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	"created_at": "2026-04-06T00:11:31.475403Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T13:12:00.646686Z",
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	"title": "Vault7 - Home",
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	"plain_text": "Vault7 - Home\r\nArchived: 2026-04-05 16:41:52 UTC\r\nPress Release\r\nToday, Tuesday 7 March 2017, WikiLeaks begins its new series of leaks on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.\r\nCode-named \"Vault 7\" by WikiLeaks, it is the largest ever publication of confidential documents on the agency.\r\nThe first full part of the series, \"Year Zero\", comprises 8,761 documents and files from an isolated, high-security\r\nnetwork situated inside the CIA's Center for Cyber Intelligence in Langley, Virgina. It follows an introductory\r\ndisclosure last month of CIA targeting French political parties and candidates in the lead up to the 2012\r\npresidential election.\r\nRecently, the CIA lost control of the majority of its hacking arsenal including malware, viruses, trojans,\r\nweaponized \"zero day\" exploits, malware remote control systems and associated documentation. This\r\nextraordinary collection, which amounts to more than several hundred million lines of code, gives its possessor\r\nthe entire hacking capacity of the CIA. The archive appears to have been circulated among former U.S.\r\ngovernment hackers and contractors in an unauthorized manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with\r\nportions of the archive.\r\n\"Year Zero\" introduces the scope and direction of the CIA's global covert hacking program, its malware arsenal\r\nand dozens of \"zero day\" weaponized exploits against a wide range of U.S. and European company products,\r\ninclude Apple's iPhone, Google's Android and Microsoft's Windows and even Samsung TVs, which are turned into\r\ncovert microphones.\r\nSince 2001 the CIA has gained political and budgetary preeminence over the U.S. National Security Agency\r\n(NSA). The CIA found itself building not just its now infamous drone fleet, but a very different type of covert,\r\nglobe-spanning force — its own substantial fleet of hackers. The agency's hacking division freed it from having to\r\ndisclose its often controversial operations to the NSA (its primary bureaucratic rival) in order to draw on the\r\nNSA's hacking capacities.\r\nBy the end of 2016, the CIA's hacking division, which formally falls under the agency's Center for Cyber\r\nIntelligence (CCI), had over 5000 registered users and had produced more than a thousand hacking systems,\r\ntrojans, viruses, and other \"weaponized\" malware. Such is the scale of the CIA's undertaking that by 2016, its\r\nhackers had utilized more code than that used to run Facebook. The CIA had created, in effect, its \"own NSA\"\r\nwith even less accountability and without publicly answering the question as to whether such a massive budgetary\r\nspend on duplicating the capacities of a rival agency could be justified.\r\nIn a statement to WikiLeaks the source details policy questions that they say urgently need to be debated in public,\r\nincluding whether the CIA's hacking capabilities exceed its mandated powers and the problem of public oversight\r\nof the agency. The source wishes to initiate a public debate about the security, creation, use, proliferation and\r\ndemocratic control of cyberweapons.\r\nhttps://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/\r\nPage 1 of 11\n\nOnce a single cyber 'weapon' is 'loose' it can spread around the world in seconds, to be used by rival states, cyber\r\nmafia and teenage hackers alike.\r\nJulian Assange, WikiLeaks editor stated that \"There is an extreme proliferation risk in the development of cyber\r\n'weapons'. Comparisons can be drawn between the uncontrolled proliferation of such 'weapons', which results\r\nfrom the inability to contain them combined with their high market value, and the global arms trade. But the\r\nsignificance of \"Year Zero\" goes well beyond the choice between cyberwar and cyberpeace. The disclosure is also\r\nexceptional from a political, legal and forensic perspective.\"\r\nWikileaks has carefully reviewed the \"Year Zero\" disclosure and published substantive CIA documentation while\r\navoiding the distribution of 'armed' cyberweapons until a consensus emerges on the technical and political nature\r\nof the CIA's program and how such 'weapons' should analyzed, disarmed and published.\r\nWikileaks has also decided to redact and anonymise some identifying information in \"Year Zero\" for in depth\r\nanalysis. These redactions include ten of thousands of CIA targets and attack machines throughout Latin America,\r\nEurope and the United States. While we are aware of the imperfect results of any approach chosen, we remain\r\ncommitted to our publishing model and note that the quantity of published pages in \"Vault 7\" part one (“Year\r\nZero”) already eclipses the total number of pages published over the first three years of the Edward Snowden NSA\r\nleaks.\r\nAnalysis\r\nCIA malware targets iPhone, Android, smart TVs\r\nCIA malware and hacking tools are built by EDG (Engineering Development Group), a software development\r\ngroup within CCI (Center for Cyber Intelligence), a department belonging to the CIA's DDI (Directorate for\r\nDigital Innovation). The DDI is one of the five major directorates of the CIA (see this organizational chart of the\r\nCIA for more details).\r\nThe EDG is responsible for the development, testing and operational support of all backdoors, exploits, malicious\r\npayloads, trojans, viruses and any other kind of malware used by the CIA in its covert operations world-wide.\r\nThe increasing sophistication of surveillance techniques has drawn comparisons with George Orwell's 1984, but\r\n\"Weeping Angel\", developed by the CIA's Embedded Devices Branch (EDB), which infests smart TVs,\r\ntransforming them into covert microphones, is surely its most emblematic realization.\r\nThe attack against Samsung smart TVs was developed in cooperation with the United Kingdom's MI5/BTSS.\r\nAfter infestation, Weeping Angel places the target TV in a 'Fake-Off' mode, so that the owner falsely believes the\r\nTV is off when it is on. In 'Fake-Off' mode the TV operates as a bug, recording conversations in the room and\r\nsending them over the Internet to a covert CIA server.\r\nAs of October 2014 the CIA was also looking at infecting the vehicle control systems used by modern cars and\r\ntrucks. The purpose of such control is not specified, but it would permit the CIA to engage in nearly undetectable\r\nassassinations.\r\nhttps://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/\r\nPage 2 of 11\n\nThe CIA's Mobile Devices Branch (MDB) developed numerous attacks to remotely hack and control popular\r\nsmart phones. Infected phones can be instructed to send the CIA the user's geolocation, audio and text\r\ncommunications as well as covertly activate the phone's camera and microphone.\r\nDespite iPhone's minority share (14.5%) of the global smart phone market in 2016, a specialized unit in the CIA's\r\nMobile Development Branch produces malware to infest, control and exfiltrate data from iPhones and other Apple\r\nproducts running iOS, such as iPads. CIA's arsenal includes numerous local and remote \"zero days\" developed by\r\nCIA or obtained from GCHQ, NSA, FBI or purchased from cyber arms contractors such as Baitshop. The\r\ndisproportionate focus on iOS may be explained by the popularity of the iPhone among social, political,\r\ndiplomatic and business elites.\r\nA similar unit targets Google's Android which is used to run the majority of the world's smart phones (~85%)\r\nincluding Samsung, HTC and Sony. 1.15 billion Android powered phones were sold last year. \"Year Zero\" shows\r\nthat as of 2016 the CIA had 24 \"weaponized\" Android \"zero days\" which it has developed itself and obtained from\r\nGCHQ, NSA and cyber arms contractors.\r\nThese techniques permit the CIA to bypass the encryption of WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, Wiebo, Confide and\r\nCloackman by hacking the \"smart\" phones that they run on and collecting audio and message traffic before\r\nencryption is applied.\r\nCIA malware targets Windows, OSx, Linux, routers\r\nThe CIA also runs a very substantial effort to infect and control Microsoft Windows users with its malware. This\r\nincludes multiple local and remote weaponized \"zero days\", air gap jumping viruses such as \"Hammer Drill\"\r\nwhich infects software distributed on CD/DVDs, infectors for removable media such as USBs, systems to hide\r\ndata in images or in covert disk areas ( \"Brutal Kangaroo\") and to keep its malware infestations going.\r\nMany of these infection efforts are pulled together by the CIA's Automated Implant Branch (AIB), which has\r\ndeveloped several attack systems for automated infestation and control of CIA malware, such as \"Assassin\" and\r\n\"Medusa\".\r\nAttacks against Internet infrastructure and webservers are developed by the CIA's Network Devices Branch\r\n(NDB).\r\nThe CIA has developed automated multi-platform malware attack and control systems covering Windows, Mac\r\nOS X, Solaris, Linux and more, such as EDB's \"HIVE\" and the related \"Cutthroat\" and \"Swindle\" tools, which are\r\ndescribed in the examples section below.\r\nCIA 'hoarded' vulnerabilities (\"zero days\")\r\nIn the wake of Edward Snowden's leaks about the NSA, the U.S. technology industry secured a commitment from\r\nthe Obama administration that the executive would disclose on an ongoing basis — rather than hoard — serious\r\nvulnerabilities, exploits, bugs or \"zero days\" to Apple, Google, Microsoft, and other US-based manufacturers.\r\nSerious vulnerabilities not disclosed to the manufacturers places huge swathes of the population and critical\r\ninfrastructure at risk to foreign intelligence or cyber criminals who independently discover or hear rumors of the\r\nhttps://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/\r\nPage 3 of 11\n\nvulnerability. If the CIA can discover such vulnerabilities so can others.\r\nThe U.S. government's commitment to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process came after significant lobbying by US\r\ntechnology companies, who risk losing their share of the global market over real and perceived hidden\r\nvulnerabilities. The government stated that it would disclose all pervasive vulnerabilities discovered after 2010 on\r\nan ongoing basis.\r\n\"Year Zero\" documents show that the CIA breached the Obama administration's commitments. Many of the\r\nvulnerabilities used in the CIA's cyber arsenal are pervasive and some may already have been found by rival\r\nintelligence agencies or cyber criminals.\r\nAs an example, specific CIA malware revealed in \"Year Zero\" is able to penetrate, infest and control both the\r\nAndroid phone and iPhone software that runs or has run presidential Twitter accounts. The CIA attacks this\r\nsoftware by using undisclosed security vulnerabilities (\"zero days\") possessed by the CIA but if the CIA can hack\r\nthese phones then so can everyone else who has obtained or discovered the vulnerability. As long as the CIA keeps\r\nthese vulnerabilities concealed from Apple and Google (who make the phones) they will not be fixed, and the\r\nphones will remain hackable.\r\nThe same vulnerabilities exist for the population at large, including the U.S. Cabinet, Congress, top CEOs, system\r\nadministrators, security officers and engineers. By hiding these security flaws from manufacturers like Apple and\r\nGoogle the CIA ensures that it can hack everyone \u0026mdsh; at the expense of leaving everyone hackable.\r\n'Cyberwar' programs are a serious proliferation risk\r\nCyber 'weapons' are not possible to keep under effective control.\r\nWhile nuclear proliferation has been restrained by the enormous costs and visible infrastructure involved in\r\nassembling enough fissile material to produce a critical nuclear mass, cyber 'weapons', once developed, are very\r\nhard to retain.\r\nCyber 'weapons' are in fact just computer programs which can be pirated like any other. Since they are entirely\r\ncomprised of information they can be copied quickly with no marginal cost.\r\nSecuring such 'weapons' is particularly difficult since the same people who develop and use them have the skills to\r\nexfiltrate copies without leaving traces — sometimes by using the very same 'weapons' against the organizations\r\nthat contain them. There are substantial price incentives for government hackers and consultants to obtain copies\r\nsince there is a global \"vulnerability market\" that will pay hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars for copies\r\nof such 'weapons'. Similarly, contractors and companies who obtain such 'weapons' sometimes use them for their\r\nown purposes, obtaining advantage over their competitors in selling 'hacking' services.\r\nOver the last three years the United States intelligence sector, which consists of government agencies such as the\r\nCIA and NSA and their contractors, such as Booz Allan Hamilton, has been subject to unprecedented series of\r\ndata exfiltrations by its own workers.\r\nA number of intelligence community members not yet publicly named have been arrested or subject to federal\r\ncriminal investigations in separate incidents.\r\nhttps://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/\r\nPage 4 of 11\n\nMost visibly, on February 8, 2017 a U.S. federal grand jury indicted Harold T. Martin III with 20 counts of\r\nmishandling classified information. The Department of Justice alleged that it seized some 50,000 gigabytes of\r\ninformation from Harold T. Martin III that he had obtained from classified programs at NSA and CIA, including\r\nthe source code for numerous hacking tools.\r\nOnce a single cyber 'weapon' is 'loose' it can spread around the world in seconds, to be used by peer states, cyber\r\nmafia and teenage hackers alike.\r\nU.S. Consulate in Frankfurt is a covert CIA hacker base\r\nIn addition to its operations in Langley, Virginia the CIA also uses the U.S. consulate in Frankfurt as a covert base\r\nfor its hackers covering Europe, the Middle East and Africa.\r\nCIA hackers operating out of the Frankfurt consulate ( \"Center for Cyber Intelligence Europe\" or CCIE) are given\r\ndiplomatic (\"black\") passports and State Department cover. The instructions for incoming CIA hackers make\r\nGermany's counter-intelligence efforts appear inconsequential: \"Breeze through German Customs because you\r\nhave your cover-for-action story down pat, and all they did was stamp your passport\"\r\nYour Cover Story (for this trip)\r\nQ: Why are you here?\r\nA: Supporting technical consultations at the Consulate.\r\nTwo earlier WikiLeaks publications give further detail on CIA approaches to customs and secondary screening\r\nprocedures.\r\nOnce in Frankfurt CIA hackers can travel without further border checks to the 25 European countries that are part\r\nof the Shengen open border area — including France, Italy and Switzerland.\r\nA number of the CIA's electronic attack methods are designed for physical proximity. These attack methods are\r\nable to penetrate high security networks that are disconnected from the internet, such as police record database. In\r\nthese cases, a CIA officer, agent or allied intelligence officer acting under instructions, physically infiltrates the\r\ntargeted workplace. The attacker is provided with a USB containing malware developed for the CIA for this\r\npurpose, which is inserted into the targeted computer. The attacker then infects and exfiltrates data to removable\r\nmedia. For example, the CIA attack system Fine Dining, provides 24 decoy applications for CIA spies to use. To\r\nwitnesses, the spy appears to be running a program showing videos (e.g VLC), presenting slides (Prezi), playing a\r\ncomputer game (Breakout2, 2048) or even running a fake virus scanner (Kaspersky, McAfee, Sophos). But while\r\nthe decoy application is on the screen, the underlaying system is automatically infected and ransacked.\r\nHow the CIA dramatically increased proliferation risks\r\nIn what is surely one of the most astounding intelligence own goals in living memory, the CIA structured its\r\nclassification regime such that for the most market valuable part of \"Vault 7\" — the CIA's weaponized malware\r\n(implants + zero days), Listening Posts (LP), and Command and Control (C2) systems — the agency has little\r\nlegal recourse.\r\nThe CIA made these systems unclassified.\r\nhttps://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/\r\nPage 5 of 11\n\nWhy the CIA chose to make its cyberarsenal unclassified reveals how concepts developed for military use do not\r\neasily crossover to the 'battlefield' of cyber 'war'.\r\nTo attack its targets, the CIA usually requires that its implants communicate with their control programs over the\r\ninternet. If CIA implants, Command \u0026 Control and Listening Post software were classified, then CIA officers\r\ncould be prosecuted or dismissed for violating rules that prohibit placing classified information onto the Internet.\r\nConsequently the CIA has secretly made most of its cyber spying/war code unclassified. The U.S. government is\r\nnot able to assert copyright either, due to restrictions in the U.S. Constitution. This means that cyber 'arms'\r\nmanufactures and computer hackers can freely \"pirate\" these 'weapons' if they are obtained. The CIA has primarily\r\nhad to rely on obfuscation to protect its malware secrets.\r\nConventional weapons such as missiles may be fired at the enemy (i.e into an unsecured area). Proximity to or\r\nimpact with the target detonates the ordnance including its classified parts. Hence military personnel do not\r\nviolate classification rules by firing ordnance with classified parts. Ordnance will likely explode. If it does not,\r\nthat is not the operator's intent.\r\nOver the last decade U.S. hacking operations have been increasingly dressed up in military jargon to tap into\r\nDepartment of Defense funding streams. For instance, attempted \"malware injections\" (commercial jargon) or\r\n\"implant drops\" (NSA jargon) are being called \"fires\" as if a weapon was being fired. However the analogy is\r\nquestionable.\r\nUnlike bullets, bombs or missiles, most CIA malware is designed to live for days or even years after it has reached\r\nits 'target'. CIA malware does not \"explode on impact\" but rather permanently infests its target. In order to infect\r\ntarget's device, copies of the malware must be placed on the target's devices, giving physical possession of the\r\nmalware to the target. To exfiltrate data back to the CIA or to await further instructions the malware must\r\ncommunicate with CIA Command \u0026 Control (C2) systems placed on internet connected servers. But such servers\r\nare typically not approved to hold classified information, so CIA command and control systems are also made\r\nunclassified.\r\nA successful 'attack' on a target's computer system is more like a series of complex stock maneuvers in a hostile\r\ntake-over bid or the careful planting of rumors in order to gain control over an organization's leadership rather\r\nthan the firing of a weapons system. If there is a military analogy to be made, the infestation of a target is perhaps\r\nakin to the execution of a whole series of military maneuvers against the target's territory including observation,\r\ninfiltration, occupation and exploitation.\r\nEvading forensics and anti-virus\r\nA series of standards lay out CIA malware infestation patterns which are likely to assist forensic crime scene\r\ninvestigators as well as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Samsung, Nokia, Blackberry, Siemens and anti-virus\r\ncompanies attribute and defend against attacks.\r\n\"Tradecraft DO's and DON'Ts\" contains CIA rules on how its malware should be written to avoid fingerprints\r\nimplicating the \"CIA, US government, or its witting partner companies\" in \"forensic review\". Similar secret\r\nstandards cover the use of encryption to hide CIA hacker and malware communication (pdf), describing targets \u0026\r\nexfiltrated data (pdf) as well as executing payloads (pdf) and persisting (pdf) in the target's machines over time.\r\nhttps://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/\r\nPage 6 of 11\n\nCIA hackers developed successful attacks against most well known anti-virus programs. These are documented in\r\nAV defeats, Personal Security Products, Detecting and defeating PSPs and PSP/Debugger/RE Avoidance. For\r\nexample, Comodo was defeated by CIA malware placing itself in the Window's \"Recycle Bin\". While Comodo 6.x\r\nhas a \"Gaping Hole of DOOM\".\r\nCIA hackers discussed what the NSA's \"Equation Group\" hackers did wrong and how the CIA's malware makers\r\ncould avoid similar exposure.\r\nExamples\r\nThe CIA's Engineering Development Group (EDG) management system contains around 500 different projects\r\n(only some of which are documented by \"Year Zero\") each with their own sub-projects, malware and hacker tools.\r\nThe majority of these projects relate to tools that are used for penetration, infestation (\"implanting\"), control, and\r\nexfiltration.\r\nAnother branch of development focuses on the development and operation of Listening Posts (LP) and Command\r\nand Control (C2) systems used to communicate with and control CIA implants; special projects are used to target\r\nspecific hardware from routers to smart TVs.\r\nSome example projects are described below, but see the table of contents for the full list of projects described by\r\nWikiLeaks' \"Year Zero\".\r\nUMBRAGE\r\nThe CIA's hand crafted hacking techniques pose a problem for the agency. Each technique it has created forms a\r\n\"fingerprint\" that can be used by forensic investigators to attribute multiple different attacks to the same entity.\r\nThis is analogous to finding the same distinctive knife wound on multiple separate murder victims. The unique\r\nwounding style creates suspicion that a single murderer is responsible. As soon one murder in the set is solved\r\nthen the other murders also find likely attribution.\r\nThe CIA's Remote Devices Branch's UMBRAGE group collects and maintains a substantial library of attack\r\ntechniques 'stolen' from malware produced in other states including the Russian Federation.\r\nWith UMBRAGE and related projects the CIA cannot only increase its total number of attack types but also\r\nmisdirect attribution by leaving behind the \"fingerprints\" of the groups that the attack techniques were stolen\r\nfrom.\r\nUMBRAGE components cover keyloggers, password collection, webcam capture, data destruction, persistence,\r\nprivilege escalation, stealth, anti-virus (PSP) avoidance and survey techniques.\r\nFine Dining\r\nFine Dining comes with a standardized questionnaire i.e menu that CIA case officers fill out. The questionnaire is\r\nused by the agency's OSB (Operational Support Branch) to transform the requests of case officers into technical\r\nrequirements for hacking attacks (typically \"exfiltrating\" information from computer systems) for specific\r\nhttps://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/\r\nPage 7 of 11\n\noperations. The questionnaire allows the OSB to identify how to adapt existing tools for the operation, and\r\ncommunicate this to CIA malware configuration staff. The OSB functions as the interface between CIA\r\noperational staff and the relevant technical support staff.\r\nAmong the list of possible targets of the collection are 'Asset', 'Liason Asset', 'System Administrator', 'Foreign\r\nInformation Operations', 'Foreign Intelligence Agencies' and 'Foreign Government Entities'. Notably absent is any\r\nreference to extremists or transnational criminals. The 'Case Officer' is also asked to specify the environment of\r\nthe target like the type of computer, operating system used, Internet connectivity and installed anti-virus utilities\r\n(PSPs) as well as a list of file types to be exfiltrated like Office documents, audio, video, images or custom file\r\ntypes. The 'menu' also asks for information if recurring access to the target is possible and how long unobserved\r\naccess to the computer can be maintained. This information is used by the CIA's 'JQJIMPROVISE' software (see\r\nbelow) to configure a set of CIA malware suited to the specific needs of an operation.\r\nImprovise (JQJIMPROVISE)\r\n'Improvise' is a toolset for configuration, post-processing, payload setup and execution vector selection for\r\nsurvey/exfiltration tools supporting all major operating systems like Windows (Bartender), MacOS (JukeBox) and\r\nLinux (DanceFloor). Its configuration utilities like Margarita allows the NOC (Network Operation Center) to\r\ncustomize tools based on requirements from 'Fine Dining' questionairies.\r\nHIVE\r\nHIVE is a multi-platform CIA malware suite and its associated control software. The project provides\r\ncustomizable implants for Windows, Solaris, MikroTik (used in internet routers) and Linux platforms and a\r\nListening Post (LP)/Command and Control (C2) infrastructure to communicate with these implants.\r\nThe implants are configured to communicate via HTTPS with the webserver of a cover domain; each operation\r\nutilizing these implants has a separate cover domain and the infrastructure can handle any number of cover\r\ndomains.\r\nEach cover domain resolves to an IP address that is located at a commercial VPS (Virtual Private Server) provider.\r\nThe public-facing server forwards all incoming traffic via a VPN to a 'Blot' server that handles actual connection\r\nrequests from clients. It is setup for optional SSL client authentication: if a client sends a valid client certificate\r\n(only implants can do that), the connection is forwarded to the 'Honeycomb' toolserver that communicates with\r\nthe implant; if a valid certificate is missing (which is the case if someone tries to open the cover domain website\r\nby accident), the traffic is forwarded to a cover server that delivers an unsuspicious looking website.\r\nThe Honeycomb toolserver receives exfiltrated information from the implant; an operator can also task the\r\nimplant to execute jobs on the target computer, so the toolserver acts as a C2 (command and control) server for the\r\nimplant.\r\nSimilar functionality (though limited to Windows) is provided by the RickBobby project.\r\nSee the classified user and developer guides for HIVE.\r\nhttps://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/\r\nPage 8 of 11\n\nFrequently Asked Questions\r\nWhy now?\r\nWikiLeaks published as soon as its verification and analysis were ready.\r\nIn Febuary the Trump administration has issued an Executive Order calling for a \"Cyberwar\" review to be\r\nprepared within 30 days.\r\nWhile the review increases the timeliness and relevance of the publication it did not play a role in setting the\r\npublication date.\r\nRedactions\r\nNames, email addresses and external IP addresses have been redacted in the released pages (70,875 redactions in\r\ntotal) until further analysis is complete.\r\n1. Over-redaction: Some items may have been redacted that are not employees, contractors, targets or\r\notherwise related to the agency, but are, for example, authors of documentation for otherwise public\r\nprojects that are used by the agency.\r\n2. Identity vs. person: the redacted names are replaced by user IDs (numbers) to allow readers to assign\r\nmultiple pages to a single author. Given the redaction process used a single person may be represented by\r\nmore than one assigned identifier but no identifier refers to more than one real person.\r\n3. Archive attachments (zip, tar.gz, ...) are replaced with a PDF listing all the file names in the archive. As\r\nthe archive content is assessed it may be made available; until then the archive is redacted.\r\n4. Attachments with other binary content are replaced by a hex dump of the content to prevent accidental\r\ninvocation of binaries that may have been infected with weaponized CIA malware. As the content is\r\nassessed it may be made available; until then the content is redacted.\r\n5. The tens of thousands of routable IP addresses references (including more than 22 thousand within the\r\nUnited States) that correspond to possible targets, CIA covert listening post servers, intermediary and test\r\nsystems, are redacted for further exclusive investigation.\r\n6. Binary files of non-public origin are only available as dumps to prevent accidental invocation of CIA\r\nmalware infected binaries.\r\nOrganizational Chart\r\nThe organizational chart corresponds to the material published by WikiLeaks so far.\r\nSince the organizational structure of the CIA below the level of Directorates is not public, the placement of the\r\nEDG and its branches within the org chart of the agency is reconstructed from information contained in the\r\ndocuments released so far. It is intended to be used as a rough outline of the internal organization; please be aware\r\nthat the reconstructed org chart is incomplete and that internal reorganizations occur frequently.\r\nWiki pages\r\nhttps://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/\r\nPage 9 of 11\n\n\"Year Zero\" contains 7818 web pages with 943 attachments from the internal development groupware. The\r\nsoftware used for this purpose is called Confluence, a proprietary software from Atlassian. Webpages in this\r\nsystem (like in Wikipedia) have a version history that can provide interesting insights on how a document evolved\r\nover time; the 7818 documents include these page histories for 1136 latest versions.\r\nThe order of named pages within each level is determined by date (oldest first). Page content is not present if it\r\nwas originally dynamically created by the Confluence software (as indicated on the re-constructed page).\r\nWhat time period is covered?\r\nThe years 2013 to 2016. The sort order of the pages within each level is determined by date (oldest first).\r\nWikiLeaks has obtained the CIA's creation/last modification date for each page but these do not yet appear for\r\ntechnical reasons. Usually the date can be discerned or approximated from the content and the page order. If it is\r\ncritical to know the exact time/date contact WikiLeaks.\r\nWhat is \"Vault 7\"\r\n\"Vault 7\" is a substantial collection of material about CIA activities obtained by WikiLeaks.\r\nWhen was each part of \"Vault 7\" obtained?\r\nPart one was obtained recently and covers through 2016. Details on the other parts will be available at the time of\r\npublication.\r\nIs each part of \"Vault 7\" from a different source?\r\nDetails on the other parts will be available at the time of publication.\r\nWhat is the total size of \"Vault 7\"?\r\nThe series is the largest intelligence publication in history.\r\nHow did WikiLeaks obtain each part of \"Vault 7\"?\r\nSources trust WikiLeaks to not reveal information that might help identify them.\r\nIsn't WikiLeaks worried that the CIA will act against its staff to stop the series?\r\nNo. That would be certainly counter-productive.\r\nHas WikiLeaks already 'mined' all the best stories?\r\nNo. WikiLeaks has intentionally not written up hundreds of impactful stories to encourage others to find them and\r\nso create expertise in the area for subsequent parts in the series. They're there. Look. Those who demonstrate\r\njournalistic excellence may be considered for early access to future parts.\r\nhttps://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/\r\nPage 10 of 11\n\nWon't other journalists find all the best stories before me?\r\nUnlikely. There are very considerably more stories than there are journalists or academics who are in a position to\r\nwrite them.\r\nSource: https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/\r\nhttps://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/\r\nPage 11 of 11",
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