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	"id": "1fb4130c-7b3e-4b06-b5bb-48b702c45ad2",
	"created_at": "2026-11-17T02:12:35.976737Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-11-22T02:30:39.996681Z",
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	"sha1_hash": "bcb23e333dada5654ab24e32ddddfd4ab82a7f2d",
	"title": "n0n Group Puts Dozens of Global Ports and Shipping on Its Leak Site",
	"llm_title": "n0n Group Puts Dozens of Global Ports and Shipping on Its Leak Site",
	"authors": "Omer Faruk Diken, SOCRadar",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
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	"plain_text": "https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/\n\nn0n Group Puts Dozens of Global Ports and Shipping on Its Leak\n\nSite\n\nBy Omer Faruk Diken\n\nPublished: 2026-10-13 · Archived: 2026-11-17 02:00:57 UTC\n\nA month after its first leak site postings, the n0n extortion group has turned its attention to global shipping. On\n\nOctober 12, 2026, the group added 38 organizations to its Dark Web leak site in one batch: container terminals in\n\nBrazil, Spain, Morocco, India and Vietnam, shipping lines in Singapore, China and Taiwan, port IT providers in\n\nKuwait, Indonesia and Germany, and a dense cluster of South Korean operators.\n\nThe batch more than doubles the group’s public victim count and shifts it from an opportunistic, cross-sector actor\n\nto one with a clear sector focus. The way the stolen data is described also raises a question that matters more to the\n\nmaritime industry than any single listing: whether these are 38 separate intrusions, or exposure flowing out of one\n\nshared system.\n\nKey Takeaways\n\nActor: n0n is a financially motivated data-theft extortion group that emerged in September 2026\n\nMaritime wave: On October 12, 2026, n0n posted 38 organizations in a single batch, nearly all in port,\n\nshipping and logistics, across 18 countries\n\nConcentration: South Korea accounts for 12 of the 38 entries, including Busan terminal operators BNCT\n\nand Pusan Newport Company\n\nLikely shared entry point:\n\nvictims point to an exposed shared application or vulnerability rather than separate intrusions\n\nDeadline and demands:\n\nreviewed demands ranging from USD 2.4 million to USD 14 million\n\nVerification: None of the maritime claims had been publicly confirmed by a listed organization at the time\n\nof writing\n\nn0n at a Glance\n\nAttribute\n\nName\n\nType\n\nFirst seen\n\nSource country\n\nSmall, application-scoped data sets and incomplete infostealer coverage across\n\nThe maritime entries are set to publish on October 19, 2026, at 13:27 UTC, with\n\nDetail\n\nn0n\n\nData-theft extortion group\n\nSeptember 2026\n\nLikely Russia\n\nPage 1 of 11\n\nAttribute\n\nInitial access\n\nVictims before the maritime wave\n\nMaritime wave\n\nMaritime publication deadline\n\nStatus\n\nWho Is n0n?\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/\n\nDetail\n\nLikely a shared application or vulnerability\n\n21 (as of October 8, 2026)\n\n38 organizations posted on October 12, 2026\n\nOctober 19, 2026, 13:27 UTC\n\nActive\n\nn0n is a financially motivated extortion group that emerged in September 2026 and monetizes stolen data through\n\npublic leak postings. SOCRadar’s tracker profile describes an operation that gets in with credentials harvested by\n\ninfostealer malware, exfiltrates material such as Active Directory mappings and legal documents, and then\n\npressures victims with Dark Web leak postings.\n\nThe profile also notes that n0n avoids traditional ransomware deployment and instead manipulates victim data\n\nwith administrative tools. Its ATT\u0026CK mapping still includes encryption and recovery-inhibition techniques, so\n\ndefenders should not rule out disruptive impact.\n\nUntil an encryptor is publicly tied to the group, n0n is best treated as a data-theft extortion operation with the\n\naccess to cause damage.\n\nBefore the maritime wave, n0n’s victimology was broad and opportunistic. Its first 21 listings spanned investment\n\nfirms, telecommunications, retail, education and pharmaceuticals across 17 countries, including claims against\n\nFanatics, Transcom WorldWide, AstraZeneca Türkiye, Argentina’s Ministry of Education, STOKR and\n\nVenezuelan internet provider Inter. SOCRadar rates n0n near the top of its aggressiveness scale and near zero for\n\nlethality.\n\nInside the October 12 Maritime Wave\n\nThe 38 organizations posted on October 12 cover almost every link in the container supply chain, from the\n\nterminal gate to the shipping line, the port agent and the IT systems that connect them.\n\nSegment\n\nContainer\n\nterminals and port\n\noperators\n\nOrganizations\n\nSantos Brasil, Portonave and Superterminais (Brazil); Asyaport (Turkey); MGNP,\n\nBNCT and Pusan Newport Company (South Korea); TTI Algeciras (Spain); Eurogate\n\nTanger (Morocco); NCT Kandla (India); Nam Dinh Vu Port (Vietnam); NEOM Ports\n\nPort IT, EDI and\n\nterminal systems\n\n(Saudi Arabia)\n\nGNCNet / DGT Busan (South Korea); GCS Kuwait (Kuwait); ILCS Pelindo\n\n(Indonesia); HPC Hamburg Port Consulting (Germany); T2S (Brazil)\n\nPage 2 of 11\n\nSegment\n\nShipping lines and\n\nship operators\n\nAgencies,\n\nlogistics, depots\n\nand surveying\n\nAdjacent industry\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/\n\nOrganizations\n\nOcean Network Express (Singapore); CULines (China); T.S. Lines (Taiwan); Polaris\n\nShipping, Dong-A Tanker, Samjoo Maritime and Korea Ferry (South Korea); Camellia\n\nLine and Tsuneishi / Kambara Kisen (Japan); Samudera (Indonesia)\n\nSaehan Marine, EUSU Logistics and BKH ICD (South Korea); April Asia and\n\nGlobalNet LCL (Indonesia); Yusen Logistics Hong Kong; Premier Alliance\n\n(Netherlands); BMT IQ (United Kingdom)\n\nZPMC (China); Apical Group (Singapore); Dongkuk Steel (South Korea)\n\nSouth Korea, with 12 entries spanning terminal operators, a Busan port IT provider, ship agents, an inland\n\ncontainer depot and Korean shipping companies. SOCRadar’s South Korea Threat Landscape Report found\n\nransomware targeting in the country weighted toward finance, insurance and manufacturing, which makes a\n\nmaritime cluster of this size stand out. Another interesting point is the presence of five port IT and terminal\n\nsystems providers, organizations whose business is holding other companies’ operational data.\n\nThe posts follow a fixed format. Each names the organization with its function in brackets, gives its segment and\n\ncountry, summarizes the claimed data in one line, and closes with a “NOT PAID, EXPOSED” status and a\n\ncountdown to publication.\n\nPage 3 of 11\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/\n\nMaritime and logistics victims on n0n’s Dark Web leak site, each marked “NOT PAID, EXPOSED” with a\n\ncountdown to publication\n\nThe detail pages behind the maritime listings point to one exposed application or vulnerability rather than 38\n\nseparate network intrusions. Reviewed postings  describe small, narrowly scoped data sets:\n\nClaimed\nOrganization Files Data described\nvolume\n\nVessel schedules, container manifests, gate movement\nNam Dinh Vu 23,507 EDI\nNot stated records and booking messages exchanged with\nPort message files\nmultiple international shipping lines\n\nEDI container manifest archives and operational\nILCS Pelindo 2.4 GB 108\nrecords\n\nContainer documentation, EDI shipping records,\nPusan Newport\n1.5 GB 774 deployment material and terminal system configuration\nCompany\nrecords\n\nPage 4 of 11\n\nClaimed\nOrganization Files\nvolume\n\nEurogate Tanger 660 MB 354\n\nBMT IQ 90 MB 18\n\nEUSU Logistics 60 MB 41\n\ndeployment material and terminal system configuration records\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/\n\nData described\n\nCommercial configuration records, systems release\n\ndocumentation, and container and vessel records\n\nCommercial e-invoice records, equipment interchange\n\nreceipts and inspection records\n\nInfrastructure configuration and assessment records\n\nand internal systems material\n\nn0n’s posting for Pusan Newport Company claims 1.5 GB of container documentation, EDI shipping records,\n\nPage 5 of 11\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/\n\nThree observations support a shared entry point:\n\nScale: Each reviewed listing presents its data as a complete archive or copy, yet volumes run from 60 MB\n\nto 2.4 GB and file counts from 18 to 774, the footprint of a single application’s data store rather than a\n\ncompromised corporate network\n\nContent: The same narrow categories recur across countries and business types: EDI messages, manifests,\n\ngate and equipment interchange records, terminal system configuration, release documentation and\n\ndeployment material\n\nAccess: SOCRadar checks stealer-log data for n0n victims’ domains, and did not find credential matches\n\nfor many maritime organization listed, so stolen credentials, n0n’s documented entry point, do not explain\n\nthe batch\n\nRelease documentation and deployment material sit with the systems and integration layer that connects terminals,\n\ncarriers and agents. The likeliest source is therefore a platform that many of these organizations use or exchange\n\ndata through, such as a terminal system, EDI integration or file transfer product, reached through a vulnerability or\n\na shared access path.\n\nThe pattern resembles earlier mass-exploitation extortion campaigns, such as those against MOVEit Transfer in\n\n2023 and Cleo in 2024, where a flaw in one widely deployed file transfer product produced a long list of victims\n\nwhose data came from that single application. There is no evidence linking n0n to those campaigns.\n\nA shared source also widens the exposure beyond the 38 names. The Nam Dinh Vu Port posting itself states that\n\nits archive would expose the cargo flows, booking relationships and operational records of every carrier that called\n\nat the terminal. Interchange headers in any published EDI files, together with archive date ranges, should help\n\nidentify the system the data came from.\n\nn0n’s posting for Nam Dinh Vu Port describes an archive of 23,507 EDI message files exchanged with multiple\n\ninternational shipping lines\n\nPage 6 of 11\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/\n\nHow n0n Applies Pressure\n\nn0n’s leak site works as a public scoreboard. Every entry carries a status and a countdown, and the statuses tell\n\nvictims, and everyone watching, how the group expects negotiations to go.\n\nStatus What it signals\n\nPENDING The victim is anonymized as “Company #N” with only a sector and location, and a\n\nEXPOSURE publication date one to three days out\n\nNOT PAID,\nThe victim is named, with a publication date and countdown\nEXPOSED\n\nThe victim settled before its deadline; one Canadian financial services company carries\nHONORED\nthis label with a settlement date of October 7, 2026\n\nAnonymized posting lets the group show a breach to the victim, and hint at it publicly, while keeping room to\n\nnegotiate before the name goes out. The “HONORED” label serves the opposite audience: it advertises to future\n\nvictims that paying works.\n\nThe maritime batch breaks from the group’s earlier rhythm. Instead of short, staggered deadlines, the maritime\n\nentries were posted named and the ones reviewed share a single publication time of October 19, 2026, at 13:27\n\nUTC, a seven-day window. A uniform deadline is consistent with a batch processed at once, which supports the\n\npossibility of a common data source discussed above.\n\nFixed Prices and a Paid Negotiation Room\n\nThe detail pages reviewed set a fixed settlement amount in US dollars with its Bitcoin equivalent and a dedicated\n\nBitcoin address. The pages state that payment is verified automatically on-chain, and that once the full amount\n\narrives the data is destroyed and the page removed, with no registration, contact or negotiation.\n\nNegotiation is available, at a price. The Eurogate Tanger and ILCS Pelindo pages offer a one-time option: send\n\n10% of the settlement amount to the same address in a single transaction, then use the transaction ID to claim a\n\nprivate negotiation room. For Eurogate Tanger, that entry fee is 5.7 BTC, roughly USD 600,000; for ILCS\n\nPelindo, it is 2.3 BTC, roughly USD 240,000.\n\nPage 7 of 11\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/\n\nn0n’s Eurogate Tanger posting, with a USD 6 million settlement demand and a 10% entry fee for a private\n\nnegotiation room\n\nDemands do not scale with data volume. EUSU Logistics faces the highest demand reviewed, USD 14 million for\n\n60 MB of data, while ILCS Pelindo’s 2.4 GB carries a USD 2.4 million demand.\n\nPage 8 of 11\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/\n\nn0n demands USD 14 million from EUSU Logistics for a claimed 60 MB of data\n\nHow Much Weight Do the Claims Carry?\n\nn0n’s claims should be treated as unverified until data is published or a victim confirms. Of the 21 victims\n\nSOCRadar tracked before the maritime wave, 19 remain at the “Claimed” stage, one is listed as negotiating and\n\none, Chibitek, has had data leaked.\n\nSeveral factors cut both ways:\n\nSpecificity: The maritime descriptions name concrete data types, such as bunker cost calculations,\n\ndemurrage and despatch records, and port disbursement accounts, which are hard to invent convincingly at\n\nscale\n\nTemplated language: The entries follow an identical structure and phrasing, which suggests automated or\n\ngenerated write-ups and says little about the underlying access\n\nPage 9 of 11\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/\n\nNo confirmations: No listed maritime organization had publicly confirmed an incident at the time of\n\nwriting\n\nTrack record: The group’s earlier high-profile claims, including those against Fanatics and Transcom\n\nWorldWide, had not been publicly confirmed by the named companies at the time of writing\n\nThe October 19 deadline is the most useful test. Whether data appears, how much, and whether it matches the\n\ndescriptions will show what n0n actually holds.\n\nWhat Maritime and Logistics Organizations Should Do Now\n\nListed or not, any organization that exchanges EDI with the companies above should plan for the possibility that\n\nits operational data appears in the October 19 release.\n\nMap your shared platforms: Identify which port community systems, EDI hubs, terminal system vendors\n\nand file transfer services carry your data, and ask them directly whether they are investigating\n\nPatch and review exposed interfaces: Check internet-facing EDI, file transfer and terminal system\n\ncomponents for outstanding security updates and unexpected access or bulk downloads; as SOCRadar’s\n\nmaritime OSINT guide shows, port management and cargo tracking systems can be discoverable on search\n\nengines such as Shodan\n\nRotate integration credentials: Reset SFTP, AS2, VAN and vendor support accounts used for EDI and\n\nterminal systems, starting with any shared or long-lived ones\n\nCheck infostealer exposure: Search for employee and vendor credentials in stealer logs, since n0n’s\n\nearlier access started there; the SOCRadar Dark Web Report is a free starting point\n\nClose remote access gaps: Enforce MFA on VPN and RDP, remove internet-exposed RDP, and review\n\nrecent remote logins for unfamiliar sources\n\nPrepare for counterparty exposure: Draft customer and regulator communications now, because your\n\ndata can leak through a partner’s or vendor’s breach even if your own network is clean\n\nTrack the group: Follow n0n’s activity and new postings on its SOCRadar group profile\n\nFrequently Asked Questions\n\nWhat Is the n0n Ransomware Group?\n\nn0n is a financially motivated extortion group that emerged in September 2026. It has typically gained access with\n\ncredentials stolen by infostealer malware, and it threatens to publish stolen data on its Dark Web leak site unless\n\nvictims pay.\n\nDoes n0n Deploy Ransomware?\n\nSOCRadar’s profile describes n0n as avoiding traditional ransomware and relying on data theft and extortion,\n\nalthough its ATT\u0026CK mapping includes encryption and recovery-inhibition techniques.\n\nWhich Maritime Organizations Did n0n List?\n\nPage 10 of 11\n\nhttps://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/\n\nOn October 12, 2026, n0n posted 38 organizations, including Santos Brasil, Ocean Network Express, Pusan\n\nNewport Company, BNCT, TTI Algeciras, Eurogate Tanger, NEOM Ports, ILCS Pelindo and Camellia Line.\n\nHow Did n0n Access the Maritime Victims?\n\nThis has not been confirmed. Small, application-scoped data sets and the lack of infostealer credential matches for\n\nsome victims point to an exposed shared application or vulnerability rather than separate intrusions.\n\nHow Much Is n0n Demanding?\n\nSettlement demands reviewed by SOCRadar range from USD 2.4 million to USD 14 million, payable in Bitcoin to\n\na unique address per victim, and some pages require a 10% payment before negotiations can open.\n\nWhen Will the Maritime Data Be Published?\n\nThe maritime entries show a publication deadline of October 19, 2026, at 13:27 UTC.\n\nHave the Listed Companies Confirmed a Breach?\n\nNo listed maritime organization had publicly confirmed an incident at the time of writing, and the claims remain\n\nunverified.\n\nOmer Faruk Diken\n\nOmer is Technical Content Lead at SOCRadar, helping turn threat research into reports, blog posts, and other\n\nmaterial for the security community. He spends most of his time working with researchers and editors to get the\n\ndetails right. There's usually a draft in progress and a headline he isn't quite happy with yet.\n\nSource: https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-group-global-ports-shipping-leak/\n\nPage 11 of 11",
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