

New MuddyWater Threat: Old Kitten; New Tricks | Deep Instinct

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MuddyWater, also known as Static Kitten and Mercury, is a cyber espionage group that’s most likely a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).

Since at least 2017 MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.

MuddyWater has various campaigns that are entirely different from each other. In this post we will focus on the most recent changes and observations of their campaign which utilizes spearphishing with legitimate remote administration tools.

Executive summary:

- Deep Instinct’s Threat Research team has identified a new campaign of the MuddyWater group.
- The campaign has been observed targeting Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Tajikistan, and United Arab Emirates.
- The campaign exhibits updated TTPs to previously reported MuddyWater activity.




Figure 1: Campaign overview

MuddyWater Exploiting Legitimate Tools

[Previous](#) research has shown that in 2020 MuddyWater sent spearphishing emails with direct links as well as PDF and RTF attachments containing links to archives hosted at “ws.onehub.com.”

Those archives contained the installer for “RemoteUtilities,” a legitimate remote administration tool.

Since the beginning of 2021, MuddyWater has been [observed](#) sending spearphishing emails containing either direct links or Word documents with links to archives hosted at “ws.onehub.com.”

The archives from 2021 contained installers for ScreenConnect, another legitimate remote administration tool.

This activity was [observed](#) intermittently through the end of [2021](#) and until July [2022](#).

In July 2022 a [potential](#) file related to this campaign was observed, but it contained Atera Agent instead of the usual ScreenConnect, potentially signaling the threat actor switched to another remote administration tool to avoid detection of their long running campaign.

A new discovery: The current MuddyWater campaign

The most recent MuddyWater campaign was observed by Deep Instinct in the beginning of October and [possibly](#) started in the September timeframe.

What makes this campaign different from previous waves is the use of a new remote administration tool named “[Syncro](#).”^[OBJ]

A new lure in the form of an HTML attachment was observed, along with the addition of other providers for hosting the archives containing the installers of the remote administration tool.

The previous July sample with ScreenConnect mentioned earlier, was named “promotion.msi.”

In the current campaign there was a sample that had few names; one of them was also “promotion.msi.”

The above ScreenConnect sample was communicating with “instance-q927ui-relay.screenconnect.com.” This instance was communicating with another MuddyWater MSI installer named “[Ertiqa.msi](#)” which is a name of a Saudi [organization](#).

In the current wave, MuddyWater used the same name “[Ertiqa.msi](#),” but with Syncro installer.

The target geolocations and sectors also align with previous targets of MuddyWater. Combined, these indicators provide us with enough proof to confirm that this is the MuddyWater threat group.

EXAMPLE #1: Egyptian Hosting Company

Direct links to Dropbox:




Figure 2: Email containing direct link to Dropbox

This mail was sent from an Egyptian data hosting company, unlike previous campaigns using OneHub. This time MuddyWater used Dropbox to host the archive with the Syncro installer:




Figure 3: Zip archive hosted on Dropbox containing MSI installer for Syncro

HTML attachment leading to OneDrive:




Figure 4: Email containing HTML attachment

On the same date the email with the Dropbox link was sent, MuddyWater sent another email from the same address of an Egyptian hosting company to another Egyptian hosting company.

Instead of embedding a direct link in the email message, an HTML attachment was sent. This is a well-known technique to build trust. The receiving end knows the company who sent the mail. The attachment is not an archive or an executable which doesn't raise end-user suspicion because HTML is mostly overlooked in phishing awareness trainings and simulations.

HTML is considered "safer," at least from an anti-virus (AV) and email security solutions point of view. Although those solutions have the ability to scan HTML, they are often still delivered to the recipients and not blocked.

The HTML itself is very small; its main function is most likely to [bypass](#) email [solutions](#) that replace any link with "safe" link.




Figure 5: HTML attachment containing link to OneDrive

The [link](#) inside the HTML file leads to OneDrive this time, hosting an archive containing Syncro MSI installer.

EXAMPLE #2: Israeli Hospitality Industry

In another example from early November, MuddyWater sent an email from a company in the Israeli hospitality industry to a wide number of contacts across different Israeli insurance companies:



Figure 6: Email containing HTML attachment

In this mail the company from the hospitality industry is looking for insurance.

The text is written in Hebrew, but a native speaker will find it suspicious due to a poor choice of words.

Once again, the [link](#) leads to an archive hosted on OneDrive which contain Syncro MSI installer:




Figure 7: HTML attachment containing link to OneDrive

Despite those new TTPs, most of the Syncro installers are still hosted in OneHub:




Figure 8: Archive hosted on OneHub containing Syncro MSI installer

What is unclear is whether or not MuddyWater gained full access to the email server or only the credentials to one email box. The emails are sent from legitimate corporate accounts. We see that in spite of the low level of sophistication that this tactic can be effective.

Syncro: A tool used by multiple threat actors

MuddyWater is not the only actor abusing Syncro. It has also been observed recently in [BatLoader](#) and [Luna Moth](#) campaigns.

Syncro is a fully-featured platform for Managed Service Provider's (MSPs) to run their business.

```
using System;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Reflection;
using System.Runtime.CompilerServices;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using System.Runtime.Versioning;

[assembly: AssemblyVersion("1.0.161.0")]
[assembly: CompilationRelaxations(8)]
[assembly: RuntimeCompatibility(WrapNonExceptionThrows = true)]
[assembly: Debuggable(DebuggableAttribute.DebuggingModes.IgnoreSymbolStoreSequencePoints)]
[assembly: AssemblyTitle("Installer")]
[assembly: AssemblyDescription("")]
[assembly: AssemblyConfiguration("")]
[assembly: AssemblyCompany("RepairTech, Inc.")]
[assembly: AssemblyProduct("Syncro")]
[assembly: AssemblyCopyright("Copyright © 2018")]
[assembly: TargetFramework(".NETFramework,Version=v4.0", FrameworkDisplayName = ".NET Framework 4")]
```

Figure 9: Syncro Installer inside the MSI

Syncro provides an agent for MSPs to manage any device that has Syncro installed with the custom-made provided MSI file that includes the customerID.

```
// Token: 0x00000063 RID: 99 RVA: 0x000035DC File Offset: 0x000017DC
public bool TryGetEmbeddedParameters(string filePath, out EmbeddedContentResolver.Keys keys)
{
    keys = default(EmbeddedContentResolver.Keys);
    try
    {
        byte[] content = File.ReadAllBytes(filePath);
        string jwtPayload;
        string apiKey;
        string customerId;
        string policyId;
        if (EmbeddedContentResolver.TryGetEmbeddedToken(content, EmbeddedMarkers.JwtPayloadStart, EmbeddedMarkers.JwtPayloadEnd, out jwtPayload))
        {
            keys = new EmbeddedContentResolver.Keys
            {
                JwtPayload = jwtPayload
            };
            result = true;
        }
        else if (!EmbeddedContentResolver.TryGetEmbeddedToken(content, EmbeddedMarkers.ApiKeyStart, EmbeddedMarkers.ApiKeyEnd, out apiKey))
        {
            result = false;
        }
        else if (!EmbeddedContentResolver.TryGetEmbeddedToken(content, EmbeddedMarkers.CustomerIdStart, EmbeddedMarkers.CustomerIdEnd, out customerId))
        {
            result = false;
        }
        else if (!EmbeddedContentResolver.TryGetEmbeddedToken(content, EmbeddedMarkers.PolicyIdStart, EmbeddedMarkers.PolicyIdEnd, out policyId))
        {
            result = false;
        }
        else
        {
            keys = new EmbeddedContentResolver.Keys
            {
                ApiKey = apiKey,
                CustomerId = customerId,
                PolicyId = policyId
            };
            result = true;
        }
    }
    catch (Exception exception)
    {
        this.logger.Error(exception, "Error locating embedded tokens.");
        result = false;
    }
}
```

```
public struct Keys
{
    // Token: 0x17000005 RID: 5
    // (get) Token: 0x06000094 RID: 148 RVA: 0x0000468A File Offset: 0x0000288A
    // (set) Token: 0x06000095 RID: 149 RVA: 0x00004692 File Offset: 0x00002892
    public string ApiKey { readonly get; set; }

    // Token: 0x17000006 RID: 6
    // (get) Token: 0x06000096 RID: 150 RVA: 0x0000469B File Offset: 0x0000289B
    // (set) Token: 0x06000097 RID: 151 RVA: 0x000046A3 File Offset: 0x000028A3
    public string CustomerId { readonly get; set; }

    // Token: 0x17000007 RID: 7
    // (get) Token: 0x06000098 RID: 152 RVA: 0x000046AC File Offset: 0x000028AC
    // (set) Token: 0x06000099 RID: 153 RVA: 0x000046B4 File Offset: 0x000028B4
    public string PolicyId { readonly get; set; }

    // Token: 0x17000008 RID: 8
    // (get) Token: 0x0600009A RID: 154 RVA: 0x000046BD File Offset: 0x000028BD
    // (set) Token: 0x0600009B RID: 155 RVA: 0x000046C5 File Offset: 0x000028C5
    public string JwtPayload { readonly get; set; }
}
```

Figure 10: Syncro installation process with the customerID and ApiKey

Syncro has a 21-day trial offer. You choose the subdomain to be used by your MSP:




Figure 11: Syncro trial sign-up screen with choice of syncromsp.com subdomain

While investigating some of the installers that MuddyWater used, we see that for each unique mail a new MSI was used. In most cases MuddyWater used a single subdomain with a single MSI installer.

It seems that most of the subdomains don't have any useful meaning, although a few are clear:

- mohammadoman6060 and osmandembele4040 are football players
- netanyahu8585 and benet5050 are the current and former prime ministers of Israel

- Cham Wings is the name of a Syrian airline

The trial version contains the fully featured web GUI which allows complete control over a computer with the Syncro agent installed:




Figure 12: Web GUI of Syncro with available remote administration features

Those features are standard for remote administration tools, such as terminal with SYSTEM privileges, remote desktop access, full file system access, tasks, and services manager.

All those features combined with a signed MSI installer creates the perfect weapon for a threat actor to gain initial access and start performing recon on the target. Later, they enable the threat actors to deploy additional backdoors, exfiltrate files, or hand-off access to other threat actors. A threat actor that has access to a corporate machine via such capabilities has nearly limitless options.

Recommendations:

We have recently [described](#) other dual-use tools that are being abused for malicious purposes. We recommend that security teams monitor for remote desktop solutions that are not common in the organization as they have a higher chance of being abused.

MITRE ATT&CK:

Tactic	Technique	Description	Observable
Initial Access	T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment	MuddyWater has compromised third parties and used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails with targeted attachments to recipients.	aaa9db79b5d6ba319e24e6180a7935d6
Initial Access	T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link	MuddyWater has compromised third parties and used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails containing links to legitimate domains hosting archives with remote management software.	d1b4ca2933f49494b4400d5bf5ab502e
Command and Control	T1219 Remote Access Software	MuddyWater has used a legitimate application, Syncro, to manage systems remotely and move laterally.	2ed6ebaa28a9bfccc59c6e89a8990631
Resource Development	T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool	MuddyWater has used a legitimate application, Syncro, to manage systems remotely and move laterally.	2ed6ebaa28a9bfccc59c6e89a8990631

Tactic	Technique	Description	Observable
Resource Development	T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services	MuddyWater has used file sharing services including OneHub, Dropbox, and OneDrive to distribute tools.	https://urlscan.io/result/c6f46810-ee19-47b4-8717-40dc09b4ea09/ - archived scan of a Dropbox URL containing an archive with Syncro installer.

IOC:

f511bdd471096fc81dc8dad6806624a73837710f99b76b69c6501cb90e37c311
efd5271bdb57f52b4852bfda05122b9ff85991c0600befcbcd045f81d7a78eac5
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4550b4fa89ff70d8ea59d350ad8fc537ceaad13779877f2761d91d69a2c445b2
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76ab046de18e20fd5cddb90678389001361a430a0dc6297363ff10efbcb0fa8

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