

# Hijack Execution Flow: DLL, Sub-technique T1574.001 - Enterprise

Archived: 2026-04-05 17:07:36 UTC

## [C0057 3CX Supply Chain Attack](#)

During the [3CX Supply Chain Attack](#), [AppleJeus](#) splits functionally across multiple .dll files using export functions, such as `DLLGetClassObject`, to execute code from an embedded .dll file within another .dll file. [AppleJeus](#) has also used DLL search order hijacking via the `IKEEXT` service, running with `LocalSystem` privileges, to load the `TAXHAUL` DLL for persistence. [\[12\]\[13\]](#)

## [G0073 APT19](#)

[APT19](#) launched an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant using a legitimate executable that loaded the malicious DLL. [\[14\]](#)

## [G0022 APT3](#)

[APT3](#) has been known to side load DLLs with a valid version of Chrome with one of their tools. [\[15\]\[16\]](#)

## [G0050 APT32](#)

[APT32](#) ran legitimately-signed executables from Symantec and McAfee which load a malicious DLL. The group also side-loads its backdoor by dropping a library and a legitimate, signed executable (`AcroTranscoder`). [\[17\]\[18\]\[19\]](#)

## [G0096 APT41](#)

[APT41](#) has used search order hijacking to execute malicious payloads, such as [Winnti for Windows](#). [\[20\]](#) [APT41](#) has also used legitimate executables to perform DLL side-loading of their malware. [\[21\]](#)

## [C0040 APT41 DUST](#)

[APT41 DUST](#) involved the use of DLL search order hijacking to execute [DUSTTRAP](#). [\[22\]](#) [APT41 DUST](#) used also DLL side-loading to execute [DUSTTRAP](#) via an AhnLab uninstaller. [\[22\]](#)

## [G0143 Aquatic Panda](#)

[Aquatic Panda](#) has used DLL search-order hijacking to load `exe`, `dll`, and `dat` files into memory. [\[23\]](#) [Aquatic Panda](#) loaded a malicious DLL into the legitimate Windows Security Health Service executable (`SecurityHealthService.exe`) to execute malicious code on victim systems. [\[24\]](#)

## [S0373 Astaroth](#)

[Astaroth](#) can launch itself via DLL Search Order Hijacking. [\[25\]](#)

### [G0135 BackdoorDiplomacy](#)

[BackdoorDiplomacy](#) has executed DLL search order hijacking. [\[26\]](#)

### [S0128 BADNEWS](#)

[BADNEWS](#) typically loads its DLL file into a legitimate signed Java or VMware executable. [\[27\]\[28\]](#)

### [S0127 BBSRAT](#)

DLL side-loading has been used to execute [BBSRAT](#) through a legitimate Citrix executable, ssonsvr.exe. The Citrix executable was dropped along with [BBSRAT](#) by the dropper. [\[29\]](#)

### [G0098 BlackTech](#)

[BlackTech](#) has used DLL side loading by giving DLLs hardcoded names and placing them in searched directories. [\[30\]](#)

### [S1226 BOOKWORM](#)

[BOOKWORM](#) has used DLL side-loading to execute the malicious payload. [\[31\]\[32\]](#) [BOOKWORM](#) has also side-loaded DLL components into a legitimate process, including Microsoft Malware Protection `MsmEng.exe` and Kaspersky Anti-Virus `ushata.exe`. [\[33\]](#)

### [S0415 BOOSTWRITE](#)

[BOOSTWRITE](#) has exploited the loading of the legitimate Dwrite.dll file by actually loading the gdi library, which then loads the gdiplus library and ultimately loads the local Dwrite dll. [\[34\]](#)

### [G0060 BRONZE BUTLER](#)

[BRONZE BUTLER](#) has used legitimate applications to side-load malicious DLLs. [\[35\]](#)

### [S1063 Brute Ratel C4](#)

[Brute Ratel C4](#) has used search order hijacking to load a malicious payload DLL as a dependency to a benign application packaged in the same ISO. [\[36\]](#) [Brute Ratel C4](#) has loaded a malicious DLL by spoofing the name of the legitimate Version.DLL and placing it in the same folder as the digitally-signed Microsoft binary OneDriveUpdater.exe. [\[36\]](#)

### [S1237 CANONSTAGER](#)

[CANONSTAGER](#) has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs. [\[37\]](#)

### [S0631 Chaes](#)

[Chaes](#) has used search order hijacking to load a malicious DLL. [\[38\]](#)

### [G0114 Chimera](#)

[Chimera](#) has used side loading to place malicious DLLs in memory. [\[39\]](#)

### [S1041 Chinoxy](#)

[Chinoxy](#) can use a digitally signed binary ("Logitech Bluetooth Wizard Host Process") to load its dll into memory. [\[40\]](#)

### [G1021 Cinnamon Tempest](#)

[Cinnamon Tempest](#) has used search order hijacking to launch [Cobalt Strike](#) Beacons. [\[41\]\[42\]](#) [Cinnamon Tempest](#) has also abused legitimate executables to side-load weaponized DLLs. [\[43\]](#)

### [S1236 CLAIMLOADER](#)

[CLAIMLOADER](#) has used a legitimately signed executable to execute a malicious payload within a DLL file. [\[44\]](#)

### [S0660 Clambling](#)

[Clambling](#) can store a file named `mpsvc.dll`, which opens a malicious `mpsvc.mui` file, in the same folder as the legitimate Microsoft executable `MsMpEng.exe` to gain execution. [\[45\]\[46\]](#)

### [S1235 CorKLOG](#)

[CorKLOG](#) has leveraged legitimate binaries to conduct DLL side-loading. [\[47\]](#)

### [S0538 Crutch](#)

[Crutch](#) can persist via DLL search order hijacking on Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, or Microsoft OneDrive. [\[48\]](#)

### [G1034 Daggerfly](#)

[Daggerfly](#) has used legitimate software to side-load [PlugX](#) loaders onto victim systems. [\[49\]](#) [Daggerfly](#) is also linked to multiple other instances of side-loading for initial loading activity. [\[50\]](#)

### [S1111 DarkGate](#)

[DarkGate](#) includes one infection vector that leverages a malicious "KeyScramblerE.DLL" library that will load during the execution of the legitimate KeyScrambler application. [\[51\]](#)

### [S0354 Denis](#)

[Denis](#) exploits a security vulnerability to load a fake DLL and execute its code. [\[17\]](#)

### [S0134 Downdelph](#)

[Downdelph](#) uses search order hijacking of the Windows executable sysprep.exe to escalate privileges. [\[52\]](#)

### [S0384 Dridex](#)

[Dridex](#) can abuse legitimate Windows executables to side-load malicious DLL files.<sup>[53]</sup>

### [G1006 Earth Lusca](#)

[Earth Lusca](#) has placed a malicious payload in `%WINDIR%\SYSTEM32\oci.dll` so it would be sideloaded by the MSDTC service.<sup>[54]</sup>

### [S0624 Ecipekac](#)

[Ecipekac](#) can abuse the legitimate application `policytool.exe` to load a malicious DLL.<sup>[55]</sup>

### [S0554 Egregor](#)

[Egregor](#) has used DLL side-loading to execute its payload.<sup>[56]</sup>

### [S0363 Empire](#)

[Empire](#) contains modules that can discover and exploit various DLL hijacking opportunities.<sup>[57]</sup>

### [G0120 Evilnum](#)

[Evilnum](#) has used the malware variant, TerraTV, to load a malicious DLL placed in the TeamViewer directory, instead of the original Windows DLL located in a system folder.<sup>[58]</sup>

### [G1016 FIN13](#)

[FIN13](#) has used IISCrack.dll as a side-loading technique to load a malicious version of `httpodbc.dll` on old IIS Servers (CVE-2001-0507).<sup>[59]</sup>

### [S0182 FinFisher](#)

[FinFisher](#) uses DLL side-loading to load malicious programs.<sup>[60][61]</sup> A [FinFisher](#) variant also uses DLL search order hijacking.<sup>[60][62]</sup>

### [S0661 FoggyWeb](#)

[FoggyWeb](#)'s loader has used DLL Search Order Hijacking to load malicious code instead of the legitimate `version.dll` during the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe` execution process.<sup>[63]</sup>

### [G0093 GALLIUM](#)

[GALLIUM](#) used DLL side-loading to covertly load [PoisonIvy](#) into memory on the victim machine.<sup>[64]</sup>

### [S0032 gh0st RAT](#)

A [gh0st RAT](#) variant has used DLL side-loading.<sup>[65]</sup>

### [S0477 Goopy](#)

[Goopy](#) has the ability to side-load malicious DLLs with legitimate applications from Kaspersky, Microsoft, and Google.<sup>[18]</sup>

### [G0126 Higaisa](#)

[Higaisa](#)'s JavaScript file used a legitimate Microsoft Office 2007 package to side-load the `0INF012.0CX` dynamic link library.<sup>[66]</sup>

### [S0009 Hikit](#)

[Hikit](#) has used [DLL](#) to load `oci.dll` as a persistence mechanism.<sup>[67]</sup>

### [S1230 HIUPAN](#)

[HIUPAN](#) has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs to include the legitimate `exe` `UsbConfig.exe`.<sup>[68][69]</sup>

### [S0070 HTTPBrowser](#)

[HTTPBrowser](#) abuses the Windows DLL load order by using a legitimate Symantec anti-virus binary, `VPDN_LU.exe`, to load a malicious DLL that mimics a legitimate Symantec DLL, `navlu.dll`.<sup>[70]</sup> [HTTPBrowser](#) has also used DLL side-loading.<sup>[71]</sup>

### [S1097 HUI Loader](#)

[HUI Loader](#) can be deployed to targeted systems via legitimate programs that are vulnerable to DLL search order hijacking.<sup>[42]</sup>

### [S0398 HyperBro](#)

[HyperBro](#) has used a legitimate application to sideload a DLL to decrypt, decompress, and run a payload.<sup>[72][73]</sup>

### [S0260 InvisiMole](#)

[InvisiMole](#) can be launched by using DLL search order hijacking in which the wrapper DLL is placed in the same folder as `explorer.exe` and loaded during startup into the Windows Explorer process instead of the legitimate library.<sup>[74]</sup>

### [S0528 Javali](#)

[Javali](#) can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs into legitimate executables.<sup>[25]</sup>

### [S0585 Kertdown](#)

[Kertdown](#) can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs.<sup>[75]</sup>

### [G0032 Lazarus Group](#)

[Lazarus Group](#) has replaced `win_fw.dll`, an internal component that is executed during IDA Pro installation, with a malicious DLL to download and execute a payload.<sup>[76]</sup> [Lazarus Group](#) utilized DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads through abuse of the legitimate processes `wsmprovhost.exe` and `dfrgui.exe`.<sup>[77]</sup>

### [S1101 LoFiSe](#)

[LoFiSe](#) has been executed as a file named `DsNcDiag.dll` through side-loading.<sup>[78]</sup>

### [S0582 LookBack](#)

[LookBack](#) side loads its communications module as a DLL into the `libcurl.dll` loader.<sup>[79]</sup>

### [G1014 LuminousMoth](#)

[LuminousMoth](#) has used legitimate executables such as `winword.exe` and `igfxem.exe` to side-load their malware.<sup>[80][81]</sup>

### [S1213 Lumma Stealer](#)

[Lumma Stealer](#) has leveraged legitimate applications to then side-load malicious DLLs during execution.<sup>[82]</sup>

### [S0530 Melcoz](#)

[Melcoz](#) can use DLL hijacking to bypass security controls.<sup>[25]</sup>

### [G0045 menuPass](#)

[menuPass](#) has used DLL side-loading to launch versions of Mimikatz and PwDump6 as well as [UPPERCUT](#).<sup>[83]</sup>  
<sup>[84][85]</sup> [menuPass](#) has also used DLL search order hijacking.<sup>[86]</sup>

### [S1059 metaMain](#)

[metaMain](#) can support an HKCMD sideloading start method.<sup>[87]</sup>

### [S0455 Metamorfo](#)

[Metamorfo](#) has side-loaded its malicious DLL file.<sup>[88][89][90]</sup>

### [S0280 MirageFox](#)

[MirageFox](#) is likely loaded via DLL hijacking into a legitimate McAfee binary.<sup>[91]</sup>

### [G0069 MuddyWater](#)

[MuddyWater](#) maintains persistence on victim networks through side-loading dlls to trick legitimate programs into running malware.<sup>[92]</sup>

### [G0129 Mustang Panda](#)

[Mustang Panda](#) has used a legitimately signed executable to execute a malicious payload within a DLL file. [\[93\]\[94\]](#)  
[\[95\]\[31\]\[96\]\[97\]\[98\]\[99\]\[100\]\[101\]\[33\]\[102\]\[47\]\[103\]](#) [Mustang Panda](#) has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs. [\[104\]\[105\]\[44\]\[68\]\[37\]](#)

### [G0019 Naikon](#)

[Naikon](#) has used DLL side-loading to load malicious DLL's into legitimate executables. [\[106\]](#)

### [S0630 Nebulae](#)

[Nebulae](#) can use DLL side-loading to gain execution. [\[107\]](#)

### [S1100 Ninja](#)

[Ninja](#) loaders can be side-loaded with legitimate and signed executables including the VLC.exe media player. [\[78\]](#)

### [C0012 Operation CuckooBees](#)

During [Operation CuckooBees](#), the threat actors used the legitimate Windows services `IKEEXT` and `PrintNotify` to side-load malicious DLLs. [\[108\]](#)

### [S1233 PAKLOG](#)

[PAKLOG](#) has leveraged legitimate binaries to conduct DLL side-loading. [\[47\]](#)

### [S0664 Pandora](#)

[Pandora](#) can use DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads. [\[73\]](#)

### [G0040 Patchwork](#)

A [Patchwork](#) .dll that contains [BADNEWS](#) is loaded and executed using DLL side-loading. [\[109\]](#)

### [S1102 Pcexter](#)

[Pcexter](#) has been distributed and executed as a DLL file named `Vspmsg.dll` via DLL side-loading. [\[78\]](#)

### [S0013 PlugX](#)

[PlugX](#) has the ability to use DLL search order hijacking for installation on targeted systems. [\[110\]\[102\]](#) [PlugX](#) has also used DLL side-loading to evade anti-virus. [\[16\]\[71\]\[111\]\[83\]\[112\]\[45\]\[113\]](#) [PlugX](#) has also used a legitimately signed executable to side-load a malicious payload within a DLL file. [\[93\]\[95\]\[96\]\[102\]\[114\]](#)

### [S0194 PowerSploit](#)

[PowerSploit](#) contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit DLL hijacking opportunities in services and processes. [\[115\]](#)[\[116\]](#)

#### [S1046 PowGoop](#)

[PowGoop](#) can side-load `Goopdate.dll` into `GoogleUpdate.exe`. [\[92\]](#)[\[117\]](#)

#### [S0113 Prikormka](#)

[Prikormka](#) uses DLL search order hijacking for persistence by saving itself as `ntshui.dll` to the Windows directory so it will load before the legitimate `ntshui.dll` saved in the System32 subdirectory. [\[118\]](#)

#### [S1228 PUBLOAD](#)

[PUBLOAD](#) has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs. [\[95\]](#)[\[104\]](#)[\[105\]](#)[\[68\]](#)[\[100\]](#)[\[32\]](#)[\[119\]](#)

#### [S0650 QakBot](#)

[QakBot](#) has the ability to use DLL side-loading for execution. [\[120\]](#)

#### [S0629 RainyDay](#)

[RainyDay](#) can use side-loading to run malicious executables. [\[107\]](#)

#### [S0458 Ramsay](#)

[Ramsay](#) can hijack outdated Windows application dependencies with malicious versions of its own DLL payload. [\[121\]](#)

#### [S1130 Raspberry Robin](#)

[Raspberry Robin](#) can use legitimate, signed EXE files paired with malicious DLL files to load and run malicious payloads while bypassing defenses. [\[122\]](#)

#### [S0662 RCSession](#)

[RCSession](#) can be installed via DLL side-loading. [\[123\]](#)[\[45\]](#)[\[113\]](#)

#### [C0047 RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations](#)

[Mustang Panda](#) used DLL search order hijacking on vulnerable applications to install [PlugX](#) payloads during [RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations](#). [\[124\]](#)

#### [S0153 RedLeaves](#)

[RedLeaves](#) is launched through use of DLL search order hijacking to load a malicious dll. [\[125\]](#)

#### [G0048 RTM](#)

[RTM](#) has used search order hijacking to force TeamViewer to load a malicious DLL. [\[126\]](#)

#### [S0074 Sakula](#)

[Sakula](#) uses DLL side-loading, typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files. [\[127\]](#)

#### [G1008 SideCopy](#)

[SideCopy](#) has used a malicious loader DLL file to execute the `credwiz.exe` process and side-load the malicious payload `Duser.dll`. [\[128\]](#)

#### [G0121 Sidewinder](#)

[Sidewinder](#) has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file `rekeywiz.exe`. [\[129\]](#)

#### [S1232 SplatDropper](#)

[SplatDropper](#) has leveraged legitimate binaries to conduct DLL side-loading. [\[47\]](#)

#### [S1227 StarProxy](#)

[StarProxy](#) has been side-loaded by the legitimate, signed executable, `IsoBurner.exe`. [\[103\]](#)

#### [G1046 Storm-1811](#)

[Storm-1811](#) has deployed a malicious DLL (`7z.DLL`) that is sideloaded by a modified, legitimate installer (`7zG.exe`) when that installer is executed with an additional command line parameter of `b` at runtime to load a [Cobalt Strike](#) beacon payload. [\[130\]](#)

#### [S1183 StrelaStealer](#)

[StrelaStealer](#) has sideloaded a DLL payload using a renamed, legitimate `msinfo32.exe` executable. [\[131\]](#)

#### [S0663 SysUpdate](#)

[SysUpdate](#) can load DLLs through vulnerable legitimate executables. [\[73\]](#)

#### [S0098 T9000](#)

During the [T9000](#) installation process, it drops a copy of the legitimate Microsoft binary `igfxtray.exe`. The executable contains a side-loading weakness which is used to load a portion of the malware. [\[132\]](#)

#### [G0027 Threat Group-3390](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has performed DLL search order hijacking to execute their payload. [\[133\]](#) [Threat Group-3390](#) has also used DLL side-loading, including by using legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants as well as `rc.exe`, a

legitimate Microsoft Resource Compiler. [\[71\]](#)[\[134\]](#)[\[135\]](#)[\[72\]](#)[\[136\]](#)

### [S1239 TONESHELL](#)

[TONESHELL](#) has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs. [\[104\]](#)[\[137\]](#)[\[98\]](#)[\[99\]](#)[\[100\]](#)[\[138\]](#)

[TONESHELL](#) has also been loaded via DLL side-loading, using legitimate, signed executables to include: FastVD.exe, Bandizip.exe and gpgconf.exe. [\[103\]](#)

### [G0131 Tonto Team](#)

[Tonto Team](#) abuses a legitimate and signed Microsoft executable to launch a malicious DLL. [\[139\]](#)

### [G0081 Tropic Trooper](#)

[Tropic Trooper](#) has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools. [\[140\]](#)[\[141\]](#)

### [G1047 Velvet Ant](#)

[Velvet Ant](#) has used malicious DLLs executed via legitimate EXE files through DLL search order hijacking to launch follow-on payloads such as [PlugX](#). [\[142\]](#)

### [S0612 WastedLocker](#)

[WastedLocker](#) has performed DLL hijacking before execution. [\[143\]](#)

### [S0579 Waterbear](#)

[Waterbear](#) has used DLL side loading to import and load a malicious DLL loader. [\[30\]](#)

### [S0109 WEBC2](#)

Variants of [WEBC2](#) achieve persistence by using DLL search order hijacking, usually by copying the DLL file to %SYSTEMROOT% ( C:\WINDOWS\ntshrui.dll ). [\[144\]](#)

### [G0107 Whitefly](#)

[Whitefly](#) has used search order hijacking to run the loader Vcrodat. [\[145\]](#)

### [S0176 Wingbird](#)

[Wingbird](#) side loads a malicious file, sspisrv.dll, in part of a spoofed lssas.exe service. [\[146\]](#)[\[147\]](#)

### [S0230 ZeroT](#)

[ZeroT](#) has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads. [\[148\]](#)[\[149\]](#)

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001>