

# Behavioral Detection for T1490 - Inhibit System Recovery, Detection Strategy DET0329

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## AN0933

Process chains that use native utilities (vssadmin, wbadmin, diskshadow, bcdedit, REAgentC, wmic) with arguments to delete shadow copies, disable recovery, or remove backup catalogs

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
TimeWindow	Used to track rapid recovery feature changes over short intervals
CommandLinePattern	Can be tuned to catch variations in destructive flags (/all, /quiet, -delete)
ParentProcessContext	Tune based on common parent-child chains (e.g., powershell → diskshadow)

## AN0934

Shell utilities or scripts deleting `/etc/systemd/system/rescue.target`, `/etc/fstab` backups, or `/boot/efi` partitions; chattr used to block snapshot auto-recovery

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
WatchedFilePaths	Modify to include specific OS backup configs or LVM snapshots
ShellProcessUser	Restrict detection to root or sudo users

## AN0935

ESXi shell or vim-cmd execution that deletes all VM snapshots using vmsvc/snapshot.removeall or rm on snapshot paths

### Log Sources

**Mutable Elements**

Field	Description
TargetVMNames	Limit to critical VM names to reduce false positives

**AN0936**

Execution of `erase` , `format` , and `reload` in immediate sequence from a privileged AAA session

**Log Sources**

**Mutable Elements**

Field	Description
CommandSequenceWindow	Time between erase and reload command to establish causality
UserPrivilegeLevel	Filter for high-privilege user sessions

**AN0937**

Cloud API calls disabling snapshot scheduling, backup policies, versioning, followed by DeleteSnapshot/DeleteVolume operations

**Log Sources**

**Mutable Elements**

Field	Description
UserAgent	Tune for legitimate backup automation vs unknown tools
ResourceType	Filter only on production images or vaults

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Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0329#AN0937>