# “Sin”-ful SPIDERS: WIZARD SPIDER and LUNAR SPIDER Sharing the Same Web **[crowdstrike.com/blog/sin-ful-spiders-wizard-spider-and-lunar-spider-sharing-the-same-web/](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sin-ful-spiders-wizard-spider-and-lunar-spider-sharing-the-same-web/)** February 15, 2019 February 15, 2019 [Brendon Feeley and Bex Hartley](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/author/brendon-feeley-and-bex-hartley/) [Research & Threat Intel](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/category/threat-intel-research/) CrowdStrike Intelligence observed a new campaign from a LUNAR SPIDER affiliate to distribute® WIZARD SPIDER’s TrickBot malware on Feb. 7, 2019. However, this latest campaign is somewhat unique due to a custom variant of a TrickBot module that (to date) is only associated with this campaign. The WIZARD SPIDER threat group is the Russia-based operator of the TrickBot banking malware. This group represents a growing criminal enterprise of which GRIM SPIDER appears to be a subset. The LUNAR SPIDER threat group is the Eastern European-based operator and developer of the [commodity banking malware called BokBot (aka IcedID), which was first observed in April](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/digging-into-bokbots-core-module/) 2017. The BokBot malware provides LUNAR SPIDER affiliates with a variety of capabilities to enable credential theft and wire fraud, through the use of webinjects and a malware distribution function. Campaigns involving both BokBot and TrickBot were first identified by CrowdStrike Intelligence in July 2017. In these campaigns, victim machines infected with BokBot issued a command to download and execute a TrickBot payload. A somewhat sporadic relationship between the two adversaries has continued since then, although this most recent campaign likely signals a more intimate phase of that relationship. ## TrickBot Distribution ----- On Feb. 7, 2019, LUNAR SPIDER s BokBot project ID `C610DF9A was seen downloading and` executing a loader from `http://tfulf[.]host/Sw9HJmXzq.exe. The custom loader` subsequently downloaded a TrickBot loader from `http://185.68.93[.]30/sin.png . The` configuration file of this sample indicates it is TrickBot version 1000351 and belongs to the group tag (gtag) `sin2. The gtags with a prefix of` `sin have been related to LUNAR SPIDER activity` as the successor to the previously associated `mom gtag prefix.` The full TrickBot configuration file, including command-and-control (C2) servers, can be seen below. ``` 181.129.93[.]226:449 ``` ----- ``` 170.79.176[.]242:449 ## Modified TrickBot Module ``` This activity follows the previous pattern of BokBot assisting in the delivery of TrickBot. However, the most interesting thing about the custom loader is the embedded, Base64-encoded Portable Executable (PE) file shown in Figure 1. Figure 1. Base64-Encoded PE File The embedded PE file is extracted by the custom loader, then decoded and executed. Analysis revealed that this decoded PE file is, in fact, a modified version of the TrickBot [lateral movement](https://www.crowdstrike.com/epp-101/lateral-movement/) module `shareDll . Typically, TrickBot modules are downloaded as a dynamic link library (DLL)` with a standard set of exports, named `Start, Control and` `Release . This DLL would then be` injected into a child `svchost.exe process within the TrickBot modular framework. However, in` the absence of this framework, the `shareDll module distributed by BokBot is a PE file.` In addition, the strings within a standard TrickBot module are not obfuscated or protected in any way. However, the module distributed by BokBot contains strings that are both encrypted with 256bit AES, with a derived key and initialization vector (IV), and Base64-encoded with the custom alphabet of `terKSDozBw1l24IyCL6AHh/+5WRiGnj3xJQ8YkEbcgOZVNPamMsuUTpd0q9vFfX7. The` strings are stored in an encrypted string table (shown in Figure 2) in the exact same way as the main TrickBot loader, and decrypted when they are needed. ----- Figure 2. Custom Base64 Alphabet and Encrypted Strings Table 1 below outlines the key identified differences between the two variants of the shareDll module. **BokBot Distributed shareDll** **TrickBot Distributed shareDll** PE file DLL file Obfuscated Little or no obfuscation No exports Start, Control, and Release exports Table 1. Compares Key Differences Between Two Variants of ShareDLL The primary function of the `shareDll module in both cases is to attempt lateral movement within` the victim’s network, to reach machines accessible by the currently logged-on user. In the BokBot distributed instance, once an accessible machine has been located, the modified spreader module will attempt to download the TrickBot loader located at `http://185.68.93[.]30/sin.png or` ``` http://185.68.93[.]30/win.png and install TrickBot on the accessible network machine. ``` The whole process of BokBot installing TrickBot on the local machine and moving laterally around the network is illustrated in Figure 3. ----- Figure 3. BokBot Installation of TrickBot and Lateral Movement Using ShareDll ## Renamed Modules Beginning on Feb. 8, 2019, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed further development in this intriguing relationship when renamed TrickBot modules were delivered to victims of the gtags ``` sin2 and sin4 . These gtags have been closely associated with LUNAR SPIDER activity. The ``` renamed modules and their respective SHA256 hashes are shown in Table 2 and contain the strings `sin, tin, and` `win .` **Module Name** **Module SHA256 Hash** ``` sharesinDll32 eefd209ba6afff5830d5510e68b2af90df200550d8ca4c40029baa93a0f01999 sharesinDll32 1b84f604847be0dbdf19ca169deb22b0245ca6f4bc2877b7a0ceeffa0436d7b3 sharesinDll32 ea3c70d82f3b4fe8d0914cc58669da0f3f116aa20f0661d68f826fd55763ef50 sharesinDll64 93da209d2fdb49df19b53089bb1820aa0183e9f207ea87b51b49faa74f8e76ba sharesinDll64 915e416576be4b459c19941cc86a84fb0d66f54964552be0f69045b89323d2f7 sharesinDll64 6d8551194b12655b4605f046a754257f69b1ee250f21e32466db54797a45c7c0 tabtinDll32 aa074b7a1ce29abd9141dc18ca603f2ed2764ae1afabb92eb2f9e4dc008d99d6 tabtinDll32 ba5bd732466a41636217b639a7a2aff1038a80bc29bd80c0532609d53297051f tabtinDll64 7023bbd875635b35fdc0eba303143be76afb50c0f34e8d79e8d0daba1d984b60 tabtinDll64 13b8ab8ce0aa9db161c065c6bf2fdbb50c6fd82fe48e4576abc4b8c3136f925e wormwinDll32 cac2f117d8b4f1fc40dd0921ea91312ad8129df3556444e41fda8d27c81e02cd ``` ----- ``` wormwinDll32 d51644cefd34dd7e1ec32a3e0336f9c479c196527e8baea6e85937254cecfe99 wormwinDll64 8c20b33374c280e9fd98113304843a339f738647cc13daf8f60312b9fef6b702 wormwinDll64 e8ecceb0cbc0e6aefab5ac47a9e69f7926317d9e4f9a782b8df418c67a8d0661 ``` Table 2. Renamed Modules and Associated SHA256 Hashes Unlike the changes identified in the TrickBot module `shareDll being distributed by BokBot, the` modules `sharesinDll, tabtinDll, and` `wormwinDll remain functionally equivalent to the` TrickBot deployed modules `shareDll, tabDll, and` `wormDll, respectively, and retain the` typical characteristics of a TrickBot module. More explicitly, the modules are DLLs, contain no encrypted strings, and have the standard TrickBot exports of `Start, Control, and` `Release .` CrowdStrike Falcon endpoint provides protection coverage against these threats through® behavioral IOA and machine learning. ## Conclusion It is unclear at this stage what purpose the module renaming serves, but it may be a method of tracking activity from those modules specifically associated with the aforementioned gtags. Additionally, CrowdStrike Intelligence is exploring a possible connection between the TrickBot affiliate operating `sin -prefixed TrickBot gtags and the BokBot affiliate operating the project ID` ``` C610DF9A, due to the recent introduction of the previously mentioned custom TrickBot module. Of ``` note, BokBot has aided the distribution of TrickBot, with the standard module set, through other BokBot project IDs for some time. Another key point to note about this recent development is the historical relationship that previously existed between the developers and operators of the banking malware families Dyre (aka Dyreza) and Neverquest (aka Vawtrak). This relationship is key because: WIZARD SPIDER includes members that were a part of the same group that had developed and operated Dyre. LUNAR SPIDER includes members that were a part of the same group that had developed and operated Neverquest. Despite being successful malware operations, both Dyre and Neverquest suddenly ceased operating in November 2015 and May 2017, respectively (Figure 4). LUNAR SPIDER had already introduced BokBot to the criminal market at the time Neverquest operations ceased, suggesting that the malware change may have been planned. Conversely, the Dyre operation ceased following Russian law enforcement action in which the offices of a Moscow-based film and production company, named 25th Floor, were raided in November 2015. Although no details were released by Russian law enforcement, it was speculated that the office played a part in the operation of Dyre. There was a one-year delay before the release of the TrickBot malware, which contains key similarities to the Dyre malware, but the operation was immediately successful and grew swiftly. ----- Figure 4. Timeline of Malware Operating Dates Although BokBot has aided the distribution of TrickBot since 2017, the development of custom TrickBot modules for the specific campaign has not been observed before. This significant development demonstrates a close relationship between the members of LUNAR SPIDER and WIZARD SPIDER. CrowdStrike Intelligence assesses that the historical relationship established during the operations of Dyre and Neverquest has been reinvigorated and solidified now that both WIZARD SPIDER and LUNAR SPIDER have established successful malware operations. ## Appendix/Indicators **Indicator** **Description** `http://tfulf[.]host/Sw9HJmXzq.exe` Custom loader URL `4ba234160cfbd1ef8ca2a259e51abdd4f6109ce74954fb7541d6226ec510b755` Custom loader SHA256 `http://185.68.93[.]30/sin.png` TrickBot loader URL `http://185.68.93[.]30/win.png` TrickBot loader URL `d06432486e7e9c2b8aaef4f42c11cf8efe19689638a3512ce931a23bdb5f2b4c` TrickBot loader SHA256 ----- ``` 185.246.64[.]237:443 ``` TrickBot C2 Servers Customized ``` shareDll ``` module ``` 13b8ab8ce0aa9db161c065c6bf2fdbb50c6fd82fe48e4576abc4b8c3136f925e tabtinDll64 ``` ----- ``` cac2f117d8b4f1fc40dd0921ea91312ad8129df3556444e41fda8d27c81e02cd wormwinDll32 d51644cefd34dd7e1ec32a3e0336f9c479c196527e8baea6e85937254cecfe99 wormwinDll32 8c20b33374c280e9fd98113304843a339f738647cc13daf8f60312b9fef6b702 wormwinDll64 e8ecceb0cbc0e6aefab5ac47a9e69f7926317d9e4f9a782b8df418c67a8d0661 wormwinDll64 ``` **Additional Resources** _Hear a comprehensive discussion of today’s top cyberthreats by CrowdStrike experts:_ _[register for a webinar on the 2020 Global Threat Report.](https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2020-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/)_ _[Read a report on Falcon X Automated Threat Intelligence and learn why actionable threat](https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/falcon-x-intelligence-automation/)_ _intelligence is the next step in SOC evolution._ _Learn more about comprehensive endpoint protection with the CrowdStrike Falcon platform_ _by_ _[visiting the product page.](https://www.crowdstrike.com/products/)_ _Test CrowdStrike next-gen AV for yourself. 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