

Google Play Apps Drop Anubis, Use Motion-based Evasion

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We recently found two malicious apps on Google Play that drop wide-reaching banking malware. The two apps were disguised as useful tools, simply named Currency Converter and BatterySaverMobi. Google has confirmed that both these apps are no longer on the Play Store.

The battery app logged more than 5,000 downloads before it was taken down, and boasted a score of 4.5 stars from 73 reviewers. However, a close look at the posted reviews show signs that they may not have been valid; some anonymous usernames were spotted and a few review statements are illogical and lack detail.

We looked into this campaign and found that the apps dropped a malicious payload that we can safely link to the known [banking malware Anubis](#) (detected by Trend Micro as ANDROIDOS_ANUBISDROPPER). Upon analysis of the payload, we noted that the code is strikingly similar to known Anubis samples. And we also saw that it connects to a command and control (C&C) server with the domain *aserogege.space*, which is linked to Anubis as well.

Besides *aserogege.space*, 18 other malicious domains map to the IP address 47.254.26.2 and we confirmed that Anubis uses the subpath of these domains. These domains change IP addresses quite frequently and may have switched six times since October 2018, showing just how active this particular campaign is.



BatterySaverMobi

BatterySaverMobi Tools


★★★★★ 73



This app is compatible with all of your devices.

Add to Wishlist

Install



Easy use this free application and give more a battery life your mobile devise

REVIEWS

Review Policy

4.5
★★★★★
73 total





Currency Converter

CurrencyConve Finance


★★★★★ 1

3+

This app is compatible with all of your devices.

Add to Wishlist

Install







Features include:

- ~ Calculate prices with the currency converter
- ~ Monitor up to 5 currencies of your choice
- ~ Access to top world currency
- ~ Fast easy-to-use calculator functionality

[READ MORE](#)

WHAT'S NEW

-
-  **Alberto Pacheco**
★★★★★ December 23, 2018
just started using still unknown 👍 4 ⋮
 -  **michael william**
★★★★★ December 27, 2018
you are asking me and I just now installed the app 👍 ⋮
 -  **A Google user**
★★★★★ December 17, 2018
Thanksgiving 👍 5 ⋮
 -  **A Google user**
★★★★★ December 21, 2018
totally awesome. 👍 1 ⋮

WHAT'S NEW

BatterySaverMobi 3.0

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION


Updated December 20, 2018	Size 1.2M	Installs 5,000+
Current Version 3.0	Requires Android 4.0.3 and up	Content Rating Rated for 3+ Learn More
Permissions View details	Report Flag as inappropriate	Offered By BatterySaverMobi
Developer  @gmail.com		

Figure 1. Images of the malicious apps on Google Play




Table 1. Victim distribution for all BatterySaveMobi samples

How the apps evade detection

These apps don't just use traditional evasion techniques; they also try to use the user and device's motions to hide their activities.

As a user moves, their device usually generates some amount of motion sensor data. The malware developer is assuming that the sandbox for scanning malware is an emulator with no motion sensors, and as such will not create that type of data. If that is the case, the developer can determine if the app is running in a sandbox environment by simply checking for sensor data.

The malicious app monitors the user's steps through the device motion sensor. If it senses that the user and the device are not moving (if it lacks sensor data and thus, might be running in a sandbox environment), then the malicious code will not run.

```

public void onSensorChanged(SensorEvent arg10) {
    this.k.registerListener(((SensorEventListener)this), this.l, 3);
    Sensor v0 = arg10.sensor;
    this.k.registerListener(((SensorEventListener)this), v0, 3);
    if(v0.getType() == 1) {
        float[] v10 = arg10.values;
        float v0_1 = v10[0];
        float v1 = v10[1];
        float v10_1 = v10[2];
        long v2 = System.currentTimeMillis();
        if(v2 - this.m > 100) {
            long v4 = v2 - this.m;
            this.m = v2;
            if(Math.abs(v0_1 + v1 + v10_1 - this.n - this.o - this.p) / (((float)v4) * 10000f) > 600f) {
                this.a(); // save step
            }

            this.n = v0_1;
            this.o = v1;
            this.p = v10_1;
        }
    }
}

```

Figure 2. The malware tracks the user's movement; the malicious code will run if it senses motion

Command	Action
"::apk::"	Download apk and trick user to install
"kill"	Stop running malicious code

Table 2. C&C server commands

If the malicious code runs, then the app will try to trick the users into downloading and installing its payload APK with a fake system update.



System update available

This update will install a stable version of Android. To learn more about the Android Beta Program or opt out, visit www.android.com/beta. Downloading updates over cellular data or metered Wi-Fi networks may lead to additional charges.

New features include:

- Adaptive battery and brightness
- Simpler ways to navigate your phone
- Recommended apps and actions based on your context

Update size: 1.2 MB



Install Update



Figure 3. Fake system update

One of the ways the app developers hide the malicious server is by encoding it in Telegram and Twitter webpage requests. The bank malware dropper will request Telegram or Twitter after it trusts the running device. By parsing the response's HTML content, it gets the C&C server (*aserogege.space*). Then, it registers with the C&C server and checks for commands with an HTTP POST request. If the server responds to the app with an APK command and attaches the download URL, then the Anubis payload will be dropped in the background. It will try and trick users into installing it with the fake system update seen in Figure 3.



Telegram

Don't have **Telegram** yet? Try it now!



start1

1 member

苏尔的开始拉冀比斯比冀注册号并冀阿号个中意
妈比而需化拉而在音并的并吸并而没吸个亡有
不比的并你比中有你比而需而死要比号拉语念
不比的号号并化肉肉苏尔苏尔完

VIEW CHANNEL

If you have **Telegram**, you can view and join
start1 right away.

Figure 4. The encoded server URL, showing the text results in the URL of the C&C server

The Anubis payload

The Anubis malware masquerades as a benign app, prompts the user to grant it accessibility rights, and also tries to steal account information. Banking trojans usually launch a [fake overlay screenopen on a new tab](#) when the user accesses a target app and tries to steal information when the user inputs account credentials into the overlay. However, Anubis' process is a little different. It has a built-in keylogger that can simply steal a users' account credentials by logging the keystrokes. The malware can also take a screenshot of the infected users' screen, which is another way to get the victims credentials.

Our data shows that the latest version of Anubis has been distributed to 93 different countries and targets the users of 377 variations of financial apps to farm account details. We can also see that, if Anubis successfully runs, an attacker would gain access to contact lists as well as location. It would also have the ability to record audio, send SMS messages, make calls, and alter external storage. Anubis can use these permissions to send spam messages to contacts, call numbers from the device, and other malicious activities. [Previous researchopen on a new tab](#) from security company Quick Heal Technologies shows that versions of Anubis even function as a ransomware.

```
public String a(Context arg5) {
    String v5_1;
    String v0 = "";
    Iterator v5 = arg5.getPackageManager().getInstalledApplications(128).iterator();
    while(v5.hasNext()) {
        Object v1 = v5.next();
        if(((ApplicationInfo)v1).packageName.equals("at.sparadat.bcrmobile")) {
            v0 = v0 + "at.sparadat.bcrmobile,";
        }

        if(((ApplicationInfo)v1).packageName.equals("at.sparadat.netbanking")) {
            v0 = v0 + "at.sparadat.netbanking,";
        }

        if(((ApplicationInfo)v1).packageName.equals("com.bankaustralia.android.olb")) {
            v0 = v0 + "com.bankaustralia.android.olb,";
        }

        if(((ApplicationInfo)v1).packageName.equals("com.bmo.mobile")) {
            v0 = v0 + "com.bmo.mobile,";
        }

        if(((ApplicationInfo)v1).packageName.equals("com.cibc.android.mobi")) {
            v0 = v0 + "com.cibc.android.mobi,";
        }

        if(((ApplicationInfo)v1).packageName.equals("com.rbc.mobile.android")) {
            v0 = v0 + "com.rbc.mobile.android,";
        }

        if(((ApplicationInfo)v1).packageName.equals("com.scotiabank.mobile")) {
            v0 = v0 + "com.scotiabank.mobile,";
        }

        if(((ApplicationInfo)v1).packageName.equals("com.td")) {
            v0 = v0 + "com.td,";
        }

        if(((ApplicationInfo)v1).packageName.equals("cz.airbank.android")) {
            v0 = v0 + "cz.airbank.android,";
        }

        if(((ApplicationInfo)v1).packageName.equals("eu.inmite.prj.kb.mobilbank")) {
            v0 = v0 + "eu.inmite.pri.kb.mobilbank,";
        }

        if(((ApplicationInfo)v1).packageName.equals("com.bankinter.launcher")) {
            v0 = v0 + "com.bankinter.launcher,";
        }

        if(((ApplicationInfo)v1).packageName.equals("com.kutxabank.android")) {
            v0 = v0 + "com.kutxabank.android,";
        }
    }
}
```

Figure 5. Some of the financial apps Anubis targets

Gaps in mobile security can lead to severe consequences for many users because devices are used to hold so much information and connect to many different accounts. Users should be wary of any app that asks for banking credentials in particular and be sure that they are legitimately linked to their bank.

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- [Trend Microopen on a new tab™ Mobile Security for Enterpriseopen on a new tab](#)
- Trend Micro’s [Mobile App Reputation Serviceopen on a new tab](#)

Indicators of Compromise

<i>SHA256 and URLs</i>	<i>Definitions</i>
b012eb5538ad1d56c5bdf9fe9562791a163dffa4 bc87c9ffcdac4eea1b84c62842ce1138fd90ed6 7e025e21d445be9b6b12a9181ada4bab3db5819c e29c814c2527ebbac11398877beea2bc75b58ffd	IoCs
16fc9bc96f58ba35a04ade2d961b0108d135caa5	Payload
areadozemode.space selectnew25mode.space twethujsnu.cc project2anub.xyz taiprotectsq.xyz uwannaplaygame.space projectpredator.space nihaobrazzzahit.top aserogege.space hdfuckedin18.top dingpsounda.space wantddantiprot.space privateanbshouse.space seconddoxed.space firstdoxed.space oauth3.html5100.com dosandiq.space protect4juls.space wijariief.space scradm.in	Command and control

Source: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/a/google-play-apps-drop-anubis-banking-malware-use-motion-based-evasion-tactics.html