# Panda Goes Full Global

How MustangPanda refuses to abandon PlugX

Still Hsu



Persistent Cyber Threat Hunters

### whoami

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### Disclaimer

Collaborated research with Sean Sabo @ Recorded Future




# History



## History Lesson Time!





- China-based APT group
- Highly interested in antique infection methods via USB devices (especially post-2019) or third-party web hosts.
- Previously focused its campaigns on (South) East Asian territories
  - Myanmar
  - Mongolia
  - Philippines
  - Japan
  - ···many more

## History Lesson Time!

- Polaris loves using PlugX and refuses to abandon it.
- Various PlugX variants were developed over the years
  - PlugX Fast
    - "THOR" variant
  - PlugDisk
    - PlugX + UDiskShell/USB infection ability
  - MiniPlug
    - Miniaturized/rewrite version of PlugX
    - we'll get to this one later






## History Lesson Time!

### So what's new?

- Expanded territory
- New tech (but also not really)
- Less blatant (but also not really)






# **Expanded Territory**



### Previously…



#### NUMBER OF SAMPLES BETWEEN 2019 TO 2021 BY REGION\*




\* Illustrative purposes only – may not be representative of samples in-the-wild





#### NUMBER OF SAMPLES BETWEEN 2019 TO 2022 BY REGION\*



\* Illustrative purposes only – may not be representative of samples in-the-wild

# So what happened?

A quick rundown in ten minutes or so...



## Another Brief History Lesson

#### Everything before...

- Prepended 10-byte XOR decoding key in blobs
- Used simple stack strings to avoid basic detections

Late 2020


Increased XOR key length

#### Late 2021

- Detected PlugDisk
- New payload encoding scheme
- Control-flow flattening obfuscation began to crop up
  - Custom OLLVM implementation








#### Earlier stackstring-only command handler





Control-flow flattened command handler



#### • • •

```
def decode_bytes_rolling_xor(filepath: str, base: int, key_1: int, key_2: int) -> bytes:
 with open(filepath, 'rb') as file:
     target = file.read()
     buffer = []
     k = base
     for i in range(len(target)):
         left = target[i]
         right = (k - key_1) & 0xff
         b = right ^ left
         buffer.append(b.to_bytes(1, 'little'))
         k = k - key_2
     return b''.join(buffer)
```

#### New payload encoding scheme




## Another Brief History Lesson






- Some time around mid January 2022, a mysterious sample triggered our detection system.
  - State\_aid\_\_Commission\_approves\_ 2022-
    - 2027\_regional\_aid\_map\_for\_Greec e.exe
  - d404e3cd5f1c6a50f10f56f5c5b9c1e
    3
- What did the detection flag the sample as? PlugDisk



#### Execution flow





#### Execution flow



#### •••

```
def decode_bytes_rolling_xor_v2(filepath: str, base: int, subkey: int, offset: Optional[int]) -> bytes:
 with open(filepath, 'rb') as file:
     buffer = []
     if offset:
         buffer.append(file.read(offset))
     target = file.read()
     k = base
     for i in range(len(target)):
         left = target[i]
         right = (k - subkey) & 0xff
         b = right ^ left
         buffer.append(b.to_bytes(1, 'little'))
         k = (k - subkey) & 0xfffffff
     return b''.join(buffer)
```

#### Slightly modified payload encoding scheme



## But hang on...

- Polaris had barely specifically targeted EU up until this point.
- TTPs are wildly different from before.
  - Different payload encoding scheme
  - Downloader
  - Targets EU
  - Slightly different PlugX behavior





## But hang on...

#### Slightly different PlugX behavior

- Much smaller PlugX
- Contains fewer command code support
- HTTP headers are now almost completely different from before
- Hard to fully disassemble due to the level of obfuscation
- We now refer this variant as MiniPlug due to the miniaturized nature of it



### We kept observing...





- Polaris continued to tamper with the encoding schemes
  - Single-byte XOR
  - Single-byte XOR + appended shellcode
    We'll get back to this
  - Skipping X number of bytes + singlebyte XOR
  - Mathematical XORs based on filesizes
- Use of archive files and obscure file paths.
- EU-targeted attacks continue along with other campaigns and regions featuring PlugX and other custom malware

### We kept observing...

- The appended shellcode could be dated back much earlier on in the operation that was previously attributed to Polaris back in 2018.
- Code reuse -> further attributing the attack to Polaris





0B DB		or	ebx, ebx
80 C0 00		add	al, 0
58		pop	eax
50		push	eax
5A		pop	edx
B9 00 A6 08 00		mov	ecx, offset sub_8A600
80 32 F5	loc_8A625:	xor	; CODE XREF: sub_8A609+28ij
83 C2 01		add	byte ptr [edx], 0F5h
83 E9 01		sub	edx, 1
83 F9 00		cmp	ecx, 1
75 F2		jnz	ecx, 0
50		push	short loc_8A625
C1 F9 80		sar	eax
90		nop	ecx, 80h
2D 00 00 00 00		sub	eax, 0
58		pop	eax
FF D0		call	eax
79 05		jns	short locret_8A647
55		push	ebp
83 EC 00		sub	esp, 0

#### Self-XORing shellcode loader



### We kept observing...



### • Over the last few months, they've continued to evolve TTPs by...

- Started experimenting with more and more launchers
- Started using ISOs as distribution method
- Extremely frequent attacks (at least once or twice per month)

eneral background to the Red-White-Red - Card.docx						
Political Guidance for the new EU approach towards Russia.docx						
Unilateral statement by the Commission on migration.docx						
Godišnji izveštaj EK o Srbiji.pdf						
Written comments of Hungary.docx						
draft letter to European Commission. RUSSIAN OIL PRICE CAP sg de.docx						
st15935-en22.pdf						
Summary MSs reporting - recommendation.docx						
AdobePhotosowm	AdobePhotos	45.43.63.219				
AcroDistJBM	AcroDistMGzXRY	107.181.160.16:443				
<pre>%ProgramFiles%\Common Files</pre>	BitDefender Crash Handler	152.32.211.67:80,152.32.				
ClassicExploreFvN	ClassicExplorepDvoov	5.34.178.156:443				
LMIGuardianjIg	LMIGuardianEsKRrY	62.233.57.49:443				
LMIGuardianqqH	LMIGuardianRqEbeL	62.233.57.49:443				
LMIGuardianpfc	LMIGuardianvSqtmC	45.90.59.153:443				
WaveEditFjd	gCmXurfomxhUJYioxqnf	45.131.179.179:443,45.13				
LMIGuardianHri	LMIGuardianBLfAKp	217.12.206.116:443				
LMIGuardianMEZ	LMIGuardianDKHaMF	217.12.206.116:443				
LMIGuardianEQj	LMIGuardianICDKhn	195.211.97.117:443				

Bundled decoy document within the PE Rotated C2 servers almost every attack



### Conclusion



#### Polaris/MustangPanda is continuing to evolve their TTPs

- Frequent attacks
- Now carry multiple campaigns focusing on a wide variety of targets
  - EU-related governmental entities <-> MiniPlug
  - Asia-focused USB spreader/general monitoring <-> PlugDisk / PlugX Fast
    - Long-time operation
  - SEA-focused high-profile ops <-> NoFive
    - Perhaps another day...

## THANK YOU!



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