Juicy Potato (abusing the golden privileges)

github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato

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A sugared version of <u>RottenPotatoNG</u>, with a bit of juice, i.e. **another Local Privilege Escalation tool, from a Windows Service Accounts to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM**

Summary

RottenPotatoNG and its variants leverages the privilege escalation chain based on <u>BITS</u> service having the MiTM listener on <u>127.0.0.1:6666</u> and when you have <u>SeImpersonate</u> or <u>SeAssignPrimaryToken</u> privileges. During a Windows build review we found a setup where <u>BITS</u> was intentionally disabled and port <u>6666</u> was taken.

We decided to weaponize <u>RottenPotatoNG</u>: Say hello to Juicy Potato.

For the theory, see <u>Rotten Potato - Privilege Escalation from Service Accounts to</u> <u>SYSTEM</u> and follow the chain of links and references.

We discovered that, other than **BITS** there are a several COM servers we can abuse. They just need to:

- 1. be instantiable by the current user, normally a "service user" which has impersonation privileges
- 2. implement the IMarshal interface
- 3. run as an elevated user (SYSTEM, Administrator, ...)

After some testing we obtained and tested an extensive list of <u>interesting CLSID's</u> on several Windows versions.

Juicy details

JuicyPotato allows you to:

- **Target CLSID** pick any CLSID you want. <u>Here</u> you can find the list organized by OS.
- **COM Listening port** define COM listening port you prefer (instead of the marshalled hardcoded 6666)
- COM Listening IP address bind the server on any IP

• **Process creation mode** depending on the impersonated user's privileges you can choose from:

- CreateProcessWithToken (needs SeImpersonate)
- CreateProcessAsUser (needs SeAssignPrimaryToken)
- both

Process to launch

launch an executable or script if the exploitation succeeds

Process Argument

customize the launched process arguments

RPC Server address

for a stealthy approach you can authenticate to an external RPC server

RPC Server port

useful if you want to authenticate to an external server and firewall is blocking port **135** ...

• TEST mode

mainly for testing purposes, i.e. testing CLSIDs. It creates the DCOM and prints the user of token. See <u>here for testing</u>

Usage

T:\>JuicyPotato.exe JuicyPotato v0.1

Mandatory args: -t createprocess call: <t> CreateProcessWithTokenW, <u> CreateProcessAsUser, <*> try both -p <program>: program to launch -l <port>: COM server listen port

Optional args: -m <ip>: COM server listen address (default 127.0.0.1) -a <argument>: command line argument to pass to program (default NULL) -k <ip>: RPC server ip address (default 127.0.0.1) -n <port>: RPC server listen port (default 135) -c <{clsid}>: CLSID (default BITS:{4991d34b-80a1-4291-83b6-3328366b9097}) -z only test CLSID and print token's user

Example



Final thoughts

If the user has <u>SeImpersonate</u> or <u>SeAssignPrimaryToken</u> privileges then you are **SYSTEM**.

It's nearly impossible to prevent the abuse of all these COM Servers. You could think to modify the permissions of these objects via **DCOMCNFG** but good luck, this is gonna be challenging.

The actual solution is to protect sensitive accounts and applications which run under the * SERVICE accounts. Stopping DCOM would certainly inhibit this exploit but could have a serious impact on the underlying OS.

Binaries 📀 build passing

An automatic build is available. Binaries can be downloaded from the Artifacts section here.

Also available in <u>BlackArch</u>.

Authors

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References