

TEMP.Veles, XENOTIME, Group G0088 | MITRE ATT&CK®

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Enterprise [T1583 .003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server](#)

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) used Virtual Private Server (VPS) infrastructure.^[1]

Enterprise [T1595 Active Scanning](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) engaged in network reconnaissance against targets of interest.^[2]

Enterprise [T1059 .001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) used a publicly available PowerShell-based tool, WMImplant.^[2]

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) used PowerShell to perform timestomping.^[1]

Enterprise [T1074 .001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging](#)

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) used staging folders that are infrequently used by legitimate users or processes to store data for exfiltration and tool deployment.^[1]

Enterprise [T1587 .001 Develop Capabilities: Malware](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) developed, prior to the attack, malware capabilities that would require access to specific and specialized hardware and software.^[7]

Enterprise [T1573 Encrypted Channel](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) used cryptcat binaries to encrypt their traffic.^[2]

Enterprise [T1546 .012 Event Triggered Execution: Image File Execution Options Injection](#)

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) modified and added entries within

```
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
```

to maintain persistence.^[1]

Enterprise [T1133 External Remote Services](#)

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) used VPN access to persist in the victim environment.^[1]

Enterprise [T1070 .004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion](#)

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) routinely deleted tools, logs, and other files after they were finished with them.^[1]

[.006 Indicator Removal: Timestamp](#)

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) used timestomping to modify the `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` attribute on tools.^[1]

Enterprise [T1056 .003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) captured credentials as they were being changed by redirecting text-based login codes to websites they controlled.^[6]

Enterprise [T1036 .005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) renamed files to look like legitimate files, such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files.

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) renamed files to look like legitimate files, such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files.^[1]

Enterprise [T1571 Non-Standard Port](#)

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) used port-protocol mismatches on ports such as 443, 4444, 8531, and 50501 during C2.^[1]

Enterprise [T1027 .005 Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) modified files based on the open-source project cryptcat in an apparent attempt to decrease anti-virus detection rates.^[2]

Enterprise [T1588 .002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) used tools such as Mimikatz and other open-source software.^[2]

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz and PsExec.^[1]

Enterprise [T1003 .001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) used Mimikatz.^[8]

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) used Mimikatz and a custom tool, SecHack, to harvest credentials.^[1]

Enterprise [T1572 Protocol Tunneling](#)

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) used encrypted SSH-based PLINK tunnels to transfer tools and enable RDP connections throughout the environment.^[1]

Enterprise [T1021 .001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol](#)

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) utilized RDP throughout an operation.^[1]

[.004 Remote Services: SSH](#)

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) relied on encrypted SSH-based tunnels to transfer tools and for remote command/program execution.^[1]

Enterprise [T1053 .005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) installed scheduled tasks defined in XML files.^[2]

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) used scheduled task XML triggers.^[1]

Enterprise [T1505 .003 Server Software Component: Web Shell](#)

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) planted Web shells on Outlook Exchange servers.^[1]

Enterprise [T1078 Valid Accounts](#)

During the [C0032](#) campaign, [TEMP.Veles](#) used compromised VPN accounts.^[1]

ICS [T0830 Adversary-in-the-Middle](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) changed phone numbers tied to certain specific accounts in a designated contact list. They then used the changed phone numbers to redirect network traffic to websites controlled by them, thereby allowing them to capture and use any login codes sent to the devices via text message.^[6]

ICS [T0807 Command-Line Interface](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#)' tool took one option from the command line, which was a single IP address of the target Triconex device.^[7]

ICS [T0817 Drive-by Compromise](#)

[TEMP.Veles](#) utilizes watering hole websites to target industrial employees.^[9]

ICS [T0872 Indicator Removal on Host](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) would programmatically return the controller to a normal running state if the [Triton](#) malware failed. If the controller could not recover in a defined time window, [TEMP.Veles](#) programmatically overwrote their malicious program with invalid data.^[7]

ICS [T0867 Lateral Tool Transfer](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) made attempts on multiple victim machines to transfer and execute the WMImplant tool.^[2]

ICS [T0828 Loss of Productivity and Revenue](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) tripped a controller into a failed safe state, which caused an automatic shutdown of the plant, this resulted in a pause of plant operations for more than a week. Thereby impacting industrial processes and halting productivity.^[7]

ICS [T0843 Program Download](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) downloaded multiple rounds of control logic to the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers through a program append operation.^[7]

ICS [T0886 Remote Services](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) utilized remote desktop protocol (RDP) jump boxes, poorly configured OT firewalls ^[6], along with other traditional malware backdoors, to move into the ICS environment.^{[8][6]}

ICS [T0853 Scripting](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) used a publicly available PowerShell-based tool, WMImplant.^[2]

ICS [T0862 Supply Chain Compromise](#)

[TEMP.Veles](#) targeted several ICS vendors and manufacturers. ^[10]

ICS [T0855 Unauthorized Command Message](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) leveraged [Triton](#) to send unauthorized command messages to the Triconex safety controllers.^[8]

ICS [T0859 Valid Accounts](#)

In the [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](#), [TEMP.Veles](#) used valid credentials when laterally moving through RDP jump boxes into the ICS environment.^[8]

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088/>