", "text": "https://archive.orkl.eu/cd5a463dbbb52b17cde83d1ea7ea176a0a3d7bb9.txt", "img": "https://archive.orkl.eu/cd5a463dbbb52b17cde83d1ea7ea176a0a3d7bb9.jpg" } }