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	"title": "Password cracking",
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	"plain_text": "Password cracking\r\nBy Contributors to Wikimedia projects\r\nPublished: 2004-02-20 · Archived: 2026-04-05 15:03:03 UTC\r\nFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia\r\nIn cryptanalysis and computer security, password cracking is the process of guessing passwords[1] protecting a\r\ncomputer system. A common approach (brute-force attack) is to repeatedly try guesses for the password and to\r\ncheck them against an available cryptographic hash of the password.[2] Another type of approach is password\r\nspraying, which is often automated and occurs slowly over time in order to remain undetected, using a list of\r\ncommon passwords.[3]\r\nThe purpose of password cracking might be to help a user recover a forgotten password (due to the fact that\r\ninstalling an entirely new password would involve System Administration privileges), to gain unauthorized access\r\nto a system, or to act as a preventive measure whereby system administrators check for easily crackable\r\npasswords. On a file-by-file basis, password cracking is utilized to gain access to digital evidence to which a judge\r\nhas allowed access, when a particular file's permissions restricted.\r\nBrute-force password guessing attacks against online systems are usually ineffective because systems are designed\r\nto lock accounts after a certain number of unsuccessful login attempts. Obtaining the cryptographic hash of the\r\npassword makes it possible to perform an unlimited number of offline guesses. Hash files can might be obtained\r\nby third parties by court-ordered access, or as part of an illegal data breach. If passwords are reused across web\r\nsites, the hash file obtained from one web site can be used for cracking, and then the discovered passwords can be\r\nattempted against the same email addresses on other web sites.\r\nThe password spraying approach evades account lockout countermeasures by guessing the same password across\r\nmany accounts, allowing time to pass between attempts on the same account, which might include legitimate\r\nlogins. This approach does not target specific accounts.\r\nTime needed for password searches\r\n[edit]\r\nThe time to crack a password is related to bit strength, which is a measure of the password's entropy, and the\r\ndetails of how the password is stored. Most methods of password cracking require the computer to produce many\r\ncandidate passwords, each of which is checked. One example is brute-force cracking, in which a computer tries\r\nevery possible key or password until it succeeds. With multiple processors, this time can be optimized through\r\nsearching from the last possible group of symbols and the beginning at the same time, with other processors being\r\nplaced to search through a designated selection of possible passwords.[4] More common methods of password\r\ncracking, such as dictionary attacks, pattern checking, and variations of common words, aim to optimize the\r\nnumber of guesses and are usually attempted before brute-force attacks. Higher password bit strength\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking\r\nPage 1 of 8\n\nexponentially increases the number of candidate passwords that must be checked, on average, to recover the\r\npassword and reduces the likelihood that the password will be found in any cracking dictionary.\r\n[5]\r\nThe ability to crack passwords using computer programs is also a function of the number of possible passwords\r\nper second which can be checked. If a hash of the target password is available to the attacker, this number can be\r\nin the billions or trillions per second, since an offline attack is possible. If not, the rate depends on whether the\r\nauthentication software limits how often a password can be tried, either by time delays, CAPTCHAs, or forced\r\nlockouts after some number of failed attempts. Another situation where quick guessing is possible is when the\r\npassword is used to form a cryptographic key. In such cases, an attacker can quickly check to see if a guessed\r\npassword successfully decodes encrypted data.\r\nFor some kinds of password hash, ordinary desktop computers can test over a hundred million passwords per\r\nsecond using password cracking tools running on a general purpose CPU and billions of passwords per second\r\nusing GPU-based password cracking tools[1][6][7] (see John the Ripper benchmarks).\r\n[8]\r\n The rate of password\r\nguessing depends heavily on the cryptographic function used by the system to generate password hashes. A\r\nsuitable password hashing function, such as bcrypt, is many orders of magnitude better than a naive function like\r\nsimple MD5 or SHA. A user-selected eight-character password with numbers, mixed case, and symbols, with\r\ncommonly selected passwords and other dictionary matches filtered out, reaches an estimated 30-bit strength,\r\naccording to NIST. 230 is only one billion permutations[9] and would be cracked in seconds if the hashing function\r\nwere naive. When ordinary desktop computers are combined in a cracking effort, as can be done with botnets, the\r\ncapabilities of password cracking are considerably extended. In 2002, distributed.net successfully found a 64-bit\r\nRC5 key in four years, in an effort which included over 300,000 different computers at various times, and which\r\ngenerated an average of over 12 billion keys per second.[10]\r\nGraphics processing units can speed up password cracking by a factor of 50 to 100 over general purpose\r\ncomputers for specific hashing algorithms. As an example, in 2011, available commercial products claimed the\r\nability to test up to 2,800,000,000 NTLM passwords a second on a standard desktop computer using a high-end\r\ngraphics processor.\r\n[11]\r\n Such a device can crack a 10-letter single-case password in one day. The work can be\r\ndistributed over many computers for an additional speedup proportional to the number of available computers\r\nwith comparable GPUs. However some algorithms run slowly, or even are specifically designed to run slowly, on\r\nGPUs. Examples are DES, Triple DES, bcrypt, scrypt, and Argon2.\r\nHardware acceleration in a GPU has enabled resources to be used to increase the efficiency and speed of a brute\r\nforce attack for most hashing algorithms. In 2012, Stricture Consulting Group unveiled a 25-GPU cluster that\r\nachieved a brute force attack speed of 350 billion guesses of NTLM passwords per second, allowing them to\r\ncheck password combinations in 5.5 hours, enough to crack all 8-character alpha-numeric-special-character\r\npasswords commonly used in enterprise settings[citation needed]. Using ocl-Hashcat Plus on a Virtual OpenCL\r\ncluster platform,[12] the Linux-based GPU cluster was used to \"crack 90 percent of the 6.5 million password\r\nhashes belonging to users of LinkedIn\".[13]\r\nFor some specific hashing algorithms, CPUs and GPUs are not a good match. Purpose-made hardware is required\r\nto run at high speeds. Custom hardware can be made using FPGA or ASIC technology. Development for both\r\ntechnologies is complex and (very) expensive. In general, FPGAs are favorable in small quantities, ASICs are\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking\r\nPage 2 of 8\n\nfavorable in (very) large quantities, more energy efficient, and faster. In 1998, the Electronic Frontier Foundation\r\n(EFF) built a dedicated password cracker using ASICs. Their machine, Deep Crack, broke a DES 56-bit key in 56\r\nhours, testing over 90 billion keys per second.[14] In 2017, leaked documents showed that ASICs were used for a\r\nmilitary project that had a potential to code-break many parts of the Internet communications with weaker\r\nencryption.[15] Since 2019, John the Ripper supports password cracking for a limited number of hashing\r\nalgorithms using FPGAs.[16] Commercial companies are now using FPGA-based setups for password cracking.\r\n[17]\r\nEasy to remember, hard to guess\r\n[edit]\r\nPasswords that are difficult to remember will reduce the security of a system because:\r\nusers might need to write down or electronically store the password using an insecure method,\r\nusers will need frequent password resets, and\r\nusers are more likely to re-use the same password.\r\nSimilarly, the more stringent the requirements for password strength, e.g. \"have a mix of uppercase and lowercase\r\nletters and digits\" or \"change it monthly\", the greater the degree to which users will subvert the system.[18]\r\nIn \"The Memorability and Security of Passwords\",[19] Jeff Yan et al. examine the effect of advice given to users\r\nabout a good choice of password. They found that passwords based on thinking of a phrase and taking the first\r\nletter of each word are just as memorable as naively selected passwords, and just as hard to crack as randomly\r\ngenerated passwords. Combining two unrelated words is another good method. Having a personally designed\r\n\"algorithm\" for generating obscure passwords is another good method.\r\nHowever, asking users to remember a password consisting of a \"mix of uppercase and lowercase characters\" is\r\nsimilar to asking them to remember a sequence of bits: hard to remember, and only a little bit harder to crack (e.g.\r\nonly 128 times harder to crack for 7-letter passwords, less if the user simply capitalizes one of the letters). Asking\r\nusers to use \"both letters and digits\" will often lead to easy-to-guess substitutions such as 'E' → '3' and 'I' → '1':\r\nsubstitutions which are well known to attackers. Similarly, typing the password one keyboard row higher is a\r\ncommon trick known to attackers.\r\nResearch detailed in an April 2015 paper by several professors at Carnegie Mellon University shows that people's\r\nchoices of password structure often follow several known patterns. For example, when password requirements\r\nrequire a long minimum length such as 16 characters, people tend to repeat characters or even entire words within\r\ntheir passwords.[20] As a result, passwords may be much more easily cracked than their mathematical probabilities\r\nwould otherwise indicate. Passwords containing one digit, for example, disproportionately include it at the end of\r\nthe password.[20]\r\nOn July 16, 1998, CERT reported an incident where an attacker had found 186,126 encrypted passwords. By the\r\ntime the breach was discovered, 47,642 passwords had already been cracked.[21]\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking\r\nPage 3 of 8\n\nIn December 2009, a major password breach of Rockyou.com occurred that led to the release of 32 million\r\npasswords. The attacker then leaked the full list of the 32 million passwords (with no other identifiable\r\ninformation) to the internet. Passwords were stored in cleartext in the database and were extracted through an SQL\r\ninjection vulnerability. The Imperva Application Defense Center (ADC) did an analysis on the strength of the\r\npasswords.[22] Some of the key findings were:\r\nabout 30% of users chose passwords whose length was below seven characters,\r\nalmost 60% of users chose their passwords from a limited set of alpha-numeric characters, and\r\nnearly 50% of users used names, slang words, dictionary words, or trivial passwords that employed weak\r\nconstructs such as consecutive digits and/or adjacent keyboard keys — case in point, the most common\r\npassword among RockYou account owners was simply “123456”.[22]\r\nIn June 2011, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) suffered a security breach that led to the public release\r\nof first and last names, usernames, and passwords of more than 11,000 registered users of their e-bookshop. The\r\ndata were leaked as part of Operation AntiSec, a movement that includes Anonymous, LulzSec, and other hacking\r\ngroups and individuals.[23]\r\nOn July 11, 2011, Booz Allen Hamilton, a large American consulting firm that does a substantial amount of work\r\nfor the Pentagon, had its servers hacked by Anonymous and leaked the same day. \"The leak, dubbed 'Military\r\nMeltdown Monday', includes 90,000 logins of military personnel—including personnel from USCENTCOM,\r\nSOCOM, the Marine Corps, various Air Force facilities, Homeland Security, State Department staff, and what\r\nlooks like private-sector contractors.\"[24] These leaked passwords were found to be hashed with unsalted SHA-1,\r\nand were later analyzed by the ADC team at Imperva, revealing that even some military personnel used passwords\r\nas weak as \"1234\".[25]\r\nOn July 18, 2011, Microsoft Hotmail banned the password: \"123456\".[26]\r\nIn July 2015, a group calling itself \"The Impact Team\" stole the user data of Ashley Madison.\r\n[27]\r\n Many passwords\r\nwere hashed using both the relatively strong bcrypt algorithm and the weaker MD5 hash. Attacking the latter\r\nalgorithm allowed some 11 million plaintext passwords to be recovered by password cracking group CynoSure\r\nPrime.[28]\r\nOne method of preventing a password from being cracked is to ensure that attackers cannot get access even to the\r\nhashed password. For example, on the Unix operating system, hashed passwords were originally stored in a\r\npublicly accessible file /etc/passwd . On modern Unix (and similar) systems, on the other hand, they are stored\r\nin the shadow password file /etc/shadow , which is accessible only to programs running with enhanced\r\nprivileges (i.e., \"system\" privileges). This makes it harder for a malicious user to obtain the hashed passwords in\r\nthe first instance, however many collections of password hashes have been stolen despite such protection. And\r\nsome common network protocols transmit passwords in cleartext or use weak challenge/response schemes.[29][30]\r\nThe use of salt, a random value unique to each password that is incorporated in the hashing, prevents multiple\r\nhashes from being attacked simultaneously and also prevents the creation of pre-computed dictionaries such as\r\nrainbow tables.\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking\r\nPage 4 of 8\n\nAnother approach is to combine a site-specific secret key with the password hash, which prevents plaintext\r\npassword recovery even if the hashed values are purloined. However privilege escalation attacks that can steal\r\nprotected hash files may also expose the site secret. A third approach is to use key derivation functions that reduce\r\nthe rate at which passwords can be guessed.[31]: 5.1.1.2 \r\nModern Unix Systems have replaced the traditional DES-based password hashing function crypt() with stronger\r\nmethods such as crypt-SHA, bcrypt, and scrypt.\r\n[32]\r\n Other systems have also begun to adopt these methods. For\r\ninstance, the Cisco IOS originally used a reversible Vigenère cipher to encrypt passwords, but now uses md5-crypt\r\nwith a 24-bit salt when the \"enable secret\" command is used.[33] These newer methods use large salt values which\r\nprevent attackers from efficiently mounting offline attacks against multiple user accounts simultaneously. The\r\nalgorithms are also much slower to execute which drastically increases the time required to mount a successful\r\noffline attack.[34]\r\nMany hashes used for storing passwords, such as MD5 and the SHA family, are designed for fast computation\r\nwith low memory requirements and efficient implementation in hardware. Multiple instances of these algorithms\r\ncan be run in parallel on graphics processing units (GPUs), speeding cracking. As a result, fast hashes are\r\nineffective in preventing password cracking, even with salt. Some key stretching algorithms, such as PBKDF2 and\r\ncrypt-SHA iteratively calculate password hashes and can significantly reduce the rate at which passwords can be\r\ntested, if the iteration count is high enough. Other algorithms, such as scrypt are memory-hard, meaning they\r\nrequire relatively large amounts of memory in addition to time-consuming computation and are thus more difficult\r\nto crack using GPUs and custom integrated circuits.\r\nIn 2013 a long-term Password Hashing Competition was announced to choose a new, standard algorithm for\r\npassword hashing,[35] with Argon2 chosen as the winner in 2015. Another algorithm, Balloon, is recommended by\r\nNIST.\r\n[36]\r\n Both algorithms are memory-hard.\r\nSolutions like a security token give a formal proof answer[clarification needed] by constantly shifting password.\r\nThose solutions abruptly reduce the timeframe available for brute forcing (the attacker needs to break and use the\r\npassword within a single shift) and they reduce the value of the stolen passwords because of its short time validity.\r\nThere are many password cracking software tools, but the most popular[37] are Aircrack-ng, Cain \u0026 Abel, John\r\nthe Ripper, Hashcat, Hydra, DaveGrohl, and ElcomSoft. Many litigation support software packages also include\r\npassword cracking functionality. Most of these packages employ a mixture of cracking strategies; algorithms with\r\nbrute-force and dictionary attacks proving to be the most productive.[38]\r\nThe increased availability of computing power and beginner friendly automated password cracking software for a\r\nnumber of protection schemes has allowed the activity to be taken up by script kiddies.\r\n[39]\r\nBrute-force attack\r\nCold boot attack\r\nDictionary attack\r\nPassword strength\r\nSmudge attack\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking\r\nPage 5 of 8\n\n1. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n oclHashcat-lite – advanced password recovery Archived June 26, 2016, at the Wayback\r\nMachine. Hashcat.net. Retrieved on January 31, 2013.\r\n2. ^ Montoro, Massimiliano (2005). \"Cain \u0026 Abel User Manual: Brute-Force Password Cracker\". oxid.it\r\n(defunct). Archived from the original on June 7, 2019. Retrieved August 13, 2013.\r\n3. ^ \"What Is Password Spraying? How to Stop Password Spraying Attacks\". Archived from the original on\r\nSeptember 30, 2022. Retrieved September 16, 2021.\r\n4. ^ Bahadursingh, Roman (January 19, 2020). \"A Distributed Algorithm for Brute Force Password Cracking\r\non n Processors\". doi:10.5281/zenodo.3612276. Archived from the original on June 24, 2022. Retrieved\r\nJune 24, 2022.\r\n5. ^ Lundin, Leigh (August 11, 2013). \"PINs and Passwords, Part 2\". SleuthSayers.org. Orlando. Archived\r\nfrom the original on May 19, 2022. Retrieved June 24, 2022.\r\n6. ^ Alexander, Steven. (June 20, 2012) The Bug Charmer: How long should passwords be? Archived April 7,\r\n2022, at the Wayback Machine. Bugcharmer.blogspot.com. Retrieved on January 31, 2013.\r\n7. ^ Cryptohaze Blog: 154 Billion NTLM/sec on 10 hashes Archived March 6, 2016, at the Wayback\r\nMachine. Blog.cryptohaze.com (July 15, 2012). Retrieved on January 31, 2013.\r\n8. ^ John the Ripper benchmarks Archived May 5, 2018, at the Wayback Machine. openwall.info (March 30,\r\n2010). Retrieved on January 31, 2013.\r\n9. ^ Burr, W E; Dodson, D F; Polk, W T (2006). Electronic authentication guideline (PDF) (Report).\r\nGaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology. doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-63v1.0.2.\r\n10. ^ \"64-bit key project status\". Distributed.net. Archived from the original on September 10, 2013. Retrieved\r\nMarch 27, 2008.\r\n11. ^ \"Password Recovery Speed table\". ElcomSoft. Archived from the original on February 21, 2011.\r\nRetrieved February 1, 2011.\r\n12. ^ \"VCL Cluster Platform\". mosix.cs.huji.ac.il. Archived from the original on October 19, 2021. Retrieved\r\nSeptember 12, 2021.\r\n13. ^ \"25-GPU cluster cracks every standard Windows password in \u003c6 hours\". 2012. Archived from the\r\noriginal on January 27, 2019. Retrieved January 27, 2019.\r\n14. ^ \"EFF DES Cracker machine brings honesty to crypto debate\". EFF. Archived from the original on\r\nJanuary 1, 2010. Retrieved June 7, 2020.\r\n15. ^ Biddle, Sam (May 11, 2017). \"NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-breaking Computer Project to\r\nEntire Internet\". The Intercept. Archived from the original on June 9, 2022. Retrieved June 6, 2020.\r\n16. ^ \"announce - [openwall-announce] John the Ripper 1.9.0-jumbo-1\". openwall.com. Archived from the\r\noriginal on November 8, 2020. Retrieved June 6, 2020.\r\n17. ^ \"Bcrypt password cracking extremely slow? Not if you are using\". Medium. September 8, 2020. Archived\r\nfrom the original on September 20, 2021. Retrieved September 12, 2021.\r\n18. ^ Managing Network Security. Fred Cohen \u0026 Associates. All.net. Retrieved on January 31, 2013.\r\n19. ^ Yan, J.; Blackwell, A.; Anderson, R.; Grant, A. (2004). \"Password Memorability and Security: Empirical\r\nResults\" (PDF). IEEE Security \u0026 Privacy. 2 (5): 25. doi:10.1109/MSP.2004.81. S2CID 206485325.\r\nArchived (PDF) from the original on December 6, 2022. Retrieved June 24, 2022.\r\n20. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n Steinberg, Joseph (April 21, 2015). \"New Technology Cracks 'Strong' Passwords – What\r\nYou Need To Know\". Forbes. Archived from the original on August 31, 2017. Retrieved September 7, 2017.\r\n21. ^ \"CERT IN-98.03\". Archived from the original on July 9, 2010. Retrieved September 9, 2009.\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking\r\nPage 6 of 8\n\n22. ^ Jump up to: a\r\n \r\nb\r\n \"Consumer Password Worst Practices\" (PDF). Imperva.com. Archived (PDF) from the\r\noriginal on June 24, 2022. Retrieved June 24, 2022.\r\n23. ^ \"NATO Hack Attack\". The Register. Archived from the original on July 26, 2020. Retrieved July 24, 2011.\r\n24. ^ \"Anonymous Leaks 90,000 Military Email Accounts in Latest Antisec Attack\". July 11, 2011. Archived\r\nfrom the original on June 24, 2022. Retrieved June 24, 2022.\r\n25. ^ \"Military Password Analysis\". Imperva.com. July 12, 2011.\r\n26. ^ \"Microsoft's Hotmail Bans 123456\". Imperva.com. July 18, 2011. Archived from the original on March\r\n27, 2012.\r\n27. ^ \"Ashley Madison: Hackers Dump Stolen Dating Site Data\". bankinfosecurity.com. Archived from the\r\noriginal on April 11, 2021. Retrieved April 11, 2021.\r\n28. ^ \"Researchers Crack 11 Million Ashley Madison Passwords\". bankinfosecurity.com. Archived from the\r\noriginal on April 11, 2021. Retrieved April 11, 2021.\r\n29. ^ Singer, Abe (November 2001). \"No Plaintext Passwords\" (PDF). Login. 26 (7): 83–91. Archived (PDF)\r\nfrom the original on September 24, 2006.\r\n30. ^ \"Cryptanalysis of Microsoft's Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol\". Schneier.com. July 7, 2011. Archived\r\nfrom the original on May 21, 2016. Retrieved January 31, 2013.\r\n31. ^ Grassi, Paul A (June 2017). \"SP 800-63B-3 – Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Lifecycle\r\nManagement\" (PDF). NIST. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63b. Archived (PDF) from the original on April 1,\r\n2019. Retrieved February 3, 2021.\r\n32. ^ A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme Archived September 24, 2008, at the Wayback Machine.\r\nUsenix.org (March 13, 2002). Retrieved on January 31, 2013.\r\n33. ^ MDCrack FAQ 1.8 Archived August 27, 2008, at the Wayback Machine. None. Retrieved on January 31,\r\n2013.\r\n34. ^ Password Protection for Modern Operating Systems Archived March 11, 2016, at the Wayback Machine.\r\nUsenix.org. Retrieved on January 31, 2013.\r\n35. ^ \"Password Hashing Competition\". Archived from the original on September 2, 2013. Retrieved March 3,\r\n2013.\r\n36. ^ \"NIST SP800-63B Section 5.1.1.2\" (PDF). nvlpubs.nist.gov. Archived (PDF) from the original on April 1,\r\n2019. Retrieved February 3, 2021.\r\n37. ^ \"Top 10 Password Crackers\". Sectools. Archived from the original on May 11, 2019. Retrieved November\r\n1, 2009.\r\n38. ^ \"Stay Secure: See How Password Crackers Work - Keeper Blog\". Keeper Security Blog - Cybersecurity\r\nNews \u0026 Product Updates. September 28, 2016. Archived from the original on October 21, 2020. Retrieved\r\nNovember 7, 2020.\r\n39. ^ Anderson, Nate (March 24, 2013). \"How I became a password cracker: Cracking passwords is officially\r\na \"script kiddie\" activity now\". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on October 26, 2017. Retrieved\r\nMarch 24, 2013.\r\nPhilippe Oechslin: Making a Faster Cryptanalytic Time-Memory Trade-Off. Archived April 9, 2023, at the\r\nWayback Machine CRYPTO 2003: pp617–630\r\nRoundup of leaks made by The Anonymous and LulzSec in 2011\r\nInternational passwords conference\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking\r\nPage 7 of 8\n\nPassword security: past, present, future, Passwords12 presentation\r\nSkullsecurity list of breached password collections Archived December 15, 2019, at the Wayback Machine\r\nSource: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking\r\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking\r\nPage 8 of 8",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"MITRE"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking"
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	"report_names": [
		"Password_cracking"
	],
	"threat_actors": [],
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