https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain RenEngine Loader and HijackLoader: Dual-Stage Attack Chain By Howler Cell Research Team Published: 2026-02-04 · Archived: 2026-09-26 02:02:05 UTC Our analysis indicates that more than 400,000 global victims have been impacted, with the operation continuing to infect over 5,000 new victims per day. The threat actors blend compelling social‑engineering techniques with a stealthy, multi‑stage execution chain designed to bypass security controls and impede analysis. By embedding a modular, stealth‑focused second‑stage loader inside a legitimate Ren’Py launcher, the attackers closely mimic normal application behavior, significantly reducing early detection. This campaign is far from a commodity “grab‑and‑go” infection chain. It is a high‑volume, long‑running, and technically mature operation that combines trusted application execution paths, staged decryption, modular payload delivery, and extensive evasion techniques. The result is an intrusion chain that is difficult to triage, resistant to automated sandboxing, and capable of sustaining large‑scale victimization over extended periods. The Howler Cell Threat Research Team traced the origin of the RenEngine Loader campaign to early April 2025, and it remains active to date. Variants observed since early October include an additional function that retrieves the value of the pub field from the configuration and appends it to a GET request sent to analytics tracking. Our OSINT hunt and analysis of victim analytics dumps and logs confirm that telemetry tracking was added to the loader on October 14, 2025. The campaign is still active. The analytics data indicates approximately 400k global distributions reaching the telemetry server (embedded in the malware), as shown in Figure 1. Exact victim counts cannot be confirmed due to limited visibility in the available telemetry data. The data covers daily telemetry from October 2025 through early January 2026 and shows a clear, steady growth pattern over time. Figure 2: Daily user traffic from Oct. 14, 2025 to Jan. 5, 2026 by telemetry Table 1: RenEngine Loader top 10 countries of users reached Country Users India 38,016 The United States 31,317 Brazil 25,220 Page 1 of 23 Country Russian Federation Egypt Turkey Spain Indonesia Pakistan France Attack Overview Figure 3: Attack overview https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Users 22,366 19,500 18,835 18,109 15,790 15,426 14,100 Page 2 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Technical Analysis Initial access occurs when users download pirated game installers from platforms that distribute cracks and game modifications, as shown in Figure 4. These installers are advertised as preactivated or cracked versions of commercial games. Users often trust these files to bypass licensing controls or avoid paying for legitimate software. In addition to full installers, users frequently download game mods to customize or enhance gameplay. These mods are treated as low risk by users and are often executed without verification. The Howler Cell Threat Research Team identified a popular game mod and crack distribution site delivering information stealer malware through both installers and mod packages. The AAA game titles observed so far include: Far Cry Need for Speed FIFA Assassin’s Creed This delivery method relies on social trust within piracy communities rather than technical exploitation. That makes it effective against users with limited security awareness and minimal endpoint protections. Figure 4: Pirated game page displayed on the website Page 3 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Clicking on the download link of the game we landed on a page go[.]zovo[.]ink as shown in Figure 5. Figure 5: Zovo webpage showing button as "Download Setup" Further clicking on Download Setup button of this page, it redirects us to the MediaFire download page containing the zip of pirated setup (which contains RenEngine Loader),) , the complete initial payload drop chain is shown in Figure 6. Page 4 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Figure 6: Initial payload drop chain Once we download the zip & extract it with WinRAR or 7zip tool. The structure of files and directories will look as shown in Figure 7. Instaler.exe is a legitimate game launcher based on Ren'py visual novel engine and is abused here to execute a malicious python script. Figure 7: Files and directories dropped by zip The threat actors behind this campaign abused Ren’Py’s archive build feature to package the final payloads within an RPA file. Since common extractors like 7-Zip typically fail to unpack these archives by default, the compiled scripts remain embedded, likely as a tactic to evade static detection by security solutions and ensure the script is present only in memory. Figure 8: Build options specified in options.rpy Page 5 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain As illustrated in Figure 8, the threat actors leveraged Ren’Py’s built-in archive functionality to consolidate all files into archive.rpa. Notably, they also deliberately removed all plain text script files (rpy) from the final build package leaving only the compiled scripts (rpyc). On execution, Instaler.exe (Ren'py Launcher) by default decompresses archive.rpa present within game, launcher, or data directory and executes a compiled python script named script.rpyc. As visualized in Figure 9, We decompressed the RPA archive and decompiled the malicious python script for detailed analysis. This script has been designated by Howler Cell as RenEngine Loader. Figure 9: RenEngine Loader: Decompiled Script.rpyc Page 6 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain RenEngine Loader reads a .key file from disk, decodes its contents using Base64 to retrieve JSON configuration details (see Figure 10). Based on this configuration, it locates an XOR-encoded archive, decrypts it using the specified key, and executes the process defined in the configuration from within the extracted archive. In addition to this staged delivery mechanism, the loader also implements extensive sandbox checks (detailed later in this blog) to evade analysis and ensure execution only on real user environments. Figure 10: RenEngine Loader configuration Page 7 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain The configuration is structured as JSON and supports up to six identifiers, each serving a specific role during different phases of RenEngine Loader’s execution. The details of these fields and their respective functions are outlined in Table 2. Field Name filename password exec_file sandbox Value in Current Campaign Zt5qwYUCFL.txt eAX7G6bTT W8CPbGQI.exe false Table 2: RenEngine Loader’s configuration detail Description Name of the XOR-encoded archive file. XOR key used to decode the file specified in filename. Executable within the decoded archive that is launched during execution. Determines sandbox behavior: • False – Perform sandbox checks • True – Skip checks Page 8 of 23 Field Name pub final_zip_name Sandbox Check Value in Current Campaign t11_asm Instsatp_* https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Description Identifier appended to analytic events sent to Clicky for victim tracking. Currently unused in this campaign; observed in other samples. It currently holds no value in the code and lacks implementation, suggesting it may signify functionality under development or reserved for future use. Based on the decoded configuration, if the sandbox field is set to False, the RenEngine Loader initiates a sandbox check. The loader calculates a scoring sum based on different information it collects from the system, and the sum is compared at the end to identify if the current execution is within a sandbox machine. Figure 11: Sandbox check simulated in a VMware guest After completing all discovery actions (Figure 11), the calculated sum is converted into percentage. If this percentage is below 50, the loader proceeds with execution; otherwise, it terminates silently. Table 3 details the artifacts and comparisons used to determine whether the host is a virtual machine. Page 9 of 23 Sandbox Check RAM Table 3: List of sandbox checks performed to determine VM Details & Score RAM < 2GB - score: 0 2GB < RAM < 4GB – score: 3 4GB < RAM < 8GB – score: 4 RAM > 8GB – score: 5 Storage < 20GB - score:0 20GB < Storage < 50GB – score: Hard Disk 3 Storage (only 40GB < C: drive) Storage < 80GB – score: 4 Storage > 120GB – score: 5 Cores < 2 – score: 0 2 < Cores < 4 – score: 3 CPU Cores 4 < Cores < 6 – score: 4 Cores > 6 – score: 5 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain System Command executed & List compared powershell -Command 'Get-CimInstance Win32_ComputerSystem | Select-Object TotalPhysicalMemory' powershell -Command 'Get-PSDrive C | Select-Object Used,Free' powershell -Command 'Get-CimInstance Win32_Processor | Select-Object NumberOfLogicalProcessors' Page 10 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Sandbox Details & Score System Command executed & List compared Check Serial =0 – score: 0 powershell -Command 'Get-CimInstance Win32_BIOS | Select- Device Serial Serial !=0 – Object SerialNumber' score: 5 powershell -Command ‘Get-CimInstance Win32_ComputerSystem | Select-Object Model’ Model in hardcoded list Hardcoded list of Models – score: 0 Device Model virtualbox, vmware, kvm, virtual machine, qemu, xen, hyperv, Model not in hyper-v, parallels, virtual platform, vm platform, vsphere, hardcoded list proxmox, citrix, oracle vm, bochs, virtual pc, cloud pc, shadow – score: 5 pc, amazon ec2, google compute engine, azure virtual machine, bhyve, virtual desktop, sandbox powershell -Command 'Get-CimInstance Manufacturer Win32_ComputerSystem | Select-Object in hardcoded Manufacturer'Hardcoded list of Manufacturersinnotek, vmware, list – score: 0 Device qemu, xen, parallels, oracle, citrix, red hat, proxmox, amazon Manufacturer Manufacturer web services, google cloud, microsoft azure, virtualbox, docker, not in nutanix, cloud, vagrant, kubernetes, openstack, digital ocean, hardcoded list linode, vultr, ibm cloud, alibaba cloud, huawei cloud, tencent – score: 5 cloud Page 11 of 23 Sandbox Details & Score Check Registry has keys matching hardcoded list – score: 2 Registry Keys Registry not accessible or none of keys found from list – score: 5 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain System Command executed & List compared Hardcoded list of Registry keys "SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions", "HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__", "HARDWARE\ACPI\FADT\VBOX__", "HARDWARE\ACPI\RSDT\VBOX__", "SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\VBoxGuest", "SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\VBoxMouse", "SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\VBoxService", "SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\VBoxSF", "SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\VBoxVideo" Any of files Hardcoded list of Files from hardcoded list VBoxMouse.sys, VBoxGuest.sys, VBoxSF.sys, VBoxVideo.sys, found in vboxdisp.dll, vboxhook.dll, vboxmrxnp.dll, vboxogl.dll, SYSTEM32 – vboxoglarrayspu.dll, vboxoglcrutil.dll, vboxoglerrorspu.dll, Module and score: 2 vboxoglfeedbackspu.dll, vboxoglpackspu.dll, Driver Files None of files vboxoglpassthroughspu.dll, vboxservice.exe, vboxtray.exe, from VBoxControl.exe, vmmouse.sys, vmhgfs.sys, vmusbmouse.sys, hardcoded list vmkdb.sys, vmrawdsk.sys, vmmemctl.sys, vm3dmp.sys, found - score: vmci.sys, vmsci.sys 5 Any of active processes from hardcoded list Hardcoded list of processes found – score: Active 2 vboxservices.exe, vboxservice.exe, vboxtray.exe, xenservice.exe, Process None of active VMSrvc.exe, vemusrvc.exe, VMUSrvc.exe, qemu-ga.exe, processes from prl_cc.exe, prl_tools.exe, vmtoolsd.exe hardcoded list found - score: 5 Page 12 of 23 Sandbox Check Username Hijack Loader Details & Score Username in list – score: 0 Username not in list – score: 5 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain System Command executed & List compared Hardcoded list of sandbox usernameswdagutilityaccount, vagrant, sandbox Following the sandbox check, the RenEngine Loader retrieves a file named Zt5qwYUCFL.txt from disk and applies XOR decoding with the key eAX7G6bTT to obtain a ZIP archive. It then extracts the archive’s contents and executes a binary called W8CPbGQI.exe, continuing the malicious attack chain. The structure is shown in Figure 12. Figure 12: Files present within the extracted archive W8CPbGQI.exe is a legitimate signed executable which is abused to sideload and execute the malicious module d3dx9_43.dll. On Load, this module is responsible for dynamically loading another DLL from current directory named VSDebugScriptAgent170.dll using LoadLibraryA API (see Figure 13 for Snippet) and transfers execution to this DLL via indirect jmp instruction. Figure 13: Module load using LoadLibraryA VSDebugScriptAgent170.dll leverages the modified DllGetClassObject export function to perform dynamic API resolution, as illustrated in Figure 14. Page 13 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Figure 14: Dynamic API resolution using modified DllGetClassObject. Following dynamic API resolving, it performs module stomping on evr.dll; It is loaded via LoadLibraryA API and then execution is transferred using call EDX instruction, as shown in Figure 15. Figure 15: Transfer execution to stomped EVR.DLL Stomped Evr.dll reads an encrypted file named Froodjurain.wkk from disk, which serves as the configuration container for HijackLoader. This file holds compressed module data that is later unpacked by the malware using the RtlDecompressBuffer API with the LZNT1 compression format. As shown in Figure 16, the malware looks for the magic value C6 A5 79 EA, followed by a 4-byte XOR key (DB CD 7B C6). This XOR key differs across samples. The configuration structure is outlined below: IDAT: 49 44 41 54 Magic Number: C6 A5 79 EA XOR Key: DB CD 7B C6 Figure 16: Encrypted IDAT Config Page 14 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Figure 17: Illustrates how HijackLoader decompresses the data using the RtlDecompressBuffer API. Page 15 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain After decompression, the second-stage loader data appear as shown in Figure 18. Figure 18: Decompressed data of second stage loader. The decompressed data contains a list of 38 modules. Early HijackLoader samples included only a small number of modules, mainly responsible for reading the configuration file, decrypting data, and loading the next stage. Over time, the malware authors have expanded this set by adding many more modules to the existing framework. In the sample analyzed during this research, HijackLoader loads 38 separate modules (listed under Table 4), indicating its evolution from a simple loader into a highly modular framework. Table 4: Modules Loaded by HijackLoader Page 16 of 23 Module name ANTIVM ANTIVMGPU ANTIVMMACS AVDATA COPYLIST CUSTOMINJECT CUSTOMINJECTPATH ESAL ESAL64 ESLDR ESLDR64 ESWR ESWR64 ANTIVMHYPERVISORNAMES https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Purpose Of the Module CRC Hash General virtual machine detection 0x4DAD7707 GPU checks to detect virtual machines 0xE6789CD4 Looks for known hypervisor names 0x19E1DA5E Checks MAC addresses linked to VMs 0xCFF91D66 Collects antivirus and security product info 0x78B783CA Prepares file lists for later actions 0x1AE7700A Custom process injection (32-bit) 0x6703F815 Injection using a specific process path 0x192A4446 Core execution support layer (32-bit) 0x757C9405 Core execution support layer (64-bit) 0x6364A15B Module loader (32-bit) 0xE7794E15 Module loader (64-bit) 0x4FA01AC5 Writes payload data (32-bit) 0x93EB1CB1 Writes payload data (64-bit) 0x00AE2762 Page 17 of 23 Module name FIXED LauncherLdr64 modCreateProcess modCreateProcess64 modTask modTask64 modUAC modUAC64 modWD modWD64 modWriteFile modWriteFile64 rshell rshell64 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Purpose Of the Module Static or fixed configuration data Launches main loader in 64-bit mode Process creation logic (32-bit) Process creation logic (64-bit) Scheduled task persistence (32-bit) Scheduled task persistence (64-bit) UAC bypass or elevation attempts (32-bit) UAC bypass or elevation attempts (64-bit) Windows Defender interference (32-bit) Windows Defender interference (64-bit) File write operations (32-bit) File write operations (64-bit) Reverse shell capability (32-bit) Reverse shell capability (64-bit) Page 18 of 23 CRC Hash 0x699D0C82 0xF4F141C2 0x696F778F 0x9B0B7E4B 0x3115355E 0x9BFAF2D3 0xC64EBFDA 0xC97832F9 0x0F508E52 0x6BFCE99E 0xFCE82FC1 0x90415081 0x74984889 0x7B37E907 Module name SM ti ti64 TinycallProxy TinycallProxy64 tinystub tinystub64 tinyutilitymodule.dll tinyutilitymodule64.dll X64L https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Purpose Of the Module Session or state management System and environment profiling (32-bit) System and environment profiling (64-bit) API call proxy and obfuscation (32-bit) API call proxy and obfuscation (64-bit) Initial bootstrap loader (32-bit) Initial bootstrap loader (64-bit) Shared utility functions (32-bit) Shared utility functions (64-bit) 64-bit execution switch helper CRC Hash 0xD8222145 0x3EE477F1 0x2AB77DB8 0x455CBBC3 0x5515DCEA 0x4EACE798 0x6E874E5A 0xA1D724FC 0xA0077EA3 0xCB5B9F3F In the next stage, the malware searches for the ti module (CRC = 0x3EE477F1) by comparing hardcoded CRC values against each available module. Once the matching module is identified, it loads a system DLL to inject the shellcode. In our case, the target system DLL is predefined in the configuration (as shown in Figure 19) and is rasapi32.dll, which is loaded dynamically at runtime using the LoadLibraryW API. Figure 19: Dynamically Loading rsaapi32.dll. Page 19 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain The malware creates a directory named broker_crypt_v4_i386 under %ProgramData%, which is also defined in the configuration. After creating this directory, it loads the COPYLIST (CRC= 0x1AE7700A) module and copies d3dx9_43.dll, Froodjurain.wkk, Taig.gr, and VSDebugScriptAgent170.dll as shown in Figure 20 to later establish persistence on the system dropping LNK on Desktop. Figure 20: Dependent files in %ProgramData%\broker_crypt_v4_i386 The malware also creates a directory named %AppData%\Roaming\broker_crypt_v4_i386 using the CreateDirectoryW API and drops chime.exe into this location, as shown in Figure 21. It then sets the current working directory to %AppData%\Roaming\broker_crypt_v4_i386 and spawns a new process. During this process execution, two .tmp files are created in the %Temp% directory, which contain the configuration data and the shellcode for the final payload. Figure 21: Dropped chime.exe in %AppData%\roaming\broker_crypt_v4_i386. Page 20 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain In the final phase, the malware creates an executable named ZoneInd.exe under %AppData%\Local. The loader then implements process doppelgänging, writing the shellcode extracted from the .tmp files into both ZoneInd.exe and chime.exe. Final payload - ACR stealer Analysis of the final payload confirms it to be an ACR stealer, and its configuration is provided in Table 5, It is designed to harvest sensitive user data such as saved browser passwords, cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and autofill information, along with system details and clipboard contents. This capability enables account takeover, session hijacking, and financial theft by quietly exfiltrating the collected data to its command-and-control (C2) server. Table 5: Final ACR Stealer Configuration C2: 78[.]40[.]193[.]126 Campaign ID: 08de3605-f8ce-46fa-874f-3adf0bd308ba Build Date: Sun Dec 7 14:26:54 2025 In this campaign, only ACR stealer was delivered as final payload; however, in other similar scenarios, we observed different payloads such as Rhadamanthys stealer, Async RAT, and XWorm delivered via RenEngine Loader. The complete network infrastructure is shown in Figure 22. Figure 22: Complete network infrastructure Conclusion Page 21 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain RenEngine Loader marks a significant evolution in loader-based attack chains. Unlike traditional loaders, RenEngine leverages the legitimate Ren’Py visual novel engine to embed malicious scripts within legitimate game launchers, exploiting the engine’s archive packaging feature to evade static detection. This approach demonstrates a creative abuse of gaming frameworks for malware delivery, making RenEngine a novel and stealthy initial-stage loader. RenEngine’s capabilities extend beyond simple payload delivery. It incorporates: Dynamic configuration decoding via Base64 and XOR encryption. Advanced sandbox scoring mechanisms to ensure execution only on real user environments. Telemetry integration for infection tracking, enabling campaign operators to monitor victim distribution globally. Its role as the first stage in a dual-loader chain (preceding HijackLoader) highlights a growing trend toward modular, multi-layered attack architectures. By combining RenEngine’s stealth and HijackLoader’s extensive module set, threat actors achieve persistence, privilege escalation, and flexible payload deployment. This discovery underscores the need for behavioural detection strategies focused on: Abuse of legitimate frameworks (e.g., Ren’Py). Unusual archive formats and embedded Python scripts. Sandbox evasion logic and staged decryption routines. Appendix IOC’s SHA256: 9e3b296339e25b1bae1f9d028a17f030dcf2ab25ad46221b37731ea4fdfde057 Zip Package: 9e3b296339e25b1bae1f9d028a17f030dcf2ab25ad46221b37731ea4fdfde057 RenPy Installer (legitimate but exploited): Instaler.exe: 7123e1514b939b165985560057fe3c761440a9fff9783a3b84e861fd2888d4ab HijackLoader: d3dx9_43.dll: 326ec5aeeafc4c31c234146dc604a849f20f1445e2f973466682cb33889b4e4c VSDebugScriptAgent170.dll:  db4ccd0e8f03c6d282726bfb4ee9aa15aa41e7a5edcb49e13fbd0001452cdfa2 hxxps[://]dodi-repacks[.]site (Piracy game download website) C2’s 78[.]40[.]193[.]126 MITRE Initial Access: • T1204.002 – User Execution: Malicious File Page 22 of 23 https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Execution: • T1059.006 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python Defense Evasion: • T1027 – Obfuscated/Compressed Files & Information • T1497.001 – Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion • T1140 – Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information • T1055 – Process Injection • T1055.013 – Process Doppelgänging Persistence: • T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task • T1574.002 – Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion: • T1548.002 – Bypass User Account Control Discovery: • T1082 – System Information Discovery • T1012 – Query Registry • T1057 – Process Discovery Credential Access: • T1555.003 – Credentials from Web Browsers Collection: • T1115 – Clipboard Data • T1539 – Exfiltrate Web Session Cookies Command and Control: • T1071.001 – Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols Exfiltration: • T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Back to Top Source: https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/renengine-loader-hijackloader-attack-chain Page 23 of 23