

COVID-19 and FMLA Campaigns used to install new IcedID banking malware

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


Juniper Threat Labs has been monitoring a campaign that pushes a new IcedID banking trojan. This new campaign changes tactics by injecting into `msiexec.exe` to conceal itself and use full steganography for downloading its modules and configurations. Previous versions of IcedID injected into `svchost.exe` and downloaded encrypted modules and config as “.dat” files. This campaign also takes advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic by using keywords such as COVID-19 and FMLA in email sender names and attachment names. IcedID is a banking malware that performs Man-in-the-Browser attacks to steal financial information.

In this blog, we will detail this campaign’s infection chain and also touch on the network communications, including how quickly threat actors update and change their network communication.

1st Stage (Malicious Office Files)

The first stage of the infection chain starts with phishing emails with malicious attachments, such as below:



Sha256 of attachment: 822a8e3dfa14cd7aac749dc0515c35cf20632717e191568ba5daf137db7ec17

The Word document has a malicious macro in it and, when opened by the victim, it will drop and execute a file in a specific folder.

- C:\1\Whole\PFSDNSKDF.EXE (Ee9fd78107cdcaffc274cf2484d6c74c56c7f3be39b1896894d9525506118d1e)

It achieves this by reading a binary embedded in it and using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute the binary.

```

+-----+-----+-----+
|Type      |Keyword      |Description
+-----+-----+-----+
|AutoExec  |Document_Open|Runs when the Word or Publisher document is
|          |              |opened
|Suspicious|Put          |May write to a file (if combined with Open)
|Suspicious|Open        |May open a file
|Suspicious|Lib         |May run code from a DLL
|Suspicious|Chr         |May attempt to obfuscate specific strings
|          |              |(use option --deobf to deobfuscate)
|Suspicious|ChrW        |May attempt to obfuscate specific strings
|          |              |(use option --deobf to deobfuscate)
|Suspicious|Binary      |May read or write a binary file (if combined
|          |              |with Open)
|Suspicious|Base64 Strings|Base64-encoded strings were detected, may be
|          |              |used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to
|          |              |see all)
|Suspicious|UBA obfuscated
|          |Strings     |UBA string expressions were detected, may be
|          |              |used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to
|          |              |see all)
|IOC       |PFSDNSKDF.EXE|Executable file name (obfuscation: UBA
|          |              |expression)
|Base64    |'&\xe9\xde\x0e\x87.'|JuneDocu
|String
|UBA string|\PFSDNSKDF.EXE|'"\" & "PFSDNSKDF.E" + Chr$(88) + Chr$(69)
|UBA string|M             |Chr$(77)
|UBA string|winmgmts:Win32_Proce
|          |ss          |(ChrW(119) & ChrW(105) & ChrW(110) &
|          |              |ChrW(109) & ChrW(103) & ChrW(109) & ChrW(116)
|          |              |& ChrW(115) & ChrW(58) & ChrW(87) &
|          |              |ChrW(105) & ChrW(110) & ChrW(51) & ChrW(50) &
|          |              |ChrW(95) & ChrW(80) & ChrW(114) & ChrW(111)
|          |              |& ChrW(99) & ChrW(101) & ChrW(115) &
|          |              |ChrW(115))
+-----+-----+-----+
    
```

Olevba output of the malicious word document

2nd Stage Loader

The file C:\1\Whole\PFSDNSKDF.EXE that was dropped by the malicious document is another loader whose purpose is to download another IcedID loader. It first unpacked itself by reading a binary file embedded in its resource, decrypting it

and executing in memory. It will then loop on the following domains, using WinHTTP queries:

- support.apple.com
- www.intel.com
- help.twitter.com
- support.microsoft.com
- connuwedro[.]xyz
- support.oracle.com


All of the above queries are normal, except for **connuwedro[.]xyz**. It does this to evade detection by trying to blend to normal traffic.

It is specifically looking for a response that is a PNG file and ignores responses with tags present in an html, such as the following:

```
if ( v4 )
{
  v6 = "\"";
  v7 = "src=\"";
}
else
{
  v6 = "\"";
  v7 = "url(\"";
}
v16 = SearchforString(v7, (int)v6, (int)lpMem, &v13);
```

Code Snippet for filtering out benign domains


It expects a PNG file as a response from connuwedro[.]xyz. To confirm this, it will specifically look for the DWord “IDAT”, which is a tag found in any PNG files.



Code snippet for finding the ‘IDAT’ keyword on PNG file

It would then decrypt this PNG file using the RC4 algorithm and execute the embedded binary. It also includes checksum checking in the code to make sure that it is the correct file. This technique is also known as steganography.

The binary will be saved in the %APPDATA% folder and, for persistence, it creates a scheduled task that will execute every hour.



Task Job of 3rd stage loader

The hash of the binary is c35dd2a034376c5f0f22f0e708dc773af8ee5baf83e2a4749f6f9d374338cd8e and we designate it as the 3rd stage loader whose purpose is to download the IcedID main module.


3rd Stage Loader and Main Module

This is the loader that will download the IcedID main module. Similar to the second stage, it applies the same technique of unpacking itself and using steganography. It unpacks an embedded binary in its resource and executes it. Once unpacked, it will download the IcedID main module as a PNG file from the following link:

- [https://cucumberz99\[.\]club/image?id={01XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX}](https://cucumberz99[.]club/image?id={01XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX})

This domain resolves to 31.24.224[.]12, during our analysis.

The image will be saved in the following directory:



IcedID stored as PNG file

This image is stored at that specific location so that when the third stage loader starts, it does not need to download it again. The size of the image is more than 600KB and embedded in it is the encrypted IcedID main module. The encryption algorithm is RC4 and the keys are also embedded in the image at specific offset.

The decrypted code is not a complete PE image, as it does not contain any header. Most of its strings are also encrypted, which makes analysis even harder.

The first part of the shellcode is to spawn a suspended process of msiexec.exe.

```

push ebx
push ebx
push 4
push ebx
push ebx
push ebx
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-1B8]
push eax
push ebx
call esi

```

```

eax:"C:\\windows\\system32\\msiexec.exe /i dwvrvcv.msi"
CreateProcessA

```

Code snippet for injecting to msiexec.exe

It calls the following series of API calls to inject itself on the remote process before it exits:

ZwWriteVirtualMemory, ZwProtectVirtualMemory, ZwQueueApcThread, NtResumeThread.

Using **msiexec.exe /i {random name}.msi** is a simple technique to try to conceal itself and look like a normal installation of an msi application.

The code injected into an msiexec.exe sends a beacon signal to the CnC server and awaits commands. The commands include:

- Update the IcedID main module
- Update configurations
- Send bot logs to the server
- Execute a shellcode from the CnC server
- Collect system information
- Download and execute a file from the CnC server
- Execute a command and send results to the server
- Reboot the client machine
- Upload a file to the server
- Extract passwords stored in browsers and mail applications

Man-in-the-Browser


The IcedID core's main function is to steal financial data using webinjects. The IcedID main module, which is injected into msiexec process, watches for specific browser process names:

- Firefox.exe
- Chrome.exe
- Iexplore.exe

When it finds that a browser process is present, three things happen:

- It creates a local proxy that listens on 127.0.0.1:56654
- It hooks the following API on the browsers:
 - Chrome.exe and Iexplore.exe
 - CertGetCertificateChain
 - CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy
 - connect
 - Firefox.exe
 - connect
 - SSL_AuthCertificateHook or function from the library SSL3.dll
- It generates a self-signed certificate in the %TEMP% folder

With these three things, all connections to the browser are proxied to msiexec.exe and it achieves full control of the browser.



TCPView results on a system infected with IcedID

It will monitor browser activity related to financial transactions and inject forms on the fly to try to steal credit card details. Among the banks and financial-related services it targets are the following:

- Amazon.com
- American Express
- AT&T
- Bank Of America
- Capital One
- Chase
- CIBC
- Comerica
- Dell
- Discover
- Dollar Bank
- eBay
- Erie Bank
- E-Trade
- Frost Bank
- Halifax UK
- Hancock Bank
- Huntington Bank
- J.P. Morgan
- Lloyds Bank
- M&T bank
- Centennial Bank
- PNC
- RBC
- Charles Schwab
- SunTrust Bank
- Synovus
- T-Mobile
- Union Bank
- USAA
- US Bank
- Verizon Wireless

- Wells Fargo

More details about the functionality of the main module have already been discussed by various security blogs. We link to these in the reference section.

Let's Go Hunt

1st Stage Loader


The vast majority of benign documents do not perform any network communication, even towards benign domains. The following network behavior could be used for finding other samples related to this campaign. With this, we have found other samples that are using COVID-19 and FMLA keywords. All of them have macros.

File Name	Detections	Size	First seen
COVID-19 FMLA CENTER.doc	38 / 63	124.29 KB	2020-05-19 06:45:22
FMLA-INSTRUCTIONS.doc	36 / 62	124.29 KB	2020-05-19 19:20:56
INVOICE.073914869.doc	15 / 64	240.55 KB	2020-04-30 15:34:00
new_fax_document_2951.doc	29 / 64	197.28 KB	2020-03-29 13:26:59

VT search for finding related malware

For the second stage, we found 29 unique domains with varying IP resolutions.

2nd Stage Download Domains




Download Domains for Third Stage

3rd Stage and Main Module

The network communication of this IcedID is unique, as it follows this specific format:


- {cnc_domain}/image/?id=01XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX



VT Query for hunting third stage loaded


Using VTs behavior search module, we are able to find approximately 250 unique samples. Out of these samples, we identified 62 unique C2 domains. The complete list of hashes and domains will be listed in the IOC section of this blog. The following data shows how quickly IcedID threat actors update or change their CnC.

CnC Domains for March




CnC Domains for March

CnC Domains for April




CnC Domains for April

CnC Domains for May



CnC Domains for May

CnC Domains for June



CnC Domains for June

A commonality among these download and CnC domains is that they only use the following TLDS:

- .xyz
- .club
- .top
- .pw
- .online
- .email
- .best
- .bid
- .site
- .uno

All of these domains also use the Nameserver **dnspod.com**

Last DNS Records ⓘ

Record type	TTL	Value
A	299	
NS	599	c.dnspod.com
NS	599	b.dnspod.com
NS	599	a.dnspod.com
+ SOA	599	a.dnspod.com

Nameserver information of IcedID download and CnC domains

Self-signed certificates

IcedID uses TLS in all of its communication but the certificate is self-signed. They can be spotted, as they use this kind of a self-signed certificate. The keyword “Internet Widgits Pty Ltd” is also being used by Trickbot, another banking malware, and it is believed that Trickbot and IcedID are cousins.

Certificate Subject O	Internet Widgits Pty Ltd	1530	31.24.224.12 [cucumberz99.club]
Certificate Subject S	Some-State	1530	31.24.224.12 [cucumberz99.club]
Certificate Subject C	AU	1530	31.24.224.12 [cucumberz99.club]
Certificate Subject CN	localhost	1530	31.24.224.12 [cucumberz99.club]
Certificate Issuer O	Internet Widgits Pty Ltd	1530	31.24.224.12 [cucumberz99.club]
Certificate Issuer S	Some-State	1530	31.24.224.12 [cucumberz99.club]
Certificate Issuer C	AU	1530	31.24.224.12 [cucumberz99.club]
Certificate Issuer CN	localhost	1530	31.24.224.12 [cucumberz99.club]
Certificate Hash	97293FB7FD4D21A0EFE0D37EF2334DB5CFF3A...	1530	31.24.224.12 [cucumberz99.club]

Network Miner output of IcedID certificate

Conclusion

IcedID is a very complex malware and there is no doubt the threat actors behind this are very much capable with constant updates to their arsenal. In summary, this latest IcedID Campaign focused on evasion by implementing the following:

- Signed Binary Proxy Execution using msixexec
- Full steganography
- HTTPS communication
- String encryption
- Blend communication with normal traffic

Juniper Advanced Threat Prevention (ATP) products detect this malware.

Monitor / File Scanning / HTTP File Downloads

822a8e3dfa14cd7aac7... ?

Threat Level

9

File name 822a8e3dfa14cd7aac749dc...
Category document (MIME type: app...)

Top Indicators

Malware Name Win32:Trojan.Dropper:Generickd:B
Signature Match Generickd (Trojan.Dropper)
Antivirus Clean

GENERAL BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS NETWORK ACTIVITY BEHAVIOR DETAILS

<p>Status</p> <p>Threat Level 9</p> <p>Global Prevalence Medium</p> <p>Last Scanned Jun 4, 2020 4:47 PM</p>	<p>File Information</p> <p>File Name 822a8e3dfa14cd7aac749dc0515c35cf20632717e191568ba5daf137db7ec17</p> <p>Category document (MIME type: application/msword)</p> <p>Size 124KB</p>
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Juniper ATP detection

IOC

1st stage malicious documents

- 822a8e3dfa14cd7aac749dc0515c35cf20632717e191568ba5daf137db7ec17
- 74d6e374d7958e70c6733b6c17e2f0d79b629e172aaf385c142c76678647f3b8
- 436b0c94c1be2be6b328830568ef7f031b45bf6d2377fa9f4b1f872ffb39b369
- 4ca8c054641c1f11c033cc20ebae77c4a41853e2fe693ecf4b93a9719b624c1e
- afdb9b4c2e9a47a137a385e41a47727c0a04b2001aab60d6b3e099d0faf4ddef
- e4f89d4ff1d26e0959c7147df641c6dae3e0d15729a5fd275857e98225b44245
- 3ff97578adea9f45bccea091234c5ccee6a12b3c52e7e29195a45e3c191aa926
- e15744eb13666670ad3cf256c31df57a01c40f355a0f8a592294187d4fedc257
- 454ff6a5ebf01fc7d9c1ced5b081d582d11119ab9b49fc06ccaf22b1b0259c23
- 54197c58c9693580c8ca961d8ff326cbad7688b23627114f7437c59fede46e82
- f1bf5ef89f644b1558dd54e68148e60310d537ca45c2daae2b410c30540d7de6
- e48e4e74dc7e67523878a2cf68b2ce72b5e5c999897e075d6b993e41c81f4174
- ef2ab4bc4ee63dd1b9f04a56fe727a87f56ddd476bc1cd72c78f4d31abff322a
- fd11736701395813459091b6d07878c52b448a4d9a5825517a0308fbfe6fa070
- 9979063dae01bdf946ed012e69fabb82be3795323a52b06532b42b0f59609
- 09c3ada49c47af20854d87fbb76a24263d759f93f8de7e5af88549111ce55dda
- 10ab8bfff505a3add9537bf742ede32f985e9f1ecc3a8afca99005b7255bca1b
- a6e0690db18e89187c2a9b0924585264606482dfdd9ac97c744bb649615ced65
- 1e988d02dedc8307c518e6bc2c6f8be14e4f0cd941972622deebcd90a6f09013
- f4fecefc8cd7c7688d98ff168e137c70d98f01866114e552ede71aa28e2088018
- b0dc0a79862585b381afb1b05640276d51001961ddf9608703195bc183f1f06
- 8664c34e72bc78098668331faa8f5113ad798a29c085662a0a9d83c4598843b2
- 404650dbf9d8d4fc844f529b042b895979f3a87334fb97925805c8072725ea8
- f5d8de500a504f6493af21ac67f50f5a4de5d6371e36c3a2251ac098f256187b
- 385a41aaa192a8cd56bc35b1841a8e4a31f4cae1d5b68542ae7584b6420d363e

- 55e1ba8683bb6b1d2a4f8b16b16ede25943d66e5884c9793f8c078614d12d9c4
- dea7eae76df0fa27ae5ddd2988222b8afefd73ff80f5a5a14108cb499b85a23
- f30f283832f7a371c2c23cb2b5801e71bd33856c026480ab9165e584300fa3b3
- 57ea3ae558efce33cf28a5cefa26e93a07186e5cdf799d5d066edaf581f66706
- 2e294fbc75cefcbece50a3e57730212fd7672a4cce487db0bdfd241032a5bcb7
- 3a11e16512b0f4c1380c5f94ff65312c421955c5693ea73260e2274eb34470c8

2nd stage download domains

- 2pillsofhundreds[.]pw
- 3chickens[.]pw
- 3glanzepages[.]top
- bividilli[.]xyz
- carpetkisa[.]xyz
- connuwedro[.]xyz
- feminization[.]xyz
- filacolonel[.]xyz
- fredoferodo[.]top
- frenchfries8[.]top
- ghefgekil[.]club
- gigakolors[.]club
- goodcolonell[.]xyz
- groggypirogy[.]top
- hinkaly[.]club
- karantino[.]xyz
- kassadesada[.]top
- knockaddress[.]xyz
- knockdomain[.]xyz
- lokolojazz[.]club
- pyramide33[.]pw
- siffersniffer[.]best
- silkycow[.]pw
- stuffed8tomatoes[.]club
- testermeisterz[.]top
- tryfreder[.]xyz
- vodkahater[.]xyz
- yahzdaje2[.]website
- zajjizev[.]club
-

3rd stage loader hashes

- c35dd2a034376c5f0f22f0e708dc773af8ee5baf83e2a4749f6f9d374338cd8e
- 014b422e6c1bc23db2b5898dd0c49ac61fbac174c1e0d916f68b41cfb535cdb5
- 015243f1e4fa8c0eabf86ae752056e2876e50b3b67e95fa486451904d311580d
- 021cae01a3e9e734ca0b96c30d7d358b7b41c84565c95b448771de56ae85621e

- 063ed7054f8f7d72cb34f9a37725b5974fdafc743c338b07bc7b0b2ab6a212e1
- 06d21126d11e3fd07c66c7f9c096f80fa8046b5e1bf4370187401890fdf4fd5c
- 07671c10dd548d8a535939c0282d6710b07c8e2e8e7efa466de09202d02cd550
- 08bb93772c22c2842e968f5ad3753062530c4fcee87110afe46d95889c484dfb
- 0b0b92a625911a7065cf0e48d470acac71290c6832363a715b1f46aff01fe4c8
- 0c69c38b7d436280492807d77a308f2eec5007afc0683aa206358db91c116def
- 15041d3408372977905bda10cbccd9a86135eb441152968299e3c05ebcbae93c
- 16ae5983ca6e3f7bf893e0ba9ef44f2f46270a717abed860fdd56a7ad5cc8f77
- 16efa114618cdf5426f514c79597d29fe0ced79f32c5b56985cf2820854d7a36
- 18726b5405dc2f8159f3496939c5df3ca742ff271a2dd294b033433203f35eb3
- 1faa5ce90b3496c6938f3fe3a25f89939a297254a183fb75a8d58abfcc9fddfd
- 1fd7fea39524f3e5edcd0d41e9b2f9c9fa639ec22e80bacd173b7744b4a05601
- 2660abba68d81b50c997b787a98484e1eeea47269cdbc1f5ae87e6ac086b5237
- 26e0468acd186e744e895f116d14e20179d74f61fa819b5984442cac51f07b00
- 284aaafa51b1131e6656b270af6c3a032cf454ead1d5f0a5926ebe22772cf0d9
- 2aab4bb300e505e278a20a2aa804c9ba5920c2513b425440b1c818d53a0dd672
- 2b7ccec0aa1d9f09b7d17034acf00b0e96dd47ecabe767b419a474a0854e42c
- 2ba7ecdb95e16f4af77d2cb09e301306c2115350da49e36afa26a365fceb110c
- 2bfa9f878dce2de087715d7986e369197aec166a635c80a2f2c39a9b8e327fd
- 2e1d4c5755845068909b229939511d6a9a0b7b5df6801f44a3a3a274d6048804
- 32efada9f1ba73c5ded10c2338fe261e0e4c997f48696464978af942c9f2599f
- 3391f3da58a8b440b0c58084a280cf9cac28395ecf87c8307d5efb9d66b6164f
- 359ea0e4217bea81d92e6e274681ab7df24caaaa0e6ad412e2f9045113c6ea1
- 386becd1260847d03958dbc82b5f6565e2855ed5439eef34b57678410877174e
- 396a445f43fc63122543cbb16fe2919e19aa2371f7165c3817acac7885701afd
- 3a09fb755bb94cfbd598d16c3a8dd430be51a1eed9dc5791a8f07bab6e2bc284
- 4267ef18ddeb15cf6920e2bc89f5c9247b6f554112a124ee2211281ce98ec04f
- 43275d3fdf60216df9c0151b11db2896a1dd56b9e7267ed6db78f4ef21cb8b46
- 44271a7612f1b32ed5fb0bac211992ea5e5c243710b9b4e8ad83f08af6a6cf4f
- 46a19f4b4dcfcb51b0db1718ad6d64bf0eb28170c61421e87e7edc07facd329c
- 48293a9ec8e7d12370cb1c1266653053ad5861761c74c437b2350aa909490327
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CnC domains

- 30miles[.]xyz
- antivarevare[.]club
- antivarevare[.]pw
- bavadivaclub[.]club
- beradocolon[.]top
- bluekit[.]pw
- bonwes[.]bid
- bredretre[.]juno
- carztesla[.]xyz
- chumocarz[.]club

- citytrallbus[.]xyz
- colocarantino[.]xyz
- cosacasa[.]top
- costacolonel[.]club
- costamustero[.]pw
- coucarachiz[.]top
- cozyappt[.]club
- crossbones[.]email
- cryptocrio[.]pw
- cryptocrio[.]top
- cucumberz99[.]club
- dayafterthe[.]xyz
- dezisenkor[.]club
- docccutime[.]xyz
- emergencytoolz[.]pw
- extraordinarycurc[.]club
- fekilopol[.]xyz
- fidelliware[.]pw
- filacolonel[.]site
- filteroggy[.]pw
- fishmak[.]pw
- flighfinder[.]xyz
- flightslots[.]online
- forwardnogi[.]pw
- fullplaineafares[.]club
- gerenada[.]club
- glassyradua[.]xyz
- goodservers[.]top
- herekeder[.]best
- instarobotics[.]club
- loacorecoder[.]club
- menosmeno[.]best
- millogorillo[.]top
- nadalia[.]top
- northdestrickt[.]top
- oggytarakan[.]club
- oggythecoucca[.]xyz
- polymorphis[.]top
- pravizzillo[.]club
- pravizzillo[.]email
- presserdresser[.]best
- pythonfinder[.]top
- safebanktest[.]top
- seguridadcolonel[.]club
- sharedocar[.]xyz

- smallhole[.]club
- svaerossi[.]pw
- tourdayly[.]top
- trythisone2[.]best
- uxozhuki[.]pw
- vereseptem[.]pw
- withoutemblems[.]top

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