

Kraken's two Domain Generation Algorithms

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Kraken (also known as *Oderoor* or *Bobax*) was once a large, if not the largest, botnet. It was primarily used to send spam messages. Kraken features a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) which appeared in July 2007 and was [first mentioned in 2008](#). This makes it [one of the first ever widely used DGA](#).

The original DGA of Kraken is time-independent, i.e., a specific sample will at all times generate the same domains. There are various reports on how to determine the domains. Michael Ligh and Greg Sinclair showed how to use instrumented execution with Immunity debugger in their DEFCON 16 talk [“Malware RCE: Debuggers and Decryptor Development”](#) (skip to 18:24). The same method is also described in [The Malware Analyst’s Cookbook](#), recipe 12-11 on page 476. [This report](#) by Damballa lists the domains for one parameterization of the DGA.

Much later — the first samples on Malwr are from 2003 — Kraken’s DGA changed. Probably recognizing the problem with generating the ever same domains, the authors added a time dependent input to the DGA. They also deviated from dynamic DNS providers and used four regular top level domains instead. A few samples, maybe from the transitional stage, still rely on the DDNS providers even with the new algorithm. Kraken infections with newer DGAs [peaked in July 2014](#) (also see the list of samples in Section [Samples](#)).

The later version of Kraken’s DGA is much less reported on. [Here](#) is a analysis of the malware with the new domains. But neither the domains nor the domain generating algorithm are shown. For me, good enough grounds to look at both DGA in this short blog post. I’m aware that the DGA is irrelevant today, as Kraken is currently dead or inactive, but hopefully the post might still be interesting for the keen DGA historian.

Reverse Engineering

This section shows some reverse engineering insights of the DGA. Skip to [Python Implementations](#) to see reimplementations of the two algorithms.

Both the old and new version of the DGA have parameters that can change from sample to sample and cause disjoint sets of domains. I therefore looked at multiple samples to identify the variable parts of the DGA. For the old DGA I reversed two samples:

source	virusshare
uploaded	2012-09-04 03:44
SHA-256	5f004bd36715225c22ddb27d109a2b5f1c5215a6ce2df2e111c5fb49bc7161f9
MD5	10fd78f9681d66d2dd39816b5f7f6ea6
source	malwr
uploaded	2014-12-08 15:04
SHA-256	4606a621922b28be1ff7f4621713aaafd988b8c5f1153720200c5e6dad0c5416

MD5	60838eeb3f8cd311de0faef80909632d
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As far as the new version goes, I looked at these samples:

source	malwr
uploaded	2013-08-05 04:16
SHA-256	0fed48972c9b5c7fc6735db2b8764c45c95d45bde3764933b4a4909656c1ed47
MD5	f2ae73d866bb4edd14ee96cf74fbb423
source	virusshare
uploaded	2012-04-12
SHA-256	e83bc2ec7975885424668171c2e106f7982bd409e01ce6281fb0e6e722e98810
MD5	04966960f3f5ed32ae479079a1bcf6e9

All listed offsets are from the first sample respectively.

Pseudo Random Number Generator

Both Kraken’s DGA use a linear congruential generator (LCG) as pseudo random number generator (PRNG). The parameters are the same found in many `rand()` implementations:

$$rn+1=1103515245 \cdot rn+12435 \pmod{231}$$

The bits 23 to 8 are used, i.e., $r/256 \pmod{32768}$.

Seeding

The DGA of both versions first initializes the pseudo random number generator (PRNG). Two values are used to determine the seed of the PRNG:

1. A running counter that starts at 0 and increases in steps of one (version 1) and one or two (version 2). In version 2 the increment depends on the outcome of the DNS response for the domain. The details of the counter are discussed in Section [Domain Counter](#).
2. Whether or not a list of hardcoded IPs could be contacted. These network connections are performed by `hardcoded_success` at offsets `001BE832` and `0x408D6C` respectively in the following images. The routine returns `True` if the attempts were successful.

The following graph views are from the beginning of both DGAs. Both snippets initialize the random number — `ecx` in version 1 and `ebx` in version 2 — depending on the counter value and success of contact to hardcoded IPs. On left-hand side is the old version of the DGA, on the right-hand side the newer release (click to enlarge the images).

The hardcoded values `-265273224` and `143803713` on the left, as well as `-1FCFBF87h` and `7924542h` on the right might change from sample to sample. These parameters can be used to generate different sets of domains.

For the first version of the DGA, the snippet above boils down to the following, rather elaborate, formula:

$d = \lfloor \text{counter} / 2 \rfloor + 1000015$
 $r = \begin{cases} d \cdot (d+7) \cdot (d+12) / 9 + d \cdot (d+1) + c_s & \text{if success with hardcoded IP} \\ d \cdot (d+2) \cdot (d+7) / 9 + d \cdot (3d+1) + c_f & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

I found two different parameter sets. Notice that the changes are very subtle, only the first and last nibble vary:

version 1	c_s	c_f
Seed <i>a</i>	-0x0FCFBF88	0x8924541
Seed <i>b</i>	-0x1FCFBF87	0x7924542

The second version uses a much simpler formula to initialize the random number:

$d = \lfloor \text{counter} / 2 \rfloor + 3$
 $r = \begin{cases} c_s & \text{if success with hardcoded IP} \\ c_f & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Again I found two parameter sets:

version 2	c_s	c_f
Seed <i>a</i>	24938314	24938315
Seed <i>b</i>	1600000	1600001

Notice that in both versions the *counter* input to the DGA is first divided by two. The *Malware Analyst's Cookbook* (page 480) considers this as a flaw of the DGA:

There are two weaknesses in Kraken's DGA that are worth mentioning: (...) Odd numbers cause Kraken's algorithm to generate the same domain names as the even numbers that precede them. This effectively cuts the number of possible domains generated by the DGA in half.

Section [Domain Counter](#) explains why I think this is by design and not a flaw of the DGA.

Discarding (only version 2)

Next follows code that is only present in the new version of Kraken's DGA. The code incorporates a timestamp, which is determined by making an HTTP request to a randomly picked, legitimate website. The date is extracted from the http date header of the response and converted to unix timestamp format. For the analysed samples, the domains used to determine the time are: *yahoo.com*, *google.com*, *live.com*, *msn.com*, *aol.com*, *amazon.com*, *go.com*, *bbc.co.uk*, *cnn.com*, *news.com*, *download.com*, *weather.com*, *comcast.net*, *mozilla.com* and *hp.com*. The timestamp sets the variable *discards*:

version 1	version 2

not present	<pre> 00408D86 00408D86 loc_408D86: 00408D86 call get_timestamp 00408D88 mov edi, 12435 00408D90 mov esi, 32767 00408D95 test eax, eax 00408D97 jz short skip_timestamp </pre> <pre> 00408D99 add eax, 3087967296 00408D9E xor edx, edx 00408DA0 mov ecx, 604800 00408DA5 div ecx 00408DA7 push 9 00408DA9 pop ecx 00408DAA add eax, 2 00408DAD mov [ebp+discards], eax </pre>
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The divisor is the number of seconds in a week, so only every 7 days the value *discard* changes.

$$\text{discards} = \lfloor \text{timestamp}_{\text{unix}} - 1207000000 \cdot 24 \cdot 7 \cdot 3600 \rfloor + 2$$

The *discard* value, along with the current domain number, determines how many of the PRNG cycles are discarded:

version 1	version 2
not present	<pre> 00408DA7 push 9 00408DA9 pop ecx 00408DAA add eax, 2 00408DAD mov [ebp+discards], eax 00408DB0 mov eax, [ebp+index] 00408DB3 cdq 00408DB4 idiv ecx 00408DB6 cmp edx, 8 00408DB9 jge short skip_timestamp </pre> <pre> 00408DB8 cmp edx, 6 00408DBE jl short loc_408DC3 </pre> <pre> 00408DC0 dec [ebp+discards] </pre> <pre> 00408DC3 loc_408DC3: 00408DC3 mov eax, [ebp+discards] 00408DC6 test eax, eax 00408DC8 jle short skip_timestamp </pre> <pre> 00408DCA loc_408DCA: 00408DCA imul ebx, 41C64E6Dh 00408DD0 add ebx, edi 00408DD2 ror ebx, 8 00408DD5 and ebx, esi 00408DD7 dec eax 00408DD8 jnz short loc_408DCA </pre>

In Pseudocode this is:

```

discards = timestamp / 604800 + 2
IF domain_nr % 9 < 8
    IF domain_nr % 9 >= 6
        discards -= 1
    
```

```
REPEAT discards TIMES
  r = rand(r)/256 % 32768
```

Notice that for every ninth domain discarding is skipped. Since the discards are the only time-dependent part of the DGA, those domains are invariants and prime targets for sinkholing.

Length of Random Domain

After the PRNG is initialized, the length of the random part of the domain is randomly picked. The two versions use almost the same algorithm:

Both versions first generate three random numbers (r_i is the random number after initialization and, for the second version, discarding):

$$r_{i+1} = 1103515245 \cdot r_i + 12435 \pmod{231} \\ r_{i+2} = 1103515245 \cdot r_{i+1} + 12435 \pmod{231} \\ r_{i+3} = 1103515245 \cdot r_{i+2} + 12435 \pmod{231}$$

The first version uses the three random values to set the length as follows:

$$d(v1)length = \lfloor r_i + 1256 \pmod{32768} \rfloor \lfloor r_{i+1} + 2256 \pmod{32768} \rfloor - \lfloor r_{i+2} + 3256 \pmod{32768} \rfloor \pmod{6} + 6$$

The second version works almost the same, apart from (a) the third random number being added rather than subtracted and (b) the minimum length being 7 instead of 6:

$$d(v2)length = \lfloor r_i + 1256 \pmod{32768} \rfloor \lfloor r_{i+1} + 2256 \pmod{32768} \rfloor + \lfloor r_{i+2} + 3256 \pmod{32768} \rfloor \pmod{6} + 7$$

This gives lengths between 6 and 11 characters for the first version, and 7 and 12 characters for the second version.

Building the Random Domain

Kraken uses straightforward calls to the random number generator to determine the characters of the random domain. All characters a-z are about equally likely picked. Both versions use the exact same algorithm:

In Pseudocode this is:

```
domain = ""
REPEAT domain_length TIMES
  r = rand(r)
  domain += (r/256 % 32768) % 26 + 'a'
```

Base Domain

The final step of the domain generation algorithm is to append the base domain. For the first version, these base domains are four dynamic DNS providers. A few of the samples with the second DGA version use the same DDNS providers, for the most part the base domains are regular top level domains though. Domains are picked one after another from a hard-coded list:

The base domains are:

version 1, some version 2 samples	“dyndns.org” → “yi.org” → “dynserv.com” → “mooo.com”	Free DDNS Providers
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version 2	“com” → “net” → “tv” → “cc”	Top Level Domains
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Domain Counter

As seen above, both DGA take a running counter as input. The counter starts at zero. Instead of an upper bound, the counter is reset after 30 minutes of trying to contact the C&C servers. There is some wait time between contacting domains which I did not examine; the expected number of generated domains is therefore unknown to me.

The old DGA always increments the index by one, regardless of the call-home attempt for the generated domains. For version 2 things are a little more complicated; the DGA can increment the counter by one or two:

The counter in version 2 is incremented depending on the DNS response to the generated domain. The IP is compared to various hard-coded domains. For example:

```

0040AFB9 cmp    eax, 127          ; eax first tuple of IP
0040AFBC jz     short private_ip
0040AFBE
0040AFBE loc_40AFBE:
0040AFBE cmp    eax, 192
0040AFC3 jnz    short loc_40AFCD
0040AFC5 cmp    ecx, 168
0040AFCB jz     short private_ip
0040AFCD
0040AFCD loc_40AFCD:
0040AFCD cmp    eax, 172
0040AFD2 jnz    short loc_40AFDE
0040AFD4 cmp    ecx, 16          ; ecx second tuple of IP
0040AFD7 jl     short loc_40AFEB
0040AFD9 cmp    ecx, 31
0040AFDC jle   short private_ip
...

```

All IPs from the following list are treated specially (I do not know why 66.116.125.150 and 72.51.27.51 get special treatments, maybe those were sinkholes in the past).

range	comment
127.x.x.x	reserved range
192.168.x.x	reserved range
172.16.0.0 - 172.31.255.255	reserved range
0.x.x.x	includes failed queries
1.1.1.1, 2.2.2.2, ... , 255.255.255.255	unlikely answers? Sandbox detection?
66.116.125.150	IP in US
72.51.27.51	IP in Canada

If the IP matches with one of above the subnets, the counter grows to the next multiple of two, i.e., even counters are increased by two, and odd counters are increased one.

Since inside the DGA routine, odd counters are rounded down to the same number as their previous (even) counters, every domain that returned an IP that was not in a “blacklisted” range will be checked *twice*. I, for one, don’t think that’s a flaw of the DGA, but a — overly complicated — way to recheck domains.

Algorithm and Samples

Python Implementations

Version 1

The following Python Code generates 1000 domains for a provided seed (either `a` or `b`). The code alternately generates domains for when the hardcoded IP callback failed and succeeded.

```
import time
from ctypes import c_int, c_uint
import argparse

def rand(r):
    t = c_int(1103515245 * r + 12435).value
    return t

def crop(r):
    return (r // 256) % 32768

def dga(index, seed_set, temp_file=True):

    seeds = {'a': {'ex': -0x0FCFBF88, 'nex': 0x8924541},
            'b': {'ex': -0x1FCFBF87, 'nex': 0x7924542}}

    tlds = ["dyndns.org", "yi.org", "dynserv.com", "mooo.com"]
    domain_nr = int(index/2) + 1000015

    if temp_file:
        x = int(c_int(domain_nr*(domain_nr + 7)*(domain_nr+12)).value /9.0)
        y = domain_nr*(domain_nr+1)
        r = c_int(x + y + seeds[seed_set]['ex']).value
    else:
        x = int(c_int((domain_nr + 2)*(domain_nr + 7)*domain_nr).value/9.0)
        y = (domain_nr*3 + 1)*domain_nr
        r = c_int(x + y + seeds[seed_set]['nex']).value

    rands = 3*[0]
    for i in range(3):
        r = rand(r)
        rands[i] = crop(r)
    domain_length = (rands[0]*rands[1] - rands[2]) % 6 + 6
    domain = ""
```

```
for i in range(domain_length):
    r = rand(r)
    ch = crop(r) % 26 + ord('a')
    domain += chr(ch)
domain += "." + tlds[domain_nr % 4]
return domain

def get_domains(nr, seed_set):
    domains = []
    for i in range(nr):
        for temp_file in range(2):
            domains.append(dga(i*2, seed_set, temp_file))
    return domains

if __name__=="__main__":
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument('-s', '--seed', choices=['a','b'], default='a')
    args = parser.parse_args()
    for domain in get_domains(1000, args.seed):
        print(domain)
```

For example:

```
$ python dga_v1.py -s b
hmhxnupkc.mo00.com
quowesuqbbb.mo00.com
rffcteo.dyndns.org
adrcgmzrm.dyndns.org
bdubefoeg.yi.org
bpdyttrlp.yi.org
hovdworxcd.dynserv.com
dljemwae.dynserv.com
nllylxvrbel.mo00.com
dcdkfq.mo00.com
gyuzohut.dyndns.org
lfiavsbyntu.dyndns.org
waxmtzkqblh.yi.org
zvfctvkdng.yi.org
hshfmrobjfr.dynserv.com
uaqjtycx.dynserv.com
prifhjstv.mo00.com
csukibyyt.mo00.com
ghcxncadj.dyndns.org
iskqszufrft.dyndns.org
```

These are also the domains from *The Malware Analyst's Cookbook*.

Version 2

The second DGA also takes the current date and top level set

```
import time
import argparse
from datetime import datetime

def rand(r):
    t = (1103515245 * r + 12435) & 0xFFFFFFFF
    return t

def crop(r):
    return (r // 256) % 32768

def dga(index, date, seed_set, temp_file=True, tld_set_nr=1):
    tld_sets = {1: ["com", "net", "tv", "cc"],
                2: ["dyndns.org", "yi.org", "dynserv.com", "mooo.com"]}

    seeds = {'a': {'ex': 24938314, 'nex': 24938315},
            'b': {'ex': 1600000, 'nex': 1600001}}
    tlds = tld_sets[tld_set_nr]

    domain_nr = int(index/2)
    if temp_file:
        r = 3*domain_nr + seeds[seed_set]['ex']
    else:
        r = 3*domain_nr + seeds[seed_set]['nex']

    discards = (int(time.mktime(date.timetuple())) - 1207000000) // 604800 + 2
    if domain_nr % 9 < 8:
        if domain_nr % 9 >= 6:
            discards -= 1
        for _ in range(discards):
            r = crop(rand(r))

    rands = 3*[0]
    for i in range(3):
        r = rand(r)
        rands[i] = crop(r)
    domain_length = (rands[0]*rands[1] + rands[2]) % 6 + 7
    domain = ""
    for i in range(domain_length):
        r = rand(r)
        ch = crop(r) % 26 + ord('a')
        domain += chr(ch)
    domain += "." + tlds[domain_nr % 4]
    return domain

def get_domains(nr, date, seed, tld_set):
    domains = []
    for i in range(nr):
        for temp_file in range(2):
            domains.append(dga(i*2, date, seed, temp_file, tld_set))
```

```
    return domains

if __name__=="__main__":
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument("-d", "--date",
                        help="date for which to generate domains")
    parser.add_argument("-t", "--tld", choices=[1,2], type=int,
                        help="tld set", default=1)
    parser.add_argument('-s', '--seed', choices=['a','b'], default='a')
    args = parser.parse_args()
    if args.date:
        d = datetime.strptime(args.date, "%Y-%m-%d")
    else:
        d = datetime.now()
    for domain in get_domains(1000, d, args.seed, args.tld):
        print(domain)
```

For example:

```
$ python dga_v2.py -d 2013-12-12 -t 1 -s a
gwbgmsmhgsp.com
bizyssylscs.com
egbmbdey.net
ogoqxbevdeqm.net
iuhqhbmq.tv
iuhqhbmq.tv
wedlgyvplmt.cc
zoipmnrw.cc
gktdtghza.com
toogdpdiekwh.com
iuhqhbmq.net
oxfjukumll.net
vwmlcid.tv
glmvhcm.tv
pgmryukdb.cc
egbmbdey.cc
vsdvzwt.com
wixcaiktigew.com
xewokii.net
lvctmusxcyz.net
```

You also find the code on my [GitHub page](#).

Properties of the DGA

The properties of the two DGAs are:

	version 1	version 2
time dependent	no	yes

	version 1	version 2
granularity	-	1 week
domains per seed and day	variable, as many as can be generated in 30 minutes	see version 1
sequence	sequential	see version 1
wait time between domains	unknown	see version 1
top level domains	.dyndns.org, yi.org, dynserv.com, mooo.com	some as version 1, but mostly com, .net, .tv, .cc
second level characters	lower case a-z	see version 1
second level domain length	6 to 11	7 to 12

Samples

The following table shows reports on malwr.com that contact at least one domain generated by the second version of Kraken's DGA. Many samples seem to be downloader, e.g., Vobfus, and the domains are actually generated by the Kraken payload.

md5	analysis date	tlds	Microsoft	Kaspersky	Sophos
04966960f3f5ed32ae479079a1bcf6e9	16 Jul. 2013	1 ^A	¹ Oderoor.gen!C	Email-Worm.Win32.Agent.fe	² EncPk-DJ
f2ae73d866bb4edd14ee96cf74fbb423	05 Aug. 2013	1 ^A	Clean	³ Generic	¹ Generic-S
c13abb6be8a1c7fc9b18c8fd0a9488b7	09 Oct. 2013	1 ^A	⁴ Rimecud.A	² Generic	⁵ Rimecud-DD
c13abb6be8a1c7fc9b18c8fd0a9488b7	10 Oct. 2013 ^R	1 ^A	³ Rimecud.A	² Generic	⁴ Rimecud-DD
1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513	22 Oct. 2013	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁶ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513	28 Nov. 2013 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513	18 Dec. 2013 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK

md5	analysis date	tlds	Microsoft	Kaspersky	Sophos
04966960f3f5ed32ae479079a1bcf6e9	24 Jan. 2014 ^R	2 ^B	⁰ Oderoor.gen!C	² Generic	¹ EncPk-DJ
1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513	24 Jan. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513	25 Jan. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
04966960f3f5ed32ae479079a1bcf6e9	27 Jan. 2014 ^R	2 ^B	⁰ Oderoor.gen!C	² Generic	¹ EncPk-DJ
1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513	05 Feb. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513	13 Feb. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
1ec55311a564f8272d62ccb621a8b513	21 Feb. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	³ Sisron	⁵ Agent.hdqc	¹ EncPk-CK
c7ec51ac3b9d91a483f1860c3d965f16	03 Mar. 2014	1 ^A	Clean	² Generic	¹ Generic-S
c7ec51ac3b9d91a483f1860c3d965f16	17 Mar. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	⁰ Oderoor.M	² Generic	¹ Generic-S
c7ec51ac3b9d91a483f1860c3d965f16	19 Mar. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	⁰ Oderoor.M	² Generic	¹ Generic-S
c7ec51ac3b9d91a483f1860c3d965f16	25 Mar. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	⁰ Oderoor.M	² Generic	¹ Generic-S
c7ec51ac3b9d91a483f1860c3d965f16	01 Apr. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	⁰ Oderoor.M	² Generic	⁴ Agent-AGLO
c7ec51ac3b9d91a483f1860c3d965f16	22 Apr. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	Clean	⁵ Agent.hegf	⁴ Agent-AGLO
c413f1a0738a3b475db2ed44aecbf3ba	16 Jun. 2014	1 ^A	⁰ Oderoor.M	² Generic	¹ EncPk-CK
0bfd909d651a11e3d3cdf5b091ee12a1	28 Jun. 2014	1 ^A	⁷ Vobfus	⁸ Win32.Agent.agdmx	¹ SillyFDC-S
15993254499407fd7cbe701be11106f1	01 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZV	⁷ Win32.Agent.ageop	¹ SillyFDC-S

md5	analysis date	tlds	Microsoft	Kaspersky	Sophos
1598723f88c6432e8ceee68336a08b01	01 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcvt	1 ^{VB} -ALW
17d4b6b618f7576023dd3b983416a180	01 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.escx	1 ^{VB} -ALW
1bfac857a733ec498fc1efc0ebb6a236	02 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZO	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcnq	1 ^{VB} -ALW
1cfb3882d79b42f2f881ea20cca0f780	02 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.esdv	1 ^{VB} -ALW
1e291e57c007acd5aecbddd156c46e6	02 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.escj	1 ^{SillyFDC} -S
1fafa36c436af003b28fd9d7befddf01	02 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agerc	1 ^{SillyFDC} -S
20ff4c7b6265bc2b7e9b66bbfe4c8ee6	02 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZZ	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.esdw	1 ^{VB} -ALW
22a5ce2602e8a0f76e4ab1db713098c6	03 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.esaj	1 ^{VB} -ALW
26e7996626da3fbf66b78c0b5969efc1	03 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZM	⁷ Win32.VBKrypt.urjq	1 ^{VB} -ALW
272577cdcd11389a4b95d5eae8f3c5b1	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	1 ^{SillyFDC} -S
27549feb774b058fde65bc3936a0bf36	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcvt	1 ^{VB} -ALW
2807aafab5a799ff261b3f614aecbf91	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZC	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.erwz	1 ^{SillyFDC} -AH
2812ce13236087c1a5b30f63ae33c7a0	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	1 ^{SillyFDC} -S
2825b9e636ad7a9304ea97981b68bf20	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.YS	⁷ Win32.VBKrypt.uqif	1 ^{SillyFDC} -AH
292028779b7c4c2e525ccbad0e0f5161	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agere	1 ^{SillyFDC} -S
2bc4df2819c8983b1511814809c2c641	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.esdv	1 ^{VB} -ALW

md5	analysis date	tlds	Microsoft	Kaspersky	Sophos
28d89ceb348459fd7d1468e130b1a706	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZD	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.erxc	¹ SillyFDC-AH
2c3b96ca3a18140dfcd42434f3e03020	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZQ	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.erzx	¹ VB-ALW
2c931871fef3b50c0bd2b4961419a311	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.esat	¹ VB-ALW
2cae6bd4e939b318726eebb347db0a26	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	¹ SillyFDC-S
2cc5ad6770250338bd5844904fb18181	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcsv	¹ VB-ALW
2d07ba427df9cd2c4af815015a484391	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.YY	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.ervr	¹ SillyFDC-S
2d321324e9a28c834a750860122233c6	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcvt	¹ VB-ALW
2db1a991aea1664e3dcbc5e75e108131	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.erwv	¹ Generic-S
2f2a752f96ecb251efdc275f0ec8ea80	04 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZV	?	¹ SillyFDC-S
2fab042f7b482e8aa2c5ecd413f2eff1	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcvt	¹ VB-ALW
2fcae2e2a9ed2f36bd399c77da2470c6	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	¹ SillyFDC-S
30cc569d95b4401aa0681b8e01299981	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.YU	?	?
30cf2bf448db73c75e153216d4cd4fc0	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.VBKrypt.uron	¹ SillyFDC-S
302471280652d2d1817757ef0f8ad656	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.esdv	¹ VB-ALW
3127e3127a2a206a8dc6bc21f4693386	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	¹ SillyFDC-S
33bf61ebeb41d157b45d3180d1f71b76	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZN	⁷ Win32.VBKrypt.urkc	¹ VB-ALW

md5	analysis date	tlds	Microsoft	Kaspersky	Sophos
33c739e7d6aa599c05ff9f94a5768921	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZR	⁷ Win32.Agent.agcpv	¹ VB-ALW
32d5e945a82fb6fb511e7bdd32cf8c21	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.eseu	¹ Generic-S
34defe58f6d305960fff8c295bd9b851	05 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	?	¹ SillyFDC-S
383977446a2a42bd1427703974265606	06 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	¹ SillyFDC-S
39408e199dd996cbe915c5c32261c490	06 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZN	⁷ Win32.VBKrypt.urkc	¹ VB-ALW
395df008604e98e228ed41ce67f213b1	06 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZV	⁷ Win32.Agent.ageop	¹ SillyFDC-S
3d6d6bbe37b37be79c43dc6a7b052a46	06 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus	⁷ Win32.Agent.agere	¹ SillyFDC-S
38ab4d2cda29c4ba1346da4b85c81800	06 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.ZW	⁷ Win32.Agent.agexl	¹ SillyFDC-S
3ca13a5648d4f2573f28b37638333701	06 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.YF	⁷ Win32.VBKrypt.uprs	¹ SillyFDC-AH
3bc39b3af9f13317744fd0548503baa6	07 Jul. 2014	1 ^A	⁶ Vobfus.YU	Worm.Win32.Vobfus.erwm	¹ VB-ALR
c413f1a0738a3b475db2ed44aebf3ba	30 Sep. 2014 ^R	1 ^A	⁰ Oderoor.M	Clean	¹ EncPk-CK
675d97e5cdd3b7e07c7945fa5398e599	21 May. 2015	1 ^A	?	?	?

Prefixes: ⁰Backdoor:Win32/, ¹Mal/, ²HEUR:Trojan.Win32., ³Trojan:Win32/, ⁴Troj/, ⁵Trojan-Downloader.Win32., ⁶Worm:Win32/, ⁷Trojan.

TLDS: ^A com, net, tv, cc. ^Bdyndns.org, yi.org, dynserv.com, mooo.com

Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20160324035554/https://www.johannesbader.ch/2015/12/krakens-two-domain-generation-algorithms//