CAPEC-132: Symlink Attack (Version 3.9)
Archived: 2026-04-05 15:52:54 UTC
 Description
An adversary positions a symbolic link in such a manner that the targeted user or application accesses the link's endpoint,
assuming that it is accessing a file with the link's name.
 Extended Description
The endpoint file may be either output or input. If the file is output, the result is that the endpoint is modified, instead of a
file at the intended location. Modifications to the endpoint file may include appending, overwriting, corrupting, changing
permissions, or other modifications.
In some variants of this attack the adversary may be able to control the change to a file while in other cases they cannot. The
former is especially damaging since the adversary may be able to grant themselves increased privileges or insert false
information, but the latter can also be damaging as it can expose sensitive information or corrupt or destroy vital system or
application files. Alternatively, the endpoint file may serve as input to the targeted application. This can be used to feed
malformed input into the target or to cause the target to process different information, possibly allowing the adversary to
control the actions of the target or to cause the target to expose information to the adversary. Moreover, the actions taken on
the endpoint file are undertaken with the permissions of the targeted user or application, which may exceed the permissions
that the adversary would normally have.
 Likelihood Of Attack
 Typical Severity
 Relationships
This table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These
relationships are defined as ChildOf and ParentOf, and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels
of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack
patterns that the user may want to explore.
Nature Type
ChildOf Standard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It
This table shows the views that this attack pattern belongs to and top level categories within that view.
 Execution Flow
Explore
1. Identify Target: Adversary identifies the target application by determining whether there is sufficient check before
writing data to a file and creating symlinks to files in different directories.
Techniques
The adversary writes to files in different directories to check whether the application has sufficient checking
before file operations.
The adversary creates symlinks to files in different directories.
Experiment
1. Try to create symlinks to different files: The adversary then uses a variety of techniques, such as monitoring or
guessing to create symlinks to the files accessed by the target application in the directories which are identified in the
explore phase.
Techniques
The adversary monitors the file operations performed by the target application using a tool like dtrace or
FileMon. And the adversary can delay the operations by using "sleep(2)" and "usleep()" to prepare the
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appropriate conditions for the attack, or make the application perform expansive tasks (large files parsing, etc.)
depending on the purpose of the application.
The adversary may need a little guesswork on the filenames on which the target application would operate.
The adversary tries to create symlinks to the various filenames.
Exploit
1. Target application operates on created symlinks to sensitive files: The adversary is able to create symlinks to
sensitive files while the target application is operating on the file.
Techniques
Create the symlink to the sensitive file such as configuration files, etc.
 Prerequisites
The targeted application must perform the desired activities on a file without checking whether the file is a symbolic link or
not. The adversary must be able to predict the name of the file the target application is modifying and be able to create a new
symbolic link where that file would appear.
 Skills Required
[Level: Low]
To create symlinks
[Level: High]
To identify the files and create the symlinks during the file operation time window
 Resources Required
None: No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack. The only requirement is the ability to create the
necessary symbolic link.
 Consequences
This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security
property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in
their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative
to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a
certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Scope Impact Likelihood
Confidentiality Other
Integrity Modify Data
Confidentiality Read Data
Integrity Modify Data
Authorization Execute Unauthorized Commands
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Accountability
Authentication
Authorization
Non-Repudiation
Gain Privileges
Access Control
Authorization
Bypass Protection Mechanism
Availability Unreliable Execution
 Mitigations
Design: Check for the existence of files to be created, if in existence verify they are neither symlinks nor hard links
before opening them.
Implementation: Use randomly generated file names for temporary files. Give the files restrictive permissions.
 Example Instances
The adversary creates a symlink with the "same" name as the file which the application is intending to write to. The
application will write to the file- "causing the data to be written where the symlink is pointing". An attack like this can be
demonstrated as follows:
root# vulprog myFile
{...program does some processing...]
adversary# ln –s /etc/nologin myFile
[...program writes to 'myFile', which points to /etc/nologin...]
In the above example, the root user ran a program with poorly written file handling routines, providing the filename
"myFile" to vulnprog for the relevant data to be written to. However, the adversary happened to be looking over the shoulder
of "root" at the time, and created a link from myFile to /etc/nologin. The attack would make no user be able to login.
 Taxonomy Mappings
CAPEC mappings to ATT&CK techniques leverage an inheritance model to streamline and minimize direct
CAPEC/ATT&CK mappings. Inheritance of a mapping is indicated by text stating that the parent CAPEC has relevant
ATT&CK mappings. Note that the ATT&CK Enterprise Framework does not use an inheritance model as part of the
mapping to CAPEC.
Relevant to the ATT&CK taxonomy mapping (also see parent)
Entry ID Entry Name
1547.009 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution:Shortcut Modification
 References
 Content History
Submissions
Submission Date Submitter Organization
2014-06-23
(Version 2.6)
CAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation
Modifications
Modification Date Modifier Organization
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2015-11-09
(Version 2.7)
CAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation
Updated References
2017-08-04
(Version 2.11)
CAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation
Updated Resources_Required
2019-04-04
(Version 3.1)
CAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation
Updated Consequences
2020-07-30
(Version 3.3)
CAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation
Updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2022-02-22
(Version 3.7)
CAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation
Updated Description, Example_Instances, Execution_Flow, Extended_Description, Prerequisites
2022-09-29
(Version 3.8)
CAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation
Updated Example_Instances
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Source: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html
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