#### Hackers are Humans too ###### Cyber leads to Cl leads ----- ###### Introductions • • Cyber-counter intelligence • My primary focus is MAKERSMARK (Russia) • CSEC - Covert Network Threat (CNT) group - New name, same Cyber/CI group you know and love - Cyber and traditional Cl sitting side by side - Focused on Foreign Intelligence, not Information Assurance ----- ###### Goals • How do we attribute cyber intrusion sets? • How do we go beyond the hacking face of a CNE program? - Expose management structure, operators - Requirements , technological advances • This presentation portrays only one method - Passive infrastructure tasking/contact chaining - Many other are available ----- ###### Initial Seed • Infrastructure tasking - Mostly exposed through malware/content delivery • Careful and manual monitoring of anomalous network sessions • Nothing fancy • Not Web 2.0, but it works ----- ###### Overview • MAKERSMARK Misuse of Operational Infrastructure Poor OPSEC practices ----- ## MAKERS MARK #### (Russian CNE) ###### Designed by geniuses Implemented by morons ----- ### MAKERS MARK ###### • The MAKERSMARK less attributed (LA) systems are really well designed • This has not translated into security for MAKERSMARK operators • Personal browsing through LA systems - Workshops, ORBs, and controllers • Development shop infected by crimeware - 4th party collection ----- ###### MAKERSMARK: Less Attributed Overview . SIGINT Intercept Spoofed Source IP MAKERSMARK ----- ###### MAKERSMARK: Misuse of Infrastructure • Less Attributable infrastructure used for highly attributable purposes: - Hosting implant callback servers - Live testing of new implant protocols - Collecting exfiltration • This is not CNE best practices ----- ###### MAKERSMARK: Misuse of LA Systems • Personal Social Networking - Vkontakt - (mail/inbox/bk).ru accounts **y'/,-,;** **_/If / ,_** ###### • Personal Email ~...r. ~~ .II'/ - Webmail/POP W.fr -111· - Personal retrieval through masquerading infrastructure • Personal web browsing ----- ###### MAKERSMARK: 4th party collection • Implant development shop infected by GUMBLAR botnet - Crimeware - Sends pharmaceutical spam • Exfiltration to Canadian "bullet proof' host - HTTP/FTP logins - Collection of MM operator browsing habits - MM LiveJournal accounts included in collection ----- ###### Closing Remarks • You have to keep an eye out - A lot of value can be lost by not following leads - Typically the window to exploit information is short - Knowing what to look for is half the battle • These exploitation opportunities don't last forever • As a CNE program matures, so will its OPSEC ----- #### Questions? ----- ###### National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994‐7000, Fax: 202/994‐7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu -----